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Abstract
This study presents a critique of post-foundational political thought, suggesting that it
lacks a positive account of the unpolitical, of a radical outside of politics. I argue that
political thought that oscillates around the distinction between “politics” and “the
political” is correlationist and totalizing, resulting in the forgetting of its “Great
Outdoors.” This critique is advanced through a close analysis of texts by Carl Schmitt,
Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy.
Against this background stand out Massimo Cacciari's and Roberto Esposito's categories
of “the impolitical,” and Giorgio Agamben's notion of “bare life.” “The impolitical” is
positively defined as a critique of the modern political and of its valorization. However, I
suggest that Cacciari and Esposito do not succeed in taking the impolitical to its limit: it
remains attached to the political as its shadow and its internal critique. Agamben's
account of the impolitical in terms of “bare life” introduces into our discussion the real
experience of living outside of politics. Even though Agamben views the impolitical only
negatively, he suggests an avenue for further research in his notion of “form-of-life.” The
latter, nevertheless, addresses the problem of “bare life” only by redeeming its
politicalness and thus, ultimately, fails to engage the unpolitical. I turn to the radical
phenomenology of life of Michel Henry in order to address the problems of correlation
and the totalizing ambition of politics. From this perspective, the unpolitical is conceived
as life: an a priori positive and real experience of self-affection that manifests itself in the
radical reduction of the world. This conception reverses the way in which living beyond
politics is addressed in contemporary scholarship. In particular, it recasts the modern
figure of the refugee in terms of a historically situated epitome of life's becomingunpolitical. The unpolitical allows for an affirmation of life as an immediate experience
available to the living regardless of their relation to the world, and of pure movement as a
projection of life's movement of self-revelation and transformation.
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Introduction
Hakim Bey suggests that we live in a time when the “closure of the map” has completed,
meaning that there is no longer any space left unoccupied by the system of states. About a
century ago, terra incognita as such ceased to exist. However, parallel to this closure, we
have witnessed the emergence, unprecedented in history, of mass population movements
and forced displacements, which place the lives of millions of people outside a
traditional, state-centred system of coordinates. In other words, many people find
themselves 'outside' of politics, while this 'outside' is itself nowhere to be found. Even if
we distance ourselves from the question of the mere material existence of this 'outside',
we are unable to progress much further. We can hardly find any discussion in
contemporary political theory of something like 'the unpolitical', something that would
radically extend beyond politics. It is not accounted for either in terms of a localizable
space or in purely theoretical terms. The popularity of the discourse on biopolitics
complicates the situation even further. Once we recognize that politics is not limited to
the institutional operation of the state, but extends toward and penetrates the very lives of
modern individuals and populations, we are left wondering whether modern politics has
indeed become a totality that we cannot or do not dare to overcome. These are, ultimately,
the thoughts, doubts and questions that have resulted in the present project. In this
respect, the primary goals of this dissertation are, first, to examine contemporary political
thought regarding its engagement with a possibility of a radical outside of politics; and
second, based on this critical investigation, to present a conception of the unpolitical that
would account for this outside in positive terms.
It is my contention that in order to really avoid a drift toward a new kind of
totalitarianism, political theory needs to be able to think, to direct its gaze to its outside,
and to acknowledge its radical exteriority and positivity beyond the concerns of politics,
unrelated to the experience of political co-belonging. What is at stake in thinking the
unpolitical, then, is a theoretical reconstitution of the “great outdoors” of politics, which
would allow something like the 'soul' or the non-objective and non-objectifiable
experience of living to play a role in determining what constitutes happy life,

2
togetherness, and community. It has been the task of politics and political thought to
ponder upon these questions, however, in order to open up to the possibilities of living
differently in this world and thus, perhaps, of 'amending' this world, one has to be able to
present a case for living that is not uniformly defined in political terms. The sense of
community need not be reduced to politics, because once we fail to recognize the reality
and positivity of unpolitical existence and unpolitical community, the very notion of
politics becomes the means of policing and even justifying the injustices, as well as the
exclusion and segregation of those who do not fit within the political space or do not
appear to immediately posses the 'proper' quality of living. In the midst of the numerous
calls to rethink politics so that this politics, in turn, becomes capable of addressing the
problems that haunt contemporary societies, my call for finding a perspective on the
unpolitical is a call for the articulation and affirmation of the possibilities of living and
being together that are not limited or determined by any political conceptions, ideologies,
movements and demands. At the same time, this living is not apathetic, withdrawn, or
disinterested: it is oriented toward an 'inner' reality, its recognition as an a priori of
politics and not as its ultimate rejection. Thus, the unpolitical outlines an alternative
ground for the unconditional experience of living and enjoying life in the multiplicity of
its projections in the world.
It seems that the initial question that needs to be asked in the search for the unpolitical is
what lies beyond politics, traditionally conceived as the sphere of state operation.
Perhaps, the unpolitical, then, is simply that which extends beyond the state. There are at
least two broad ways in which contemporary political thought addresses this question:
'mainstream' and 'critical'.1 A great number of critiques of the state, and state-oriented
notions of politics, have occurred within the 'mainstream' theoretical discourse of political
science. These critiques primarily address the displacement of the political structure of
the state in view of various international processes such as globalization and regional
1

I do not mean to suggest that there are no 'critical' interventions within the 'mainstream' thought or the
other way around. I recognize that my use of the notions of 'mainstream' and 'critical' here is overly
simplified and too general. I use this distinction only to outline a general difference between two
approaches, one more empirically oriented and the other more ontologically oriented. In no way I
mean to reduce and diminish the internal complexities of these streams of theory.
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integration. The spread of the late capitalist mode of production across the globe, it is
argued, has resulted in the fact that the states no longer constitute the primary actors of
international and domestic politics. The flows of financial capital and multinational
corporations have taken over the task of ordering the lives of the populations.
Furthermore, it might be suggested that the processes of regional integration such as, for
example, the European Union, tend to relegate the centre of political life from the
national to the supranational level. However, the majority of these accounts do not seem
to allow for the unpolitical: they rather relocate politics to a different, larger scale than
that of the state, absorbing anything beyond the state into the political sphere.
Contemporary 'critical' political theory revolves around questions of political ontology: in
order to explore the outside of the traditional sphere of politics-as-state it endeavours to
rethink what constitutes the very being or essence of politics. In other words, questions of
political ontology have become of the utmost importance for those who are not satisfied
with the limitations of the traditional understanding that delimits political being strictly in
terms of the public sphere of rational deliberation, state functions and institutionalized
systems of representation. Politics-as-state has met its greatest theoretical challenges from
post-foundational thinkers who have succeeded in transforming the classical, rigid
framework of political analysis into a more open and flexible horizon of 'the political'.
They answer the question of what lies beyond the state by creating the notion of 'the
political'. Consequently, critical political thought, just as its mainstream counterpart,
through its critique of the state merely relocates 'politics' on the plane of 'the political',
leaving the unpolitical beyond the scope of its concerns.
What we witness as a result of these constant relocations and displacements of politics is
the disappearance or simply a confirmation of the absence of a clear-cut distinction
between what is political and what is not. Meanwhile, the question of the outside of
politics, primarily in terms of a natural allocation of duties, deliberate apoliticism, or
contemplative withdrawal, has consistently been present in ancient political philosophy,
at least since Plato and Aristotle. For example, the distinctions between oikos and polis,
theoria and praxis, bios theoretikos and bios politikos, vita contemplativa and vita activa
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have contributed to the establishment of a fairly rigid delimitation of the political and
non-political spheres of human activity. Furthermore, the liberal development of the
ancient conceptual distinctions resulted, again, in a more or less clear understanding of
what constitutes the space of politics (the public aspect of social relationships) and what
must remain essentially apolitical, confined to private concerns. Thus, the distinction
between politics and non-politics was established in relation to the distinction of the
'outer' and 'inner' aspects of human life. Ultimately, the modern individual is split
between rational, outward-oriented activity that, in the interaction with others, constitutes
politics, and an inner activity of her 'soul', 'spirit', passion or emotion, as well as the
mundane necessities of everyday life, that remain non-political insofar as they do not
enter the domain of public rational deliberation about the common good. As I noted, these
traditional distinctions between what is politics and what is non-political have been
widely challenged and rethought within contemporary political theory. Politics is no
longer strictly confined to the public sphere and the domain of state activities but extends
toward what once was considered its outside: economy, passions, desires, conflicts, and
life itself. The 'soul' is no longer outside of the reach of politics; on the contrary, it is
pronounced to be the operating ground of modern biopolitical regime. As a result, politics
consumes relationality in its generality and leaves no room for the radical unpolitical.
However, I believe that despite the fact that politics is no longer clearly distinguished
from the non-political, the ghost of the latter lingers on. Something like the unpolitical
keeps reappearing, however negatively and as a side-note of political theory and its
concerns. In a nutshell, in the attempt to rethink politics, contemporary political thought
turns its back on the unpolitical, but does not get rid of it altogether.
The attention to the outside of politics today is often framed in terms of “negative
politics,”2 that is, in terms of what remains unthought in modern political thought, and
what can be eventually brought into the light of political consciousness. However, at the
same time one can speak of the advent of the unpolitical in contemporary thought, of
2

See, for example, a recent issue of Diacritics 39, No. 2, entitled Negative Politics: At the City’s Limit,
and a book by Diana Coole Negativity and Politics: Dionysus and Dialectics from Kant to
Poststructuralism (2000).
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which the present project is an instance. This advent is grounded in the repressed of
political theory and in the unconscious of the political: it begins where politics does not
dare to go in the fear of its 'disappearance'. An interesting example of this advent, which
manages to go beyond the concerns of the political negativity, is the current work of
Laurent Dubreuil (2006; 2009; 2011), who postulates the problem of the totalizing
tendency of the political in a way similar to ours. He suggests that “many contemporary
thinkers forget what even Aristotle had not omitted: the totalizing ambition of politics
should be contradicted by an affirmation of life itself, notwithstanding the political order
that attempts to contain it” (2006, 97). Dubreuil's efforts are motivated by “the dream of
breaking away not only from the police, but also from all forms of politics and the
political” (2009, 5), resulting in the affirmative contradiction of “apolitics.” The latter is
defined as “a movement of critique, refusal, separation, and proclamation where those
involved, while not losing sight of the fact that policies may clash, still insist that it is
inherently insufficient to simply settle wrongs” (17). The settlement of these wrongs is at
stake for politics, the task of which is to organize and manage the lives merely “lived,”
while apolitics “simply allows us to make life more livable” (17; my emphasis). This
notion of “livable life” thus constitutes the starting ground for Dubreuil's 'project' of the
affirmative refusal of politics.
In a similar vein, the basic intuition of this dissertation is that despite the lack of
theoretical engagement with the unpolitical, life beyond politics is a reality. The fluidity
in the conception of politics and of life suggests that the lack of an immediate vision of
something like the unpolitical is conditioned not by its ultimate absence, non-existence or
impossibility, but by a certain colouring of the lens through which we tend to look at the
world. I will argue that this lens of thought is dominated by the presupposition of the
primacy of politics (supposedly inherent in human nature), which results in its blindness
toward the outside. Politics is believed to be able to account for the totality of human
existence, experiences and interactions, and to be the only means of 'salvation' within the
secular societies of the West. This dissertation, then, is a call for a reversal of perspective,
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in a form of undermining the primacy of politics and the political, and challenging their
totalizing tendency.
I suggest that the notion of the unpolitical is able to attune our theoretical vision to the
reality of experiences that radically extend beyond politics (no matter how it is defined or
redefined) and, as such, remain almost unthinkable. This work, then, is a creative inquiry
into the possibility of this 'almost' – the space that the notion of the unpolitical occupies.
Inasmuch as political thought regards politics as the anchoring 'concept' of human
relationality and of the experience of living in this world, unpolitical thought aims to
displace politics in its primacy and to point to its own limits, that is, to the limits of
thought. Consequently, the unpolitical, as a notion, is primarily an attempt, at least a
partial one, to think the unthought, to speak of the unspeakable and to get a glimpse of the
invisible of life that persists in its irremediable indifference to politics, but not in order to
make it fully present in language, in sight, in thought and in politics, but so that we can
continue to live it as such, in mystery. This is not to suggest that the notion that I
endeavour to develop here is itself absolutely mysterious and has no 'practical'
ramifications. I will propose quite directly that the unpolitical refers to the radical outside
of politics which can be 'found' in the certainty of life's self-revelation in self-affection.
The unpolitical phenomenology of life, then, answers the totalizing tendency of the
political, anchored, as I will show, in the principle of correlation. Furthermore, I would
also like to believe that my notion of the unpolitical can be used as a theoretical tool to
account for the lived experiences of those 'subjects' (both human and non-human) that
find themselves outside the political system of coordinates of modernity. For example,
those, as I mentioned, who are confined to the non-existent 'outside' of the international
system of states, such as the refugees and the stateless. Can we think about their lives
unpolitically in a positive way? And what do these figures reveal to us all about life as
such? Finally, can we possibly think of a way of living in this world that is not grounded
in or conditioned by politics?
I will commence my exploration with the following theses in mind. First, politics is
totalizing insofar as in its attempt to redefine itself it fails to positively account for its
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radical outside. Second, in contemporary political thought there is no sufficient
engagement with this problem of the totalizing tendency of the political as well as with its
radical outside. Third, despite this theoretical insufficiency, life beyond politics is the
real3 that we experience immediately in the very act of living our lives, but of which we
can hardly speak. Finally, it is necessary to attempt to speak of this essentially
unspeakable so that we can discover new possibilities of living 'other', 'true' and 'happy'
lives that are constituted positively, that is, not as secondary acts of resistance to politics
and its faults. In sum, the overarching intent of this dissertation is, by a way of critique, to
present a positive notion of the radical outside of politics, to establish the unpolitical as
the a priori of politics, and to affirm unpolitical life that positively persists in its
indifference (and non-relation) to all versions of politics and the political.
v
O erview
In order to accomplish these tasks, I will deal with three major notions already apparent
in the title of this work: 'politics', 'beyond', and 'life'. A chapter will be dedicated to each
of these notions correspondingly. Positing the question of what it would mean to live
outside politics today, this dissertation opens with a critique of contemporary, postfoundational political thought, suggesting that the latter lacks a positive account of the
unpolitical as a radical outside of politics. In the first chapter, my critique will be
structured around two major points. First, I will argue that political thought that oscillates
around the distinction (often referred to as “the political difference”) between the
traditional notion of “politics-as-state” and its reconstitution in terms of “the political” is
correlationist. That is, the excess or the outside of “politics,” vaguely signified as “the
political,” is recognized only negatively, resulting in the constitution of the merely
relative outside of politics and in the forgetting of its “Great Outdoors.” Second, it will be
3

In my use of the notion of 'the real' in this dissertation I do not rely on any particular theory of 'the
real', but rather use it as a concept that essentially stands for or gestures toward the radical as opposed
to the relative outside of politics, which, as I will show below, is a problematic aspect of postfoundational political thought. Furthermore, through my recourse to the notion of 'the real' in relation
to the unpolitical I emphasize that the latter is not just a concept, an abstraction or an ephemeral
psychic register that is never manifest as such, but rather that the unpolitical is necessarily
experienced. In an important sense, as we will see toward the end of this dissertation, 'the real' implies
the specific material reality of the unpolitical experience as auto-affection of life.
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suggested that political thought, defined by the correlation, exhibits a totalizing ambition
insofar as it does not account positively for its real unthought, i.e., the unpolitical. In
other words, the excess of politics always (re)appears itself as political, leaving no room
for its radical outside. This two-fold critique will be advanced through a close analysis of
texts by Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe
and Jean-Luc Nancy.
The second chapter will be dedicated to two major ways in which the unpolitical is
confronted within contemporary theory. First is the category of “the impolitical”
(l'impolitico), developed by Italian political thinkers Massimo Cacciari and Roberto
Esposito. Second is the notion of the impolitical as“bare life” (nuda vita), formulated by
another Italian thinker Giorgio Agamben. I turn to these particular theories because they,
instead of focusing primarily on politics, pay close attention to its outside. Cacciari and
Esposito offer a reversal of perspective from modern politics to the impolitical: the
political is recognized as totalizing and is to be addressed through a new perspective. The
value of the political is challenged resulting in the proposition to rethink politics based on
the recognition of its limit, its outside. As a result, the impolitical no longer appears on
the margins of political thought but rather forms its centre: impolitical thought is called
upon to lead the modern political to its transformation into politics without foundation.
Moreover, the impolitical is no longer seen in terms of a threat of neutralization; it is
accounted for in positive terms, as something that has been constantly present within the
political while remaining mostly unrecognized. Thus, Cacciari's and Esposito's task lies
in bringing the repressed of the political, i.e., the impolitical, back into the consciousness
of political thought. Through my analysis of this notion in Cacciari and Esposito I will
highlight its achievements and innovation, but also its limitations. I will ask how far these
authors go in their thinking of the impolitical and whether in it they reach something like
the outside of politics as such.
Agamben's notion of bare life brings an important development into unpolitical thought:
he defines the impolitical in terms of “bare life,” thus introducing into this notion the real
experience of living beyond politics. Even though his view of the impolitical is negative,
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since bare, excepted life is the originary problematic aspect that constitutes Western
(bio)politics, his notion of “form-of-life” contains an intriguing intimation of the
unpolitical-to-come. As a result, I will first examine Agamben's view of the impolitical as
bare life, and then present a reading of his notion of “form-of-life” in attempt to further
my task of discerning the unpolitical in the midst of totalizing politics. In the end, through
a reading of Cacciari's, Esposito's and Agamben's works I will construct the ground for
something like the unpolitical form-of-life, where “bare life” is allowed to persist
positively outside the space of “coming politics.”
The third, final chapter of this dissertation assumes the task of thinking life unpolitically,
in order to arrive at a conception of the radical outside of politics. I believe that it is in an
phenomenological approach to life that we can arrive at something that radically exceeds
politics, since this trend of thought leads us to consider or rather reconsider the inner
experiences of living that were mostly dismissed by post-foundational thought. This inner
space has been conceived as a mere product of ideology or discourse, and thus the ground
for the interventions of power, replacing what once bore a name of 'soul'. However, once
we bring into the discussion the question of affect, this inner realm can no longer be
dismissed as merely constructed: while the content of affect can be a result of, let us say,
power relations, the very ability to be affected remains beyond the reach of any political
intervention. The view of life as affectivity and receptivity, then, opens up another
'dimension' of experience that is often overlooked in critical political thought. That is, it
raises a question about lived experiences that cannot be accounted for in positive terms
from the perspective of worldly relationality, which necessarily includes politics. In this
respect, I will engage with the radical philosophy of life of contemporary French thinker
Michel Henry and suggest that with his help it is possible to conceive the unpolitical in
terms of life that constitutes the unconscious as such of the political. It is positive, real,
non-relational experience of self-affection that manifests itself in the radical reduction of
the world. I will also present a way in which this view of the unpolitical addresses the
problems of the political correlation and of its totalizing ambition, and how it can open
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our thinking toward appreciation of the experience of living beyond politics, of the
unpolitical form-of-life.
In the end, I will suggest how my theoretical engagement with the unpolitical can bear
some more 'practical' consequences. I will essentially return to the questions that
motivated my inquiry in the first place: what does it mean to live beyond politics in a
time when this outside no longer exists, can no longer be located on the world map. In
order to explore the possibilities presented by the notion of the unpolitical form-of-life, I
will turn to an examination of the modern condition of the refugee. I will examine what
the figure of the refugee reveals to us in the reduction of its political world. My intuition
is that the refugee is a historically situated epitome of the ahistorical experience of
'becoming-unpolitical'. Furthermore, I will see how the notion of the unpolitical offers a
reversal in the way in which this figure is understood in contemporary scholarship.
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Chapter I. Politics and the Political: Correlation and the
Totalizing Tendency of the Political Difference

All is consumed.
All is occupied, exploited, filled to the mouth, the
rim, the edge. Space is pregnant. Places are full.
Each section is full. ... Land is dense, bulging,
filled to capacity. It chokes. I choke. I feel
claustrophobic outside.
Michel Serres

Everything is outside, yet it is impossible to get
out.
Francis Wolff

Within contemporary political theory there is a tendency to think about politics as
revolving around two principles: one fluid, unordered, mobile and dynamic, and the other
rigid, stable and ordered. There are a number of parallels that can be drawn between
various strains of political thought in this respect, and there are a number of notions,
which are not limited only to political thought, that essentially refer to these two
principles. For example, one can hear the echo of these principles in the discussions of
the relationship between constituted and constitutive power, of consciousness and the
unconscious, or bound and unbound energies, of the symbolic and the real, and of
restricted and general economy. One of the prominent ways of taking on the rigid and
fluid principles in politics is through the concepts of politics and the political (an English
translation of German das Politische and French le politique).
Dissatisfaction with politics, narrowly defined as the state and its institutions, leads to a
conceptual shift, first in Germany and then in France, toward the political – an
ontological dimension of undecidability and contingency, agonism and difference
underlying political reality. Extending beyond the French context, the political has
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become an important conceptual tool for a variety of recent studies in political theory,
which gradually transform the classical, rigid framework of political analysis into the
more open and flexible horizon of the political. Among the scholars who, at least to some
extent, employ or comment on this distinction are Benjamin Arditi (1996), Hannah
Arendt (1998), Alain Badiou (2005a), Diana Coole (2000), Jacques Derrida (1997),
Mladen Dolar (2008), Michel Foucault (1990; 2010), Ernesto Laclau (1990), Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy
(1997), Claude Lefort (1988), Oliver Marchart (2007), Chantal Mouffe (1993, 2005),
Jean-Luc Nancy (1991; 1997; 2000; 2010a), Kari Palonen (2007), Jacques Rancière
(1995; 1999; 2001), Paul Recoeur (1965), Carl Schmitt (2007), Yannis Stavrakakis (1999;
2007), Slavoj Žižek (1999a), and many others.
I suggest that the conceptual distinction of politics and the political has acquired certain
dominance, if not become the new common sense, within contemporary political thought,
and as such is itself in need of a critical examination. Along with praise, the political has
received a number of criticisms regarding its overly philosophical or 'abstract' nature and
a resulting lack of engagement with 'real' politics. In other words, the very value of
political ontology has been questioned (see, for example, Strathausen 2009). However,
there has been almost no critique of the thought of the political regarding its nearly
totalizing status which, I argue, is related to another problem with this distinction –
correlation. As a result, in what follows below I attempt a critical account of the
relationship between the notions of politics and the political and suggest that it is
correlationist and also exhibits a totalizing tendency.
My following critique of correlation is inspired by Quentin Meillassoux who advances a
thesis on the necessity of contingency based on his critique of correlationism. 4
4

Despite the fact that Meillassoux's work serves as a point of departure for my critique of
correlationism here, I will not deal extensively with his 'solution' to the problem of correlation
presented in the second part of his book After Finitude. An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency
(2008). Even thought he coined the term “correlationism,” he is not unique in pointing out the essence
of this problem within modern thought. Ultimately, I will turn to Michel Foucault's and Michel
Henry's 'diagnosis' of this paradox of modern thought insofar as their thinking presents an opportunity
to directly engage the problem of political correlation in relation to the question of the radical outside
of politics in terms of life. Meillassoux, on the other hand, as well as the movement of speculative
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Meillassoux suggests that the central notion of modern philosophy since Kant appears to
be that of correlation: “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from
the other” (2008, 5). The same problem arises in the relationship between the subject and
object, and between the 'inside' and the 'outside'. According to Meillassoux,
correlationism disqualifies the possibility of viewing the domains of subjectivity and
objectivity independently from one another. In this spirit, modern philosophers emphasize
the primacy of the relation over the related terms: “[t]he ‘co-‘ (of co-givenness, of corelation, of the co-originary, of co-presence) is the grammatical particle that dominates
modern philosophy...” (5).
The status of exteriority is at stake here and, specifically, its relation with the 'inside' (e.g.,
language and consciousness). Meillassoux points out that “correlational exteriority” has a
paradoxical nature: on the one hand, correlationist thought insists on the fact of “an
originary connection to a radical exteriority.” On the other hand, this insistence
dissimulates “a strange feeling of imprisonment or enclosure within this very exteriority
(the 'transparent cage') … given that we are always-already in it (the 'always already'
accompanying the 'co-' of correlationism as its other essential locution), and given that we
have no access to any vantage point from whence we could observe these 'object-worlds'”
(7). The transparent cage creates an 'illusion' of being thrown into the outside, however,
this outside is never experienced as such but only from 'behind the bars' of consciousness.
Consequently, the outside evoked by correlationist philosophies is “a cloistered outside,”
meaning that one is imprisoned in it insofar as it is altogether relative: “[c]onsciousness
and its language certainly transcend themselves toward the world, but there is a world
only insofar as a consciousness transcends itself toward it. Consequently, this space of
exteriority is merely the space of what faces us, of what exists only as a correlate of our
own existence” (7; my emphasis). Any transcendence of the inside is 'false', since we
never reach the outside as such, and what remains is merely the process of infinite
reaching out, of extending outward. Meillassoux contends that contemporary
realism in general, presents another direction for research that will not be addressed in this dissertation
due to the limit of its scope, as well as limitations of time and space.
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philosophers keep insisting that thought is fully oriented toward the outside because they
fail to admit that with the abandonment of “dogmatism” they have irrecoverably lost “the
great outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside which was not
relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own givenness to be what it is,
existing in itself regardless of whether we are thinking of it or not; that outside which
thought could explore with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory – of being
entirely elsewhere” (7). There is no place for radical exteriority in contemporary thought
as long as it is correlationist.
In a similar way, I suggest that we can notice a correlationist tendency in contemporary
political thought, insofar as it is centred around the relationship between politics and the
political, where the former refers to the conscious, 'visible' reality of ordered communal
life in the polis (traditional view of politics-as-state), and the latter stands for the excess,
outside or the unconscious of politics. However, this extension of 'politics' beyond the
limited sphere of the state, toward a 'general economy of the political', is conditioned by
and inseparably attached to this very state or visible political reality. The political is the
correlational exteriority of politics: it aims at accounting for the excess of politics,
however, ends up re-inscribing it within order as the principle which infinitely escapes
but is never able to leave the political 'inside'. As a result, many attempts at thinking
politics beyond the state fail insofar as they draw their theoretical energy from what they
want to displace – the state order or politics-as-state.
Furthermore, contemporary theoretical attempts to define and sketch the political present
themselves as severe critiques and alternatives to classical political visions, especially
liberal theories. I maintain that these contemporary theories are only partially successful
because they fall into the same trap as their classical counterparts: they both repress
elements that are seen as antithetical or negative to the 'achievement' of their own vision
of the political. In this way, both classical and contemporary political theories suffer from
different intensities of correlation, where 'authentic' politics is defined through negation
or repression of its Other. In the case of traditional political theory, the elements that act
counter to social unity and identity are repressed, excluded or ignored. This strain of

15
political thought acknowledges that disruptive or contingent elements are closely related
to or even condition politics; however, it tends to repress the 'memory' of such
conditioning and cover the consequent silence with the fantasy of social unity (expressed
by various social contract theories) that ultimately forms the ground of modern politics.
That is, classical theories place the emphasis on the side of the mutual reconciliation of
human beings through the institution of political society, the state or sovereign, the
necessity of which is posited in opposition to the fear of contingent, asocial, apolitical
reality.
Contemporary political thought reverses the relationship between the non-political and
political realities: in a way, it makes possible the return of the repressed of politics. What
is called the political (the disruptive and agonistic element), was formerly conceptualized
as non-political, typically, as the state of nature. Contingency and conflict are now seen as
pertaining to politics 'proper' (i.e., the political). Nonetheless, this position is affirmed not
on its own terms but as a critique of the state-oriented conception of politics. That is,
what is repressed, suppressed or ignored in contemporary political theory is the fact that
its critique is primarily motivated by the pressure of an organizing principle, namely, the
state. This correlative nature of the political is not fully acknowledged, resulting in the
mere reproduction of the relative outside of politics. In this regard, contemporary thought
of the political is self-referential: it is centred around a split and a correlation between
politics and the political (or inauthentic and authentic politics), and does not account for
the unpolitical as such. In the end, what is endlessly reproduced is the irreducible play
between two principles or registers of political 'matter' (rigid and fluid, conscious and
unconscious), which Oliver Marchart (2007) calls “the political difference.”5 Through
this notion Marchart, in the positive light, explicates the relation between the two terms
but does not address the problem of correlation. Other scholars similarly acknowledge the
5

In this respect, an important thinker who could be engaged in this discussion, but who ultimately
remains beyond the attention of the present work, is Jacques Derrida and, in particular, his discussion
of the question of difference in terms of différance (see, for example, Derrida 1982). Yet another
approach to the question of the unpolitical in relation to difference (which remains beyond the scope
of the present project) could be developed around an engagement with the philosophy of Gilles
Deleuze, as well as that of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.
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irreducible attachment between politics and the political, however, they as well fail to
effectively address the problematic aspects of this (cor)relation.
I argue that, due to correlation, contemporary political thought lost its “great outdoors”:
unpolitical reality (or the excess inherent to the political difference) remains unthought.
The political exhibits the totalizing tendency insofar as it does not leave room for the
radical outside of politics or the unpolitical as such. As a result, many contemporary
accounts of the political fail to effectively address the problem they themselves identify:
the problem of totalizing politics as expressed in the statement “everything is political.”
Contemporary political thought is not able to fully transcend this totalizing horizon of
modern politics also because this horizon gives birth to critical thought in the first place.
Nevertheless, this contemporary totalizing tendency of the political is not 'complete' but
remains 'open': the political, as the condition of possibility of being-together in general,
refuses to complete itself. It is rather constituted as a totality revolving around its own
opening, incompletion or void. As a result, we can rather call the totalizing tendency of
the political an “ambition” (cf. Dubreuil 2006, 97), since the ambition remains ambition
only insofar as it is unfulfilled or incomplete. The kind of political thought that allows for
such an open totality is often referred to as “post-foundational”: the only foundation or
“quasi-ground” it preserves and almost religiously maintains is the “necessary
contingency,” i.e., the absence of any final ground/foundation of politics (for a more
detailed discussion of this point see Marchart 2007, 11–34).
Another distinctive trait that accompanies and, perhaps, even fuels the totalizing ambition
of the political is the fear of depoliticization. In this respect, Marchart (2007) suggests
that post-foundational thought depends on the “neutralization or sublimation thesis.”
According to it, “the political becomes increasingly neutralized or colonized by the social
... or sublimated into non-political domains ... The primacy of the political is ... always in
danger of becoming entirely closed up in the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratized, technologized,
and depoliticized society” (44). In other words, the political is an essentially threatened
principle and thus it has to be forcefully affirmed, rather than simply recognized and
described, against the imminent prospect of depoliticization. From this point of view,
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anything unpolitical is interpreted only negatively, something that has to be avoided or
politicized. A condition without politics is described as a state of either 'suffering' or
apolitical 'apathy', non-participation and abstention from praxis. 6 Thus, the unpolitical
receives primarily negative acknowledgement and treatment in post-foundational political
thought.
The primary aim of this chapter is to explicate and to develop a critique of the correlation
and the totalizing ambition of the political, and to discern a limited place assigned to the
unpolitical in contemporary political theory. I will also look at how the political emerges
as a truly interdisciplinary question, as it extends beyond the limited sphere of politics
and shakes the disciplinary boundaries of the political sciences by exploding its 'object'.
Furthermore, I will trace how the political ultimately comes to 'claim' life, to consume
and merge with it. To accomplish these tasks, I will turn to the works of Carl Schmitt,
Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière and Jean-Luc Nancy. There are a number of other
thinkers of politics that I could potentially turn to in this respect; however, due to the
limitations of the present project, I cannot address them all. The four key thinkers of the
political, whom I selected here, exemplify several important themes within contemporary
political thought, as well as present good cases for an examination of the correlation and
the totalizing tendency of the political. Carl Schmitt was the first to introduce the political
with its new meaning, and, thus, his work has influenced many contemporary debates
about the 'essence' of the political. Specifically, through his friend and enemy distinction
he institutes real conflict at the heart of the political, extends the latter beyond the
traditional political sphere of the state, and transforms the political into an expansive and
parasitic phenomenon. The importance of Michel Foucault for my project consists in his
methodological critique of the traditional accounts of “Power” as “the system of Lawand-Sovereign.” His critique leads to the reconceptualization of power in terms of a
multiplicity of force relations that are not regional (i.e., limited to the sphere of politicsas-state) but extend, in a way similar to Schmitt, toward the general economy of the
political. Foucault's governmentality studies further present us with the material to
6

For example, Alain Badiou suggests that “time without politics” is characterized by “resignation”
(2005a, 145).
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exemplify and critique the constitution of the new totalizing tendency of the political
marked by the correlation, which seems to emerge despite the conscious intentions of the
author. Jacques Rancière, like many others, places the conflictual aspect at the core of the
political and offers a new (however, still correlationist) methodology for political
thought: a conceptual distinction between politics and the political or order of the police
and politics. The specificity of his project lies in his affirmation of 'authentic' politics in
terms of rare events that necessarily come to interrupt the homogeneity of the police
order. Furthermore, his theoretical engagement with the excluded or 'the part of no part' is
exemplary of the lack of a positive account of the unpolitical as such in contemporary
theory. Jean-Luc Nancy, in his radical rethinking of relationality and being-in-the-world,
presents another ontological treatment of the notion of the political. His affirmation of
Being as essentially 'with', and of existence as co-existence, results in the institution of
the ontological or primordial totality of the political, as the ground-abyss of everything.
Nancy also elucidates the essential connections between worldliness and being political
as well as between politics and thought, which are eagerly accepted by many
contemporary political thinkers. By the end of this chapter, I expect to achieve a more or
less clear understanding of the political correlation and the totalizing ambition of the
political as problems that need to be further addressed within contemporary political
theory. In this respect, I will also introduce the question of the unpolitical 'as such' that, I
believe, constitutes a way of addressing these problematic aspects of political thought.

1.1. The Schmittian Totality of the Political:
Deciding on the Unpolitical
Carl Schmitt's The Concept of the Political (2007) is notoriously regarded as the first
major instance of theorizing the political in a new way. I argue that it is also a major early
example of instituting the political as a new kind of totality that penetrates human life to
its very core. The concept of the political, as presented by Schmitt, is no longer limited in
terms of the state but is determined by the friend and enemy distinction. Nevertheless, it
remains to some degree correlated with the concept of the state: insofar as the political
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functions as a displacement of politics-as-state, it depends on an initial emplacement for
its manifestation. Furthermore, insofar as the political has no 'proper' space, it evolves
into a potentially all-encompassing and parasitic reality that leaves practically no space
for the radical, unpolitical outside or the neutral. The unpolitical, in the form of an
exception, is nothing but a product of a sovereign decision, which is exercised in order to
prepare the homogeneous field where it becomes possible to distinguish a friend from an
enemy. In what follows, I endeavour to unpack these arguments by focusing on the
analysis of Schmitt's two major works, The Concept of the Political and Political
Theology. My aim is to present not a reductive reading of Schmitt's oeuvre but, perhaps,
to simply expose the elements of his novel thought of the political and the unpolitical that
have found their way into contemporary post-foundational political thought.
The context of Schmitt's thought
Even though Schmitt introduced the concept of the political into the theoretical discourse
of the 20th century, he was not the one to 'invent' the term itself. The substantivized
adjective, “the political” (an English translation of German das Politische and French le
politique) appeared, according to Kari Palonen (2007), long before Schmitt in the works
of Schiller and Schlegel. However, both of them used the concept in a more traditional
way, that is, they used it to refer to politics defined by the activity of the state and its
institutions. Furthermore, an abstract concept of the political was used by another
German thinker, Georg Jellinek, in his book Allgemeine Staatslehre (1900). But again, for
him it was subordinate to the state. In general these examples suggest that the question of
the nature of politics and the political was an open and controversial question in the
Wilhelminian and Weimar debates (Palonen 2007, 70). It is within this intellectual
climate that Schmitt's thought arises. In a way, he responds to the prior usages of the
concept of the political in the theoretical debates of his time.
This fact points to an important dimension of Schmitt's thought – its historical context.
First of all, the concept of the political embraces the 'spirit' of the beginning of the 20 th
century. Schmitt lived and worked in a conflict-ridden age: the horrors and the aftermath
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of the World War I, the struggles of the Weimar Republic and, specifically, the failure of
its democracy, all contributed to his critique of liberalism and life-long attraction to the
thought of conflict and, especially, to Thomas Hobbes (Gottfried 1990). In addition to
conflict, at least two other opposing tendencies characterize the beginning of the 20 th
century. These are, first, the emergence of effective, non-state political actors and
processes, as well as the expansion of democracy and the politicization of civil society
(see, Arditi 1996, 15). As a result, state institutions and borders, supposedly, play a less
and less important roles in defining proper political spaces. Second, there is the opposite
process of the disappearance of 'no-man's space', of the factual outside of the nation-state
system. As Hakim Bey suggests, the historical development of the 20 th century is
characterized by “the closure of the map,” meaning that “[t]he last bit of Earth unclaimed
by any nation-state was eaten up in 1899. Ours is the first century without terra
incognita, without a frontier” (1991, 102). I suggest that the disappearance of the material
outside of the state-system triggers the thought of the political, which, in a way, performs
a function of compensation for the lost 'beyond'. The 20th century is the first century that
denies, rejects or abandons transcendence in both material and ideal sense: the material
space of the globe is fully appropriated, consumed by either states or the international
community of states, and the 'ideal space' of thought (as a result of secularization and
devaluation of traditions) falls prey to the “seduction of immanence... a denying and
averting of every form of transcendence” (de Wit 2008, 165). Due to his deep
indebtedness to Catholic religious thought, Schmitt, however, remains critical of such a
rejection of transcendence. Nevertheless, he does not 'salvage' it as an absolute (that
radically extends beyond the 'city of man') but, rather, introduces “transcendence within
immanence” into political thought in the form of the sovereign decision – the founding
event of politics (cf. Ojakangas 2005a, 28–29).
Beyond the historical events of the beginning of the century, we can observe the
intellectual climate within which Schmitt's thought developed. Most importantly for our
discussion here, Schmitt was prone to the influence of wide-ranging critiques of
liberalism and modernity, of reason and transcendence, occurring against the background

21
of “the closure of the map” and the emergence of non-state political actors. A critique of
reason in Schmitt is apparent in his recourse to a certain “irrationalism” or even
mysticism in the definition of the political and especially the decision that it is founded
on. As Radhika Desai (2002) suggests, Schmitt's thought is founded on a “philosophical
irrationalism” that draws its inspiration from Nietzsche's critique of Enlightenment
reason. The main opposition it relies on is between “the political, an irrationalist 'real',
and the rational” (394), that is, the state and its institutions. The rational is a domain of
orderly conceptions, and the irrational refers to a certain reality of life that resists
conceptualization and rationalization – “the formless unformulable world of the chaos of
sensations” (395), as Nietzsche put it in The Will To Power. These two realities, “life” and
“intellect,” Desai suggests, are present in Schmitt in the form of the opposition between
“the immediacy of life” and its “rational interpretation” (395). I believe that his
conceptualization of the political emerges as an indication of the ever-present, however
suppressed, “immediacy” that manifests itself in the potentiality of conflict and war, in an
actual existential threat. The political is “vital substance” or “pure life” that breaks
through the crust of repetition and formalism of the state law (see, Schmitt 2005, 15). It is
important to note that for Schmitt these two principles (life and repetition) are inseparable
from each other; moreover, they become manifest only at the moment of their interaction
or at the moment of their conflict. The conflictual nature of reality implies, according to
Schmitt, that not only the major concepts of political theory are polemical, but that their
real manifestation has to emerge out of polemos in order to be 'genuine'. In this way, the
political, as dynamic life, is necessarily attached to or correlated with its Other – politics,
state, repetition, life at a stand-still. To speak of the concept of the political beyond this
confrontation would mean to depoliticize it, which is not what Schmitt wants to achieve.
Another important feature that emerges as a result of the “crisis mentality” and the
critique of modernity, is existentialism. Since transcendence as well as the majority of
traditional values were devalued, “human existence, in its brute factivity, became a value
in and of itself ” (R. Wolin 1990, 394). Such “brute primacy of human existence” implies
that in a world devoid of meaning, which used to be guaranteed by a transcendent

22
absolute, the primary certainty of life becomes death. It is not surprising, then, that the
threat of death, its inevitable possibility, is presented by Schmitt as the indicator of the
'genuine' political. The conflict that he locates at the core of the political is determined by
the real possibility of dying and killing: “[t]he friend, enemy, and combat concepts
receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical
killing” (2007, 33). Except death, there seems to be no other measure left that can form
the foundation of new politics. In the words of Richard Wolin, in such a context “naked
self-preservation” becomes “the highest end of political life” (1990, 405).
In fact, since no life is free from the looming possibility of death, life in itself becomes
unavoidably political, with war being its highest and most intense manifestation. Schmitt
suggests that “[p]olitics means intensive life” (quoted in Wolin 1990, 406). The political
is a constitutive part of living insofar as it is charged with a degree of intensity. Such a
view of the intimate connection between specifically human life and the political is
further exemplified by Schmitt's embrace of pessimistic anthropology. He argues that
“optimistic anthropology” views humans as beings driven toward consensus and
agreement with each other, while “...all genuine political theories presuppose man to be
evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous and dynamic being” (Schmitt
2007, 61). The drive to consensus and deliberation on the way to an agreement is one of
the defining features of the liberal conception of the political process. Schmitt, on the
contrary, embraces a 'belief' in human nature, defined by the drive to conflict and
confrontation. In his recourse to the Hobbesian view of humanity, Schmitt seems to
suggest that the commencement of the political way of life, through the institution of the
sovereign, does not deal away with the human desire for conflict but merely represses it.
In other words, liberal political thought represses the 'genuine' political and substitutes it
with the neutral (i.e., depoliticized) sphere of the state. As a result, Schmitt's critique of
liberalism can be interpreted as an attempt at lifting the repression introduced by
liberalism: the concept of the political is the return of the repressed of politics-as-state.
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Liberal repression and the return of the repressed of politics
Considering the historical and intellectual context of Schmitt's thought, I would like to
emphasize again that the concept of the political arises primarily as a response and a
reaction to the classical liberal conception of politics, defined in terms of the state. In the
words of Leo Strauss, “...Schmitt's basic thesis is entirely dependent upon the polemic
against liberalism; it is to be understood only qua polemical...” (Strauss 2007, 84 ), that
is, set against the liberal processes of neutralization and depoliticization. The political, in
Schmitt (and later) does not stop reflecting on its historical origins, and this is where it
seems to gain its theoretical energy. Moreover, as I noted above, the political is the return
of the repressed of politics. First, the concept of the political is the return of the historicotheoretical repressed: those features (e.g., conflict) that were recognized by liberal
thought but eventually denied conscious existence in political space. Second, the political
(as the 'real' to which the concept refers) expresses the ever-present interruption of
politics by its unconscious: the continuous disruption of the ordered political reality by
the mobile and evasive principle of concrete life.
In his critique of liberalism,7 Schmitt presents it primarily as an ideology and movement
of neutralization and depoliticization. According to Schmitt, in the 17th century there
occurs a shift in Europe from Christian theology to “natural” science. At the core of the
shift lies “an elemental impulse that has been decisive for centuries, i.e. the striving for a
neutral sphere,” a sphere in which there would be no conflict, in which common
agreement would be reached through debates and exchange of opinion (Schmitt 1993,
137). This trajectory can be traced within liberal narrative of transition from the
conflictual state of nature to the neutral sphere of the political state, and can be
interpreted as a deliberate depoliticization of reality, as well as the repression of the
essence of the political. In order to understand better the Schmittian reversal of the
'hierarchy' between the domain of the political and the state of nature, let me have a

7

Schmitt's critique of liberalism is clearly expressed, for example, in his essay The Age of
Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (1993) and in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1985).
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closer look at an example of a liberal line of argumentation constructed in defence of the
necessity of institution of politics in the form of the state.
Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan (1994) is an exemplary case of the traditional, (proto)liberal,
conception of politics. Hobbes advocates the necessity of the institution of politics, in the
form of the state and the sovereign, based on the fear of “the state of nature,” the nonpolitical, disordered reality of human existence in the absence of absolute power or
authority. Furthermore, Hobbes aims to justify the transition to the political form of
existence from this natural state by suggesting that human passions and rationality make
it possible or even demand it (ch. xiii, 13-14). The state of nature, on the one hand, is the
state of absolute, unlimited 'freedom', where one can do whatever he wants and is limited
only by his own, primarily physical, capacities, since everyone is endowed with a certain
amount of “natural power” (ch. x, 2). In a sense, in the state of nature power circulates
freely: it is not fixed in one place and in one person. On the other hand, this 'freedom' in
the state of nature leads to a conflict of interests, where the natural rights and desires of
multiple individuals constantly intersect and, since there is no external power that could
oversee social interactions and ensure observation of the contracts, it leads to “the war of
all against all” (ch. xiii, 8). Consequently, the apparently unlimited 'freedom' turns into
'unfreedom', insofar as one is never guaranteed anything: all there is are obstacles,
presented by the conflicting desires of others. Since freedom, for Hobbes, is primarily
defined by the absence of impediments for the attainment of one's desires (survival and
self-preservation being of the utmost importance), the state of nature, in the end, is the
impediment to everyone's freedom and security.
As Hobbes famously put it, life in the state of nature is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short” (ch. xiii, 9). It is an a-social life of contingency and war, without a guarantee for
not only personal security, but any kind of social meaning and productivity (see, ch. xiii,
9). According to Hobbes, the main concern of every individual is struggle for power and,
most importantly, self-preservation by any means. As a result, lack of security and fear of
death become the major motivations for the social contract between all (ch. xvii). The use
of reason, with which all humans are equally endowed, ensures that the majority of
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individuals, in the pursuit of their best interest, decide to agree on the peaceful coexistence. Thus, the political state is established by persons who, in the face of the fear of
death, give up their 'freedom' and absolute right to everything and “confer” it, together
with their power, to one person, the sovereign, in exchange for protection from the
internal and international enemies or aggressors. This results in centralization and
accumulation of power in sovereign “hands” (ch. xvii, 13). The establishment of the state
fixes and codifies, as law, the circulation and exercise of power, which becomes solely
the right of the sovereign. Moreover, it fixes and regulates the use of violence, residual
from the state of nature, that becomes the exclusive right of the sovereign. In sum,
Hobbes attempts to establish a certain hierarchy between the conflictual, a-social and apolitical state of nature and the political state, defined by freedom and peace.
I would like to suggest that Hobbes' line of argumentation is representative of the liberal
repression of the political, and we can get a glimpse of the nature of this repression by
reading Hobbes against himself. In his description of the state of nature Hobbes
emphasizes its disorderly, asocial and apolitical character. Life in this state is qualitatively
inferior to political form of life: it is solitary as opposed to social, poor as opposed to
wealthy, nasty and brutish as opposed to peaceful and civilized, unproductive as opposed
to fruitful, etc. As Hobbes writes, in the condition of war, which defines the natural
condition of mankind, “there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is
uncertain, and consequently, no culture on earth, no navigation, nor use of the
commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of
moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the
earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all,
continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short” (ch. xiii, 9). In short, in order to establish and maintain the hierarchy
between the state of nature and politics, Hobbes presents the former in the most negative
terms. However, if we look closer at his interpretation of the transition from the state of
nature to politics, we can notice that a number of social and political elements are already
present in this 'savage' state.
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First and foremost, the very possibility of agreement of all, i.e., the social contract,
requires the use of language, which means that the state of nature is not absolutely asocial
and not devoid of shared meaning and understanding. A contract, for Hobbes, is “the
mutual transferring of right” (ch. xiv, 9), and “[t]he way by which a man ... transferreth
his right is a declaration, or signification by some voluntary and sufficient sign or signs,
that he doth so ... transfer, or hath so ... transferred the same, to him that accepteth it” (ch.
xiv, 7; my emphasis). So, before the political commonwealth comes into existence, such a
mutual transference of right has to, at least theoretically, occur among the majority of
people. However, if among these people there were no shared meaning and a sort of
community established, how and where would it be possible to declare or signify
anything in front of anyone and, moreover, to determine the “sufficiency” of the signs
used? It is precisely because of this, as Hobbes notes, it is impossible “to make covenants
with brute beasts”: “not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of, any
translation of right, nor can translate any right to another; and without mutual
acceptation, there is no covenant” (ch. xiv, 22; my emphasis). So, the sharing of language
or speech is the defining condition of mutual acceptation, and thus, of social contract.
Before there is politics there is social meaning and some sort of order in the state of
nature. The latter is not simply a chaotic, disordered reality of brutal war; the fact that
there is no overarching authority to ensure the observation of contracts does not mean
that there are no contracts in the natural state. On the contrary, this state is a state of
multiple, non-hierarchical contracts and covenants. On several occasions Hobbes speaks
of such “covenants entered into ... in the condition of mere nature” (ch. xiv, 27), based,
for example, on “mutual trust” (ch. xiv, 18) or “fear” (ch. xiv, 27), including the fear of
God (ch. xiv, 31). So, the problem of the non-performance of contracts, which Hobbes
'observes' in “the miserable condition of war” (consequent to “when there is no visible
power to keep them [men] in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance
of their covenants” (ch. xvii, 1)), cannot be rendered identical to the absence of sociality,
as Hobbes seems to advocate.
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Furthermore, the interpretation of the state of nature as apolitical itself springs from the
unquestioned premise of what counts as politics. From the very beginning Hobbes seems
to assume what politics is and can be, and constructs his view of the non-political from
that perspective. As a result, conflict, unordered power struggles and wars are excluded
from his view of politics that is confined to the commonwealth. However, at least from
two perspectives we can observe political activity in the state of nature: first, in the
establishment of multiple contracts based on deliberation and mutual understanding and
use of language; second, in the struggle between the multiple 'nodes' of concentrated
power. From this perspective, while 'classical' politics is defined by the ordered
movement of power, controlled and managed by the sovereign, 'politics' in the state of
nature is present in the un- or dis-ordered movement or circulation of power. Thus,
Hobbes' politics, i.e., the political commonwealth, is but a continuation of war by other
means. Nevertheless, in order to justify the necessity and essential 'goodness' of the
commonwealth, Hobbes, against himself, affirms that the state of nature is both asocial
and apolitical, and that life in the state of nature is qualitatively different from life in the
political community of the state. As a result, social existence and politics are reduced to
the space of the state, 'designed' to preclude the dangers of contingency, insecurity and
unordered, free flowing and circulating power in the state of nature. The very concept of
politics becomes a guarantor of security, a tool for policing the borders of ordered social
interactions. The thought of the real conflict is repressed within traditional political
theory: the institution of sovereign regulation is assumed to have conclusively eliminated
the dangers of conflictual, contingent and non-political life.
I argue that Schmitt's concept of the political essentially signals the return of the
repressed of the liberal political thought. In his attempt at lifting the liberal repression,
Schmitt explicitly rejects identification of politics with the state. In response, he not only
(re-)introduces confrontation and struggle into politics, but posits the “ever present
possibility of [war-like] conflict” (Schmitt 2007, 32) at the heart of “the political.”8 In
8

However, some scholars, for instance, Slavoj Žižek (1999b) and Chantal Mouffe (2005), critique
Schmitt for not being radical enough, that is, for not going beyond the conflict between “us” and
“them” in his concept of the political. Žižek suggests that the real task of leftist thought of politics
should be the “return of the political proper, that is, the reassertion of the dimension of antagonism”
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other words, Schmitt posits the state of nature, defined by the ever-present possibility of
war, at the centre of the political, thus reversing the Hobbesian desire for the containment
of conflict through the order of the state. In sum, what Hobbes defines as the non-political
state of nature, for Schmitt comes to constitute the very specificity of the political.9
“The political is the total”: the friend and enemy distinction
Schmitt's concept of the political introduced a new tendency into political thought: it is a
self-referential reflection on the new history of politics, on the “essence” of late-modern
politics and its tendencies, but at the same time it itself is an instance of the new
historico-political consciousness, in which politics is no longer reduced to the actuality of
the political sphere (the state and institutions) but extends far beyond its limits, merges
with life itself and thus becomes totality. What is interesting about this approach is not
necessarily its content: it is the approach itself, its methods and framework that are really
novel (cf. Szabo 2006). Regardless of the content that is attributed to the political by
Schmitt and his followers, the overarching framework remains without much variation:
the political is interpreted as potentiality that exists and can actualize anywhere and
anytime, be it in the form of an event, decision, resistance, revolution, insurrection,
inscription of the excluded, etc. Schmitt redefines the basic concepts of political theory:
not only is the political no longer limited by the sphere of the state, it turns out not to be
limited by anything, it becomes a new, open totality that cannot ever complete itself or
become closed.10 Thus, Schmitt proclaims, “[w]e have come to recognize that the political
is the total” (2005, 2).
Such a new interpretation of the political as totality is reflected in Schmitt's famous
friend-enemy distinction. He writes: “The specific political distinction to which political
actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy. This provides a
(Žižek 1999b, 35), which is coextensive with the political far beyond foreign relations.
9 For a discussion of Agamben's radicalization of Schmitt on this point, see, Prozorov (2009).
10 Many other scholars note this radical move and similarly suggest that the political transforms from a
limited concept into an expansive, deterritorialized and parasitic one; it becomes an ontological
horizon and merges with life itself (see, for example, Arditi 1996; Arditi 2008; Chrostowska 2009;
Deuber-Mankowsky 2008; Marder 2005; Shapiro 2003; Shapiro 2010; Szabo 2006; R. Wolin 1990).
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definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition or one indicative
of substantial content [...] The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree
of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation [...] The political
distinction is the strongest and most intense of the distinctions and categorizations...”
(2007, 26, 27; my emphasis). Several important points emerge here. According to
Schmitt, first, the political gains its conceptual autonomy only through the specificity of
criterion that it refers to and not through a reference to an essence; second, in the concept
of the political distinction as such is given an important role; third, an energetic aspect of
the political is expressed through the reference to intensity. Finally, the political exhibits
expansive and parasitic tendencies, insofar as it is not limited to a specific sphere and
derives its abundant energy from a variety of human activities.
One of the main goals that Schmitt proclaims as he pursues the concept of the political is
to show that the political is not limited to the state. Thus the opening sentence of the
essay: “The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political” (19).
Furthermore, Schmitt wants to distance himself from the common 'negative' definitions of
the political sphere of his time, and to present a positive one that proceeds from its own
criteria. He notes that politics tends to be defined negatively: “in contrast to various other
ideas, for example in such antitheses as politics and economy, politics and morality,
politics and law...” (20). Moreover, it is also often subordinated to these other spheres,
resulting in the political being just an extension of other human activities. In opposition to
such an attitude, Schmitt introduces into the discourse of political philosophy a
distinction which is, supposedly, independent from other spheres of activity and, thus,
presents an autonomous basis for the concept of the political. This concept, however,
remains incomplete, it is rather a non-concept in a sense of “a name for that what cannot
have a name” (Ojakangas 2005a, 36): a name of intensive 'life', the reality of which can
never be fully grasped by the intellect. Insofar as the political does not refer to “the
essential substance,” but finds its temporary certainty in a “criterion” that, by definition,
is always potentially multiple, it evades any limitation through a definition. As Marton
Szabo suggests, “[t]he political does not seek the essence, but the specific,” meaning that
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“Schmitt chooses from the competing possibilities of specification that one aspect based
upon which things get a political meaning, namely the friend-enemy distinction” (Szabo
2006, 32). In the end, Schmitt affirms not the autonomy of the political (based on a clear
definition of its object), as per his initial indication, but, rather, the specificity of the
political criterion (cf. Arditi 1996, 17). This ultimately provides the concept of the
political with much flexibility and a possibility for mobility across other social fields. The
political is no longer dependent on other spheres; on the contrary, it invests them with its
intense principle of differentiation. It is worth noting, in this regard, that it not just the
figures of the friend and enemy, as well as their struggle, that define the political: the
distinction as such plays an important role here. As Gary Ulmen suggests in his reading
of Schmitt's later work, Theory of the Partisan, the political is “defined not by enmity
(friend-enemy), but by the very distinction” (Ulmen 1987, 189). The political is a
principle of distinction or differentiation. It is not surprising that later political thinkers
will come up with a very appropriate term, “the political difference,” to refer to the play
of the irreducible difference at the heart of the political (cf. Marchart 2007).
Another important factor that contributes to the totalizing tendency of the political is the
notion of intensity. Schmitt suggests that the main difference of the political distinction
from other distinctions is the degree of its intensity, which results in the proposition that
any distinction can be politicized. As the intensity of a certain opposition grows, it
eventually can reach its highest level (friend/enemy distinction); and, when it reaches this
level, it is no longer an ethical, religious or any other opposition but a political
distinction. The quantitative augmentation of the intensity of an opposition results in its
qualitative transformation – politicization. In this way, Schmitt's discussion introduces
potentiality as an important factor of the concept of the political: any opposition may
become political. In the words of Michael Marder, “[g]iven that any opposition can
become political if it reaches the maximal intensity of friend-enemy groupings, the
political 'principle' assumes the place of potentiality inherent in various other spheres”
(2005, 15–16). Moreover, if we take into account Schmitt's pessimistic anthropology, we
can argue that human life as such tends toward politicization: it is attracted to the political
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(i.e., the potentiality of war and real conflict where life and death are at stake) in its very
essence. In a nutshell, the combination of the criteria of intensity and potentiality in
Schmitt results in the construction of the political as totality, meaning that every relation
can potentially reach the level of intensity necessary for the political to emerge.
Inasmuch as the political is only marked by the criteria of distinction and intensity and,
so, it can potentially consume or politicize any and every relation (i.e., opposition), it
does not have a place of its own; that is, it does not belong to a limited sphere or a field.
In this regard Szabo (2006) suggests that the political acquires an infinite character: it
can refer to anything by “touching” but not encircling its subject. The political, then, is a
total contact or “an infinite substance that penetrates life as a whole” (33). The political is
nothing else but “intensive life.” We can draw an interesting parallel between this
interpretation of the political and Georges Bataille's “general economy,” both of which
employ the rhetoric of energies and intensities. Bataille (1988) revised major economic
concepts and coined the notion of “general economy” – the unconscious of a “restricted”
or “rational economy” (traditionally limited to the principles of productive activity and
accumulation). General economy considers, contrary to economic science, the
heterogeneous “play of living matter in general” (23) that is not limited to a particular
domain or a utilitarian aim. This “general play” is very similar to what Schmitt suggests
about the political: its 'energy' is not restricted to a specific domain. The concept rather
refers to the play of the political distinction in general or, to use Bataille's language, to a
general economy of the political.11
We can further note that the concept of the political is parasitic. It not only infinitely
absorbs life, even in its potentiality, it also feeds off and digests the heterogeneous
energies of life. The political is “'parasitic' insofar as it draws its power from nonpolitical
commitments” (Shapiro 2003, 107). As Schmitt writes, “[t]he political can derive its
energy from the most varied human endeavours, from the religious, economic, moral, and
other antithesis” (2007, 38). This parasitism, on the one hand, results from the absence of
11

Some might object that the political is not capable of forming either an internal or external economy
(cf. Marder 2009, 59). However, such an objection, I believe, still rests on the notion of “restricted
economy.” As a result, I think it is possible to speak of a general economy of the political in Schmitt.
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the 'proper' place of the political; on the other hand, it is a defining feature of the political
distinction as such. As Marder suggests, “Schmitt frames his discussion of the political in
a kind of negative ontology, in the non-space or, better yet, in the displacement of
different domains of human action” (2009, 60). That is, the ability of the political to
thrive off the heterogeneous energies is not just an outcome of dislocation of politics (an
evolutionary adaptation) but is indicative of the political itself as the principle of
displacement.12
To sum up, the new totalizing tendency of the political consists in the consumption of life
(in its concreteness and potentiality) and of various human relations by the total
possibility of politicization. If, for example, ancient Greek, medieval and classical liberal
society used to have the criteria (at the very least, theoretical) for a more or less clear
distinction between politics and the non-political,13 late-modern political though, of which
Schmitt is a representative, finds such a distinction problematic. Due to the displacement
of the state's monopoly on politics, there is no longer an institution or objective structure
that could take the place of the state and draw the line between the political and the nonpolitical (cf. Szabo 2006, 29). Moreover, since the political, as potentiality, invests life
and all social spheres, they ultimately rely on it in the last instance (Marder 2009, 62).
They are not non-political as such, but are merely not yet fully politicized. I suggest that
Schmitt's drive toward total politicization can be explained by the problem of liberal
depoliticization, identified by him from the very start. However, it also seems plausible to
suggest that the institution of the political as totality can be attributed to a certain
(irrational) fear of depoliticization or the unpolitical. Insofar as the political is viewed as
always in danger of neutralization, depoliticization and sublimation into other domains
12 The political as the principle of displacement is taken up seriously by contemporary political thought,
especially in relation to the analysis of the mass phenomena of human displacement and dislocation,
such as the refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. The political as displacement of other spheres is
exemplified by the figure of the refugee that represents anything that flees from the rigid state-centred
framework of international order, challenges and transcends it toward the general economy of the
political, where the play is “performed” by living matter in general. I will return to this discussion
further on.
13 For example, the polis is opposed to oikos, freedom to slavery, inside to outside (e.g., the city wall as
“the sine qua non of the Greek polis” (McKesson Camp II 2000, 47)), political commonwealth to the
state of nature, and a public space to private.
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(cf. Marchart 2007, 44), this view provokes a reactive affirmation not just of the primacy
of the political but of the impossibility of any real (as opposed to merely appearing)
depoliticization at the ontological level. In this way, pressure from the fear of the nonpolitical contributes to the institution of the political as totality.
The political displacement: laceration of the body politic
I would like to further argue that a correlation is at the core of the political as totality: this
totality is split or “doubly inscribed.” There are two registers of politics that remain
infallibly present in the discourse of modern political theory, including Schmitt's thought.
The political differentiates itself from itself in self-critique, in self-overcoming or
becoming, and there are at least two primary dimensions of this self-differentiation. The
first dimension, as I discussed above, consists in the negative attachment of the thought
of the political to its historical origin, meaning that the late-modern thought of politics is
self-referential: it grounds itself in the tension and argumentation with the preexisting,
liberal, political thought. The second dimension consists in the recognition of a
difference, and consequent tension, between often visible, relatively immobile, ordered
political reality (politics-as-state, bureaucracy), and the fluid, 'unconscious' principle that
interrupts this order (the political as intensive life, conflict and an expansive movement of
distinction). In the words of Benjamin Arditi, these are the “two registers of political
matter,” of which one (politics) is fixed, and the other (the political) is expressive of the
“living movement, the magma of conflicting wills” (Arditi 1996, 21). Furthermore,
Slavoj Žižek calls such relation between the two principles a “double inscription” of the
political: “the political is inscribed as a gentrified domain of normalized or institutional
political exchanges (politics) and as the negativity of decisions and actions that put
objectivity into question (the political), whether at the local or macro levels, within or
outside the political sub-system” (quoted in Arditi 2008, 17). In Arditi's interpretation,
this means that politics and the political interpenetrate because of a “double coding” (17).
They are not alternative modes of inscription but, rather, correlated modes that constitute
themselves through a relation of mutual dependence and negation or interruption.
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In Schmitt we can see this correlation exemplified by the relation between the concepts of
the state and the political. In this respect, the opening sentence of The Concept of the
Political is symptomatic: “The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the
political” (2007, 19; my emphasis). Even though Schmitt implies here that the political is
prior to the state, it is ultimately the state that seems to call the political into question and
thus into being. The state still serves as a point of departure and the stable ground for
Schmitt's elaboration of the concept of the political. (This is the opposite of what we see
in liberal social contract theories, for instance, in Hobbes, where politics is 'summoned'
by the state of nature; in Schmitt's case it is the state or politics that demands the
introduction of the political and its conflictuality.) I would like to suggest that the reverse
of Schmitt's statement is also necessary for his theory: the concept of the political
presupposes the concept of the state, insofar as 'someone' (the sovereign) has to make a
decision on who counts as an enemy or a friend. The state and the political presuppose
and, simultaneously, negate and interrupt each other. As a result, the political, as totality
structured around correlation, does not effectively do what it appears to promise: it does
not 'liberate' the fluid principle from the rigid one. On the contrary, in his attempt to
rethink politics, Schmitt subordinates the political to the state, first, in terms of its
negation and, ultimately, as a product of the sovereign decision.
Schmitt recognizes these two registers of politics by distinguishing not just between the
concepts of the state and the political, but also between the mechanisms of repetition and
real life. In Political Theology (which was published several years before The Concept of
the Political) he writes: “In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust
of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition” (2005, 15). Even though he speaks
of the exception here, such a relation between real life (or an event) and repetition applies
to his concept of the political. The power of deciding on the distinction between friend
and enemy interrupts supposedly inert and neutral, non-conflictual reality of the statecentred form of life. The power of real life, which is inherently political due to its
dynamic and intensive character, breaks through the inert layer of repetitious practices
and mechanisms. However, this power does not dismantle these practices, it does not
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dispose of the body politic but rather appears as its chronic illness, a wound or laceration.
The punctual disruption of politics by the political principle of real life is not a
transformation of order into chaos; on the contrary, it functions within the framework of a
normal situation. As Colin Wright suggests, “radical novelty for Schmitt can only mean
chaos and anarchy. Because 'there is no norm that is applicable to chaos' (Schmitt: 2005,
p. 13) and no exception without a norm, it follows that 'the exception is different from
anarchy and chaos; order in the juristic sense still prevails' (p.12)” (2008, 8). The power
of real life that provides the political with its dynamic energy is not chaotic: it seems to
function as a force that actualizes itself primarily in reaction or in opposition to its own
petrification in the practices of normalization. The political, then, is a self-lacerating
rather than a self-cancelling unity: real life (i.e., the political) which breaks through the
crust of repetition and mechanization, does not create a new order but interrupts or
lacerates the existing one. So, through his concept of the political, Schmitt introduces a
permanent wound to the body politic.
In this regard, the Greek notion of stasis is useful for thinking through the concept of the
political in terms of the constant insurrection or laceration within the established political
order. On the one hand, stasis refers to a position and lack of movement. This meaning is
the most familiar to us today because, via Latin status/statio, it survived until this time by
signifying “a situation in which there is no change or development” (Oxford Dictionary),
and, politically, the state (Constantinou 2004, 6). On the other hand, according to Nicole
Loraux (2001), the major political meaning of stasis in ancient Greece was actually
related to antagonism, strife, revolution or, to use a Roman concept, civil war. In more
poetic language, it is “the division that tears apart and tears open: from Solon to
Aeschylus, stasis is a deep wound in the body of the city” (24). Schmitt also takes notice
of stasis, “an intriguing contradiction of a dialectical nature” (2008, 122–123). In a way
similar to Loraux's, he writes: “[s]tasis means in the first place quiescence, tranquillity,
standpoint, status; its antonym is kinesis, movement. But stasis also means, in the second
place, (political) unrest, movement, uproar and civil war” (123).14 In The Concept of the
14 On the notion of stasis see also works of Dimitris Vardoulakis (2009; 2010).
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Political Schmitt points out that the kind of enmity inherent in the political is necessarily
public: the enemy of the political distinction is the public enemy (hostis, polemios) and
not the private one (2007, 28). This distinction is derived from the ancient Greek
distinction between polemos, proper war between Hellenes and Barbarians, and stasis,
insurrection, conflict within the polis and among Hellenes. For the Greeks polemos was
the only real war, while stasis, as internal conflict, had a less radical meaning. Following
Plato Schmitt writes: since “a people cannot wage war against itself ... a civil war is only
a self-laceration and it does not signify that perhaps a new state or even a new people is
being created” (28–29, note 9; my emphasis). So, when Schmitt talks about the
potentiality of war as a defining feature of the political distinction, he thinks of polemos
and not stasis, thus his reduction of the political to the domain of foreign affairs, and to
the possibility of total annihilation or killing (i.e., creation of a radically new 'state') as the
measure of the authenticity of enmity (polemos). However, in The Concept of the
Political, despite Schmitt's affirmation of the political as polemos, we come across
elements of the political that are similar to stasis. For example, as I showed above, the
political, as real and intensive life (that obviously cannot be confined to the sphere of
international relations), constantly irrupts from within and interrupts the torpid order of
the state.
Furthermore, while in The Concept of the Political Schmitt wants to insist on the
exclusively polemical nature of political conflictuality, we find a confirmation of the
reworking of this concept in terms of stasis in his much later work, Theory of the
Partisan ([1963] 2004). In this work Schmitt elaborates his theory of enmity and suggests
that there are several types of enmity which, consequently, introduce a differentiation
within the concept of the political. I suggest that the initial concept of the political relies
primarily on the presence of “the conventional enmity of controlled and bracketed war”
between states (17). The conventional enemy presents an existential threat but is also
treated as an equal and with respect; moreover, the relation of enmity is often regulated
by the norms of international law. The partisan, on the other hand, acts outside these
restrictions, his very being is defined by his standing outside any containment: “[t]he
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modern partisan expects neither law nor mercy from the enemy. He has moved away
from the conventional enmity [...] and into the realm of another, real enmity, which,
through terror and counter-terror, grows continually, up to reciprocal annihilation” (17;
my emphasis). This form of enmity dominates partisan struggles against foreign
occupation but also often emerges during civil wars. The rise of “irregular” partisan
struggles, based on the notion of real and absolute enmity, for Schmitt signified the
gradual breakdown of the political order grounded in the primacy of state and inter-state
enmity. The recognition of the partisan as a new important political figure signals an
important turn in the concept of the political: the dominant “war among states, with its
precise rules, is put aside and substituted by a revolutionary war among parties [partisanwar]” (44). The distinctive criteria for identifying the partisan are: “irregularity, increased
mobility of active combat, and increased intensity of political engagement,” as well as his
“telluric” character (23).15 Schmitt emphasizes that the political character of the partisan
is decisive, otherwise, nothing would distinguish him from a common thief or a
criminal.16 (Here, as in The Concept of the Political, Schmitt highlights the public
character of enmity.) The figure of the partisan represents a new type of the political
which is not limited by conflict between the states, but can be rather defined in terms of
laceration from within the state order. It emerges here and there irregularly and
exemplifies the heightened intensity of the political distinction. As Schmitt concludes,
“[t]he theory of the partisan flows into the concept of the political, into the question
15 The partisan, however, has his limitations due to these characteristics: first, his enemy is real and not
absolute; second, he is limited by the defensive (despite the increased mobility) and telluric character
of his struggle, an “autochthonous” relation to the piece of earth he defends (2004, 76).
16 Schmitt singles out the role of the “friend” or “the third party” in the recognition of the political nature
of the partisan struggle. “[T]he interested third party plays an essential role when it provides that
reference to the regular, which the partisan’s irregularity needs in order to remain within the political
sphere. Now, the substance of the political is not enmity pure and simple, but the ability to distinguish
between friend and enemy, and to presuppose both friend and enemy. Although the powerful third
party interested in the partisan’s action can think or act as egoistically as he wishes, his political
interest is on the side of the partisan. This results in the birth of a political friendship, which is already
a type of political recognition, even if it does not come to public or formal recognition as a fighting
part or as government” (2004, 75–76; my emphasis). This passage is unique in Schmitt's writings on
the political since it gives an account of political friendship. In The Concept of the Political Schmitt
only mentions friendship as a defining feature of the political distinction but on no occasion discusses
it at any length, suggesting a conclusion that it is essentially enmity that 'defines' the political (cf. Van
Der Zweerde 2007).
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concerning who is the real enemy and in a new nomos of the earth” (78).17 As the nature
of enmity in the contemporary world changes, so does the concept of the political. In the
end, Schmitt opens his concept of the political to a much wider application than he
initially conceived.
In the final analysis, the correlative character of the political, together with its totalizing
tendency, makes it hard to conceive of anything that remains beyond politicization, actual
or potential. Insofar as political matter is split into two correlated registers (the political
and politics, antagonism and order, movement and immobility) anything can be
incorporated into it. The elements that confront the established order are automatically
politicized and even re-inscribed into order as its negation and interruption. Furthermore,
as we will see below, anything that challenges the political is also politicized through that
very confrontation. It is no longer the state that defines the political; on the contrary, the
excess of traditional politics (e.g., conflict, antagonism, war, intensive life) is at the core
of the concept of the political. However, regular politics or the state still remain the
necessary component in the emergence of the political. For Schmitt, the political, in its
correlation with politics, is the total. As a result of such a totalizing tendency it becomes
almost impossible to draw a line or to distinguish between what is political and what is
not.
The unpolitical exception and the neutral
What is outside the political? For Schmitt, there seems to be nothing that escapes
potential politicization. As I showed above, the political is inherent in the very nature of
humanity; it is intensive life, and, thus, it is impossible to eliminate. Leo Strauss (2007)
comes to a similar conclusion in his critique of Schmitt. He argues that insofar as the
political is proclaimed by Schmitt to be “a basic characteristic of human life,” it is
17 Nevertheless, Schmitt suggests that the partisan eventually becomes involved in the wars with
“absolute enmity.” In the wake of the revolutionary movements of the begging of the 20 th century but
also in the nuclear age, “[t]he denial of real enmity paves the way for the destructive work of absolute
enmity” (2004, 78). For example, Lenin, “a professional revolutionary engaged in a global civil war,
went further and turned the real enemy into a foe [absolute enemy]” (76). As a result, he consciously
conceives of the partisan as an important figure in the struggle against the absolute enemy in “national
and international civil war” (45).
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destiny: humans cannot escape it (94). Moreover, it is also necessary in this way, because
it is given in human nature, and human ceases to be human when it ceases to be political
(95). Strauss suggests that ultimately the question of negation or affirmation of the
political can be reduced to a quarrel about human nature: whether humans are 'good' or
'evil'. Schmitt's assumption about humans as 'evil' cannot be deduced from his concept of
the political; on the contrary, the political rests on the presupposition of the pessimistic
anthropology. The latter is indeed no more than a “supposition,” which cannot be proved
but largely remains a matter of an “anthropological confession of faith” (96). As a result,
insofar as the opposite anthropological belief is possible, the political is in principle
“threatened,” and thus requires not mere “recognition” of its reality, but its decisive
“affirmation.” Schmitt's The Concept of the Political presents such an affirmation in a
form of a normative (and not in itself polemical, as he would prefer to view it)
affirmation of a belief in the human as “evil” by nature, that is, as a dangerous and
dynamic being (see, Strauss 2007, 96–97). Furthermore, Strauss rightly notes that the
“inescapability of the political is displayed in the contradiction in which man necessarily
becomes entangled if he attempts to eliminate the political. This effort has a prospect of
success if and only if it becomes political...” (94). While here Strauss mainly thinks of the
politicization of such an effort by its necessary intensification and resulting
transformation of the situation into that of enmity and war between the opponents of the
political (pacifists) and it proponents (nonpacifists), the contradiction of this attempt to
overcome the political goes much further.
In particular, this contradiction appears in the decision on the exception or the unpolitical;
it is an originary contradiction that cannot be resolved logically, and which, consequently,
acquires the status of a miracle-like event that institutes the abyssal ground of any
political decision. In 1933 Schmitt writes: “We have come to recognize that the political
is the total, and as a result we know that any decision about whether something is
unpolitical is always a political decision, irrespective of who decides and what reasons
are advanced” (Schmitt 2005, 2). I suggest that this quote from a preface to the second
edition of Political Theology, which was written shortly after The Concept of the Political
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and Hitler's coming to power in Germany, is the quintessence of Schmitt's political
thought. It brings together two of the major concepts from two of his most influential
works: the concept of the political, revolving around the opposition between friend and
enemy, and decision on the exception, as a defining feature of sovereignty: “[s]overeign
is he who decides on the exception” (5). What is the relationship between the political
and the exception? An answer to this question will help to shed some light on the fate of
the unpolitical in Schmitt's thought.
In my opinion, the main connection between the political and the exception in Schmitt is
decision. In fact, upon a closer examination, we can distinguish between two kinds of
decisions on two types of distinction: first, a decision on the absolute form of the
exception or the unpolitical – the originary event; second, a decision about friend and
enemy groupings (i.e., the political) that occurs within the space already affected by the
originary event. Schmitt writes that “[t]he exception appears in its absolute form when a
situation in which legal prescriptions can be valid must first be brought about. Every
general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually
applied and which is subjected to its regulations. The norm requires a homogeneous
medium ... and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation
actually exists” (13; my emphasis). We can see here 'the originary event' of the political:
institution of the normal situation or a homogeneous medium where it becomes possible
to identify friends and enemies or to decide on their distinction. Such a decision cannot
be applicable to chaos. I suggest that what is excepted through this originary decision is
the unpolitical or “the neutral”: in this sense, the exception in its absolute form is the
exception of the unpolitical, of the radical outside of the political. However, for Schmitt,
insofar as any decision about something unpolitical is always a political decision, there
can be no unpolitical as such. It is immediately politicized through the sovereign
decision. The unpolitical, then, is a mere illusion and a negativity posited for a political
purpose (which is consistent with Schmitt's view of the political as an expansive and
totalizing principle). In this regard, Schmitt's thought of the political, a correlative
affirmation of the political against the background of liberal depoliticization, is itself the
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political gesture par excellence. Nevertheless, there is a sense of the unpolitical in
Schmitt beyond mere 'illusion' in the 'real' of the exception (i.e., the power of life that
breaks through). By claiming that any decision on the unpolitical is a political decision,
Schmitt involves the logic of exception: an element is included through its exclusion.
Something is unpolitical only as long as it is an outcome of a political decision, meaning
that while the decision excludes an element from the political field, it simultaneously
creates an unbreakable (constitutional) tie of the excluded with the political. I maintain
that the unpolitical (the outside of the political, the absolute form of the exception or
simply life) is incorporated, in Schmitt, into the political only partially, as a product of a
political decision (i.e., on the exception) within the already instituted normal situation.
The unpolitical as such, not correlated to a political decision, which is, perhaps, intimated
in Schmitt's reference to “chaos” and “the exception in its absolute form,” is not given a
substantial account. The Schmittian totality of the political seems to require a radical
outside but ultimately remains blind to it. Consequently, Schmitt would rather suggest
that there is no unpolitical beyond the exception to the norm (i.e., correlated to a political
decision), and that there is no radical outside of the political. There is only the immanent
transcendence of the exception (cf. Ojakangas 2005a). Such a denial of the outside is “a
pronounced blindness,” characteristic of the self-grounding phenomena (of which the
political is an example), “to everything that surrounds or falls outside of it” (Marder
2005, 19). The political grounds itself in its own premises, it is self-referential, and thus
the only “outside” it allows is the limited exception – an inclusive exclusion. I believe
that contemporary post-foundational political thought inherits this feature from Schmitt:
it does not conceive of the unpolitical beyond such an exception.
Inasmuch as the exception is ultimately beyond the friend and enemy distinction, it is
similar to that what Strauss calls “the neutral.” He suggests that the Schmittian enemy
figure appears as a result of the the dissolution of neutrality: “...each looks intently at his
enemy; in order to gain a free line of fire, with a sweep of the hand they wave aside –
without looking at – the neutral who lingers in the middle, interrupting the view of the
enemy” (Strauss 2007, 106; my emphasis). Even though for Strauss the neutral seeks
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mediation and is a case for a possible reconciliation of the enemies, one does not have to
interpret it that way only. The neutrality can be viewed in more general terms, as the
unpolitical that is blindly (“without looking at”) swept aside by the desire for the political
and its advocacy. We recognize again the blindness to the outside that accompanies the
political as a self-grounding phenomenon. The neutral, as the third of the political
distinction, is not only ignored but also actively repressed and eliminated, resulting in
constitution of the ground for the political as absent. As Marder puts it, “for Schmitt, the
political begins with the cognitive-perceptual elimination of the neutral third” (Marder
2005, 18). This third, as I suggested above, is the unpolitical, the outside of the political
as such. However, in Schmitt's work this neutral field is made present or visible only in a
limited way – as an exception. Thus, the blind field of the unpolitical has a potentially
visible spot – an exception – in which we can get a glimpse of the outside, and from
which the political can observe itself. So, while Schmitt's political is the total and
expansive, its outside is retained in the exception. Its absent origin is 'localized' and
recreated in the exception. In this way, the political is a borderline concept: it acquires its
meaning by drawing a line between itself and its other, in this case the unpolitical. And
the latter is only partially accounted for as the exception. This results in the political
being an exception-based concept: it explains (and traces its origin) and legitimates itself
through that which it is not, even though its other is granted only a limited recognition.
The primary example of the exception in Schmitt is sovereignty and sovereign decision.
In the words of Sylwia Chrostowska, sovereign self-exemption constitutes “a political
event of the first order” (2009, 104).18 The sovereign exempts itself from the norm it
institutes, since in order to be able to suspend it (like in the state of exception), he has to
remain outside the law. The logic of sovereignty is that of the excluded middle, like a
proposition about all propositions (e.g., that all propositions are either true or false) that
in its very utterance institutes a fixed relationship among all other propositions, but
18 It would be interesting to compare the status of the sovereign decision in Schmitt, as a political event
of the first order, to an event as the starting point of politics, for example, in Rancière's and Badiou's
thought. For Rancière (1999) an event, as the inscription of “the part with no part” into the order of
police, signifies the initiation of politics proper. For Badiou, an event initiates the process of fidelity
and politics as the truth procedure. For an interesting comparison between Schmitt's exception and
Badiou's event see an article by Colin Wright (2008).
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remains undecided on its own belonging to the set of those propositions (thus it cannot be
decided if it is true or false). It is both inside and outside, an inclusive exclusion or simply
a paradox. William Rasch (2002) contends, in this regard, that “for the law of the
excluded middle to operate, it must be the excluded middle, neither true nor false. Thus,
self-exemption 'solves' the paradox of totalizing propositions by rudely and insolently
becoming the paradox” (39). Sovereign self-exemption is such a paradox: an ultimate
exception, a limited instance of the unpolitical, which is neither friend nor enemy, neither
inside nor outside. Giorgio Agamben's reading of Schmitt is emblematic here. In Homo
Sacer (1998) he proposes that Western politics rests on the originary exception of bare
life or sovereign banishment of zoē from the order of bios or politics. Bare life, as an
exception or “the unpolitical” (173), however, has its perfect double – the sovereign
decision. The space of politics is thus established and continues to be re-established
through a double exception – of sovereign and bare life. This constant re-invention of the
exception is necessary since, as Colin Wright points out, it performs a structurally
stabilizing function that governs the field of (political) knowledge: the exception “polices
an inside through an articulation with an outside, creating the strategic usefulness of a
zone of indistinction – such as the Hobbesian sovereign, the Rousseauian Legislator, or,
indeed, the Freudian primordial father” (Wright 2008, 11). Agamben's analysis of Schmitt
seems to suggest that the neutral or the unpolitical in Western political tradition is
reduced to the exception. It will be the task of further examination of Agamben's thought
to see whether he succeeds in recognizing a possibility of the outside of politics beyond
the monopoly of the exception.
In conclusion, Schmitt invests the concept of the political with a new meaning that
oscillates around the friend and enemy distinction, and exhibits a totalizing and expansive
character. It emerges as a historical reaction that takes the form of a critique of
neutralization and liberal depoliticization. The political is conceived by Schmitt mostly as
a response to what it wants to deny – the state of liberal political philosophy. The totality
of the political is further characterized by the correlation: a play between the state and the
concept of the political (a play between two registers of political “matter”), and between
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dynamic life and its mechanization through repetition. Beyond this totality of the political
Schmitt seems to leave room for the unpolitical (or the neutral) only in the form of the
exception. While Schmitt famously defines the political through the distinction between
friend and enemy, one fully comprehends the scope of the political only by
complementing it with a reading of his Political Theology that proclaims that the political
is the total and that any decision about whether something is unpolitical is always a
political decision. Consequently, two decisions define Schmitt's thought – a decision on
the unpolitical, and a decision on distinction between friend and enemy. In the final
analysis, the political seems to leave no room for the unpolitical as such. As per Schmitt's
suggestion, the unpolitical manifests itself only in the form of the exception, mediated by
a political decision, and never positively and immediately as such.

1.2. Foucault's Politics: Dynamic Social Ontology, Struggle for
Power and Care of the Self
Even though Foucault did not posit the distinction between 'politics' and 'the political' in
these very terms, he introduced into the thought of politics a new trend that was
appropriated by political theory in a way similar to the concept of the political: as a tool
for the critique of the traditional view of politics. The novelty of Foucault's thought, in
this regard, lies in the methodological critique of the traditional account of “Power” as
“the system of Law-and-Sovereign.” First, I argue that Foucault's reconceptualization of
power, in terms of the multiplicity of force relations, leads, in a way similar to Schmitt's,
toward the general economy of the political as the general economy of power.
Furthermore, Foucault's investigations of modern governmentality suggest the conclusion
that everything is political or, rather, that everything is potentiality political, that is, may
become political through the intervention of power struggles and resistance.
Consequently, throughout Foucault's archeological and genealogical works, we can note
the double inscription of the notion of politics: politics in the strict sense, as the struggle
for power, the experience of power games and the play of resistances, agonistic in its
structure; and politics as the institutional crystallization of these games, often a rigid
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system that gives rise to the problems of political constitution. Foucault famously applies
his methodological innovations to the study of modern society, suggesting that we live in
the age of biopolitics. The relations of power that, in the first place, are not confined to a
specific field of operation, in modernity take life as their object. Considering Foucault's
novel methodology as well as his suspicion of ahistorical political analysis, I will raise
the question of the unpolitical in relation to his discussion of the specifically modern
form of power or governmentality. In modernity politics exhibits its totalizing ambition
by attaching its operation to individual bodies and populations in an effort to govern and
multiply life. Life is the problem of modern politics. We get some intimations of the
unpolitical in Foucault's late ethical works that, I suggest, might point in the direction of
unpolitical forms of living, based on a different notion of life. Life that “escapes” the grip
of modern (bio)politics takes the form of care of the self. However, it remains unclear
whether this practice of care is merely a case of 'another' politics or of a real, unpolitical
experience of living.
Dynamic social ontology: power and force relations
The initial problem that arises in relation to Foucault as a political thinker is the
significance of the notion of politics. It is not always clear what meaning Foucault assigns
to “politics” and “political” (as an adjective), moreover, whether he distinguishes them at
all from “power relations.” Initially it seems that Foucault's use of this adjective is rather
conventional, meaning that it refers to government of the state. Barry Hindess (2005)
holds a similar opinion and suggests that Foucault was not much concerned with how
“politics” and related terms should be used; and he uses “political” to refer to aspects of
the government of a state: “a type of reason that, in his view, has been particularly
influential in the history of Western societies and that [...] could well be described as
‘political’” (390; my emphasis). What is important here is that politics, as government of
the state, is desubstantialized: it is not a universal or substantial characteristic of politics,
it is just one type of reason that assumes dominance in modernity and presents itself as
invariant and ahistorically given. In fact, the thought of political reason as state reason is
specific to modernity (cf. Foucault 1979): as the thought of the essence of sovereignty
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and the centralized exercise of power it has been among the major preoccupations of
modern political philosophers. Foucault is critical of such an enterprise not because he
thinks that it fails to account for the 'real' of the political, but because such preoccupation
with the state as the ahistorical locus of power fails to recognize its own immanence to a
wider field of operation of multiple forces. The government of modern society is not
limited to government by the state; the latter is just one of the ways of strategic
integration of multiple tactics (a mode of power) that extend throughout the social body.
So, Foucault's critique of this “political reason” does not call for its replacement with
another reason; it calls for the illumination and uncovering of “a positive unconscious” or
a “grid of intelligibility” of modern political rationality.
Foucault introduces the notion of “a positive unconscious” in his foreword (written in
1970) to the English edition of The Order of Things (first published in French in 1966). In
the midst of the discussion of the differences between his archaeological method and that
of a historian of science, Foucault suggests that while the latter's concern is to describe
consciousness (e.g., discoveries and problems) and the 'negative' unconscious of science
(e.g., invisible influences and obstacles, implicit philosophies), his task is to reveal a
positive unconscious of knowledge. “This unconscious [of science] is always the negative
side of science – that which resists it, deflects it, or disturbs it. What I would like to do,
however, is to reveal a positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the
consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing
its validity and seeking to diminish its scientific nature” (Foucault 1994, xi). I would like
to suggest that the figure of the positive unconscious can be used not only in relation to
Foucault's early archaeological works, but also as a conceptual tool for understanding his
genealogical studies. There occurs a shift in Foucault's thought sometime between the
publication of The Order of Things (1966) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969),
and his notion of the positive unconscious is indicative of this shift: it can be interpreted
as a “correction” to Foucault's initial appreciation of psychoanalysis (which revolves
around the “negative” unconscious) as a counter-science. The positive unconscious is not
in a relation of disruption to consciousness, on the contrary, it is immanent to it: the
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conscious organization of scientific discourse can be understood by revealing its “grid,”
the rules that operate at the level of a discursive formation. The positive unconscious does
not elude consciousness even though it is not immediately present to it; it can be brought
to light as positivity, and not just as a failure of reason. We can detect in this notion of the
positive unconscious the planar character of Foucault thought, which is explicitly
articulated in The Archaeology of Knowledge. As a result, my political correlation thesis
will apply to his thought to a much lesser degree: as we will see, the correlated terms,
similarly to the relation between consciousness and the positive unconscious, are not
mere negatives of each other, they are positively co-present (but not immediately visible)
to each other. The circularity of their relation is never 'vertical' but is situated on the same
level, on a plane. However, I will argue further that politics, nevertheless, remains 'doubly
inscribed' in Foucault.
The positive unconscious of The Order of Things reappears in Foucault's first volume of
The History of Sexuality ([1976] 1990) in terms of a “grid of intelligibility.” In the
“Method” section of this work Foucault explicitly presents his methodological critique of
“Power” (and politics) as “the system of Law-and-Sovereign” by revealing its “grid of
intelligibility” – “the multiplicity of force relations.” 19 Through a critique of the political
reason of modernity, Foucault presents a different “level” of political analysis – that of “a
micro-physics of power” (Foucault 1995, 26) or “micro-politics,” to use a Deleuzian
term. This micro-political analysis renders power, the multiplicity of force relations, as “a
grid of intelligibility of the social order” (Foucault 1990, 93). Let us now look closer at
what Foucault means by this.
Foucault begins his critique of “Power” with a historically situated critique of the stateoriented thought, of modern political reason. Foucault identifies “Power” with what is
traditionally meant by politics: “the system of Law-and-Sovereign” (1990, 97), “a group
of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given
19 Of course, this method was developed by Foucault before the publication of the first volume of The
History of Sexuality, for example, in Discipline and Punish (1975). However, I believe that it is The
History of Sexuality that presents Foucault's critique of “Power” in the most concise and forceful
manner.
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state” (92), or a number of managerial techniques that order societies and oversee the
centralized exercise of power and its 'proper' distribution in order to achieve the essential
goal of politics – 'good life'. Power is understood here as a certain substance that can be
possessed, held and exercised, and that is contained within the essential political
institutions as a result of its originary transaction (in the form of the social contract) of
the multitude with the sovereign. In opposition to such a view of “Power,” Foucault
offers an alternative: power as “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere
in which they operate and which constitute their own organization” (92). It is a flexible
grid which “underlies” or “conditions” (but only as the positive unconscious) the
manifest expressions of “Power.” The latter is but a result of the integration of a
multiplicity of forces that is never finial. It is such a split of political reality into a
multiplicity of forces and their integration that, I suggest, gives us an initial indication of
the correlation or the double inscription of politics in Foucault.
This multiplicity of force relations has many characteristics of the Schmittian concept of
the political (however, in this case, it is not a concept that is a stake but the very
materiality of the forces). Among these traits is, first of all, conflictuality, for the force
relations under consideration are not only multiple but also engaged in “ceaseless
struggles” (Foucault 1990, 92). They are “unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable, and
tense” (93), “nonegalitarian and mobile” (94). Here Foucault presents a war or battle
model of power (cf. Protevi 2010; Lazzarato 2002). He offers a similar description in
Discipline and Punish ([1975] 1995): “the study of this micro-physics [of power]
presupposes that ... one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a contract
regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory” (Foucault 1995, 26; my emphasis).
Here we see a rejection, similar to Schmitt's, of the liberal, contractual model of social
relations: the operation of the multiple forces does not tend 'naturally' toward unification
due to the reasonable necessity for security or unity. On the contrary, it is a war-like
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model, not reducible to the international arena, as in Schmitt. 20 The battle is 'ontological',
constitutive of the very being of the social.
So, in his analysis of power Foucault relies on a conflictual ontology. While for Schmitt
the political lies in the friend and enemy distinction and their war-like relationship, for
Foucault the conflict is prior to any constituted identities (insofar as friend and enemy are
real, identifiable entities). The Schmittian version of conflict is thus, at most, a
crystallized form of the relations of forces. The battle or war model of power that
Foucault presents is located not at the level of constituted identities or defined
adversaries, but at the ontological level, meaning that it presents an originary difference
that lies at the basis of the social order. John Protevi (2010) suggests, in this regard, that
Foucault employs a “differential historical methodology” (this applies, specifically, to the
study of power relations in his genealogical analyses and later works on
governmentality). So, what I called 'conflictual ontology' implies that the conflict is
understood in terms of irreducible difference and multiple force relations. It is a
“differential methodology” or “a dynamic social ontology” (7).
Another important feature of Foucault's methodology is the immanence of organization to
the multiplicity: forces are immanent in the sphere in which they operate and they
constitute their own organization. For example, as I noted above, the state is just a
specific organization of forces, it is in no way necessary or unchangeable; it, as a mode of
organization, is immanent to the field of multiple forces. Thus, in Foucault's view there is
no split into two dimensions, for example, visible and invisible or structure and
superstructure (he is critical of both phenomenological and Marxist approaches). There is
no overarching “Power” or organization that exists separately from the multiplicity, and
that captures and controls it from the outside. Any organization of power is “a strategy
that is immanent in force relationships” (Foucault 1990, 97). The organization of forces
happens from within the “sphere” in which they operate. As Protevi puts it, “[i]t's
20 For a comparison of Schmitt and Foucault see also Deuber-Mankowsky 2008, whose major argument
is that while Schmitt's account of the political is reducible to the domain of foreign policy, Foucault's
analysis of governmentality as political economy of life (politicization of life in biopolitics) deals with
the micro-level of social relations, which Schmitt's conception does not account for.
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important to emphasize that this multiplicity is ontological, as is its integration” (2010,
12–13). This, again, emphasizes the planar character of Foucault's thought.
This plane of power relations is 'infinite', in a sense that it is not confined to a specific
(finite) sphere. Like the political, power relations proliferate everywhere, they come from
everywhere, they do not have a singular source; in this sense power is omnipresent,
“power is everywhere” (Foucault 1990, 93). Everything is potentially involved in power
relations or power games. Foucault writes: “Relations of power are not in a position of
exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge
relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter; they are the immediate
effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and
conversely they are the internal conditions of these differentiations; relations of power
are not in superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment;
they have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play” (94; my emphasis).
This passage brings up several important points: first, the organization of power is
immanent and in no way superstructural; second, power knows no exteriority in relation
to other 'spheres' or kinds of relations, on the contrary, it is immanent to them, meaning
that the very appearance of their difference (their classification) is an effect of power
relations. Finally, power is productive and not merely repressive.
While force relations make power intelligible (as their strategic integration), power is
itself “a grid of intelligibility” for social relations. In order to understand the latter one
has to decode or decipher them, to decompose the visible unities and identities into the
multiple fields of forces that are organized on the basis of various strategies that only
appear as stable or given (for example, class and gender divisions, situations of
domination, etc.). In an interview conducted in 1978 by Pasquale Pasquino Foucault
describes his project as a reading of reality: “[d]eciphering a layer of reality in such a
way that the lines of force and the lines of fragility come forth... It is the reality of
possible struggles that I wish to bring to light” (Foucault 1996a, 261; my emphasis). So,
the relations of forces are at the basis of Foucault's epistemology: they form a field or a
grid that enables our understanding of social reality and reveals possible points of
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struggle. The notion of force, which in physics signifies capacity for work or productive
interaction and impact, once it is incorporated into the study of social reality, becomes the
primary source of production and, consequently, of the intelligibility of social
organization.
Foucault's use of the notion of 'force', in this regard, gives us an interesting insight into a
long philosophical tradition of investigation of “the world as active power” (see,
Pietarinen and Viljanen 2009). To be more specific, Foucault's thought of power relations
traces its origin to the Nietzschean notion of the “will to power.” 21 These are “relations of
domination (Herrschafts – Verhältnissen) which are immanent in a multiplicity of force
relations” (Ansell-Pearson 1991, 273), and productive of human subjects. According to
William Connolly, there are two ways of interpreting Nietzsche's philosophy of power:
first, in terms of mastery and domination; second, as affirmation of otherness (1988, 161).
These two readings are not opposed to each other, they can be unified, to some extent, in
an interpretation of the will to power as self-overcoming (through affirmation of
irreducible difference) that implies self-mastery (a kind of ethics). In both cases the
important point is that the will to power is not confined to any 'sphere' of relations, it is a
universal principle attributed to all living beings. In Walter Kaufmann's view, the will to
power for Nietzsche is “not only the basic urge of man but nothing less than the
fundamental drive of all living beings” (1974, 206). He quotes from Beyond Good and
Evil:
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the
development and ramification of one basic form of the will – namely, of the
will to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be
traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution of
the problem of procreation and nourishment – it is one problem – then one
21 Foucault openly acknowledged his debt to Nietzsche on several occasions. For example, in his last
interview Foucault responds: “...I am simply Nietzschean, and I try to see, on a number of points, and
to the extent that it is possible, with the aid of Nietzsche's texts – but also with anti-Nietzschean theses
(which are nevertheless Nietzschean!) – what can be done in this or that domain. I'm not looking for
anything else but I'm really searching for that” (Foucault 1988, 251). As Keith Ansell-Pearson
suggests, Nietzschean influences in Foucault can be reduced to the major two: first, understanding of
power in terms of relations of forces, and second, critique of modern metaphysics and its privileging
of subject as an autonomous entity (1991, 270).
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would have gained the right to determine all efficient force univocally as –
will to power. The world viewed from inside, the world defined and
determined according to its “intelligible character” – it would be “will to
power” and nothing else [J 36]. (Nietzsche quoted in Kaufmann 1974, 217)22
So, for Nietzsche all “efficient” forces can be defined in terms of the will to power; and
these very forces constitute the world. As a result, to view the world from the inside, that
is, according to its “intelligible character,” would mean to view it from the perspective of
forces. To use Foucault's formulation of this epistemological problem, the will to power is
a “grid of intelligibility” of the world. It is interesting that the latter for Nietzsche is
specifically the world of the living; the will to power is fundamental drive of all living
beings: “Only where there is life, there is also will: not will to life but . . . will to power.
There is much that life esteems more highly than life itself; but out of the esteeming itself
speaks the will to power” (quoted in Kaufmann 1974, 206).23
Furthermore, Nietzsche's understanding of the will to power as the animating force of the
world can be interpreted as a response to the Hegelian view of force (as Spirit striving for
freedom). Without going into too much detail, an important feature of Hegelian thought is
the dialectical sublation of difference (aufhebung); in this case it concerns the opposition
of the sensible world and the supersensible (metaphysical) force of Concept or Spirit (see,
Schmidt 2009). The notion of force seems to appear as a medium that carries out the
dialectical movement of the Concept; force is like the blood of the world: “This simple
infinity, or the absolute Notion, may be called the simple essence of life, the soul of the
world, the universal blood, whose omnipresence is neither disturbed nor interrupted by
any difference, but rather is itself every difference, as also their supersession; it pulsates
within itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest. It is self-identical, for the
differences are tautological; they are differences that are none” (Phenomenology of Spirit,
22 Kaufmann notes in relation to this proposition that Nietzsche still employs experimental thinking here,
which is perceivable from his rhetoric. However, later Nietzsche will express his views from a position
of a prophet or a legislator. On the normative aspects of Nietzsche's notion of the will to power see, for
example, Sedgwick (2007).
23 It is interesting that Nietzsche seems to ascribe the will to power not to life in general, but specifically
to “organic life.” He writes: “In the case of an animal, it is possible to trace all its drives to the will to
power; likewise all the functions of organic life to this one source” (Will to Power, section 619, p.
333).
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section 162, p. 100). This Hegelian force of the Concept or movement of the Spirit (the
universal blood, the simple essence of life, the soul of the world) is reminiscent of the
Nietzschean will to power (that which defines and animates the world, and which is
attributed to the living as a universal drive). Walter Kaufmann draws an interesting
comparison in this regard and suggest that Hegel's “aufheben” (which means preserving,
cancelling and lifting up, and could be translated as “sublating”) and Nietzsche's
“sublimieren” (which could be translated as “sublimating”) are very closely related
(1974, 228–256). In fact, Latin word sublimare, from which the latter is derived, means
aufheben in German; in this respect, Nietzsche's sublimation involves a simultaneous
preserving, cancelling, and lifting up as well. Furthermore, Kaufmann suggests that
“sublimation is possible only because there is a basic force (the will to power) which is
defined in terms of an objective (power) which remains the same throughout all
'metamorphoses'” (236). In other words, while an immediate objective is cancelled, the
essential goal (i.e., power) is preserved, resulting in the lifting up – attainment of greater
power. Both Nietzsche's will to power and Hegel's spirit are conceived as “the essence of
the cosmos,” consequently they cannot be restricted to Logik or psychology but can be
found everywhere (237). Since both principles rely on ceaseless striving, the essence of
the cosmos lies in the striving of opposing forces.
However, for Hegel this principle is teleological, it tends toward the eventual
reconciliation of these opposing forces, while for Nietzsche this struggle is open-ended
(his dialectic is of a different kind): the tension is not resolved, power is not exhausted in
the attainment of a greater degree. Moreover, while for Hegel the force has an essentially
rational or intelligible quality, for Nietzsche this is not the case. We can note, in this
respect, the influence of Schopenhauer who, according to Valtteri Viljanen, “alters the
moral standing toward dynamistic metaphysics by claiming that the fundamental dynamic
factor underlying everything is far removed from rationality, intelligibility, design, or
providence. The world in itself is purposeless striving that manifests itself as a field of
constant contest with no intrinsic value; the proper thing left for us to do is the unfaltering
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acknowledgement of this” (Viljanen 2009, 329).24 In presenting never-ending strife or
constant contest as the animating principle of the world, Nietzsche essentially suggests a
“dynamic interpretation of the world” (Will to Power, section 618, p. 332). This attitude, I
believe, is inherited by Foucault and becomes apparent in his discussion of power
relations, constituting a dynamic social ontology. In other words, Nietzsche's “will to
power” (the single, non-teleological principle inherent to all living beings or the soul of
the world, defined by domination and overpowering, as well as self-overcoming and
purposeless striving) lies at the basis of Foucault's view of power, especially in his
affirmation of its multiple and conflictual character.25
I suggest that, despite the differences, the Nietzschean notion of the “will to power” and
the Foucaultian conception of power in terms of force relations similarly open onto the
problem of ontopolitics. Once force is conceived as irreducibly conflictual and as a
multiple relationality that is never at rest, it presents a possibility for a “primordial”
conception of politics: insofar as conflict and strife define politics, the soul of the world is
inevitably political. This is not to suggest that Nietzsche himself conceived of the “will to
power” as essentially political, but to emphasize an important way in which Nietzsche's
thought can be appropriated for the sake of defending the primacy of the political against
24 However, the will to power in Nietzsche does not seem to be totally removed from intelligibility, as it
was for Schopenhauer. As I noted above, Nietzsche sees the “intelligible character” of the world in the
will to power. In a similar manner, Foucault views relations of forces as a “grid of intelligibility” of the
social order. In contrast to Schmitt, whose concept of the political implies irrationality (or at least it
can be argued so), Foucault's politics is necessarily invested with a rationality of its own. This will
become most evident in Foucault's discussion of Greek dunasteia and its contrast with “the political,”
exemplified by the thought of Claude Lefort (Foucault 2010, 159).
25 Nevertheless, several important differences can be identified between the two thinkers (for a more
detailed discussion of them see Ansell-Pearson (1991, 280) and Sluga (2005, 231–233). Most
importantly, as Hans Sluga points out, Foucault's notion of power is primarily nominalistic, resulting
in his denial of a single phenomenon to be called the will to power (2005, 231). Power is always the
multiplicity of particular relations of forces, the multiplicity of their struggles, and not an expression of
an underlying principle or drive, i.e., the will to power. A good example here is Nietzsche's
appreciation of Greeks. As Walter Kaufmann suggests, Nietzsche's initial proposition for analysis of
Greek culture through the notion of contest (agon) changes with his discovery of the will to power:
Nietzsche concludes that agon itself is but a manifestation of the will to power (1974, 192). For
Foucault, on the contrary, the battle of multiple forces is not an expression of an underlying principle;
this multiplicity itself makes up what he calls power relations and politics. Another possible point of
contest between Nietzsche and Foucault is the question of domination or overpowering and its relation
to power. Sluga claims that Foucault rejects the Nietzschean assumption that power relations are
primarily relations of domination (2005, 232).
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the 'threat' of depoliticization. We will see in the subsequent chapters how Nietzschean
“will to power” may be used for opposing purposes: either to suggest a prospect for
different politics (e.g., Thomas Mann, Massimo Cacciari and Roberto Esposito) or the
possibility of the unpolitical as such (e.g., Michel Henry). This ambiguity regarding the
political nature of Nietzsche's thought and, especially, of the “will to power,” is
exemplified by Nietzsche's proclamation of himself as “the last anti-political German.”
The meaning of this statement remains a point of debate in Nietzschean scholarship (see,
for example, Cominos 2008; van Tongeren 2008).
Politics as struggle for power
Inasmuch as force relations are everywhere, power as their strategic, immanent
integration is everywhere. Once an extra step of identification of power with politics is
made, one may be inclined to conclude that politics is everywhere or that everything is
political: a general economy of the political is constituted as a general economy of power
(cf. Protevi 2010, 11). As I already noted, it is hard to clearly outline how Foucault
envisioned the relationship between the notions of 'power' and 'politics'. It is not possible
to conclusively support their identification in Foucault's works, yet it is also not possible
to do the opposite. On several occasions Foucault brings politics and power closely
together. For example, in a debate with Giulio Preti in 1972, when asked to express his
view on the difference between political and social relationships, Foucault initially
replies: “I label political everything that has to do with class struggle, and social
everything that derives from and is a consequence of the class struggle, expressed in
human relationships and in institutions” (Foucault 1996b, 104). When challenged by
Preti's suggestion that “politics is everything connected to the struggle for power,”
Foucault modifies his answer: “If we give to the term 'political' the meaning you attribute
to it – and yours is the more precise definition, I must admit – then my definition cannot
stand. I also want to give politics the meaning of a struggle for power; but it's not power
understood only as government or state, but economic power as well” (104; my
emphasis). We see a sort of a definition of politics (which is rare for Foucault since he
was not fond of defining things): politics is a struggle for power. The understanding of
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power here is reminiscent of the one from Discipline and Punish and The History of
Sexuality: it extends beyond the Marxist prioritization of class struggle as well as beyond
an identification with state and government. What Foucault labels as “economic power”
should be interpreted not only in terms of economy as market exchange, but in its wider
meaning as oikos. The latter refers not only to a household but, more generally, to the
domain of the private, which has been excluded from the political for a long time (e.g., in
ancient Greece as well as in modern liberal societies). So, Foucault's suggestion that
power and its struggles transcend the space traditionally allocated to them implies that
politics extends throughout the social fabric, regardless of the distinction of life into
public and private.
Furthermore, politics is not just power but a struggle for power. What does this actually
mean? If we go back to Foucault's definition of power as the multiplicity of force
relations and their strategic integration, then we can suggest that politics is a struggle for
power in terms of a power game that oscillates around the possibility of multiple strategic
situations. Power is “the process which, through ceaseless struggle and confrontations,
transforms, strengthens, or reverses them [multiple force relations]; ... the strategies in
which they [multiple force relations] take effect, whose general design or institutional
crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the
various social hegemonies” (Foucault 1990, 92–93; my emphasis). Politics is a strategic
game or struggle for the integration of the multiple force relations that can, at times,
become fixed or crystallized (but never permanently) in the form of stable institutions.
We have three levels of analysis here: force relations, their strategic integration as power,
and their fixation as institutions.26 The latter is what Foucault refers to in terms of
“Power”: “permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing ... simply the over-all effect
that emerges from all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and
seeks in turn to arrest their movement” (93). While “power” is nothing like that: its
organization is not fixed in institutions, it does not arrest the movement of forces but
26 John Protevi, in a similar way, speaks of these multiple levels in terms of grids of intelligibility: “the
'multiplicity of force relations' is the grid of intelligibility for power, which is in turn the grid of
intelligibility of the social field” (Protevi 2010, 7).
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directs them in a non-totalizing way, resulting in “a complex strategical situation in a
particular society” (93), which is “nothing other than the instant photograph of multiple
struggles continuously in transformation” (Foucault 1996a, 260). So, power must be
understood as a constant modification and rearrangement of the multiple force relations,
as a perpetuum mobile of the social order, as well as a mobile grid of its intelligibility.
Since politics is a struggle for the strategic integration of force relations, it cannot be
identified with the institutional stabilization of the mobile field (since this would mean at
least a temporary cessation of struggle), neither it can be equated with the mobile field
itself, because it has to do with the overall design of the relations between these forces
and not with them as singularities. As a result, we can identify politics with the 'second
level' of analysis – power relations as a strategic integration of forces. I believe, Foucault
suggests such an understanding of politics when he writes that “this multiplicity of force
relations can be coded – in part but never totally – either in the form of 'war,' or in the
form of 'politics'; this would imply two different strategies (but the one always liable to
switch into the other) for integrating these unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable, and tense
force relations” (Foucault 1990, 93; my emphasis). This codification is not fixed, so it
does not refer to the institutions of state government (though it does not exclude them).
Foucault presents politics in terms of a strategy, while power is also defined in terms of
the strategic integration of force relations. We can conclude, consequently, that power
relations and politics are certainly closely connected with each other, if not identical.
They both operate at the level of strategy. If power relations refer to the immanent
organization of the multiple force relations, and politics is seen as a never-ending struggle
for power and its strategic codification, then we can distinguish two kinds of strategies
here: the strategy of power and a 'meta-strategy' of politics. Even though it remains
unclear how these two strategies relate to each other, it is apparent that one cannot be
understood without the other, which leads to a fairly common identification of power and
politics in Foucaultian scholarship.27
27 Maurizio Lazzarato's (2002) work is an example of an attempt to distinguish between power and
politics in Foucault, however, not as such but through a call to distinguish between “biopower” and
“biopolitics.” This line of argument works as long as it is understood that Foucault's analysis of power
is historically situated, meaning that when he speaks of power he does so in the context of his analysis
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Such an identification or, rather, lack of a clear distinction between power and politics has
an enormous effect on political thought, dominated by political science and traditional
political philosophy. Insofar as politics is no longer confined to a sphere or a distinct
social domain, and extends toward its conditions of possibility or field of constitution
(power and multiple force relations), it exhibits a totalizing ambition that bears important
consequences for the disciplinary study of politics. In this respect, Foucault suggests that
“[i]t is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of
power. In this way we will escape from the system of Law-and-Sovereign which has
captivated political thought for such a long time” (1990, 97; my emphasis). The object of
political thought is at stake here: initially limited to the domain of the state and law, it is
transformed into a wider field of power and force relations. As a result, I will speak of
decentralization of political thought rather than of a mere change in its object. Foucault's
thought contributes to the an-archization of political thought, to the destruction of its
foundations and grounds and, ultimately, questions the disciplinary boundaries of the
social sciences. As Paul Brass puts it, Foucault steals political science: “[t]he subject
matter of what has been traditionally considered central to political science, namely,
power and government, has been stolen by Foucault...” (Brass 2000, 305). In other words,
the study of politics can no longer be privatized by any discipline, including political
science.28 Like Nietzsche, who in his thought altered political theory by way of going
beyond its 'disciplinary' constraints (cf. Ansell-Pearson 1991, 271), Foucault disrupts and
explodes the political thought of his time.
Wendy Brown (2002) similarly suggests that the disciplinary challenge for politics has
come from a reconceptualization of “what [Max] Weber called 'the lifeblood of politics':
power” (561). It is to this point that we can address the question of the totalizing ambition
of politics in Foucault. As Brown puts it, “[i]f the political is signalled by the presence of
any human relations organized by power ... then it is inevitable that we would find the
political everywhere today – in cultural, familial, economic, and psychosexual relations,
of a specifically modern mode of power – “biopower.”
28 On the implications of post-foundationalism and Foucault's thought for the discipline of political
science see also Bevir (2011).
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and more” (569). That is, insofar as power struggles are involved, all relations can be
rendered political. But is it actually the case in Foucault that the political is potentially
everywhere? Does politics, as potentiality, invest everything? Politics, in terms of power
relations, can arise anywhere and everywhere, thus Foucault's insistence that power is
omnipresent not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere
(1990, 93). Power is not a unified totality, however, it seems that nothing can escape it at
the level of potential: everything may become involved in power struggle, in the play of
domination of forces, and can become a nodal point through which the lines of forces
pass. Furthermore, there is no outside of power because there is no inside of it as such. To
speak of the outside of power would mean, as Foucault suggested, to misunderstand its
relational character (95). What is usually referred to as the outside of power, for instance,
resistance, is incorporated into the network of power as its integral part and even as its
condition of possibility. “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power”
(95). The possibility of resistance distinguishes power from violence. Moreover,
resistance itself is interpreted by Foucault on several occasions as something akin to 'real'
politics. (I will return to this point below.)
Governmentality and resistance: nothing is political, everything can be
politicized
If it does not make sense to speak of the outside of power, can we still speak of the
outside of politics? Are there force relations that cannot be coded in terms of a political
strategy; are there relations that cannot be politicized? In other words, is everything
indeed actually and potentially political? Foucault never addressed the problem of
“everything is political” in his published writings. However, he makes several remarks
about it in a manuscript on governmentality of 1979,29 which also gives an interesting
insight into how he understands the notion of politics in relation to resistance. Before I
29 In my discussion here I refer only to the part of this manuscript that was quoted and discussed by
Michel Senellart (2007). In a footnote he explains: “Manuscript on governmentality (untitled, bundle
of 11 sheets numbered 22 to 24 and then not paginated) inserted between the lectures of 21 February
and 7 March 1979 of Naissance de la biopolitique” (504). Senellart suggests that this manuscript is the
only text in which Foucault refers to Carl Schmitt.
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proceed with the analysis of the ideas expressed in this manuscript, it is necessary to
account for its context. There occurs a shift in Foucault's thought (sometime around the
end of 1970's) from “power” to “governmentality” as the major tool of analysis (cf.
Lazzarato 2002; Protevi 2010). As John Protevi suggests, in his lectures on Security,
Territory, Population Foucault moves “to 'governmentality' as the model for social
relations, as its grid of intelligibility. Rather than social relations being seen as war, we
are asked to see social relations as the 'conduct of conduct', as the leading of men's lives
in quotidian detail” (2010, 7).30 Foucault moves his attention away from relations of
forces to action: governmentality is defined as “action upon action.” 31 What is important
for my purpose is that, despite the shift in the primary concept of analysis, Foucault
retains the idea of integration of a multiplicity of differential elements and relations in the
play of power and resistance (cf. Protevi 2010, 7). Governmentality, alongside politics, is
a name for strategic integration of power relations: it refers to “a strategic field of power
relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility ... power as a set of
reversible relationships” (Foucault 2005, 252). It also refers to “a problematic of a
society’s immanent power relations which, unlike the juridical-institutional system of that
society, ensure that it is actually governed” (Foucault 2010, 159). In a nutshell,
governmentality primarily refers to the strategic exercise of power that enables immanent
social ordering.
“Where there is power, there is resistance.” This remains true for Foucault even as he
moves toward governmentality as the grid of intelligibility of social relations. More than
that, the possibility of resistance that is necessarily present in any governmentality
(otherwise it would rely on a network of violence, not power, and thus cease to be
governmentality in the strict sense) becomes something like 'true' politics for Foucault.
As Michel Senellart notes, the notion of resistance (or “counter-conduct”) is at the heart
of Foucault’s conception of politics. In this respect, he quotes Foucault's manuscript of
30 For example, in one of his later interviews Foucault defines the relation of power as “a relationship in
which one person tries to control the conduct of the other” (Foucault 1996c, 441).
31 My aim here is not to discuss in depth what Foucault means by governmentality but to simply provide
a general context within which Foucault addresses the question of whether “everything is political.”
For a general discussion of the notion of governmentality and it scholarly reception see, for example,
Rose et al. (2006).
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1979: “The analysis of governmentality ( ... ) implies that 'everything is political.' ( ... )
Politics is nothing more and nothing less than that which is born with resistance to
governmentality, the first revolt, the first confrontation” (Foucault 2007, 259f). It is
interesting that here appear two notions of politics with opposing meanings: first, in the
sense of “everything is political,” of which Foucault is critical (as I will show below) and,
second, in the sense of politics that is born with resistance to governmentality. In order to
elaborate on what Foucault means, let me quote a passage from the manuscript at length:
The analysis of governmentality as singular generality implies that
“everything is political.” This expression is traditionally given two meanings:
– Politics is defined by the whole sphere of state intervention, (...). To say that
everything is political amounts to saying that, directly or indirectly, the state
is everywhere. – Politics is defined by the omnipresence of a struggle
between two adversaries (...). This other definition is that of K. (sic) Schmitt.
The theory of the comrade. (...) In short, two formulations: everything is
political by the nature of things; everything is political by the existence of
adversaries. It is a question of saying rather: nothing is political, everything
can be politicized, everything may become political. Politics is no more or
less than that which is born with resistance to governmentality, the first
uprising, the first confrontation. (Foucault quoted in Senellart 2007, 505; my
emphasis)
Foucault's deconstruction and a critique of the proposition “everything is political” relies
on two major points: first, everything is political by nature, where 'nature' refers to the
total state. This appears counter-intuitive at first since the state is often opposed to nature,
or politics-as-state to the state of nature. Probably what Foucault means to suggest here is
that everything appears to be political as long as the state is maintained as the major
'marker' of political reality. Everything is political as long as the state is everywhere (cf.
Hakim Bey's suggestion about “the closure of the map”). Furthermore, if we go back to
Aristotle's view of the human and his politics, we can find a similar suggestion about the
totality of the polis as that which defines the very humanity of men. According to
Aristotle “the state is a creation of nature” and, as a result, “he who is unable to live in
society or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a
god: he is no part of a state” (Politics, i. 2. 1253a25-30). To be human means to belong to
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the polis. Human is zoon politikon, a political animal, whose politics is identical with life
in the polis. Thus, everything is political not only as a reference to a (modern) totalitarian
state, but by nature, which determines that being human means belonging to the state.
Furthermore, if we take Foucault's concept of governmentality into consideration (as that
which makes societies really governable), then, it is indeed hard to find a non-political
space, since this kind of government reaches deep down into the micro-level of social
relations, and extends into the very “soul” of an individual, imprisoning her body. 32 It
takes both populations and individuals as its objects, it is “a singular generality,” it is both
totalizing and individualizing practice; modern governmentality is a combination of
disciplinary power and bio-power (cf. Foucault 1990, 139). So, when Foucault suggests
that the analysis of governmentality implies that “everything is political,” he means that
this implication is viable as long as it rests on a wrong assumption: identification of
governmentality with the total state. I have shown above that this identification fails,
since governmentality is a strategic integration of immanent power relations, which are
always multiple and remain such regardless of their 'visible' unification. Moreover,
resistance is immanent to power relations resulting in the impossibility of closed totality,
which the total state would represent.
The question of resistance is connected to the second way of understanding “everything is
political” as discussed by Foucault: the omnipresence of struggle between two
adversaries. Even though Foucault's reference to Schmitt's “theory of the comrade” is
very short, it seems to point at the major difference between their approaches to the
question of struggle. Foucault states that for Schmitt politics is defined by “the
omnipresence of a struggle between two adversaries.” However, even if Foucault
suggested that politics is defined by a struggle for power, the obvious difference here is
that for Foucault the struggle is always multiple and often unpredictable due to the everpresent possibility of resistance. It is not confined to a binary opposition between friend
and enemy, as for Schmitt. From a Foucaultian perspective, the identities of adversaries
32 “The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body”
(Foucault 1995, 30).
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are themselves just effects of “underlying” power struggle rather than the generative
principle of that struggle. So, while for Schmitt, according to Foucault, “everything is
political by the existence of adversaries,” I suggest that Foucault advocates the view that
“everything can be politicized” due to the omnipresence of multiple struggles (at least
potentially). Resistance plays a key role here.
Foucault argues that nothing is political, meaning that nothing is political by nature (since
the very idea of nature, similar to human nature, is not reflective of a given but is an
effect of power and discourse). To say that something is political in reference to the state
or to the mere presence of adversaries amounts to its depoliticization. So, when Foucault
states that nothing is political, he means that nothing is really political, in a sense of true
politics. Nothing is political but rather 'technical'. The presence of multiple governmental
techniques implies that what is traditionally referred to as 'politics' is nothing but 'political
economy': the ordering of life in its slightest details guided by the principle of its
preservation and multiplication (i.e., biopolitics). These kinds of practices, then, are akin
to 'policing' rather than 'politics'.33
Nothing is political in some true sense but everything can be politicized, that is, may
become political due to the intervention of resistance. As in Schmitt, we see a dislocation
of the political to the level of potentiality: power relations may become (and, supposedly,
this becoming is never-ending) political since politics is born with resistance to
governmentality. Similarly to what I argued above, politics is still distinguished by the
possibility of resistance, of the destabilization of existing strategies of power (e.g.,
governmentality) and the creation of the new ones. Insofar as resistance is immanent to
power relations (it distinguishes power from violence), we can conclude that power is
always political; there is no non-political power but only violence. As a result, nothing is
political by nature, but everything is always already becoming political due to the
presence of resistance. However, one might object that Foucault proposes that everything
33 However critical of Foucault's lack of distinction between power and politics, Jacques Rancière will
take up governmentality is this sense of policing or ordering, as opposed to politics proper – practice
that interrupts this ordering, resists it by inscribing “the part of no part” (see, Rancière 1999; Rancière
2001).
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may become political, meaning that the possibility of politicization is not always
actualized. I suggest that Foucault's hesitation in this regard (the “may”) refers
specifically to “states of domination,” in which the possibility of resistance is minimal.
There are situations where “power relations are fixed in such a way that they are
perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom” 34 (Foucault
1996c, 441). These states are the opposite of something like 'true politics' born through
resistance.
In the final analysis, it is possible to distinguish between two notions of 'politics' in
Foucault: politics as governmentality, conduct of conduct, and a specific strategic
codification of power relations; and politics as resistance, immanent to these
governmental strategies.35 These two registers of the political matter are inseparable; they
define each other. Where there is power, there is resistance; where there is power, there is
freedom. Such a split notion of politics in Foucault is reminiscent of the distinction
between 'politics' and 'the political' in Schmitt: one level of politics is more or less rigid
and ordered, and the other arises as resistance to the former. This is also similar to
Foucault's analysis of power in terms of multiple force relations, and their “political”
coding. These mobilities are strategically integrated as politics, where, “'Power', insofar
as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect
that emerges from all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and
seeks in turn to arrest their movement” (Foucault 1990, 93; my emphasis). The specificity
of Foucault's account of the relation between different registers of politics lies in the fact
that “Power,” as that which arrests movement, is nothing but an over-all effect of these
mobilities, meaning that it is not outside but immanent to their field. “Power,” as
'conscious' and 'visible' reality of politics, is never totally separate and independent from
the constituting positive unconscious of the political (i.e., the multiplicity of force
relations and their strategies).
34 Freedom here refers to positive resistance. In his later works Foucault mostly abandons the notion of
resistance and replaces it with “freedom,” which occupies a structural position in power relations
similar to the former: it conditions them.
35 Arnold Davidson (2011) suggests that we can, in a similar way, distinguish between the notions of
“conduct” and “counter-conduct.” I will turn to his argument in more detail below.
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We can draw a parallel between these two notions of politics (as the strategic codification
of forces and as resistance) and the notions of “conduct” and “counter-conduct” in
Foucault. Arnold Davidson (2011) suggests that while power takes as its object the
conduct of individuals, it always depends (in its very definition) on the possibility of
resistance, “the correlative counter movements,” “specific revolts of conduct” (27), or
“counter-conduct in the sense of struggle against the procedures implemented for
conducting others” (28). The latter, like resistances, are never in a position of exteriority
but of immanence to power relations. Consequently, Davidson suggests, “as a counterpart
to the celebrated motto ‘Where there is power, there is resistance’, one could invoke
Foucault’s remark about the ‘immediate and founding correlation between conduct and
counter-conduct’, a correlation that is not only historical but also conceptual” (28; my
emphasis). Insofar as politics in Foucault can be interpreted as the struggle for power and
the strategic integration of force relations, and as the practice of resistance immanent to
these power relations, I suggest that these two notions of politics are correlated, in the
same way as power, the conduct of conduct, is correlated to counter-conduct. The major
difference, however, between the notions of resistance and counter-conduct, Davidson
notes, is that the latter “adds an explicitly ethical component to the notion of resistance ...
[and] allows one to move easily between the ethical and the political, letting us see their
many points of contact and intersection” (28). The practices of care of the self, in
particular, emerge as a notorious case of the ethical counter-conduct in Foucault's late
works.
Two dimensions of politics: “politeia” and “dunasteia”
We can find in Foucault's later works another example of the double inscription of
politics (that also incorporates the ethical component invoked by the notion of counterconduct). It surfaces in his lectures at the Collège de France on The Government of Self
and Others in the discussion of two ancient Greek notions – politeia and dunasteia
(Foucault 2010, 149–171). These, I suggest, can be associated with modern notion of
politics and, to some extent, compared with the split between 'politics' and 'the political'.
The major difference between the notions of 'the political' and 'dunasteia', as we will see
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below, is located in considerations of political practice, normativity and rationality. My
intuition is that, despite these differences and Foucault's repudiation of 'the political' as a
notion, his political thought still seems to oscillate around a split notion of politics. The
clarification of these notions is helpful not just for the present project of discussing the
modern political as the total and of a possibility of the unpolitical, but also for the
understanding of Foucault's own political project, that is, of where he sees a possible
'location' of an effective political action.
One of the major preoccupations of Foucault's lectures of 1982-1983 is the meaning of
Greek notion of parrhēsia (that can be translated as free-spokenness, free speech or truthtelling, however, the very problematic of translating this term interests Foucault in the
first place). In the lecture of February 2 nd 1983 Foucault compares parrhēsia and isēgoria
(2010, 149–171). Briefly, while isēgoria, an equal right to speech, is a constitutional
arrangement or institutional framework, a kind of 'legal' provision of an equal right in
democracy, parrhēsia is “the free and, consequently, courageous activity [that arises
within this framework] of some who come forward, speak, and try to persuade and direct
the others, with all the attendant risks” (158). Such an activity is inherently political,
since its goal is government of others as well as of the self. This distinction between
speech as pertaining to right and to government indicates, according to Foucault, two sets
of problems for Greeks: the problems of the politeia and dunasteia (158–159). The
former are the problems of constitution, the framework that defines the status of citizens,
their rights, the procedures for decision-making and the elections of leaders. The
problems of dunasteia (the Greek word means power or the game through which power is
exercised in a democracy), Foucault suggests, are, first, the problems of the political
game: “of the formation, exercise, limitation, and also guarantee given to the ascendancy
exercised by some citizens over others” (158; my emphasis). So, it describes a kind of
general field of power relations that constitutes politics as a struggle (with its own rules
and limitations) for domination of some over others, in a sense of action upon action or
conduct of conduct. Second, these are the problems of the procedures and techniques, that
is, rules and instruments, by which this power is actually exercised (in Athenian
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democracy this is essentially parrhēsia). Third, dunasteia is the problem of ethos of the
political man himself. Foucault summarizes these various sets of problems of dunasteia
and suggests that the latter is the problem of politics: “It [dunasteia] is the problem of
politics – I was going to say, as experience, that is to say, the problem of politics
understood as a practice having to obey certain rules, indexed to truth in a particular way,
and which involves a particular form of relationship to oneself and to others on the part of
those who play this game” (158). These are 'properly' political problems, as opposed to
what has been the major concern of political theory and philosophy: the problems of
politeia, of the city's constitution. The reflection upon the problems of politeia, Foucault
points out, have given rise to a whole form of reflection (indexed as political theory) on
the nature of the law, the organization of society, and what the State should be. What
remains outside of this reflection is the “political problems in the strict sense” – the
problems of dunasteia.
The distinction of politeia and dunasteia is reminiscent of the split notion of politics:
while the former refers to the institutional dimension of man's political existence, the
latter indicates its necessary excess which conditions politics, makes it possible in the
first place. It is important to note, however, in what way Foucault's engagement with
dunasteia differs from “the political” as a concept. For Foucault, dunasteia, the excess of
politeia, of institutional politics, conditions the possibility of governing societies. Like
'the political', it is the constitutive reality of politics-as-state. However, dunasteia or 'true'
politics, contrary to 'the political', is in no way irrational, unknowable, chaotic or
unordered. On the contrary, the political game of dunasteia is the experience with its own
rules and rationality. Foucault comments:
... nothing seems more dangerous to me than that much vaunted shift from
politics (la politique) to the political (le politique), which in many
contemporary analyses36 seems to me to have the effect of masking the
36 In a footnote Foucault specifies: “This distinction is particularly studied by Claude Lefort in, for
example, “Permanence du théologico-politique?” (1981) and “La Question de la démocratie” (1983),
both reprinted in Essais sur le politique (Paris: Le Seuil, 1986)” (2010, 169f). Lefort is a representative
of the post-foundational understanding of the political (see, for example, Marchart 2007, 85–108). To
give an example of what Lefort means by the political let me quote: “The political is thus revealed, not
in what we call political activity, but in the double movement whereby the mode of institution of
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specific problem and set of problems of politics, of dunasteia, of the practice
of the political game, and of the political game as a field of experience with
its rules and normativity, of the political game as experience inasmuch as it is
indexed to truthtelling and involves a certain relationship to oneself and to
others for its players. This is politics (la politique), and it seems to me that we
see the problem of politics (of its rationality, of its relationship to the truth,
and of the character who plays it) emerge around this question of parrhēsia.
(159)
As we can see, Foucault is critical of the contemporary tradition of distinguishing
between politics and the political, not because it has nothing to add to the problems of
political thought, but because it produces an effect of masking real, specific political
problems. This is the case not only because the political is extended into the condition of
possibility of every experience, but also because it itself is denied rationality and
normativity (since the latter are usually attributed to the level of institutional 'politics').
For Foucault, politics 'proper', “in the strict sense” (or what I have been calling the
political), is a field of experience with its rules and normativity, and not an instance of
irrational irruption or disruption; if anything, it is not a negative but a positive
unconscious. Politics is a specific experience of power, of dunasteia that is conditioned
by truth-telling (parrhēsia) in relation to self and others. Foucault specifies even further
that the experience of politics (la politique) emerges around the question of parrhēsia.
First, it is a “hinge between politeia and dunasteia” (since its place is defined and
guaranteed by the constitution), but also “parrhēsia, the truth-telling of the political man,
is what ensures the appropriate game of politics” (159). I suggest that it is the
appropriateness of the political game that is at stake here: the game that manages to
remain political and does not turn into the violent one or into a situation of domination by
preserving the space for resistance. As a matter of fact, parrhēsia is a form of resistance
that defines democratic politics as such and distinguishes it from despotism. Later in his
lectures Foucault turns to parrhēsia as a practice of philosophical “resistance” (“care of
society appears and is obscured. It appears in the sense that the process whereby society is ordered and
unified across its divisions becomes visible. It is obscured in the sense that the locus of politics (the
locus in which parties compete and in which a general agency of power takes shape and is reproduced)
becomes defined as particular, while the principle which generates the overall configuration is
concealed” (Lefort 1988, 11). So, while politics concerns a locus of competition for institutional
positions of power, the political is the concealed principle that generates the overall social
configuration and institutes the social.
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the self,” ethos, “a way of life”) in detail, for example, in the case of Socrates, in Plato
and Cynics, through which he forcefully asserts “the coexistence and correlation of
political practice and philosophical truth-telling” (289). In this regard, Foucault suggests
that the relation to oneself is actually the primary point of resistance: “there is no first or
final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to
oneself” (2005, 252). This could imply that in truly political communities (as in the case
of the ancient Greek democracies) this kind of practice is of utmost importance, it is at
the heart of the specifically political being of humans. Care of the self can be regarded as
the political experience par excellence. I will return to this point below.
The problems of governmentality also find their expression in Foucault's lectures of
1982-1983 in the notion of parrhēsia as the defining feature of the political game, of
dunasteia. “The problems of governmentality in their specificity, in their complex
relation to but also independence from politeia, appear and are formulated for the first
time around this notion of parrhēsia and the exercise of power [i.e., dunasteia] through
true discourse” (Foucault 2010, 159). Politics is the exercise of power that leaves the door
open to resistance (e.g., parrhēsia). To be more precise, its strategy is a form of resistance
that leaves open the possibility of resistance to itself. In other words, it remains open to
the challenge of the alternative truths. It is worth noting that for Foucault (similarly to
Schmitt) parrhēsia, as a form of resistance and a condition of politics, has a conflictual
character. Politics is not just power but the struggle for power, and parrhēsia contains this
dynamism at its core. “The superiority connected to parrhēsia is a superiority shared with
others, but shared in the form of competition, rivalry, conflict, and duel. It is an agonistic
structure. Even if it implies a status, I think parrhēsia is connected much less to status
than to a dynamic and a combat, a conflict” (156). So, politics is a struggle for power
which is defined by the rule of resistance, by the primacy of freedom over the various
strategies of power.37
37 For example, Foucault writes: “Power is not omnipotent or omniscient ... It is true that so many power
relationships have been developed, so many systems of control, so many forms of surveillance, it is
precisely because power was always impotent” (Foucault 1996a, 258). Furthermore, Foucault insists:
“... if there are relations of power in every social field, this is because freedom is everywhere”
(Foucault 1996c, 441).
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Among the “forms of reflection” that accommodate political practices we can distinguish:
first, traditional political theory (which focuses on the problems of constitution), second,
thought of “the political” (which Foucault critiques for missing the experiential level of
politics), and, finally, the Foucaultian “genealogy of politics as game and experience”
(159–160). This genealogy is a critical project that stands in opposition to the existing
tradition of political thought. Furthermore, it relies on a split notion of politics; however,
it is neither a distinction between 'politics' (la politique) and 'the political' (le politique)
nor a classical distinction between 'politics' (or the commonwealth) and 'the state of
nature'. The Foucaultian distinction, I propose, is between politics in the strict sense, i.e.,
a power game, and politics as the institutional crystallization of this game. The former
notion refers to the struggle for power: the experience of the power game (dunasteia) or
the play of resistances, which is agonistic in its structure but not devoid of rules and
strategic organization. The latter notion of politics signifies mostly a rigid system (e.g., of
Law-and-Sovereign) that gives rise to the problems of politeia and which, nevertheless,
remains immanent to the field of the multiple relations of forces.
Biopolitics and life that escapes: intimations of the unpolitical
Considering the implications of Foucault's view of politics, that is, its totalizing tendency
as well as the split notion of politics, it appears difficult to conceive the unpolitical in
Foucaultian terms. Inasmuch as power is everywhere, and politics is defined as a struggle
for power, i.e., a strategic codification of the multiple force relations immanent to the
field of these forces, I am inclined to conclude that politics is everywhere, that it is
totalizing. Furthermore, if we conceive politics in terms of resistance to the established
strategies of power, to governmentality, then nothing appears to be, by default, political
but, rather, 'technical'. However, everything may become politicized through the
intervention of resistance, which is “never in a position of exteriority in relation to
power” (Foucault 1990, 95). Power relations, as I already noted, depend on the
multiplicity of points of resistance distributed across the power network. Resistances, by
definition, “can only exist in the strategic field of power relations:” “they are the odd
term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite” (96;
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my emphasis). Thus, politics as resistance is the irreducible opposite of politics as the
institutional integration of power relationships. In the end, the notion of politics is split
into two domains, which account, in political terms, for both power relations and for their
irreducible excess (resistance). Resistance and freedom, as a result, are never unpolitical
but always remain an integral part of the political game of power. They present a different
mode of politics and constitute, at the most, the relative outside of the political.
Foucault famously applied his methodological innovations to the study of modern
society, suggesting that we live in the age of biopolitics. The relations of power that, in
the first place, are not confined to a specific field of operation, take life as their object.
Consequently, politics exhibits its totalizing ambition by attaching its operation to
individual bodies and populations in an effort to govern and multiply life. Biopolitics is a
mode of politics that relies on the new procedures or techniques of power developed
through the classical age and employed in the nineteenth century. The specificity of these
new procedures lies in their primary object – life. So, modernity is marked by the
problematization of life by politics: “... what might be called a society's 'threshold of
modernity' has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political
strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with
the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics
places his existence as a living being in question” (Foucault 1990, 143). Foucault argues
that modern politics is no longer an additional capacity of man: merging with biological
life politics consumes the very nature of humanity.38 Modern political relations are not
confined to a specific sphere of operation since their object is all-encompassing – life.
Nonetheless, for Foucault, life as the object of power is not a given upon which power
applies and attaches itself. On the contrary, power relations discover, define and
reproduce “life” as their object through a variety of discourses and disciplines, in
38 However, it is questionable if for Aristotle politics was indeed just an additional capacity, since his
view of man as a political animal and of sociality (life in the polis) as the major characteristics of his
very humanity may imply that even for Aristotle human life and politics were inseparable. The
difference between an Aristotelian politicization of life and modern biopolitics seems to reside
primarily in the definition of life itself: in modernity life is objectified and problematized primarily as
biological existence.
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particular, human and social sciences. “[M]ethods of power and knowledge assumed
responsibility for the life processes and undertook to control and modify them. Western
man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world, to have
a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare,
forces that could be modified, and a space in which they could be distributed in an
optimal manner. ... [T]he fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate” (Foucault
1990, 142). Western man had to learn what it means to be alive, what it means to be the
living. Life, as biological existence, is demystified and becomes a material object of
various manipulations and techniques: for instance, care for the life of populations, their
well-being and multiplication, proper healthcare and welfare. This is achieved through
the integration of “an anatomo-politics of the human body” (mastery over human life
located in the body) and “interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of
population” (139). Mastery and regulation are at the core of biopolitical techniques.
In the context of biopolitics, to raise the question of the unpolitical would mean to ask, 'is
there life beyond biopolitics?' The simple answer would be: as long as politics is defined
by resistance, as long as politics is born with resistance to governmentality (in this case,
biopolitical), there is a possibility of different life, of life that resists biopolitics. Foucault
acknowledges this: “It is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that
govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them” (1990, 143; my emphasis). His
project, especially of the later years, was to examine these alternative ways of living
which positively resist existing forms of governmentality. The relation to self in the
practice of care, for Foucault, is the primary case of such a resistance, of positive selfgovernment and self-creation. As he puts it, “there is no first or final point of resistance to
political power other than in the relationship one has to oneself” (2005, 252). Life that
“escapes” the grip of modern (bio)politics assumes the form of the ethical care of the self,
of self-transformation. However, it remains unclear whether this practice of care is a case
of 'another' politics or of the real unpolitical experience of living. What does it mean for
life to escape biopolitics and its power techniques? Does it lead to depoliticization of life?
Is care of the self a non-political practice, does it lead to an unpolitical form of life? It
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seems that insofar as this practice is a form of resistance, it remains necessarily political.
Insofar as politics is born with resistance, the practice of self-care is a political practice.
As Amy Allen brings to our attention, according to Foucault, “one of the main political
problems would be nowadays, in the strict sense of the word, the politics of ourselves”
(Foucault in Allen 2011, 43).39 It seems that there is no radical outside of politics in
Foucault, there is only movement from one mode of politics to another, even if these
modes are immanent to each other: for instance, care of the self as a political practice, as
a mode of politics, can exist within a biopolitical framework. By being 'inside' of power
relations one always remains on the outside by the means of resistance, since from the
point of view of the structure of power relations, the excess of a certain mode of politics
will itself always remain political. More than that, it will continue to define politics
'proper' inasmuch as this excess, by definition, is a kind of resistance and, thus, a political
practice par excellence. It is interesting that the structural position of resistance in
Foucault's thought as both outside and inside (i.e., immanent to politics) is reminiscent of
Schmitt's thought of the exception and its relation to the political: the exception remains
immanent to the political, it defines the political space by withdrawing from it. In this
respect, Foucault's statement “where there is power, there is resistance” finds its parallel
in Schmitt – where there is the political, there is the exception.
I believe that a possible objection to my conclusion about the 'genuinely' political nature
of the practice of care of the self lies in an interpretation of this practice embracing a
different understanding of life. When Foucault suggests that life always escapes the grip
of power and that the first and final point of resistance to political power consists in the
relationship one has to oneself (i.e., in the practice of care of the self), he does not seem
to envision life merely as a set of biological processes (which constitutes the object of
biopolitics). His understanding of life extends beyond the purely materialistic domain
toward the realm of ethics, toward a real experience and practice of living beyond
biopolitical determination. It is, ultimately, an “aesthetics of existence.” As a result, we
39 Interestingly, when questioned whether the problematic of care of the self could be at the heart of “a
new way of thinking about politics,” Foucault evades answering the question by saying that he did not
get very far in this direction. However, he suggests that since the 19 th century there is a sense of a lack
of room for the question of the ethical subject (Foucault 1996c, 443).
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can reformulate the question: if life escapes politics, what 'kind' of life is it? I believe that
we can find intimations of the unpolitical form of living in Foucault's last lectures at the
Collège de France (Foucault 2010; 2011). Some cases of care of the self that he discusses
present a possibility of conceiving of the unpolitical form of life, as, for example, in the
case of the Cynics in ancient Greece. Foucault makes an interesting suggestion about
them: “The philosophical parrhēsia of Diogenes basically consists in showing himself in
his natural nakedness, outside all the conventions and laws artificially imposed by the
city. His parrhēsia is therefore in his very way of life, it is also apparent in this discourse
of insult and denunciation with regard to power (Philip’s greed, etcetera). ...[I]n the case
of the Cynics we have a mode of connection of philosophical truth-telling to political
action which takes place in the form of exteriority, challenge, and derision...” (2010,
287). The art of living of Diogenes may be suggestive of the unpolitical form-of-life.
Arnold Davidson (2011) similarly singles out Foucault's account of “[c]ynic provocation
[...] as an emblem of the risks and the intensities of counter-conduct” (39). The ethicopolitical practice of counter-conduct, understood as “the 'insubordination of freedom', the
'rebelliousness of the will and the intransitivity of freedom', the 'art of voluntary
inservitude' and of 'deliberative indocility'” (30), opens up new possibilities for actions
that modify the existing force relations and that stand up “'against the impoverishment of
the relational fabric' of our social world” (33-34). In this regard, the counter-conduct of
care of the self (as a form of 'life that escapes' politics) can be interpreted as a 'revolt'
against the total politicization (and thus impoverishment) of relationality in modernity.
This could mean, for example, the return of friendship (which allows one to live “very
intense affective relations”) as a form of social relation (cf. Davidson 2011, 34).
Furthermore, insofar as “[p]olitically and ethically, counter-conduct is the invention of a
new philosophical concept” (39), it might as well signify the advent of the notion of the
unpolitical in the times when the totality of the political seems to be closing in on us. (I
intend to return to the question of 'life that escapes' in the last chapter, in which I will
engage with the problem of the unpolitical in relation to Michel Henry's radical
philosophy of life.)
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What are the other steps that we could take in order to get closer to thinking the
unpolitical? First, since power relations are, by definition, political, the unpolitical, it
would seem, must be located beyond the relations of power. But is this possible? It
certainly would be hard to find something that cannot be described in terms of force
relations. Alternatively, it might be necessary to define political power relations in their
specificity (i.e., not all relations of power are political). Jean-Luc Nancy, for example,
calls for such a redefinition. However, as we will see below, Nancy fails to go beyond the
political correlationism and to account for the unpolitical as such. Another possibility of
the unpolitical may consist in the reconceptualization of politics beyond power altogether,
that is, in the mutual detachment of these two notions. For example, Jacques Rancière
advocates such a rethinking of politics. Nonetheless, as I will argue below, he too fails to
go beyond the correlation of politics and the political and does not leave much room for
the positive experience of the unpolitical.

1.3. Politics and Police: Inscribing the Invisible,
Giving Place to Nonplace
Jacques Rancière addresses the question of the excess of the traditional notion of politics.
Like many other post-foundational thinkers, he begins with a critique of political
philosophy in an attempt to find a way of bringing the unaccounted for to presence. With
elegance and rigour he comes up with an alternative way to conceptually capture political
being, and offers a new methodology for political thought. However, it is my suggestion
that despite the move beyond political philosophy, he fails to address the problem of the
political correlation in his thought: that is, the negative attachment of his notion of the
political to what it intends to dismiss. Moreover, in his attempt to do justice to the
excluded, to “the part of no part,” he does not leave much room for a positive account of
the invisible, of the limit of both politics and the political. In his critique of “everything is
political,” he, ultimately, retains the totalizing ambition of the political. The task of the
present investigation is to show both the success and shortcomings of Rancière's thought,
specifically regarding the correlation and the totalizing ambition of the political.
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However, in no way do I intend to reduce his prolific thought to such concerns. In order
to show the presence of the correlation in Rancière's thought, I will focus on the analysis
of his distinction between “politics” and “the political,” as well as “the police order” and
“politics.” I will, then, address the problem of the totalizing ambition of this correlation
through an examination of the structural position of the principle of equality and of “the
part of no part” that seem to give us a glimpse of the unpolitical in Rancière.
Politics and the political: bringing the political unconscious to
consciousness
Rancière begins his rethinking of politics with a critique of the preceding, long standing
tradition of political philosophy. In his view, politics has “to be thought as something
radically heterogeneous to the tradition of political philosophy” (2004, 4). This
heterogeneity is due to the difference in the logic of politics and philosophy: while the
latter, for Rancière, is defined by the logic of consensus, the essence of politics is
disagreement [mésentente] or dissensus. The consensual model of politics relies on the
presupposition of “an anthropological invariant,” that is, an idea that there is something
common to humanity in general that results in the constitution of politics. This invariant
is commonly conceived as “the fear that compels individuals to unite,” the Hobbesian
model, or as “the possession of language that permits discussion” (4), exemplified,
among others, by Aristotle's, Arendt's and Habermas' political thought. Rancière's major
point of disagreement with these political philosophies is that such an invariant or
common property of humanity is not just simply given; on the contrary, what is
“common” is the original object of contestation that becomes fixed or legitimized as
given within philosophical thought. The traditional search for the essence of politics, or
what constitutes politics “proper,” is often based on the assumption of the inherently
political nature of the human being as such. An example of such an account is Aristotle's
definition of human as zoon politikon, as a being that possesses logos, and so naturally
organizes its life in the polis in order to secure common good.
In his earlier work, On the Shores of Politics ([1990] 1995), Rancière employs a
distinction between “politics” and “the political” in order to draw a line between the
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political philosophy and his own thought. He suggests that politics is “pacifying
procedure,” “the simple management of the social,” “the art of suppressing the political”
(11). Here we encounter a familiar motif of repression or sublimation of the political by
politics as seen in other thinkers. Regarding 20th century political philosophy (but not
exclusive to it) which intends to secularize and demilitarize politics, Rancière states,
similarly to Schmitt, that the erasure of social divisions and thus the reduction of politics
to the pacification procedure results in politics' self-diminution, the political suppression
of politics or the perfection of, paradoxically, “the oldest task of politics” –
depoliticization (19). The task of traditional political philosophy amounts to protecting
politics from its immanent contradictions, that is, from the passions and conflicts inherent
to the social field by founding politics on firm ground or “dry land,” by establishing “a
politics of conversion which turns its back on the sea” (2). So, politics, as a philosophical
art, presides over its own decline and produces the social realm that is necessary for the
continuous realization of this very task. Later Rancière will use different terminology,
i.e., “the order of police” and “the social,” in order to designate this kind of “politics.”
What is interesting in this earlier conceptual distinction developed by Rancière (“politics”
as the suppression “the political”) is its metaphorical translation into the distinction
between dry land and the sea: politics turns its back on the sea. The sea here stands for a
fluid principle as opposed to the rigid one, that of terra firma; moreover, the metaphor of
the sea often stands for the unconscious, the domain of unbound energy that has no
permanent marks, and can only bear a trace.40 So, what Rancière appears to be saying
here is that politics turns its back on its own unconscious; that is, it represses its own
immanent conflictuality resulting in the constitution of the unconscious – the political,
which is expelled from conscious reality, but is bound to return. The split of the psyche
into consciousness and the unconscious in the Freudian psychoanalysis (a source of
40 For example, Vincent Aurora explains, “These two initial [Freudian] metaphors (verticality and
visibility), aided by the subconscious' polyvalent metaphorization as “depth,” were further combined
into the prolific metaphor of the psyche as water. In his Interpretation of Dreams, a work in which
metalinguistic metaphor is generally avoided, Freud, in opposition to the subconscious' “depth,”
expresses the conscious as “surface” (Oberflache), and then, as corollaries of this metaphor, describes
repression as “submersion” (tauchen) and the conscious realization of formerly unconscious ideas as
“emersion” (auftauchen, which refers specifically to emergence from water) (Aurora 2001, 39).
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inspiration for a number of post-foundational political thinkers) is, in a way, parallel to
the treatment of the split between politics and the political. For example, in The
Interpretation of Dreams Freud distinguishes between the “primary processes” of an
unbound energy and the “secondary processes” of bound energy. Furthermore, in a
similar manner, while the unconscious is a domain of free-flowing, unbound and formless
energy and the drives, consciousness is the domain of reason; it is an “agent” of
repression or congestion of the circulation of free forces, which, in their turn, acquire
form through such stoppage. The functioning of the latter is similar to the repression of
the political by politics, of the congestion or the crystallization of the formless tensions
into an institutional structure, e.g., the order of the state. In the case of both the political
and the unconscious, their very existence appears through a (negative) dialectical
relationship with their antitheses, and the only way they can manifest themselves is
through a stoppage or failure of their opposites, as, for example, the unconscious
manifests itself in dreams and parapraxes. The Freudian unconscious, like the political, is
not something simply unreasonable or irrational, simply opposed to reason, but rather “a
glitch of reason, its slip, its inner torsion” (Dolar 2008, 21).
This tension between structured or permanent social ties and their 'undoing' indexes a
correlation: “the political as a dislocation of the existing social entities, as shifting the
ground of what holds the existing relations together” (Dolar 2008, 26). I argue that the
correlation is an inevitable result of the negative model of the unconscious, the kind that
we encounter in Freud and Rancière. The negative unconscious (the result of repression,
of the Oedipal drama) cannot appear as such but only as a failure of consciousness: in its
manifestation it is always attached to the latter. This negative model of the unconscious is
different from the Foucaultian “positive unconscious,” which can be brought to presence
as a field of operation of multiple forces or as a grid of intelligibility of social relations.
So, when Rancière speaks of the political as the unconscious of politics – the sea that
meets dry land and forms a shore (thus the name of the book, On the Shores of Politics),
we encounter the familiar “sublimation thesis,” where the political is viewed as an
endangered or forgotten primordial kind of relation that manifests itself in the failure of
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the established order. In short, the political is conceived in correlation with politics. First,
Rancière's thought of the political is historically attached, in the form of a critique, to
traditional political philosophy. Second, his project relies on a split notion of politics.
While he develops an alternative conception of the political, he retains the classical
notion of politics (i.e., the state ordering) as its necessary complement, which, in fact,
summons the political in the first place. We will see below, how in his later works
“politics,” devoid of its own place, appears only as a reaction to the “order of police.”
Politics versus power
Another important tradition to which Rancière opposes his project is Marxism,
specifically the Marxist identification of politics with power or with the struggle for its
possession. Rancière's relation with Marxist theories of the political could also be
compared with his seeming “rejection” of Foucault's thought of power. However, I think
that in his insistence on the non-coincidence or non-identity of power and politics,
Rancière does not dispose of the Foucaultian project, on the contrary, he develops it, but
within his own conceptual framework. In Ten Theses on Politics Rancière writes:
“Politics is not the exercise of power. Politics ought to be defined on its own terms, as a
mode of acting put into practice by a specific kind of subject and deriving from a
particular form of reason. [...] To identify politics with the exercise of, and struggle to
possess, power is to do away with politics” (2001, Thesis 1).41 In Rancière's view politics
has to be defined on its own terms, meaning that its principle cannot be derived from any
other principle or mode of action, but from a particular form of reason, action and
subject. To assume that politics equals power would mean to subjugate it to power, to
reduce it to a means of possessing this 'resource'; in short, it would mean to
instrumentalize politics. A sort of autonomy of the political is at stake here, not in a sense
41 It is interesting that here Rancière seems to retain a rather old-fashioned view of power (since he has
specifically Marxist thought in mind): he rejects the identification of politics with the exercise of
power or the struggle to possess it. He appears to treat power substantially, as something that can be
possessed. In the light of Foucault's critique of the traditional notion of power, one can suggest that
Rancière's critique in this case fails to address a post-Marxist coincidence or superimposition of power
and politics in terms of the multiplicity of force relations. We can find a clarification of Rancière's
position on this point in Disagreement (1999).
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of its separation into a specific field, but in a sense of auto-nomos (of giving law to
itself), of not being derived from anything else except itself. Nevertheless, as I will show
below, politics in Rancière does not achieve perfect autonomy because it remains
attached, in its very definition, to the order of police; it appears in opposition to the
police.
Rancière's concern for the necessity to draw a line between power and politics is fuelled
by his desire to avoid a claim that “everything is political.” He suggests that such an overextension of politics results in total depoliticization: “if everything is political, then
nothing is” (Rancière 1999, 32). Politics, for Rancière, is a specific encounter between
the two heterogeneous logics – police and equality. Consequently, he considers it
necessary to dismiss a concept of power that might form a connection between these
logics as well as the resulting substitution of “everything is political” with “everything is
policing.” In other words, pretending to be a sort of medium through which these logics
operate, power relations threaten to homogenize these heterogeneous activities. Thus,
Rancière suggests that power allowed “a certain well-meaning militancy” to proclaim that
“everything is political” because power relations are everywhere. Hence his objection, if
everything is political, then nothing is. As a result, “while it is important to show, as
Michel Foucault has done magnificently, that the police order extends well beyond its
specialized institutions and techniques [I believe Rancière has governmentality in mind
here], it is equally important to say that nothing is political in itself merely because power
relationships are at work in it. ... But anything may become political if it gives rise to a
meeting of these two logics” (32; my emphasis). Rancière seems to suggest that
Foucault's identification of power and politics does not allow for the specificity of the
political; however, I believe, he misreads Foucault by implying the immediacy of the
political in power relations. As I discussed in the previous section, Foucault similarly
states that nothing is political in itself, but everything may become political. So, in fact, it
is the mode of politicization that it at stake in their 'debate': for Foucault it happens
through immanent resistance (which defines power and politics in the first place, as
struggle); for Rancière “the political only happens by means of a principle that does not
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belong to it: equality” (33; my emphasis). The real disagreement that Rancière expresses
in relation to the conversion of power into politics is not the conversion itself, but the
resulting opening up of “the heroic vision of politics as resistance or the dreamy vision of
spaces of affirmative action opened up by those who turn their backs on politics and its
power games” (32). The connection of the political and resistance is indeed characteristic
of Foucault's project, and it is here that the real difference between Foucault's and
Rancière's projects can be located. Resistance is a principle immanent to power, it defines
power in its difference from violence, that is, it enables politics, as power struggle, to
take place. The principle of equality that, according to Rancière, brings forth the political
is not immanent to it, on the contrary, it does not belong to the political. This nonbelonging, I argue, gives us a glimpse of the unpolitical in Rancière's thought. (I will
return to this discussion in more detail below).
So, Rancière contends, similarly to Foucault (and also Schmitt), that nothing is political,
but everything may be politicized. Where Rancière differs the most is in his view that the
political is enabled by a non-political principle, but also that the possibility of
politicization leads to only very rare events of politics. While for Schmitt and Foucault
the political is widely present or possible (as the intensification of non-political
antagonisms, or as resistance immanent to power relations), for Rancière “politics, in its
specificity, is rare” (Rancière 1999, 139; my emphasis). It is not a principle that is always
manifest parallel to an opposing one; it is a rare event of inscription of a supplement into
the social or into the order of police. Politics can happen but it is not necessary:
“...politics is the outline of a vanishing difference... its existence is in no way necessary, ...
it occurs as a provisional accident in the history of the forms of domination” (Rancière
2001, Thesis 6; my emphasis). Consequently, politics does not have a teleology, it is not
grounded in human nature, but appears only as an accident, an outline of the vanishing
difference between two ahistorical logics (the logic of police and of equality), or as an
inscription of an ahistorical void or supplement. It is important to note right away the
structuralist quality of Rancière's project. As Michael Dillon suggests, for Rancière “the
advent of the void” is not a specifically modern occurrence, but “a structural principle
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that does not owe its existence to the historical, although it may/may not find contingent
expression there” (Dillon 2003).
Politics and police: the conflict of logics and the play of correlation
Let us look closer at Rancière's distinction between these two logics. The critique of
“politics” as the suppression of “the political” is replaced, in Rancière's later works, by a
concept of “the police” that is opposed to “politics proper.” (The notion of 'the political'
resurfaces in his writings from time to time, however, it remains unclear what Rancière
means by it.) Rancière distinguishes between two modes or logics of being-together: one
“puts bodies in their place and their role according to their ‘properties’” and “distributes
the bodies within the space of their visibility or their invisibility,” and another “disrupts
this harmony through the mere fact of achieving the contingency of the equality”
(Rancière 1999, 27–28; my emphasis). One mode is that of homogeneity and “harmony,”
the other is a disruptive, or rather reactive force. The former is the order of the police
(often Rancière uses the notion of police interchangeably with “the social”), the “partition
of the perceptible” the principle of which is “absence of a void and of a supplement”
(Rancière 2001, Thesis 7), suggesting that it presents itself as the order of complete
visibility where everything is accounted for, where nothing escapes. The police is the set
of procedures through which consent in society is achieved; it is the system of
distribution of parts and, simultaneously, of the legitimization of such distribution. (As I
noted above, such legitimization is often performed by political philosophy that relies for
support on the ideas of anthropological invariants.)
In a sense, the police order in Rancière is akin to Foucault's notion of governmentality, 42
however, while the latter refers to a mentality of government (as a political reason or
rationale) and a government of mentality (as conduct of conduct), for Rancière, the
partition of the perceptible or sensory distribution (the aesthetic dimension) of the
common is at stake. As for the later Foucault freedom is a primary condition or a
42 Oliver Davis points out that Rancière rather compares the sense of the term “police” with that
identified by Foucault in seventeenth and eighteenth-century writings as almost synonymous with the
social order in its entirety (Davis 2010, 76; Rancière 1999, 28).
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universal principle of power relations, for Rancière politics and the police are 'grounded'
in another universality – radical equality. Paradoxically, the order of police or the social –
of radical inequality – is only possible because of the assumption of equality of everyone,
since, in order to establish effective domination, the subjects of this hierarchy have to
understand their assignment to a place of social inferiority (as power-less). As a result,
any structure of domination, even as it discriminates to the point of exclusion from the
political sphere, depends on the assumption of radical equality of intelligence,
understanding or just “the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being”
(Rancière 1999, 30). By referring to the equality of any speaking being with any other
speaking being, Rancière points to and subsequently challenges the partition of the
perceptible (policing) based on the Aristotelian distinction between logos and phonè.
Here logos refers to “the articulate language appropriate for manifesting a community in
the aisthesis of the just and the unjust,” and it is opposed to the animal phonè,
“appropriate only for expressing the feelings of pleasure and displeasure” (Rancière
2001, Thesis 8). A problem with this distinction arises, as Rancière points out, when one
has to decide what counts as human logos and as animal phonè, resulting in political
inclusion and exclusion respectively. The presupposition of equality of all speaking
beings in their immediate access to logos as the ability to understand each other
challenges the neutrality of Aristotelian distinction and provides the major principle for
politics.
Equality as such, in the words of Michel Dillon, is “(im)possible,” it is “the absent
presence ... that both enables social order and allows its hierarchy of power relations to be
challenged” (2005, 430). Equality is impossible because it is heterogeneous to any police
order or the partition of the sensible, meaning that any social order implements inequality
through the distribution of parts or shares in community. At the same time, equality is
possible “because every partition of the sensible presupposes equality. It is thus strictly
(im)possible” (322; my emphasis). Equality is a principle that disappears as soon as it is
presented, thus, it remains possible only as a principle, an assumption, “the apolitical
structural vacuum” (Rancière 1999, 34), but never, according to Rancière's logic, as the
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reality of the social order. In a way, this principle is reminiscent, in structural and logical
terms, of the Schmittian unpolitical as an exception, which is politicized the moment it is
brought to presence.
The hierarchical order of police of any kind assumes a total count of the parts: it denies
the miscount, or the presence of a supplement, of a void immanent to it. Nonetheless,
Rancière argues, such a total inclusion or count is not possible, there is always going to
be a structural remainder: a part that is unaccounted for, the part that does not have a part
in government or, in aesthetic terms, a part that is invisible or inaudible within the social
order. “Les sans-part.” He writes: “Politics arises from a count of community 'parts',
which is always a false count, a double count, or a miscount” (Rancière 1999, 6; my
emphasis). The distribution of parts in the city contains or even relies upon a
“fundamental miscount,” blaberon or wrong: the exclusion of demos. It is curious that
while Rancière denies the anthropological invariants of traditional political philosophy,
his own thought relies on the persistence of two other “invariants” or universals: equality
and counting. The activity of counting is necessarily present in any social order, which
makes one wonder if it is another sort of anthropological invariant which conditions, if
only negatively, the emergence of politics.
Demos, or the people, for Rancière signifies not a specific group but the supplement that
always emerges as a result of the miscount: “The demos is … an abstract separation of a
population from itself. It is a supplementary part over and above the sum of a population's
parts” (Rancière 2004, 6). He derives this definition, however critically, from Plato, the
'inventor' of political philosophy. In the third book of The Laws, Plato names the qualities
that entitle one to govern; Rancière finds the seventh form of entitlement the most
interesting: it is the government of the radically incompetent, the demos; those, who have
no other qualification than an “un-qualification ... the fact of having no qualification for
governing or being governed” (Rancière 2007, 562). As a result, democracy, that was the
usual name for such government based on no qualification, is not a political regime, one
among many, but the name of the regime of politics, because “politics as such rests on the
anarchical power of the un-qualified or un-identified” (562). So, while the order of police
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denies the presence of a void, politics emerges out of this void as the process of
verification of equality and as the engagement of demos.
Guided by the universal principle of radical equality, politics happens as an act or an
event of inscription of the supplement, the part of no part, into the heart of the police
order. Yet, it has a logic opposed to that of police. Rancière defines politics as an activity
“antagonistic” to policing (Rancière 1999, 29), as acting on the police. Politics becomes
manifest precisely as a disruption of the latter: it is referred to in terms of a break,
undoing, disruption and inscription. There are always two worlds present in one: the
world of police and the world of equality, the former repressing the latter, resulting in the
appearance of a perfect unity or harmony, with all parts occupying their proper place.
The essence of politics consists in bringing to light the falsity of such appearance, the
arbitrariness of the police order, in short, the “essence of politics is the manifestation of
dissensus ” (Rancière 2001, Thesis 8). It is a contestation, disagreement about archè or
the stable ground of order: an-archy is at the heart of politics as a claim to the
impossibility of ever stabilizing the foundation for community, for example, through
anthropological invariants. The police order is any order that retrospectively intends to
legitimize its own arbitrariness as necessity, and thus to reinvent the conditions of
possibility for its hierarchy and the structures of domination, a particular distribution of
shares and senses. Politics is an activity of disagreement with any such partitioning,
since, in Rancière's view, no social ordering can ever meet the demands of radical
equality.
Disagreement [mésentente] indicates a node between two meanings, which are
untranslatable into English: first, the fact of not hearing, of not understanding each other
(as, for example, when we say the same thing but mean different things), and second,
quarrel, disagreement (Rancière 2004, 5). The combination of these two meanings
amounts to the following: the principle of equality by itself or the fact of hearing and
understanding language (equal access to logos) does not produce any of the effects of an
egalitarian community. By itself it is a passive principle that does not enact itself out of
necessity, consequently, politics does not appear out of its intrinsic necessity either.
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“Egalitarian effects occur only through a forcing, that is, the instituting of a quarrel that
challenges the incorporated, perceptible evidence of an inegalitarian logic. This quarrel is
politics” (5; my emphasis). Politics is not a principle, not a kind of an unconscious of the
police order that returns out of necessity (i.e., the inevitable return of the repressed) but,
rather, an active forcing or intervention into that order. (If we wish to retain the figure of
the unconscious here, we should remember that even though the repressed or excepted
part (the sans-part) is not simply erased through this repression; its 'return' is,
nevertheless, a matter of a forceful action, not a given.43) In relation to order, politics is
always a painful act of transcendence. As a result, Rancière keeps reminding his readers,
politics is rare: in potential it is always there due to the demands of equality but in
actuality it is difficult to achieve.
Even as it occurs, an event of politics leaves a trace rather than a clear line between an
old police order and a new, supposedly better one. As I mentioned above, politics is the
outline of a vanishing difference: an indication or temporary manifestation of the
irreducible difference of the population from itself, of the void in police order, and of the
persistent supplement that has a potential to disrupt the harmony of the police. The
difference vanishes since political interruptions, and its subjects, are always reinscribed
within order. However, this very disappearance becomes a condition for a new
intervention: “The persistence of the wrong is infinite because verification of equality is
infinite and the resistance of any police order to such verification is a matter of principle”
(Rancière 1999, 39). The essence of police is to resist total restructuring, to resist politics,
as a result, it seems to exhibit some plasticity in reaction to the events of politics by
incorporating, recognizing and establishing a relationship with that which once was
excluded, unseen and nonrelational. The “wrong” cannot be resolved or settled but it can
be “processed” (39), which involves the emergence and recognition of a subject (the exsans-part). It is worth noting that Rancière does not elaborate on this processing or the
post-political reinspription of the sans-part. Oliver Davis (2010) also raises this critical
43 Rancière's view is particularly close to Badiou's in this aspect, for whom politics is also a matter of
militancy and forcing, for example, as in naming the unnameable or forcing a name upon an event
(see, Badiou 2005a; 2005b).
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point about Rancière's work: he comments on Rancière's reluctance to probe the police
order, to think, at least in general terms, about the relationships between different types of
the police order, types of political subjectivation and demonstration. Furthermore, Davis
contends (similarly to Peter Hallward) that without an analysis of the process by which
the sans-part is recognized, and thus ceases to be such, Rancière's account is missing a
crucial element (96).
To further this line of critique, I argue that for Rancière politics not only “runs up against
the police everywhere” (1999, 31), but is also bound to do so endlessly, since the
“revolutionary” overturning of its order is not possible. What remains is the infinite
amendment and succession of the social. In order to distance himself from an essentialist
view of politics and from its traditional identification with public sphere (where
consensus is achieved) and the state, Rancière strongly argues that politics does not have
its own place, it “has no objects or issues of its own” (31). Since the classical definition
and distinction of sciences, natural or social, relies on the distinctiveness of their objects
and methodology, Rancière's suggestion by default is a critique of any reduction of
political thought to a science of politics, resulting in a general economy of the political, or
the general, as opposed to regional, ontology of politics. The essence of politics lies in
“twisting the ontology of the social,” and so as “twisted,” Rancière's political ontology is
“an anti-ontology” (Deranty 2003).
It is worth returning, at this point, to an earlier question of disagreement between
Rancière and Foucault: let us remember that both thinkers resist the “everything is
political” statement. Similar to Foucault, Rancière's “version” of the general economy of
the political (at least as the project of thought) is not that of actuality but of potentiality or
becoming: anything may be politicized, may become political if it gives rise to a meeting
of the two logics – the police and equality. Nothing is essentially unpoliticizable; there is
no real limit to politics. Like for Foucault and Schmitt, politics (or the political) is
potentially everywhere; and since it is lacking a fixed object, it is dependent on that,
which it is not, on its own difference or negativity. In Rancière's case, the essential
displacement of politics not only establishes a general economy of the political, but also
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reduces the “autonomy” of politics by attaching it to the primacy of the police order.
Politics is sustained as an activity, however rare, that is parasitic on the order of police. In
other words, politics can be thought as well as manifest only in correlation with the order
of police. Politics exists only as an act of inscription of “the apolitical structural vacuum
of equality between anyone and everyone” into the heart of the police order. If there were
no police, politics would cease to exists both in thought and action. As a result, as
Rancière tries to distance himself from political philosophy that relies on different
invariants to derive and explain politics, he seems to end up in a similar place: politics is
derived from the assumption of the invariant presence of the police. The worlds of police
and politics are in endless relation with each other: re-ordering always succeeds the
interruption of order by an event of politics. Since order is, supposedly, always already
there, politics emerges only in correlation to it, as a disruption, as a re-partition of the
perceptible, made possible by the inscription of a supplement, of a part of those who have
no part, that becomes visible through the assumption of radical equality.
Slavoj Žižek (1999a) presents a similar critique of Rancière, however, his remarks
emerge from within the framework of Lacanian psychoanalysis and thus employ different
rhetoric. Upon his examination of Rancière's (but also that of others', e.g., Badiou's)
distinction between politics and the police, Žižek suggests that the logic of the former
includes its own failure in advance, that is, it “considers its full success as its ultimate
failure [think, for example, of the (im)possibility of equality, or vanishing difference],
which sticks to its marginal character as the ultimate sign of its authenticity [i.e., politics
'proper'], and thus, entertains an ambiguous attitude toward its politico-ontological
opposite, the police Order of Being: it has to refer to it, it needs it as the big enemy
('Power') which must be there in order for us to engage in our marginal/subversive
activity – the very idea of accomplishing a total subversion of this Order ('global
revolution') is dismissed as proto-totalitarian” (233-234). Žižek's critique is similar to my
critique of correlation discussed above: he notes in Rancière's logic of politics a 'secret'
attachment or 'need' for the big enemy that happens to always already be there. Žižek,
who advocates politics as a revolutionary practice aiming at total reordering or renewal of
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order, eventually contends that Rancière's politics is no more than a “game of hysterical
provocation” (238).
The critique of correlation of politics and the police, and its Žižekian 'version', raises a
further question of the fate of the state in Rancière's thought. Since a global (communist)
revolution is not of concern for him, what remains of the state (which does not equal the
police), and what is its relation to politics? I suggest that an answer could be found in
Rancière's concept of “the political” (le politique) that occasionally resurfaces in his
works and accompanies some discussions of the distinction between politics (la politique)
and the police. According to my analysis (cf. Rockhill 2006, 89), Rancière does not
maintain a strict terminological distinction between politics (la politique) and the political
(le politique) except for the discussion in his On the Shores of Politics (1995) that I
addressed above. However, in his essay Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization
(1992) he clarifies the meaning of this concept: “the political is the encounter between
two heterogeneous processes” (58), between that of governing (“policy,” or what he will
later name “the police”) and of equality (the set of emancipatory practices, or politics
“proper”). But it is not just an encounter, it is the very place of such encounter. The
political is “the place where the verification of equality is obliged to turn into the
handling of a wrong” (59; my emphasis). So, we have three notions here: “policy,
politics, and the political” – the political being the field for the encounter between
emancipation and policy in the handling of a wrong” (59). The political here is the place
or the field of contestation, dissensus or disagreement. In Rancière's other works the
notion of “the political” does not appear as such, but, in a way, it is still present as the site
of politics. For example, in Disagreement he writes: “[p]olitics occurs when there is a
place and a way for two heterogeneous processes to meet” (1999, 30; my emphasis). The
political in this case is implied by the reference to “a place,” as the site of intersection of
the heterogeneous logics. Since politics is the staging of dissensus, i.e., “a conflict over
the existence of a common stage” (26), one might suggest that politics is a conflict over
the political, the stage or field of dissensus, or over the common.
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Rancière speaks of the state in similar terms, as the space that contains contestation,
which makes me wonder if the state is the political or, at least, its instance. Rancière
differentiates the state from the homogeneity of the police order. They are not identical,
however, they can overlap, as in the case when state institutions stabilize or become
linked with the archè of community: “What is usually posited as the space of politics,
meaning the set of state institutions, is precisely not a homogenous place. Its
configuration is determined by the state of relations between political logic and police
logic. But it is also, of course, the privileged space where their difference is dissimulated”
(Rancière 1999, 33; my emphasis). So, the space of the state is configured by the relation
between politics and the police, however, it is not just a passive object of such
configuration: it seems to “act” through dissimulation of difference between two logics.
As I showed above, the relation of politics and the police is that of constant configuration
and dissimulation, and the field that hosts this co-relation is “the political.” As a result, it
is possible to suggest that the space of the state is the political, the place of staging of
dissensus. Such a conclusion raises further questions about the possibility of politics
beyond the state. To put it differently, it is curious what other instances of the political, as
the field that enables an encounter of contestation, we might imagine. It seems that even
as Rancière attempts to “reinvent politics,” the state remains its important component.44
The totality of the political and a place for the unpolitical
Given the presence of correlation in Rancière thought, I would now like to raise the
question of its totalizing ambition. As was noted above, Rancière is highly critical of the
statement “everything is political,” specifically as it results from a lack of distinction
between power and politics. However, I argue, he re-establishes this totality in terms of
the totalizing ambition of his correlation. The two modes of being-together, politics and
44 The lack of rejection of the state is one of the major points of difference between Rancière's and
Badiou's projects. Badiou addresses this issue in his critique of Rancière's view of politics (Badiou
2005a). Jean-Philippe Deranty sums up on this point: “Rancière is guilty of the same crime as the
proponents of 'political philosophy' he is so vocal in denouncing, namely that of refusing to prescribe
and conclude. This becomes evident in Rancière's reticence to take his axioms to their ultimate
consequences and to reject the State both theoretically and practically as part of a politics of equality”
(Deranty 2003).
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the police, seem to exhaust the account of possible modes of being-together, without
presenting any conceptual tools for thinking life outside of both of them. There is no
account in Rancière of the instability of order as such, outside of its possible interruption
by politics and thus consequent re-organization. For Rancière, the political re-partitioning
of order is a rare occasion, while it seems that the police assumes a more or less
omnipresent, but not necessarily negative, role in his system – everything is the police
unless it is politics, which is rare. In a manner similar to other post-foundational political
thinkers, Rancière advocates “proper” politics in opposition to the police, and the
principle of correlation at the core of his political thinking leaves him, as many others,
blind to or indifferent to a possibility of a “third” (fourth, fifth...) mode of being-together
that is neither the harmonious order of police, nor the contingent, disruptive reality of
politics and equality. However, it is not exactly correct to suggest that Rancière does not
at all think of life beyond this political correlation; in order to be more precise, let me
contend that he does not give a positive account of a mode of being-together that is
neither politics nor the police.
We can catch a glimpse of the unpolitical in Rancière's principle of equality and in the
political subject (the sans-part). Equality, for Rancière, is “a mere assumption that needs
to be discerned within the practices implementing it,” it is “the apolitical structural
vacuum” that lends politics cases to inscribe (1999, 34). As such, the principle of equality
does not belong to the order of the social or politics, nevertheless, it conditions, makes
them both possible. In this way, it is outside the correlation: politics and the police order
rest on the principle that does not belong to them as such. This non-belonging is
unpolitical in principle. However, it becomes meaningful only in relation to politics, that
is, it is unpolitical only in principle, but becomes politicized once inscribed into order by
politics. It is thus (un)political, in a similar way as it is (im)possible. Its transitional
position is reminiscent of the Schmittian exception: equality is unpolitical as long as it is
excepted from the police order, but once it is summoned by politics (decided upon or
verified by it) is becomes politicized.
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The part of no part or the supplement of the police order is another case of something like
the unpolitical in Rancière. It is the people or demos that is excluded from, uncounted and
unrecognized by the order of police. It is its excess. Guided by the principle of equality, it
represents the wrong, and as such becomes the political subject, “the people of politics,”
whose task is to re-inscribe, re-introduce equality into order, and thus to exhibit the
arbitrariness of the foundation of hierarchy and domination (of any particular partition of
the sensible and distribution of parts). Political subjects are “fluctuating performers” who
“bring the nonrelationship into relationship and give place to nonplace” (1999, 89). They
are fluctuating because the position of a supplement is never stable, it not occupied by
one specific group; like the demos that does not, for Rancière, signify a defined group,
but refers to a void, the unqualified, that is not recognized by the order except as that
which does not count. As a result, Rancière argues, “the people of politics never
disappears into some simple coexistence of individuals and social groups without
remainder, it is always replaced by another people” (2004, 8). The political task is to
inscribe the sans-part, to make visible the invisible of the order, however, since full
visibility or total count is not possible, the remainder persist, making the task of politics
infinite. “The place of a political subject is an interval or a gap: being together to the
extent that we are in-between names, identities, cultures, and so on” (1992, 62). The inbetween persists despite any attempts of (re)ordering and political intervention.
Consequently, this in-between, the part of no part is unpolitical: like the principle of
equality, this kind of being-together neither belongs to the order of police nor is it
political in a full sense, it may only become politicized, involved in an act of political
intervention. The sans-part is (un)political: “un” as in the uncounted, “political” as in the
political subject.
Nonetheless, Rancière seems to give this kind of (un)political life only a negative value,
meaning that it has to be inscribed, brought to light through politics in order to gain its
voice as the declaration of its absence. Otherwise, as such it is in a position of exclusion,
suffering or discomfort, it is invisible and nonrelational. It is representative of the wrong
or injustice brought about by the police ordering. This description implies the necessity
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and desirability of its inscription into existing order by means of politicization or the
political action of the re-partition of the perceptible. In this light, Rancière's project is a
project of thought that finds a way of conceptually expressing the possibility of the
excluded, i.e., the part of no part, to partake in being-together through politics. The very
concept of politics prescribes that the nonrelation must transform into relation and
nonplace must find its place, that is, become (re)ordered. Rancière does not seem to
envision a reality beyond the correlation of politics and the police that would sustain the
“nonrelational” and “nonplace” in positive terms; he does not elaborate a being-together
of the “in-between,” except for suggesting that it gives rise to political subjects that
disrupt the harmonious order of the police. Rancière does not account for a possibility of
the unpolitical as such, and of a different way that it could relate to both the police and
politics.
I suggest that one of the possible ways to think the unpolitical as such in relation to
Rancière's project is to question the assumption of the persistence of the social, which
Rancière clearly recognizes as the source of the wrong. Simone Weil might have a point
when she writes: “Man is a social animal, and the social element represents evil. There is
nothing we can do about it, and yet at the same time we are not permitted to accept it as
such, under pain of losing our soul. It follows that life cannot be anything else but a
spiritual laceration. This world is uninhabitable. That is why we have to flee to the next.
But the door is shut. What a lot of knocking is required before it opens! Really to be able
to enter in, and not be left on the doorstep, one has to cease to be a social being” (1956,
2:466; my emphasis). Rancière, like many others, seems to remain “on the doorstep,”
without really entering something like “the other world.” What is the contemporary
thought of the political at all if not thought of the threshold and on the threshold? In this
respect, I believe, the process of becoming-asocial is worth pondering upon in more
detail.
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1.4. Retreating the Political: Social Ontology of Being-with as
Primordial Politics
The works of Jean-Luc Nancy represent another instance of post-foundational political
thought. Presenting an example of the correlation of politics and the political, as well as
its totalizing ambition (in a form of rethinking Being and thus political ontology in terms
of the primordiality of being-with), Nancy also asserts the need to “distinguish politics,”
to allow for other spheres of reference. Thus, I would like to note from the beginning that
my critique of correlation and the totalizing ambition of the political in Nancy's thought
does not mean to suggest an exhaustive account of his project. I argue that the seeming
presence of the two tendencies in his philosophy – a tendency toward a new totality of
politics and correlation, and a tendency toward the unpolitical, the outside of the political
as such – is indicative of the advent of the unpolitical. Nancy's work is an example of
thought on the 'threshold': still bearing the traces on the modern totality of the political,
he attempts to extend beyond it, however, he seems to remains unsure of the effects of
this extension. While looking at the unpolitical, Nancy's gaze seems to remain attached to
the space of the political. In order to elucidate this double tendency in Nancy's thought, I
will, first, attend to the analysis of correlation and the totalizing ambition of the political.
Next, I will take up in some detail Nancy's 'intuition' of the unpolitical.
The modern totality of the political and its “retreat”
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy (1997) in their cooperative work at the
Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political (1980-1984), put forward the notion of
“the retreat of the political” (la retrait du politique). This retreat was meant to be a
response to the historical situation of that time, to what they called a “closure” or
“completion of the political.” To think the “closure” as “retreat” is not only suggestive of
a kind of withdrawal and thus absence but also of a more positive re-treating, in a sense
of re-thinking, re-consideration of “the essence of the political.” The task of such a retreat
is acknowledged by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy: “the question of the political evokes the
necessity of dwelling on what makes the social relation possible as such” (180n1; my
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emphasis). As Philip Armstrong puts it, what is at stake here is “the radical re-articulation
of relationality” (2009, 3).
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy suggest that modernity is an epoch of “the absolute reign or
'total domination' of the political,” meaning that the political is “completed to the point of
excluding every other area of reference” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 110–111).
Since the problem of the political as totality is a specifically modern one, the major object
of their critique is the modern closure of the political or modernity as the closure of the
political. As such their critique is situated primarily as a response to a specific historical
constellation (foreclosure of the political), which presents a horizon where a new opening
becomes possible. That is, re-treating, as a positive gesture for the sake of the future, of
new thought, emerges as an act of critical negation of what currently is, or the withdrawal
of and distancing from the “old” political philosophy.
For Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (1997) the closure or completion of the political is
coextensive with the slogan “everything is political.” There are two primarily meanings
of this statement: first, the closure of the “theologico-political;” second, completion of the
political in political economy or “the techno-social.” The former refers primarily to the
possibility of a religious (or quasi-religious) legitimation of community, where a God or a
leader signifies and thus legitimates the 'origin' of the common, or is simply able to say
“we” for us all. Nancy further suggests that modernity is characterized by the withdrawal
of such theologico-political (modernity as secularization of social life), meaning that
there is no longer the One for community who can embody and represent it, resulting in
the withdrawal of every possible figure for community. So, we witness “the end of the
political” in a sense of “the end of religion: the end of an order of given, tied-up sense”
(Nancy 1997, 91). The closure of the political as political economy simply means that the
former is reduced to or identified with the latter: the ancient Greek separation between
the private domain of oikos, i.e., economy of the household, and the public, political
domain, i.e., the polis, is non-existent in modernity. The polis is viewed as a large oikos,
resulting in the application of the rules and concerns of the latter to the former. 45
45 This interpretation of the extension of economy into politics is reminiscent of Foucault's discussion of
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However, Nancy notes, such displacement was not simply one of magnitude, it involved a
qualitative transformation or reinterpretation of the politeia, a knowledge of the affairs of
the city-state, as an oiko-nomia. Moreover, the latter was reconfigured “no longer only in
terms of subsistence and prosperity (of 'the good life') but in terms of the production and
reproduction of wealth (of 'having more')” (Nancy 2010b, 46–47). As a result, Nancy
contends that “[i]n this respect, there is in the final analysis no difference between
'everything is political' and 'everything is economic'” (47).
Another aspect of the reduction of the political to political economy lies in the declaration
of the self-sufficiency of humanity: the possibility of its self-production, reproduction and
multiplication outside of any other reference. Humanity, in the absence of God, has “no
final destination other than its own self-production... 'Everything is political' thus also
amounts to affirming that there is a self-sufficiency of 'man' considered as the producer of
his own nature and, through it, of nature in its entirety” (2010b, 47). Nancy suggests that
such representation of natural self-sufficiency continues to dominate the meaning of
'politics' today: never has the primacy of 'political economy' been more devastating. It is
worth noting that Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy use a few other terms to refers to such
domination, which add to our understanding of the phenomenon they want to elucidate.
For example, they suggest that we are witnessing “the total immanentisation of the
political in the social” (1997, 115), where the political is converted into a form of “banal
management or organisation” that defines the epoch of the domination of political
economy. The art of political government, reinterpreted in terms of the economic
regulation of the social, results in the closure of the political as “the techno-social.”
Nevertheless, Nancy suggests, despite the total domination of political economy, the
inconsistency of its self-sufficiency becomes more and more evident today (due to
globalization, for example). As a result, what is today called the “end,” “crisis,” “eclipse,”
or “paralysis” of politics is, in the end, nothing more than the crisis “of man's selfsufficiency and/or of the nature that is within him” (Nancy 2010b, 48).
the birth of biopolitics, where the concerns of mere living (health, reproduction, subsistence, etc.),
which once were confined to the domestic sphere, oikos, become the object of political intervention or
rationality. The main subjectivity of this epoch is no longer zoon politikon, but homo oeconomicus.
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So, the modern political, according to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, is “sublimated” under
the guise of theology and economy; however, this sublimation becomes more and more
apparent, that is, the political as theology and economy withdraws or disappears, thus
exposing the 'illusion' of its totality. As Nancy puts it, “[p]olitics has withdrawn as the
donation (the auto- or hetero-donation, whether human or divine) of a common essence
and destination: it has withdrawn as totality or as totalization. In this sense, not
everything is political” (Nancy 2010b, 50). Not everything is consumed by theology and
economy, at least not anymore. Once the political withdraws, only the empty space is left
behind, which is similar to Claude Lefort's suggestion that in modern democracy the
“locus of power becomes an empty place [un lieu vide]” (1988, 17). The project of
(positive) re-treating of the political emerges within this historical horizon of its
withdrawal: the new thought of the political and its essence, to which Lacoue-Labarthe
and Nancy dedicated the work of the Centre, is historically conditioned by the emergence
of the empty space of political philosophy.
But why would it be at all necessary to rethink the political, once it is withdrawn, once its
place is vacated; why is its absence to be feared and not to be tolerated? It seems that this
question is an inquiry into the future of thought as such, due to the essential co-belonging
of politics and thought. Without the withdrawal of the political there is no space for an
alternative thought of community as well as an alternative community of thought, since
“the essential (and not accidental or simply historical) co-belonging of the philosophical
and the political” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 109) prescribes a 'limited' relation
of politics and thought. The philosophical questioning about the essence of politics is
inseparable from the political determination of philosophy, that is, the political
determination of essence. In the Western tradition politics and thought (confined to
philosophy or metaphysics) have been inseparable, where Aristotle's description of the
mutual and inseparable relationship between the polis and logos is one of the most
distinguished examples of such a co-belonging. As a result, the task for thought, in the
sight of the space vacated by the withdrawal of the political, is to question itself about its
political 'origins': “What remains to be thought by us ... is not a new institution (or
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instruction) of politics by thought, but the political institution of so-called Western
thought” (110). It is worth noting here that the question of co-belonging of politics and
thought is necessarily bound to the problem of their mutual limitation. In other words, the
question of the limits of the political (i.e., of the unpolitical) becomes essentially the
question of the limits of thought (i.e., the unthought). (I will return to this question in
more detail below.)
The retreat of the essence of the political is essentially “the questioning of the
philosophical as the political” within the horizon of its retreat or withdrawal. What is at
stake here is not a return to some originary, pure essence of the political that was clouded
by theology or economy but, as Philip Armstrong suggests, “opening toward the
political”: “...this retreat of the political ... does not mark a return to the political, to
concept of the political that exists in its pure, uncontaminated state or given identity, but
reopens the 'open space' of the Centre to a spacing in which the questioning of the
political is at once delimited and delimiting” (2009, 3). This opening is the positive retreat of the political resulting from the double crisis: the closure of the political and
“practical deprivation of philosophy as regards itself and its own authority.” To sum up,
the retreat of the political is interpreted in two ways: first, as withdrawal in the sense of
its being “the 'well-known' and in the sense of the obviousness (the blinding obviousness)
of politics” (i.e., “everything is political”); and second, “as re-tracing of the political, remarking it, by raising the question in a new way which, for us, is to raise it as the
question of its essence” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 112). The authors are quick
to warn us that such re-treating of essence does not indicate “a falling back into
'apoliticism',”46 but renders possible “a questioning which refuses to confine itself to the
categories ordinarily grouped under 'the political' and probably, in the long run, to the
concept of the political itself” (112). This amounts, in a way similar to other postfoundational thinkers, to the recognition of the excess of politics or its irreducible
difference (and thus of the limited nature of the categories of traditional political
46 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, perhaps, have in mind here the traditional opposition between politics
and philosophy, however, it remains unclear what exactly this falling back into “apoliticism” would
mean in a view of the essential co-belonging of politics and thought.
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philosophy), which become a quasi-ground for a new thought of the political. The refusal
of confinement or the limits of the political is what Nancy would call the “unworking” of
the immanent horizon of politics and thought. “Immanentism” for Nancy, in the first
place, refers to the problem of community, that is, “a closed community producing itself
or its essence as its own ‘work’ ... based on a nostalgia for a lost community: an original
and immediate being-together that has been lost but whose immanence can be restored”
(Devisch 2000, 240). Again, Nancy's critique of immanentism is 'grounded' in the idea of
retreat of the political – raising the question of the political in a new way, and not a return
to some original community. So, the re-treat as unworking consists of a double movement
of closure and opening: it does not reveal some pre-existent, hidden essence once it has
destructed or deconstructed the present one (it is not an unearthing); on the contrary, it
opens unto a new meaning or sense that is not totalizing. The nature of the re-treat as both
closure and opening makes it possible, for Nancy, to conclude that “if 'everything is
political' – in a sense that is neither that of political theology nor political economy – it is
insofar as the everything [le “tout”] can be neither total nor totalized in any way” (Nancy
2010b, 51). The investigations into the essence of such a political and the meaning of
such “everything” lie at the core of Nancy's work: the essence of the political as “beingwith” and of “everything” as “being-in-common.”
Political ontology of the in-common
While in his earlier works, including those produced in cooperation with LacoueLabarthe, Nancy is more focused on the negative aspect of retreating the political
(pointing out what it is not), in his later works, for example, in Being Singular Plural,
Nancy presents his project in a more positive way: thinking of the essence of the
common. The question of this essence (or rather co-essence) is “the ontological question
of the political (le politique) [that] arises at the moment of the evaporation of the
possibility of a polity that would incarnate such a being-with” (Critchley 1999, 56). That
is, the question of the political (le politique) can be raised positively and in a new way
because politics (la politique) or the 'incarnations' of the common (e.g., communism)
have withdrawn.
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Nancy wants to think the common or togetherness in a new way: existence as essentially
co-existence or being-with, not subordinated to any other principle. Consequently, the
question of the political is an ontological question: what is the common? I argue that in
rethinking the political is terms of Being as in-common Nancy displaces the totality of
politics (la politique) – “everything is political” – with a new, primordial 'totality' of the
political (le politique) that refuses to complete itself. One of the reasons for this
incompletion of the political is its never-ending interruption by the opposite principle
(i.e., politics), which is merely displaced but never eliminated. Oliver Marchart (2007)
calls this play “the political difference,” in the fashion of Heidegger's ontological
difference, which influenced many post-foundational thinkers (the so-called “leftHeideggerians”). Marchart reaches a similar conclusion about “the primordial status of
political ontology,” however, he argues that this primordiality does not amount to total
politicization because neither politics nor the political reside within all beings in an
immediate way, but only “by way of ‘mediation’ through the political difference” (169).
The collapse of the play of this difference would mean either the total absorption of the
social being by ontic 'politics' (la politique) – the “everything is political,” of which
Nancy is critical, – or “a world in which the political (in the ontological sense of
antagonism) is fully enacted on the entire scale of the social,” which is basically a
definition of the “universal civil war” (169). According to Marchart, within leftHeideggerian political thought the irresolvability of play between “politics” and “the
political” (the play of the political difference) guarantees that neither of the scenarios can
come true. He concludes: “The claim as to the primordial status of political ontology does
not correspond to the commonplace notion of ‘everything is political’ – even though
everything is political in the sense of being irresolvably subverted by the
instituting/destituting moment of the political, as it is indicated in the play of the political
difference. ... Not ‘everything is political’, but the ground/abyss of everything is the
political” (169). I propose that Marchart's defence of the primordial status of political
ontology as non-totalizing is not very effective, and it is still possible to suggest that the
primordial status of the political amounts to a new totality. He recognizes, as do many
other post-foundational thinkers (whose works he examines), that the common claim of
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“everything is political” does not refer to the ontological status of the political, but rather
signifies the total absorption of the social life by ontic politics, for example, by political
economy or even theology. So, Marchart successfully clarifies for us that claims toward
“the primordial status of political ontology” and “everything is political” are not the
same, and indeed they are not. As I have shown above, many political thinkers begin their
investigation into a new meaning of “the political” with the deconstruction of the slogan
“everything is political.” However, they do not seem to question the status of the result of
such a deconstruction: the status of the political as “ground/abyss of everything.” Like
Marchart, they merely argue that the political, as ontological primordiality, is not the
political of “everything is political.”
But what does it really mean to conclude (as Marchart does) that everything is political in
the sense of being irresolvably subverted by the moment of the political? What does it
mean to assume that the political, even as it is always interrupted by politics, is basically
the condition of possibility of everything? How far does this claim stand from assuming a
new totality of the political? It is my suggestion that while the statement “everything is
political” points to the immediacy of politicization (i.e., everything is political), the
political as the quasi-ground or condition of possibility of everything points rather to a
totalizing ambition of the primordial politics (since an ambition remains an ambition only
insofar as it is not fulfilled). Nancy's proposition that everything is political insofar as
“the everything [le “tout”] can be neither total nor totalized” points into a direction of
such an ambition. This political is a new kind of totality: a sort of 'proper' totality that
incorporates its own incompletion or openness. I contend that Nancy further points at
such totality when he writes that “politics must be understood as the specific place for the
articulation of a nonunity – and for the symbolization of a nonfigure. ... In such a place,
politics is far from being “everything” – even though everything passes through it and
meets up or crosses paths in it” (Nancy 2010b, 51). Such politics, or rather the political, is
a place where everything passes through and meets up, meaning that it is the space where
all relations are formed and contained. This is reminiscent of Kant's idea of space as an a
priori condition of the appearance of the external objects (and thus of forming relations
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with them). In this regard David Ingram suggests: “With explicit reference to Kant,
Nancy allows that a kind of transcendental reflection may be possible which delimits the
a priori conditions circumscribing the limits of political life – the essence of the political
(le politique) as distinct from its empirical manifestations (la politique)” (1988, 97).
Nancy's thought is dedicated to the examination of these a priori conditions: the
primordial ontology of the political as being-with. This refers to another problem with
Marchart's argument presented above: he suggests that, due to the antagonistic character
of the political ontology, the total primacy of the political would mean “universal civil
war.” While Nancy does not deny the conflictual nature of the political, his major effort
lies in showing that existence is always already political in a sense of being essentially incommon. However, there is no sense in which, for Nancy, being-in-common equals
“universal civil war.”
Worldliness and the political: rethinking “Mitsein” or being-with
Nancy commences his radical re-articulation of relationality with a critique of Heidegger:
he intends to “rewrite” Being and Time. However, Nancy notes that this question is not
limited to Heidegger's thought, but “concerns the whole of Western thinking in its way of
comprehending or failing to comprehend what Heidegger was the first to have elucidated
precisely: the essential character of the existential with (that is, of the with as condition of
possibility of human existence – if not even of the existence of all beings...” (Nancy
2008, 3–4). Being-with, as primordial politics, or the political (le politique), as the
question of “the being-together … [that] resists all assignation in empirical factuality”
(Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 134), is born out of a rethinking of Being as
essentially “with” or “in-common.”47 Nancy begins with an examination of Heidegger's
analytic of Dasein and the place of Mitsein in it: he suggests that Heidegger
simultaneously opened and erased the possibility of thinking an essential “with” of
Dasein. The opening is signalled by his positing of Mitsein as co-essential to Dasein’s
47 Nicholas Dungey (2001) makes a similar point about Derrida's relation to Heidegger. He suggests that
“[w]hat for Heidegger is an ontological structure – being-with-others as being-in-the-world – is for
Derrida the movement of the political (it)self” (471), resulting in “being-with-others as primordial
politics.”
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essence: insofar as we are thrown into the world, our entrance into sociality is not an
independent decision. We are inscribed into the world and, thus, the fact that we are
social beings is not merely an empirical but ontological fact of human existence. In the
words of Ignaas Devish, “[t]o be thrown into the world implies that I am, as a Dasein, cooriginal with a Mitsein. The ‘there’ (da) makes of me at the same time a ‘with’ (mit)”
(2000, 242). This position asserts the primacy of relational structure, as opposed to a
solipsistic view of existence. Nevertheless, Nancy further suggests that Heidegger
foreclosed his own opening toward the radical relationality of Dasein by subordinating
Mitsein to the distinction between the improper and the proper, resulting in the
suppression or loss of the “with” between the Anyone and the people (Nancy 2008, 5).
Anyone refers to the improper (or “inauthentic”) mode of Being-with: common existence
in the sense of “banal,” indifferent and anonymous. The people represents the proper (or
“authentic”) mode of Mitsein: Being-with as a community of destiny, guided by the
common cause for which it is necessary to fight (thus, the sacrificial death in combat). It
is primarily the critique of Heidegger's subordination of Mitsein to 'community' (the
proper, authentic Being-with) that drives Nancy's thought of the “with.” He writes that in
Being and Time “the affirmation of the essentiality of the with is insidiously neglected in
favor of another category, community, which appropriates the with into a destinal unity in
which there is no room for the contiguity of the theres, nor consequently any logical,
ontological or topological room for the with as such” (13). It is the with as such that must
be thought in order to elucidate the essential quality of existence as co-existence: “the
primordial, ontological condition of being-with or being-together” (Nancy 2000, xvi).
Nancy suggests that Heidegger's ontological project must become a “social ontology,”
where the question of our being-with has primary status. He is attempting “a coexistential analytic” that has the ambition of being a first philosophy (Critchley 1999, 53).
Thinking of the with as such leads to Nancy's reconsideration of the notion of
community: he is critical of Heidegger's subordination of the question of being-with to
that of community, but instead of abandoning the latter altogether, he merges the notion
of community with being-with in a new way, beyond Heideggerian destiny and unity.
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Since, according to Nancy, plurality is not an added but an essential quality of Being,
“Being 'itself' comes to be defined as relational, as non-absoluteness, and, if you will ...
as community” (Nancy 1991, 6). This community “unworks” itself rather than referring to
some common essence; it is not empirical, i.e., the polis, but ontologically 'given':
primordial community of being-with-each-other that in its essence is the singular plurality
of being. In a Heideggerian manner Nancy suggests that singularity is always already
exposed to the outside, and due to this “primordial structure, it is at once detached,
distinguished, and communitarian. Community is the presentation of the detachment (or
retrenchment) of this distinction that is not individuation, but finitude compearing [comparaît]” (29). Singularity never appears in solitude: by the very fact of being in this world
(which by definition is always plural, multiple), singularity can only co-appear.
“Community means ... that there is no singular being without another singular being, and
that there is, therefore, ... an originary or ontological “sociality” that in its principle
extends far beyond the simple theme of man as a social being (the zoon politikon is
secondary to this community)” (28). Community is “the being-ecstatic of Being itself”:
insofar as something has being, insofar as something exists, it necessarily extends beyond
itself in ek-stasis, it is relational in its very essence. Even in solitude one is never alone;
even in death, since one always dies for someone, one dies in and for the world. An
empirical community, the polis as a secondary community of zoon politikon (of political
animals), is what can be called politics (la politique), while the political (le politique)
refers to this originary “sociality” – the primordial community of Being as essentially
with.
It is important for Nancy to assert the radical finitude of such community (cf. “finitude
compearing”): only what exists exists, and nothing else. There is no transcendence
beyond existence, no driving force that guides and manifests itself through the finite;
there is no outside of this world. “There is no 'outside', no getting away from the closure
of immanence” (Nancy 2003a, 75–76). While Nancy is critical of immanentism, the
cause of the totalitarian claim to total representation and the closure of community, and
while he affirms transcendence, in a sense of the excess of representation (i.e., the
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political beyond politics), he is critical of the notion of transcendence in a more
traditional sense, as something that exists beyond the world, thus beyond the singular
plurality of being. Consequently, he affirms the closure of immanence (immanence of
existence)

in

opposition

to

totalitarian

immanentism

and

theologico-political

transcendence.
Sense as the origin of the world: the sharing of Being
If there is nothing beyond this world, what is within it? There is the world and there is
sense or meaning: the world is sense, and sense is the origin the world. The notion of
sense or meaning is very important for Nancy because on it he builds the idea of the coexistence and co-primordiality of being-with. Sense makes sense only when it is shared;
like language it is always in-common: “There is no meaning if meaning is not shared ...
because meaning is itself the sharing of Being” (Nancy 2000, 2). Nancy suggests that
Being does not have meaning but is “given to us as meaning,” that is, meaning is not an
attribute, an added quality of existence that can be uncovered, but is given to us insofar as
we can say we. It is between us: “Meaning is its own communication or its own
circulation ... and we are this circulation” (2). Another word for this circulation is sharing:
primordial exposition of all things to the outside, and of the self (ecstatic, human Dasein)
as “a pre-cognitive affective disposition towards the world” (Critchley 1999, 64). It is
interesting to note that while Nancy's co-existential analytic is mostly dedicated to
Dasein and thus 'human community', he does not fail to indicate the 'infinite' character of
the circulation or sharing. It goes “in all directions at once, in all the directions of all the
space-times [les espace-temps] opened by presence to presence: all things, all beings, all
entities, everything past and future, alive, dead, inanimate, stones, plants, nails, gods –
and 'humans', that is, those who expose sharing and circulation as such by saying 'we', by
saying we to themselves in all possible senses of that expression, and by saying we for the
totality of all being” (Nancy 2000, 3). Being as being-with-one-another concerns all
things, the totality of all being; everything that has being circulates as meaning, which is
the ultimate picture of radical relationality that Nancy wants to illuminate. However,
humans occupy a special place in this circulation: they expose sharing by saying (or being
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able to say) “we” for the totality of all being. I believe that here we encounter the
ontological question of logos and its relation to specifically human existence as political
co-existence. Moreover, it is not as much the question of logos as speech, but rather as a
distinctively human capacity for thought, which, as I already noted, in the Western
tradition is inseparable from the question of the political.
Insofar as we interpret being-with or ontological “sociality” as primordial politics or “the
political,” we also ought to view thought as political because, according to Nancy,
thought is essentially in-common.48 He brings up Descartes' example to show that the
very truth of ego sum is possible only because of the “we.” But this plurality does not
concern the possibility of recognition by the other, as in Hegel, because “before
recognition there is knowing: knowing without knowledge, and without 'consciousness',
that I am first of all exposed to the other, and exposed to the exposure of the other. Ego
sum expositus:... The Cartesian subject knows himself to be exposed, and he knows
himself because he is exposed” (Nancy 1991, 31). The Cartesian ego sum counts as
“evidence” or the first foundation only because it can be recognized by anyone (Nancy
2000, 66), so even though Descartes in his pursuit of certainty doubts everything, he must
assume community, “the stage of the 'we',” he must be already exposed or co-appearing
for his thought to reach certainty in potential recognition by anyone. In this way, the
methodological pretence of thought (of “thinking with”) is “neither substantialist nor
solipsistic: it uncovers the stage of the 'at each time' as our stage, the stage of the 'we'.
[The] 'theater of the world', as Descartes also liked to call it...” (66). So, thought finds its
confirmation and certainty on this stage of singular plurality; like sense it gains its
meaning due to the essential sharing. Consequently, the political and thought, for Nancy,
are at some level indissociable. However critical he is of the indissociability of the
political and the philosophical (i.e., of the polis and logos) in Western tradition, he is not
trying to dissociate them but to merely question, deconstruct or “unwork” their
relationship to the point of opening up the thought of community to the new possibilities,
48 It would be interesting to compare Nancy's vision of the affinity of thought and the political with Alain
Badiou's view of “politics as thought” (2005a), both of which imply inseparability of thought and
politics, but in different ways.
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such as the thought of community beyond any organicism (e.g., philosophical
determination of the essence of community in communion). As Ignaas Devish puts it, “if
we want to frame a political space where the ‘with’ is not an oppressive force anymore,
we also have to take into account how community is (un)thought, how the Western logos
is operating not as an idealistic structure of our thinking, but as the material finite
condition we live in” (243). Nancy is deconstructing the traditional thought of community
and politics, of being-together as destiny or communion, and points toward the
'unthought' of this thought – 'the political' as essential being-with, as the unworking of the
immanentist (totalitarian) horizon of politics.
For Nancy “the political” designates “not the organization of society but the disposition
of community as such”: against its dissolution in the sociotechnical, the political “must
inscribe the sharing of community” (1991, 40; my emphasis). This inscription is not a
project of regaining a communion lost or still to come, but signifies a kind of communal
ordering based on the conscious experience of sharing. However, Nancy notes, the
political as such a conscious experience does not solely depend on so-called “political
will” (which is often a determining factor in what is called “politics”), but “implies being
already engaged in the community, that is to say, undergoing, in whatever manner, the
experience of community as communication” (40; my emphasis). Here we can note how
in his definition of the political Nancy basically engages with two principles, reminiscent
of those found in other post-foundational thinkers: the political is defined by the
correlation between the conscious inscription of the unconscious principle of sharing and
the consequent and never-ending interruption (or in Nancy's words “unworking”) of this
conscious ordering by the unconscious or the primordial being-with (as “being already
engaged in the community”).
The political as collective unconscious
We can trace the 'identification' of the political as being-with with the unconscious in
Nancy's engagement with psychoanalysis in The Sense of the World (1997, 46-49).
Acknowledging Jacques Lacan's contribution, Nancy writes that “the 'unconscious'
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designates ... the inexhaustible, interminable swarming of significations that are not
organized around a sense but, rather, proceed from a significance or signifyingness
[signifiance] that whirls with a quasi-Brownian motion49 around a void point of
dispersion, circulating in a condition of simultaneous, concurrent, and contradictory
affirmation, and having no point of perspective other that the void of truth at their core...”
(46-47). The unconscious is a swarming of significations around a void, and this is
exactly what, according to psychoanalysis, the subject must become able to bear: the
simultaneity of contradictory affirmation. I suggest that Nancy undertakes this task on the
scale of the 'collective' unconscious and its 'subject' – community. The whirling of the
unconscious and circulation of contradictory significations is evocative of what Nancy
says about meaning: it is its own circulation, and “we” are this circulation. Furthermore,
the “we” here stands for the singular plurality of being – the basic contradictory
affirmation that community needs to become able to sustain.
The unconscious is the world without a centre, the world that revolves around nothing: it
is “not at all another consciousness or a negative consciousness, but merely the world
itself. The unconscious is the world as totality of signifiability, organized around nothing
other that its own opening. For psychoanalysis, this opening opens on nothing...” (Nancy
1997, 47). The unconscious or the world, is an open totality: organized around its point of
irreconciliation, the void. This opening as an essential feature of the world-unconscious
translates into the thought of community: as “transcendental of the polis,” being-together
is “not an organicism, whether that of a harmony or of a communion, nor that of a
distribution of functions and differences. But no more is it an anarchy. It is the an-archy
of the archè itself” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 119). Being-together as the
primordial political is defined by its opening, its absence of a final ground or foundational
principle. It is the unconscious of the polis, its an-archic archè: “being-in-common [êtreen-commun] is very much the concern of psychoanalysis (it is the “unconscious”), and
49 Brownian motion is a phenomenon whereby small particles suspended in a liquid or fluid tend to move
in pseudo-random or stochastic (non-deterministic) paths through the liquid, even if the liquid in
question is calm. It is interesting to note how 'fluidity' finds its way into Nancy's view of the
unconscious. As I noted in the previous section, the unconscious is often metaphorically referred to in
terms of a liquid, e.g., the sea. In Nancy's case, the “quasi-Brownian motion” represents the
'movement' of the unconscious: the whirling of a significance around a void.
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this is why psychoanalysis is a privileged witness or symptom of the end of the worldcosmos and the birth of the world ” (Nancy 1997, 48). While the world-cosmos, by
definition, is organized around an archè, the view of the world, which Nancy presents
here, affirms the nothingness or the void as its 'centring' principle or, in other words, it
affirms the irreducible plurality of archè as the plurality of the origins of the world.
The play of “the political difference” (as the correlation of politics and the political) in
Nancy parallels the play between consciousness and the unconscious (also found in other
post-foundational thinkers): the political as community organized around the conscious
experience of sharing is necessarily “grounded” in the political – the unconscious
disposition of community as such, or being-with. Nancy, then, uses “the political” in two
ways, which are inseparable from each other: the political as ontic or conscious
organization of community that takes into account or springs from the ontological
principle of the political as being-together (the unconscious). The former sense of the
political is close to what would be usually called 'politics', but it seems that Nancy
reserves this term mostly for designating the traditional view of politics as the polis, or
technosocial. However, he would sometimes use the term 'politics' to speak of his vision
of “'the political' as the place of the in-common;” for example, he writes that “politics
must be understood as the specific place for the articulation of a nonunity [of the anarchic archè]” (2010b, 51; my emphasis). Consequently, we can identify two correlated
registers of the political in Nancy, rather than strictly two correlated terms (i.e., politics
and the political) since their usage is not consistent throughout his works.
These two principles can be identified as the fluid and the rigid or rather, if we use
Nancy's own words, as the undifferentiated and the punctual, or the play between
disappearance and appearance. In order to clarify his view of the political as the
“unconscious” or the fluid, undifferentiated principle, Nancy compares and opposes it to
love. He warns us that “[t]he political ... must not be the assumption or the work of love
or of death” (Nancy 1991, 40), and further explains that “[t]he political is the place of the
in-common [le lieu de l'en-commun] as such ... the place of being-together [le lieu de
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l'être-ensemble],” while love is “the place of being-with [l'être-avec]” (Nancy 1997,
88).50 The “with” of love, according to Nancy, refers to “a contradiction as such..., played
out between two punctualities;” two in the sense of “everyone for him- or herself, none
being reducible either to the self or to a third term” (88). Thus is the formula of love.
Love for Nancy appears to be on the side of truth (or rather the play of truth between two
truths). Truth is punctual, a point of fixation or certainty, and consequently it is at the
limit of sense, because sense is always in-between, and thus it is the prerogative of the
political. Insofar as existence “does not take place for one alone or for two but for many,”
it is in-common or as being-together it is essentially political. For the political or
together, contrary to the with of love, “the common concern, beyond 'two,' is the
numerous as such and even in principle the innumerable...” (88). So, while love is binary,
the political involves the innumerable: the open totality of the world that has infinite
number of singular plural origins, and thus refuses to differentiate itself or to account for
itself. The political, consequently, as the place of the in-common, is basically the place of
“indistinct anonymity whose grouping is given, while its tie [lien] properly so-called is
not” (88). The appraisal of such anonymity is suggestive of Nancy's initial task of rewriting Heidegger's Being and Time: while the latter considers the anonymity of
“anyone” to be the sign of the inauthentic being-with, Nancy suggests that the genuine
philosophical radicality of Heidegger's work lies precisely in the existential analytic of
such inauthenticity (cf. Critchley 1999, 54).
Love and the political are opposed to each other as “pure truth” 51 (“punctuality, myth”) is
opposed to “pure sense” (“undifferentiated and vague being-toward”) (Nancy 1997, 89).
These two principles, in order to last, must penetrate each other: love must come to make
sense and the political must punctuate itself into myth. “For this reason, they have been
set up, in our tradition, as two interconnected and antagonistic paradigms, each exposed,
50 It is interesting to note that in The Sense of the World (1997) Nancy differentiates between 'beingtogether' and 'being-with' as the places of the political and of love, accordingly. However, in Being
Singular Plural (2000) he uses these two notions interchangeably, they both refer to the same
condition: “the primordial, ontological condition of being-with [l'être-avec] or being-together [l'êtreensemble]” (xvi).
51 An interesting comparison emerges again between Nancy and Badiou: while the former opposes truth
to the political, Badiou defines politics as “truth procedure” (2005a).
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in a sense, to the other, each attracting and repelling the other” (89). 'The punctual' and
'the undifferentiated' represent two “registers” of the political in a more general sense: as
being-with and being-together that come together in the world, or as the world formed
through the relation of repulsion and attraction. 52 They are essentially correlated. This
correlation can be further explicated as the play between not only two principles, but also
two 'modes of presence' – appearance and disappearance, which again points us toward
the relation between consciousness and the unconscious. This play is apparent, for
example, in Nancy's conception of community as inoperative, that is, 'ordered' around its
own unworking, as well as in his conception of singularity that is always 'dissolved' in an
undifferentiated and vague being-together (i.e., singular plurality). “...[T]he singular only
has a place when it has place. It is bound up with a sudden appearance that implies a
correlative and consecutive – in truth, a quasi-simultaneous – disappearance (Nancy
2003b, 101; my emphasis). So, I suggest that the play of correlation is characteristic of
Nancy's thought, since it contains at its heart the unbreakable relations between, for
example, the given and the “not,” presence and absence, archè and an-archy,
consciousness

and

the

unconscious,

binary

and

innumerable,

punctual

and

undifferentiated, singular and plural, all of which define existence at large. Furthermore,
Nancy's work is historically conditioned: as I showed above, he situates his project of
retreating or rethinking the political against the background of the modern retreat or
withdrawal of the political as totality. This opposition is not just an incidental but a
necessary condition for the positive retreating of the political.
Advent of the unpolitical: the limits of the political totality
Is there something beyond this correlation, beyond the endless play of the
undifferentiated and the punctual, of repulsion and attraction? Not likely, insofar as Being
52 A good example of such relation can be found in Freud's psychoanalysis, specifically in his analysis of
relationship between the primary processes of an unbound energy and the secondary processes of
bound energy, or of consciousness and the unconscious, but also in the Romantic roots of the Freudian
“invention.” For example, Friedrich Schelling in his third version of The Ages of the World speaks of
the existence of an “eternal antithesis” of two principles, two conflicting “modes of activity.” One is
“outpouring, outstretching, self-giving being,” it is formless and freely mobile, and the other is a
“force of selfhood, of retreat into self,” of inhibition and repression (2000, 6).
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is singular plural: being-with is itself “a third” term that defines existence as such. This
question is similar to the one posed to other thinkers of the political, especially to
Schmitt: is there a place for the neutral or the unpolitical as such (which is not the same
as apoliticism or apathy)? In Schmitt's case I have come to the conclusion that his view of
the political does not leave room for the unpolitical as such beyond the very much
despised “neutral sphere” of liberalism or beyond the exception. Nancy has a different
view of the exception; for him is it everywhere, it is coextensive with existence, “the
'ordinary' is always exceptional” (Nancy 2000, 10). Each singularity is an exception, thus
the rule of “a universal coexception” (Nancy 2003b, 104).53 For Nancy, then, the question
of the unpolitical should be posed differently; not in terms of the relationship between the
neutral, the political and the exception, but in terms of the limits of being-with as
primordial politics, as well as of the limits of thought, inasmuch as the political and
thought are at some level indistinguishable.
The with for Nancy is “a third” indicative of the common concern beyond the 'two,'
beyond the simple distinction of self and other, as in the case of love (but also as in the
case of Schmitt's friend and enemy distinction). It is the place of the political as such, and
as long as being is essentially singular plural or in-common, this very being is essentially
political. As a result, I contend that Nancy in his radical rethinking of relationality
institutes a correlative thought of the political that exhibits a totalizing ambition: it leaves
no room for the thought of the unpolitical. Simon Critchley makes a similar point about
Nancy's project; he suggests that Nancy presents being-with in “absolutist terms,” as the
“must” for thought (Critchley 1999, 59).54 But “[p]erhaps, the co-existential structures of
being-with overlay a prior level of 'being-without', a being-without the other that is
without being” (66). More than that, I argue that as long as thought itself is subjected to
53 For further discussion of Nancy's view of the exception and its comparison with Schmitt's see, for
example, Ojakangas (2005a).
54 “Comparution means that the 'appearing' – the fact of the world, of coming into the world, the
symbolic constitution of the real – is inseparable from the cum, from the with. It is here that we can
begin to detect a (or the) fundamental ontological structure, described in absolutist terms with yet
another il faut, 'Que l'être, absolument, est être-avec, voilà ce qu'il nous faut penser' ('That being,
absolutely, is being-with, this is what we must think') (83-84). As Nancy rather candidly puts it in the
penultimate paragraph of his book on Hegel, 'L'absolu est entre nous' (Nancy 1997, 117)” (Critchley
1999, 59).
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the imperative of the with, it fails to think that which is without (leaving it unthought). I
agree with Critchley who suggests that it is a matter “not of thinking without the 'with',
but of thinking the 'without' within this 'with'” (66). That is, it is a matter of thinking the
unpolitical, the radical outside of the political totality manifest in the correlation between
the primordial politics of being-with and the political as conscious inscription of this
ontological sharing.
Does Nancy conceive of anything akin to this unpolitical? Certainly not in relation to the
primordial ontological structure of being-with. However, as I mentioned at the beginning,
there is a sense in Nancy of something beyond politics: distinct forms or figures of beingtogether. When Nancy asks himself whether today we are free from the statement
“everything is political” (due to the retreat of the political), his answer is uncertain. This
phrase, he writes, “no doubt constituted and consolidated the horizon itself [the horizon
of our thinking] during a very long period from 1789, perhaps, right up to our own time,
though we ourselves are unable to determine whether 'our own time' is still circumscribed
by this horizon” (2010b, 45). I sense that we are indeed still within this horizon. First, the
very energy of the contemporary critique is dependent upon the opposition toward this
horizon, this is what I referred to as its historical conditioning. Second, this critique
results in a new, ontological totality of the political (or primordial politics) that
acknowledges its void but still leaves little room for thought of the radical outside.
Nancy's thought is situated within this horizon or, to use Foucaultian notion, this modern
episteme, from which we, and our critical thinking, are not fully liberated. Nevertheless,
there is a sense of the advent of the thought of the radical 'beyond' of the political and, in
this respect, contemporary thought stands in the doorway, on the threshold.
Nancy is hesitant to cross this threshold: against the background of a quasi-totalising
ontology of the political, there is an attempt to delimit or “distinguish politics,” but the
question of the limits of the political as the real limits of thought is not addressed
effectively. In his attempt to distinguish politics, Nancy proclaims that “[p]olitics is born
in the separation between itself and another order ... (through ... art, love, thought, and so
on)” (2010c, 18), that order whose 'task' is to give figure or form to the sharing or to the
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common. Thus, Nancy argues that initially politics, as well as philosophy, is founded “in
the field of an essential withdrawing: that of the gods, that of being-together (the gods
were custodians of the totality and the totality was assembled by their own gods), or, to
put it better, in the withdrawal of presence” (Esposito and Nancy 2010, 76). Politics is, by
definition, a continuous withdrawal from the representation of being-together, from the
in-common as totality. Consequently, it is the space of preservation of the
incommensurability between multiple senses of sharing (produced, again, in the place or
experience of art, love, thought, etc.). Politics is the space of nonunity. While it is
distinguished or separated from other registers of experience, politics “gives them their
space and possibility” (Nancy 2010c, 26), meaning that even though politics does not
subsume them, it conditions and prepares space for them, thus revealing its ultimate and
unbreakable relation with them. Consequently, Nancy suggests that what lies 'beyond'
politics is not another (e.g., a- or anti-political) reality that takes responsibility for the incommon, but rather the impossibility of any unitary representation. “Politics must be
understood through a distinction from – and a relation with – that which cannot and must
not be assumed by it, not, to be sure, because this should be assumed by some other
activity (art or religion, love, subjectivity, thought ... ), but because this must be taken
charge of by all and by each in ways that must remain diverse, indeed divergent, multiple,
even heterogeneous” (21). Sharing happens through a variety of experiences that intersect
in the political space. As a result, for Nancy, politics (as the space of such sharing) stands
on guard against the reduction of this heterogeneity to a specific reality, unitary principle
or symbol. However, 'politics' does not appear to be radically distinguished from itself: it
remains ultimately attached to 'the political', which defines or encompasses 'everything' in
the open ontological system. In Nancy's words, “'everything is political' ... – in a sense
that is neither that of political theology nor political economy – insofar as the everything
[le “tout”] can be neither total nor totalized in any way” (Nancy 2010b, 51). The 'retreated' political is presented by Nancy as the condition of possibility of 'everything'. In
this way, it remains unclear how anything can be radically outside of politics, how this
distinction is not just another kind of political distinction, or how this other order is really
unpolitical. It seems that as long as being is essentially with, and the real “without” is not
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acknowledged, and insofar as leaving the “world,” in Nancy's sense, remains 'forbidden'
or merely unthought, politics remains not radically distinguished, but maintains itself as a
primordial totality (however open), especially as it subordinates the ontic other (who is
simply outside the walls of the city) to the ontological otherness-difference or the
political as the place of being-together (cf. Critchley 1999, 64).
Furthermore, for Nancy, politics is “the place of an 'in common' as such,” “the specific
place for the articulation of a non-unity,” “a place of detotalization” where everything
passes, meets up or crosses paths (2010b, 50–51). “The in-common of the city has no
identity other than the space in which the citizens cross each other's paths” (1997, 104).
In other words, everything shares the political space and is shared (as sense) in this space,
while this space itself is not everything – a nonunity. “Politics is in charge of space and of
spacing (of space-time), but not in charge of figuring” (Nancy 2010b, 50). Everything is
conditioned by it and gains its form or figure through it, though politics itself is
figureless. What figures or gives form to the sharing is exactly not politics, but the “other
places of existence [...] where incommensurability is in some way formed and presented:
they can go by the names 'art', 'religion', 'thought', 'science', 'ethics', 'conduct', 'exchange',
'production', 'love', 'war', 'kinship', 'intoxication'” (50). These other places are distinct
from politics, however, they are conditioned by it: politics guarantees, without laying
claim to it, the sharing out of the incalculable. The city is a multiple localization, the
space of circulation and sharing (Nancy 1997, 104). The polis, then, is not the figure of
the political but only its space that, nevertheless, it is 'forbidden' to leave. “[T]he polis is
only the place from where (rather than 'where'), the place from which – though without
leaving it, without leaving the world that conjoins cities, nations, peoples, and states – it
is possible to sketch out, to paint, to dream, to sing, to think, to feel a 'good life' [where
'good' is 'not determined in any way, by any figure or under any concept']” (2010c, 27;
my emphasis). I believe, that it is precisely this “leaving” (cf. Dubreuil 2006) that must
be accomplished for the political to finally resolve its totalizing ambition and to give way
to the unpolitical. In order to approach the unpolitical, what remains to be thought, then,
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are the real limits of thought, the 'without' of being-with, the 'non-relation' of radical
relationality, and a possibility of leaving the polis.
***
It is my contention that a strain of contemporary political thought centred around the
conceptual distinction between politics and the political is characterized by two
tendencies: correlation and totalizing ambition. Drawing on Quentin Meillassoux's
critique of correlationism, I reached a conclusion that conception of the political in
opposition to the traditional, specifically liberal, view of politics-as-state is necessarily
attached to what it wants to dismiss. In this way, contemporary thought of the political is
historically attached to liberalism; moreover, in the endeavour to take politics beyond the
state, this thought remains negatively attached to its predecessor. Furthermore, within the
various conceptions of the political we can note a correlation: many authors recognize the
distinction between two principles or two modes of political matter (fluid and rigid,
mobile and immobile, unconscious and conscious, invisible and visible, etc). These two
principles are conceived as inseparable or correlated, as the essential parts of the political
difference. As I have shown, in Schmitt, the political is opposed and correlated to the
state. In Foucault, politics in the strict sense, as the struggle for power and resistance, is
correlated with politics as the institutional crystallization of the power game. Rancière, in
this regard, distinguishes between the police order and politics 'proper' that necessarily
emerges as a reaction to the wrong upon which policing relies. For Nancy, politics, as
community organized around the conscious experience of sharing, is necessarily
correlated to and emerges from the political – the unconscious disposition of community
as such, or being-with.
As a result of the correlation, the exteriority of 'politics' remains relative or bracketed;
and, in this way, the political exhibits its totalizing ambition. There seems to be no place
for the unpolitical, the radical outside of politics. The unpolitical is only acknowledged
negatively, or as reality that presents itself only in the form of the exception, or as
experience and practice that can be hardly sustained as such and thus is in a need of the
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political inscription. Like the neutral in Schmitt, the unpolitical remains overshadowed by
the concept of the political. Like the 'outside' of politics in Foucault, the unpolitical is not
radically affirmed. Insofar as politics is born with resistance to power, the positive form
of resistance (the practice of care of the self) is, by definition, involved in the game of
power and, thus, it remains essentially political. Like 'the part of no part' and the principle
of equality in Rancière, the unpolitical, conceived as a negative and insufficient
experience, requires politicization. Like Nancy' politics that, supposedly, emerges through
the distinction from the non-political, but essentially underlies the very possibility of
relationality. As a result, unpolitical experience is not radically distinguished from the
political; it remains ultimately subjected to the political space that pretends to condition
or 'contain' all encounters.
My critique of correlation and totalizing ambition of the political difference, I believe,
suggests at least two tasks for further investigation. First, this critique illuminates the
essential co-belonging of politics-as-state and the political; in other words, it points to the
fact that many contemporary theories fail in their attempt to effectively rethink politics
beyond the state. As a result, in order to extend the thought of politics beyond the state,
the critique of correlation has to be taken into account. This is a political task for political
thought. Second, the evident absence of the unpolitical as such, the radical outside or the
“great outdoors” of politics, calls for a different project, which is not exactly political and
might not even be a project for political thought. This is the task I undertake in the
following chapters: to think the unpolitical as such, of 'life beyond politics'. While the
thinkers, discussed above, focus their efforts on the question of the primacy and 'essence'
of the political and, thus, approach the unpolitical only with their back to it, in the next
chapter, I will look at the contemporary attempts to confront the unpolitical directly, with
a deliberate purpose of limiting politics.
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Chapter II. Confronting the Unpolitical:
The Categories of the “Impolitical” and “Bare Life”

[F]or politics is a terrible force: if one only knows
about it, one has already succumbed to it. One has
lost one’s innocence.
Thomas Mann
This world is uninhabitable. That is why we have
to flee to the next. But the door is shut. What a lot
of knocking is required before it opens!
Simone Weil

What is beyond politics and the political? And how is it possible to think this outside, the
unpolitical, positively, without getting trapped in the correlation of the political
difference? These are the general questions that will guide my discussion in the present
and the following chapter. The question of being outside politics, primarily in the terms
of a natural allocation of duties, deliberate apoliticism or contemplative withdrawal, has
consistently been present in political philosophy, at least since Plato and Aristotle. For
example, the distinctions between oikos and polis, theoria and praxis, bios theoretikos
and bios politikos, vita contemplativa and vita activa have contributed to the
establishment of a fairly rigid delimitation of the political and non-political spheres of
human activity. Furthermore, liberal development of the ancient conceptual distinctions
resulted, again, in a more or less clear understanding of what constitutes the space of
politics (the public aspect of social relationships) and what must remain essentially
apolitical, confined to private concerns. Thus, the distinction between politics and nonpolitics is established in correspondence with a distinction of the outer and inner aspects
of human life. Ultimately, the modern individual is split between the rational, outwardoriented activity that, in the interaction with others, constitutes politics, and the inner

119
activity of his 'soul', 'spirit', passion or emotion, 55 as well as the mundane necessities of
everyday life, that remain non-political insofar as they do not enter the domain of public
rational deliberation about the common good.
As I showed in the previous chapter, these traditional distinctions between what is politics
and what is non-political have been widely challenged and rethought within
contemporary political theory. Politics is no longer strictly confined to the public sphere
and the domain of state activities but extends toward what once was considered its
outside: economy, passions, desires, conflicts, etc. As a result, politics consumes
relationality in its generality and leaves no room for the radical unpolitical. However,
despite the fact that politics is no longer clearly distinguished from the non-political, the
ghost of the latter lingers on. As I have argued, something like the 'unpolitical' keeps
reappearing negatively, as a side-note of political theory and its concerns, in the form of,
for example, the imminent threat of depoliticization or the exception. In a nutshell, in its
attempt at rethinking politics, contemporary political thought turns its back on the
unpolitical.
Nevertheless, two instances of thinking or directly confronting something like the
unpolitical stand out against this background. First is the category of “the impolitical”
(l'impolitico), developed by Italian political thinkers Massimo Cacciari and Roberto
Esposito. Second is the notion of “bare life” (nuda vita) formulated by another Italian
thinker Giorgio Agamben. Overall, it seems that the emergence of questions in political
theory directly addressing the outside of politics is somehow specific to the Italian
intellectual landscape. This can be partially explained, perhaps, by the events in the postWWII Italian history, including the spread and popularity of Marxist ideas as well as the
operaismo movement, and consequent radical politico-philosophical developments (often
referred to as “the Italian difference”) such as, for instance, Paolo Virno's (1996)
“political theory of exodus.”56 Cacciari's, Esposito's and Agamben's engagement with the
55 Consider, for example, the attention to such apolitical realities of something like the inner spirit in the
Romantics. This Romantic theme of apolitical purity can be also traced in Thomas Mann's
Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man), to which I will return below.
56 For a further discussion of “the Italian difference” see, for example, Chiesa and Toscano (2009),
Lotringer and Marazzi (1980), Virno and Hardt (1996).
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impolitical emerge within the context of so-called “negative” or “weak” thought in Italy,
prepared by these political and philosophical movements.
In this respect, even though Cacciari's and, later, Esposito's notion of the impolitical can
be described as the instances of negative politics, a significant positive element is present
in their rendering of this notion, which gives us a valuable insight into what may
constitute a positive account or thought of the unpolitical as the radical outside of politics.
First of all, the very name that Cacciari gives to the excess of modern politics – the
impolitical – is indicative of his intention to not submit it to the political, both in its
essence and in its function. The ultimate task that Cacciari undertakes is to displace the
political (understood as the state) as the value of modern society. The modern valorization
of the political extends so far as to penetrate all relationships and aspects of human life,
and to define them in political terms. As a result, Cacciari proposes a critique of the
political and its value through the impolitical perspective. The latter is there to remind the
political of its essential finitude and absence of foundation. What we see here is a reversal
of the perspective from which the excess of politics is addressed: the value of politics and
its primacy with respect to the impolitical is challenged. The impolitical is no longer a
side-note of the political but constitutes the way of transition from one political
'consciousness' to another. Like many post-foundational thinkers, Cacciari still wants to
attain a kind of new politics, i.e., “grand politics” based on the Nietzschean will to power,
but a passage to these politics is essentially impolitical. In sum, Cacciari presents a
distinctively positive understanding of the impolitical, insofar as it is not something to be
feared and eliminated but, rather, cherished. Esposito's account of the impolitical is
similar to Cacciari's in its positivity: it is conceived of as a tonality, a way of looking at
the political from its limits. The impolitical gaze is directed at the political and constitutes
its critique. As in Cacciari, the political is neither prior nor constitutive of the impolitical.
On the contrary, the impolitical is called to constitute the 'authentic' politics by bringing
to the attention of the modern political its essential inessentiality or the absence of its
foundation (previously found in the idea of representation and in political theology). The
political no longer projects its condescending gaze upon the impolitical and thus,
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obscures it; in Esposito, the impolitical becomes illuminated and even assumes a certain
primacy in relation to the political.
The primary aim of this chapter, then, is to reverse the perspective from which the
unpolitical is viewed, that is, to challenge the value and primacy of politics through a
reading of Cacciari and Esposito on the impolitical. In other words, I will bring forth and
elucidate the positive aspect of the impolitical in the works of Cacciari and Esposito in
order to create the ground for my further discussion of the unpolitical as such. However, I
will suggest in this respect, that despite its positivity, the notion of the impolitical
ultimately fails to account for the radical outside of politics. As a result, throughout the
analysis of Cacciari's and Esposito's works, I will point out the insufficiency of their view
of the impolitical and show that both of these authors eventually submit or reduce the
impolitical to a function of transformation of the political, and thus, resemble the
insufficiency of the post-foundational rethinking of politics. Furthermore, another
drawback of the impolitical, as I will discuss, lies in its confinement to the domain of
thought or theoretical vision. The 'essence' of the impolitical is addressed primarily in
terms of a critique of politics and does not extend toward considerations of the impolitical
as experience.
Critical assessment of Cacciari's and Esposito's thought of the impolitical will be further
enriched by the analysis of another prominent concept in political thought of the last two
decades – “bare life,” which Giorgio Agamben presents as the only available impolitical
experience today. Sheldon Wolin writes that “political philosophy constitutes a form of
'seeing' political phenomena and that the way in which the phenomena will be visualized
depends in large measure on where the viewer 'stands'” (2004, 17; my emphasis). It is my
suggestion that an exchange between an “impolitical gaze,” presented by Esposito, and
“bare life” in Agamben addresses this particular interplay of 'seeing' and 'standing' in
political thought: the relation between a perspective and a place that the observer
occupies. Can this place be located or is it only an ontological anomaly? I believe that
Agamben raises this question through the superimposition of the notions of “the
impolitical” and “bare life.” Life here stands for the 'place' from where the vision arises
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and, as a result, it engages the experiential aspect of the impolitical, which Esposito's
account seems to be lacking. Another important difference between these two
engagements with the impolitical lies in Agamben's explicitly negative account of this
notion. While Agamben speaks of “bare life” as the “zone of indistinction” of politics,
consequently raising the question of the impolitical in terms of the experience of life as
well as positive space that it occupies, I will argue that he reduces this life to a purely
negative experience that has to be eliminated or, rather, adjusted in the advent of new
politics. The impolitical, for Agamben, remains the threat against which the coming
politics defines its tasks.
Consequently, the second aim of this chapter is to present an outline of the impolitical in
Agamben in terms of bare life and to explicate its necessary, structural negativity in his
account of the origins of Western (bio)politics. Furthermore, I will maintain that despite
the persistent negativity attributed to the impolitical, Agamben's notion of “form-of-life”
can be polemically interpreted as an account of the unpolitical as such. Despite
Agamben's proclamation of form-of-life as essentially political, I will show how it
contains the seeds of unpolitical life that extends beyond and even conditions politics.
However, these intimations of the unpolitical as such are lost by Agamben because, in his
project, he primarily focuses on the imminent necessity of 'redeeming' politics imposed
upon us by the horrors of biopolitics. The “coming politics” become the major point of
concern in Agamben's rethinking of bare life in terms of form-of-life. As I will explain
below, the 'redemption' of bare life in Agamben happens through the redemption of its
politicalness, while its radically unpolitical character remains undeveloped.
The impolitical thought of Cacciari, Esposito and Agamben not only forms the basis for
my further discussion of the unpolitical, but in its very appearance, I believe, it signals
the advent of the unpolitical in contemporary theory. More and more, as we will discover,
this advent is manifest in the emergence of the new “philosophies” of life that take this
experience beyond a negative definition, as a struggle with death, toward a more positive
view of life as the indivisible experience of living. Thus, at the end of this chapter I will
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briefly look at some of these theories of life as a precursor to my further engagement with
life in terms of the unpolitical as such.

2.1. Introducing “Impolitico”: Rejection versus a Critique of the
Political
The notion of the impolitical (l'impolitico) was introduced into politico-philosophical
debate in 1978 by Massimo Cacciari in his essay L'impolitico nietzschiano, translated into
English as Nietzsche and the Unpolitical (2009a).57 Cacciari's work is important for my
exploration of the positive account of the unpolitical, since he was the first to employ the
term independently from the notion of politics or the political. The unpolitical is not
immediately, in its very definition, subsumed under the political but signals the
recognition of the outside of politics. Through this concept Cacciari tries to outline the
space of the unpolitical as a space of critical thought or critical engagement with politics,
as “the radical critique of political reason” (2009b). The unpolitical is a gaze directed at
politics from its limits or outside. In this way, Cacciari attempts to present a positive
understanding of the unpolitical, insofar as he suggests that it neither negates the political
nor is simply derived from it. However, despite his innovative endeavour, Cacciari's
account of the unpolitical remains unsatisfactory inasmuch as he fails to push his own
conclusions to the limit and place the unpolitical radically beyond the necessary relation
with politics. It is, ultimately, impolitical rather than unpolitical. In the end, as I will
argue, the work of the unpolitical in Cacciari is reduced to the 'redemption' of politics in
terms of “grand politics.” That is, the unpolitical remains primarily a function of the
transformation of the modern political totality into post-foundational politics of the will
to power or Nietzschean “grand politics.” As a result, the success but also ultimate lack of
strength in Cacciari's notion of the unpolitical call for its further rethinking in terms of the
radical outside of the political. The task of the following discussion of Cacciari's crucial
essay is, then, to show the development of his notion of the unpolitical, to point out its
57 I will address below the problem with translating Cacciari's l'impolitico as 'the unpolitical'. For now,
however, to avoid confusion, I will adhere to this translation of the term.
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initial positivity but, most importantly, to suggests a critique of his view of the unpolitical
as a mere function of transformation or deconstruction of politics.
The unpolitical as a critique and deconstruction of the political
Cacciari derives the term l'impolitico from Thomas Mann's provocative critique of
democracy written in 1918 Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, published in English as
Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man (1987). Cacciari's essay starts as a response to Mann's
reading of Nietzsche as “the symbol of hatred for the political,” as “the center of German
Kultur precisely because he is unpolitical” (2009a, 93–94). According to Mann, German
higher culture resists politicization, it is essentially unpolitical, and Nietzsche recognized
this fact as well (Mann 1987, 78). As such, he, who called himself the “last nonpolitical
German” is, according to Mann, “a national spokesman” that “concurs precisely with all
exemplary German thought and desire” (175-176). This thought and desire are
unpolitical, which in Mann's understanding essentially corresponds to the rejection,
refusal or lack of desire for politics. He writes: “I do not want politics. I want objectivity,
order and decency. If this is philistine, then I want to be a philistine. If it is German, then
in God's name I want to be called a German...” (189). Such hatred for politics is derived
from the very understanding of what politics is: for Mann, it embodied revolt, the
disorder and destruction of traditional values, and contained the danger of a journalisticrhetorical vulgarization (Craig 1995, xi). It is not surprising, then, that Mann identifies
politics with democracy, a regime where everything is subject to debate and exchange of
opinion. As a result, his unpolitical rejection of the political domain takes the form of a
critique of democracy.
According to Cacciari, Mann attributes to Nietzsche a similar attitude to politics: he
understands the unpolitical as a rejection of the political dimension, “as the idea of the
will to power as heroic process of askesis, of renunciation in the Protestant sense. The
political is for Mann a nonvalue” (Cacciari 2009a, 94). The unpolitical, then, is an
affirmation of an alternative value or rather of those values the unfolding of which is
hindered and even perverted by politics. Cacciari suggests that Mann's Reflections,
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especially his use of Nietzsche, raise a number of crucial questions, most importantly,
“what should we understand by the unpolitical?” and “[w]hat is the 'thing in itself' that
Nietzsche thinks in the question of the unpolitical?” (94). Cacciari's essay is dedicated to
outlining “the Nietzschean origins of this process of unpoliticization” (2009b, 261) and to
carefully distinguishing it from a depoliticization of the Mannian type.
While Mann's reading of Nietzsche is geared toward a rejection of the political, Cacciari
refuses to identify Nietzsche with such an attitude. He suggests that Mann's interpretation
relies on reduction and misunderstanding of the antihistorist direction of Nietzsche's
thought, meaning that the latter cannot be considered an expression or spokesman of the
German history and spirit. Instead of standing for the German unpolitical culture, as
suggested by Mann, Nietzsche breaks with the tradition by questioning the meaning of
the political, instead of merely rejecting politics as something given and obvious. As a
result, the Nietzschean unpolitical is nothing like heroic askesis or renunciation (i.e., the
process of depoliticization); it is rather questioning and critique – “the work of
deconstruction” (Cacciari 2009a, 96).
What is there to deconstruct? According to Cacciari, the unpolitical is the work of
deconstruction of political totality in pursuance of “grand politics.” There are three major
terms that he utilizes in his analysis of Nietzsche: “the political,” “the unpolitical” and
“grand politics.” According to Cacciari (and here he is similar to many other political
thinkers), modernity is characterized by the absolutization of the political: “[i]n the
process of politicization, the political tends to represent itself as total concept. [...] The
political intervenes everywhere – its logic constitutes the method of any social relation”
(2009a, 96), it becomes absolute. The situation of total politicization that arises from the
interaction of multiple forces culminates in modernity in total state. This state is total
insofar as it presents itself as a “neutral [and thus only possible] form of political
organization,” surpassing the historically determined work that led to its own
configuration. The modern state proclaims the absolutization of the political: total state
and total politicization become synonymous.
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The initial move toward total politicization, as well as the successful coupling of the
political and the state, become possible due to the theological valorization of the political.
Cacciari suggests that the absolutization of the political (both in its democratic and
socialist version) relies on eschatology: it “presupposes a human nature that is to be
liberated from the alienation to which the institutions of civilization have presumably
condemned it” (Cacciari 2009a, 97). In a semi-religious manner it claims to be “the
redemption of the totality of man, the overcoming of the empirical, contingent immediacy
of his figure” (97). The promise of 'salvation' through politics (redemption from
alienation) forms the ethical foundation of the absolutization of the political proclaimed
by the modern state. Such foundation facilitates valorization of the political, and
specifically of its greatest expression – the state. “[T]he state […] defines itself as value:
its functions become values” (96). The state is the token of value, and as such it pretends
to regulate the totality of exchange, i.e., of social relations. At this point in Cacciari's
essay an interesting turn occurs that is different from many post-foundational thinkers.
While the latter in their critique of something like 'inauthentic politics' take recourse to its
immediate juxtaposition with some 'authentic politics' (thus preserving and reiterating the
value of politics, i.e., the necessity of its 'purification'), Cacciari, in his reading of
Nietzsche, speaks of the unpolitical as a critique of the political. Eventually he does
introduce post-foundational or 'authentic' politics in terms of “grand politics,” but it is
specifically the unpolitical that enables the passage from the total state to grand politics.
If, for the thinkers discussed in the previous chapter, the very critique of traditional
politics is itself a political act and cannot be logically otherwise, Cacciari's Nietzschean
critique of the political acknowledges the unpolitical as constitutive of the very
possibility of this critique.
The unpolitical is “the critique of the political as affirmation of value” (Cacciari 2009a,
95). To be more precise, the unpolitical “represents the critique of values on whose bases
alone such totality [the political, the state] is conceivable” (97). It deconstructs (i.e.,
exposes) the theologico-ethical foundation upon which this totality rests, and thus
devalorizes the political, affirms its nontotality by pointing at the absence of any
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foundation to guarantee it. We can see clearly here how Cacciari's unpolitical is different
from Mann's unpolitische: it is not a rejection but a critique of the political as value.
Moreover, Mann's hatred (which is essentially a devalorization) of politics results in the
subsequent advocacy for (i.e., valorization of) the nonpolitical. In this simple reversal of
values unpolitische exhibits its dialectical nature: it is still attached to what it rejects, it
defends the same values that lie at the foundation of politics, however, they appear not to
be political insofar as they were not yet subject to the process of disenchantment (95).
Cacciari argues that the Nietzschean unpolitical, contrary to Mann's, is not dialectical
because it does not simply mirror the political and establish itself as an alternative value.
More than that, it is intrinsically nihilistic and disenchanted, it is the critique of value per
se. The unpolitical develops separately from both the political and the polar nonpolitical;
it is “an analysis of the authentic genealogy of the process of politicization and of the
premises contained within it of grand politics” (95; my emphasis). The notion of value or
evaluation is thus alien to the unpolitical as a critique that embraces the Nietzschean
method of genealogical analysis.
The unpolitical as exposition of the internal contradictions of the political
According to Cacciari, a double tendency is apparent in modernity: the process of
politicization and the simultaneous decay of the political as totality due to the internal
contradictions of this process that signal the imminent advent of grand politics. The
unpolitical, then, performs a double function: first, it is a genealogical analysis of the
political as totality leading to a critique of the values that ground this political; second, it
is an exposition of the internal contradictions of politicization as well as an exposition of
the premises of grand politics that become perceptible due to the 'double' decay of the
political as totality. Cacciari, partially relying on Nietzsche's critique, presents an
interesting argument about the self-destructive extension of the political. He suggests that
we need not fail to see, through an unpolitical perspective, that modern absolutization of
the political contains its own destruction: it is destined to disappear due to decline of trust
in absolute authority (e.g., God, the state). “'[Total politicization] is destined to disappear,
because its foundation disappears, namely, trust in absolute authority and in divine
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truth...' (Human, All Too Human, I:245). […] This undermines from the foundations the
ancient 'relation of reverence and piety toward the state'” (97). Moreover, democracy
contributes to such a “desacralization” of the political by decentralizing the political
ordering of social life: it grants any subject the 'right' to express and organize its own
force, thus multiplying the centres of force in the social field. The political is no longer
reduced to the functions of the state, but is comprised of multiple 'subjects'.
However, Cacciari warns us, such decay of the political as totality, manifest in the decay
of the total state, is filled with its own contradictions. The decay, promoted by the
democratic idea, “is at the same time the greatest extension of the political, the perfection
of the Politisierung [politicization]: everybody makes politics and organizes himself
politically – but only because the political has lost any aura, because it revealed itself as
devaluation and despiritualization” (2009a, 98; my emphasis). Instead of depoliticization,
critique of the total state opens up the space for further, even more encompassing
politicization because from the political as totality (oriented around the state) we move
toward the extension of the political to an individual, to “everybody.” Even though
Cacciari does not really specify what it means to organize oneself politically in such a
situation, we can infer that at least partially it means the subjection of oneself to selfpolicing or ordering. This, I believe, is the meaning of “the perfection of Politisierung” of
which he speaks. Cacciari's analysis, in a way, is similar to the argument presented in the
previous chapter: the critique of total politics, specifically the state, does not in itself lead
to depoliticization; on the contrary, it opens space for even more encompassing
politicization since politics is no longer attached to any proper space or agent, but extends
to everything and everyone, including (biological) life itself. In this regard, Cacciari's
analysis can be compared to Rancière's and Foucault's. The greatest extension of the
political that results in the perfection of the Politisierung, of which Cacciari speaks, is
similar to Rancière's argument that if everything is political then nothing is, meaning that
the extension of politics to 'everything' actually signals the decline of authentic 'politics'
and its substitution by 'the police'. The nature of this policing, as I suggested earlier, is
best explained by Foucault's notion of biopolitics and governmentality. Foucault's
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analysis traces the transformation of the sovereign mode of power into the disciplinary
and biopolitical modes of power in modernity, which is similar to Cacciari's suggestion
about the real effects of the decay of the total state. The extension of the political, or
policing, feeds off the lack of the central agent of political action (formerly the state),
resulting in the construction of a political economy of the body and its discipline, as well
as proliferation of the population management techniques.
What distinguishes Cacciari's analysis the most from Rancière's and Foucault's, is the
'prognosis' of the fate of the post-state politicization. As a Marxist, Cacciari speaks of the
emergent contradictions of this 'second-stage' politicization – it contains its own demise:
“this very same process that appears as absolutization of the political, defines it in
actuality as a field of heterogeneous forces, of contradictions – as a space where endless
differences occur. The absolutization occurs through a loss of centrality and a constant
weakening of the system. Far from leading to unity, to common origins, the total
politicization increases the entropy of the system” (Cacciari 2009a, 97–98). This process
is analogous to imperial overstretch: an empire, as it extends by incorporating many
'foreign' territories, multiplies local centres of power and eventually becomes ridden with
multiple upheavals and revolts leading to the loss of control over its own territory.
Extension of politicization reveals the field of the multiple, heterogeneous and tense force
relations that the state once claimed to conceal in its form. This further reveals the
political to be a space of contradictions and differences, and no longer the space of total
ordering. The acknowledgement of the inherent entropy of the political system and the
multiplicity of the forces that constitute it, makes it no longer possible to deny the
conflictual nature of the political. This 'revelation' is similar to the propositions of many
post-foundational thinkers: the political is defined by multiple conflicts, struggles, desires
and passions rather than by the necessity to reconcile the opposites. Furthermore,
similarly to Cacciari, they view 'failure' as a defining feature of the political: the process
of politicization must contain its own limit.
However, we can note a significant difference concerning the operation and functioning
of this failure in Cacciari. For him, the absolutization of the political (relying on the
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unpolitical reflection) conditions or prepares the ground for the passage from the political
as totality (oscillating around 'the state') to grand politics (revolving around 'will to
power'). Even though the former represents a necessary stage on the way to the latter,
their co-dependence does not seem to reproduce itself indefinitely, meaning that the
passage does not endlessly remain as such, but actually leads to something like the
transformation of the 'political consciousness'. The state can be left behind; as a result,
grand politics is not really correlated with the political. For Rancière and Foucault,
representatives of post-foundationalism, the 'failure' of the political does not lead to some
new stage of 'consciousness' (e.g., grand politics) but rather reproduces itself as an
inherent characteristic of 'authentic' politics. That is where the correlation is rooted: the
passage beyond the modern totalization of the political is considered impossible; all we
can do is endlessly deconstruct (and re-construct) this totality, without rooting out its
origins, such as a 'secret' dedication to the preservation of the state order. For instance, as
I showed earlier, Rancière interprets the play between the logics of police and politics as
mutually necessary, that is, these two realities exist in correlation with each other and
there is no passage into some other world where their struggle is over. Passage into the
reality of 'pure' politics or just absence of politics is not considered. Of course, Rancière's
argument remains similar to Cacciari's in one major way: the extension of policing
conditions the events of politics in the same way as the absolutization of the political
conditions grand politics. That is, the contradictions of the political space or the order of
police (i.e., injustices brought upon by the logic of inequality) call forth the acts of
politics. As with Rancière and Cacciari, Foucault acknowledges the ever present struggles
or inconsistencies within the political order (e.g., multiple resistances and freedoms
within biopolitical regime of modernity) that define politics in its proper sense. However,
he does not envision a passage into a different 'world' due to these contradictions: in the
end, there is only the 'recycling' of these resistances, freedoms and lives in power
relations that persist within the current mode of governmentality.
Contrary to Foucault and Rancière, Cacciari seems to believe in the possibility of a
Nietzschean-Marxist transformation (or even revolution) of consciousness in which the

131
unpolitical is assigned the leading role. This process is inevitable because the completion
of politics coincides with its final entropy and thus disappearance (cf. Carrera 2009, 22).
The unpolitical is “the critical stage of grand politics” (Cacciari 2009a, 96): the crucial
stage of passage from 'the political' into 'grand politics' through the critique of
politicization. It points the political to its finitude, to the inevitability of its disappearance.
Furthermore, as a critique of political totality, Cacciari notes, the unpolitical is not
something like Marxist “critique of ideology,” which reveals and rejects the political as
“false consciousness.” As already noted above, the unpolitical is genealogy, the work of
deconstruction of the totality insofar as it shows that the political is “historically marked
and produced the forces of its own crisis” (96). The task of the unpolitical, then, lies in
naming the multiplicity of forces that make up the crisis of the political and, as a result of
the recognition of this multiplicity, it becomes possible for the unpolitical to critique the
values on the basis of which alone such totality is conceivable.
The passage from the modern totality of the political to grand politics
As a result, it is my argument that the unpolitical for Cacciari is primarily defined by its
function, that is, as an attitude and a critique it is solely oriented toward the facilitation of
passage from the political to grand politics. He speaks of the unpolitical always in the
sense of a mediator, stage, passage, etc., which makes it possible to conclude that it is but
a process with one outcome: politicization of a different kind. “Grand politics has, as its
condition, the unpolitical acknowledgement of the nontotality of the political: a radical
critique to the state-worshipers” (Cacciari 2009a, 102). The ultimate end of the
unpolitical is new politics that is not grounded in any value system and that contains will
to power at its core. Thus, Cacciari ultimately advocates “politics without foundation”
(102) that revolves around its own failure, finitude or nontotality. This politics retains at
its core the entropy that produced it: while the political aims at centralization and total
ordering of the energy circulating in the system, grand politics is essentially this entropy
manifest in the Nietzschean will to power. In this regard, Cacciari's argument is similar to
that in other post-foundational projects where politics is 'redeemed' through the
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introduction of the non-ordered, contingent and conflictual components (an increased
level of entropy) into its system.
As a result, I suggest that the work of the unpolitical in Cacciari is reduced to the
redemption of 'politics'. His definition of the unpolitical is purely functional: it is an
attitude or a critique the task of which is to illuminate the contradictions that arise in the
field of the political as totality, to deconstruct it and its founding values, to reveal the
political its finitude and nontotality. The unpolitical is a nihilistic acknowledgement of
the loss of the centring principle, of the impossibility of eliminating entropy in politics,
which ultimately paves the way for the advent of grand politics or, as an attitude, defines
the new 'consciousness' of politics without foundation. The unpolitical is thus a critical
distancing from the political, a gaze from the margins or, in the words of Alessandro
Carrera, a “'sublime' limitation of politics” (2009, 17). Cacciari further suggests that the
recognition of such limitation remains the only option for critical reflection and (political)
thought in the age when the political and the state are no longer credible: “the only
glimmer, the only narrow door left to us in the era of the demythologization of the
political, is to keep one's eye's open and to watch and observe well what is going on in
the world, in order to work out that dissolution of values of the state that is the intuition of
the 'philosophy of the morning'” (2009a, 103; my emphasis). The unpolitical is both the
process of “watching” and “observing” as well as of “working out” the deconstruction of
the values of the state and the political in the wake of the Nietzschean “philosophy of the
morning” – grand politics, a philosophy of finitude.
So, the unpolitical is a critique and deconstruction of the political as a value and as a
totality; it is a gaze from the margins or limits of the political, but most importantly, it is a
recognition of the very existence of these limits; in other words, it is an affirmation of the
finitude of the political. Such affirmation not only destroys the ground of the modern
politicization but also facilitates the transition toward “politics without foundation.” More
than that, it seems that grand politics itself is such a rejection of foundations. “The
unpolitical brings the political back to the acknowledgement of its intrinsic nihilism. This
key direction opens up, above all, by attacking the concepts, the forms, and the conducts
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that are the substance of the political as value. But this very same pars destruens is
already a construction of grand politics insofar as it is a nihilistic devaluation” (Cacciari
2009a, 96; my emphasis). The unpolitical points out the seeds of grand politics that the
political supposedly always already contains. The unpolitical destruction of the political
totality is the construction of a new politics that embraces its finitude, nontotality or void.
This raises a question about the relationship between the unpolitical and grand politics:
since both are essentially characterized by Cacciari as nihilistic devaluation, can we really
distinguish them? Can we actually say that the unpolitical is anything more than a mere
operation or function of grand politics? In the light of these questions, let us reread one of
Cacciari's conclusions: “The unpolitical in Nietzsche shapes up, we could say, as the
critical stage of grand politics” (2009a, 96). Earlier, I suggested that we could deduce
from this statement that the unpolitical is a process of passage from one political
'consciousness' to another. However, it seems plausible to argue here that the unpolitical
is indeed nothing more than an important stage of grand politics, meaning that the
unpolitical is essentially just a component of post-foundational politics. The limits, which
the unpolitical critique points at, are not the 'real' limits of politics, but rather a dividing
line between its two modes: foundational and post-foundational politics. Unpolitical
reflection, then, refers to an ability to tell one from the other; it does not define and
construct a space of its own, be it an actual material space, a territory or a space of
thought. The unpolitical, as the process of the critique of the political, is grand politics or
rather grand politics is itself always a multiplicity of processes, among which the
unpolitical is a 'rite of passage' from 'small' to 'grand' politics. In the end, Cacciari
succeeds in showing that the Nietzschean unpolitical proves to be not a rejection of
politics (i.e., apolitics, antipolitics, nonpolitics), as Mann interpreted it to be, but the
project of 'redemption' of the political or, in other words, of construction of new, finite
politics. Alessandro Carrera reaches a similar conclusion when he writes that Nietzsche's
“unpoliticalness” is not an alignment against the decadence of politics, but “the most
radical criticism of politics. It is, ultimately, a call for grand politics, which is another
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name for total disenchantment, accepting nihilism and groundlessness as unavoidable
features” (2009, 22; my emphasis).
Cacciari's Nietzschean unpolitical does not extend beyond politics, but rather partakes in
its evolutionary or even revolutionary transformation. Similar to the correlationist
political thinkers, Cacciari assigns the unpolitical a place of the outside-within: outside of
the political due to the critical attitude, but inside 'other', grand politics, as its critical
stage. This interpretation, I believe, calls for a brief reflection on the translation of the
Italian term l'impolitico into English as the unpolitical. Alessandro Carrera, the editor,
and Massimo Verdicchio, the translator of Cacciari's collection of essays entitled The
Unpolitical: On the Radical Critique of Political Reason, note that they prefer to translate
l'impolitico as the unpolitical (Carrera 2009, n. 10, 241). Cacciari derives his use of the
term from Mann's unpolitische, which current English edition translates as nonpolitical,
yet Carrera and Verdicchio prefer to adopt Mark Lilla's translation of the term as the
unpolitical, which they believe is closer both to the German and the Italian (241).
However, we do not find any discussion of the reason why they think the unpolitical
would best reflect Cacciari's argument. Basically, it seems that Carrera and Verdicchio
merely prefer the term unpolitical to nonpolitical (the latter, as we saw, is indeed contrary
to Cacciari's argument), without considering an alternative to both of them – the
impolitical. Getting ahead of myself, I would like to note that a similar question of
translation arises with Roberto Esposito's term l'impolitico, which he explicitly borrows
from Cacciari. Bruno Bosteels (2010) addresses this problem of translating impolitico as
either unpolitical or impolitical by examining the Latin root of the prefix 'in-'. The latter,
he notes, has both a negative and a more positive connotation (opposed to 'un-' that,
supposedly, has only a negative one): negative “as in the existing English term 'impolitic',
attested to for many centuries and meaning roughly what we would call 'politically
incorrect' today,” and positive “as in 'immanence', from the Latin for 'staying or standing
inside', 'remaining within'” (222). As a result, the translation of impolitico as impolitical,
rather than unpolitical, better reflects the topology of the outside-within that characterizes
Cacciari's reading of Nietzsche on the unpolitical.
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In the end, it appears that Cacciari's take on the unpolitical is similar to other postfoundational thinkers: he assigns to it the place of the outside-within. However, Cacciari's
political thought does not readily exhibit the correlationist tendency: he does believe in
and proclaim the inevitable advent of the end of the political and the state, as a result, 'the
political', of which he is critical, is not involved in the never-ending play with 'other',
grand politics. The political is finite and destined to disappear to the benefit of 'politics
without foundation'. While the outside of the political in post-foundational thought is
epitomized in the exception, Cacciari's unpolitical gestures toward a possibility of the real
limits of political thought and critique: the unpolitical is supposed to signify a space of
thought that is not immediately political, at least not in terms of the traditional
understanding of politics. Nevertheless, this space is re-politicized once politics itself is
re-defined in terms of grand politics. It is worth noting that even though the outcome of
Cacciari's reflection is similar to those presented in the first chapter, there is an important
difference between them: Cacciari's 'invention' of the term itself, which is supposed to
signify the real limits of politics, raises the question of the political status of thought in a
new way. If, for the correlationist, thought is not able to reach the outside of politics as
such, it is always political, Cacciari's unpolitical, as a critical reflection and thought, as
the work of deconstruction of the political, is presented as such an outside, at least as long
as we ignore its re-politicization in the service of 'other', nihilistic politics. As a result,
Cacciari is successful in positing the question of the relationship between politics and
thought differently, however, in his reflection on the unpolitical he does not seem to go
beyond the impolitical, i.e., beyond the logic of immanent transcendence or the outsidewithin.
Despite its failures, Cacciari's essay Nietzsche and the Unpolitical remains an important
event in Italian (but not only) political thought: ever since its introduction in 1978 'the
unpolitical' has become an important concept in Italian thought, as well as a symptom of
a move of the Italian intellectual landscape (primarily its leftist part) toward “negative”
(cf. Perry Anderson in Luisetti 2010, 6) or “weak” (cf. Chiesa and Toscano 2009, 4–5)
thought. The next to follow in Cacciari's steps was the Italian political philosopher
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Roberto Esposito, who dedicated much attention to 'the impolitical' in his book Categorie
dell'impolitico (Categories of the Impolitical) published in 1988, and who ultimately was
the one to popularize this notion in political theory.58

2.2. The Categories of the Impolitical: Roberto Esposito's
Philosophy of the Threshold
Roberto Esposito's contribution to the thought of 'the impolitical' (l'impolitico) is
currently the most prominent and has attracted much attention as well as criticism.
However, though he acknowledges Cacciari's prior use of the category, he does not
explicitly build his own engagement with the impolitical on Cacciairi's work. The
importance of Esposito's thought for the present project lies in the fact that he was the one
to popularize the impolitical in (Italian) political theory. Furthermore, his and Cacciari's
works on the impolitical are unique in contemporary political theory: first, they 'invent'
the very concept of the impolitical; second, they present its positive account, in a sense
58 It is worth briefly noting a contribution of a French political philosopher Julien Freund on the notion
of the impolitical. A year before the appearance of Esposito's Categorie in Italy, Julien Freund
published in France his work entitled Politique et impolitique (1987). Freund coined the term
impolitique, which is best translated as “impolitical,” to name the sort of politics undertaken by those
who do not understand what politics really is. In this sense, contrary to Cacciari's unpolitical,
“impolitical” has a negative connotation, however, it still does not coincide with the negation of
politics. Freund cautions us, as Cacciari did and Esposito will also do, not to confuse “impolitical”
with “apolitical” (apolitique), “antipolitical” (antipolitique) or “nonpolitical” (non politique). The
activities are non-political if they are not concerned with politics (la politique) directly; antipolitical
actions oppose or reject politics; and apolitical being is exterior to politics or disinterested in it.
Impolitical being is none of the above: it necessarily involves participation in political life, “but lacks
judgement or skill in performing its function, because it lacks the sense of discernment [of
understanding]” (Freund 1987, 1; here and below, the translation of Freund’s work is my own). So,
Freund's “impolitical” is firstly distinguished by lack: lack of skill, understanding of political goals
and limitations; but also it is an active offence and violation of the intelligence and relevance of
political action. In other words, it is an injury to the spirit and vocation of politics, meaning that
“impolitical” considers “politics for itself and not in its function of service to society and its citizens,
to whom it is accountable” (3). It consists “in reasoning in terms of power and not those of society [...]
in politicizing everything, both in subordinating other human activities to politics and in considering
autonomous activities only from the political point of view” (4). “Impolitical” is thus indicative of
total politicization and of a political action oriented toward the questions of power and, as a result,
ignorant of the essential function of politics, i.e., social service. While Cacciari's “un-(im-)political” is
the critical deconstruction of the political, Freund's “impolitical” is an obstacle to the proper
functioning of politics (la politique), the latter being understood in a more or less traditional way as
the institutional ordering of social affairs and interactions. This politics has to be rejuvenated and
redeemed against the impolitical 'threat'.
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that they treat the impolitical not as something to be avoided but, rather, fostered. There is
a seeming lack of engagement with Esposito's early works in English-speaking
scholarship due to the absence of their English translations, but also due to the popularity
of Esposito's later works. The impolitical, thus, is often subsumed under other rubrics of
popular discussions in political theory, such as biopolitics and community. As a result,
one of the goals of my engagement with Esposito will be an exposition or an exegesis of
his early writings dedicated solely to the impolitical. In other words, I will present his
account of the impolitical before I proceed with a critique of it in the attempt to further
the task of thinking the radical outside of politics.
In what follows below I will argue, first of all, that Esposito's category of the impolitical
is the first major step on the road to the unpolitical because, as I noted, he not only
introduces the notion itself into the theoretical debates of his time, but also 'invests' it
with a positive meaning. The impolitical, instead of an instance of problematic
depoliticization, rejection or withdrawal from politics, becomes, for Esposito (similar to
Cacciari), a tool of a critique of the modern political. The impolitical is the political
viewed from the outside, from its limits. It is a gaze, perspective or tonality that
illuminates the margins and borders of the modern political instead of obscuring them.
The impolitical reminds the political of its essential and necessary limitations, of its
finitude. In this way, the impolitical deconstructs political totality, opens it up to a selfcritique; it (re-)introduces difference, conflict and unrepresentable plurality at the heart of
the political. As a result, the impolitical remains structurally not outside but inside the
political: the impolitical is the outside-within of the political. The impolitical, as a
critique of traditional politics, is constituted as the shadow of the political and, ultimately,
coincides with it. I will further suggest, in this regard, that Esposito's impolitical, despite
its innovative features, resembles, in many ways, post-foundational political thought.
Like the (post-foundational) political, it is opposed to the representational model of
politics (i.e., the state), to (liberal) depoliticization (i.e., the elimination of conflictuality),
and to a theological grounding of politics or, rather, to grounding of politics altogether.
Thus, the impolitical, as I will show, is primarily a means of transition from modern
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(theological) politics of representation and depoliticization to a (new) politics without
foundation. It is not a rejection of the political but its radicalization. Thus, Esposito
'conceptual' innovation ultimately outlines or encircles something like impolitical politics
that stands in opposition to the apolitical politics of modernity. Consequently, I will
elaborate how Esposito's category of the impolitical, despite its positivity, gestures toward
but ultimately fails to acknowledge and account for the radical outside of the political.
The impolitical, rather, remains, to use Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's term, the re-treated
political or, as a gaze, a continuous re-treating of the political confined to the topology of
the outside-within.
The impolitical gaze
Esposito initially develops the idea of the impolitical in his book Categorie
dell'impolitico (Categories of the Impolitical) published in 1988. The work consists of the
analysis of the writings of a number of 'impolitical' authors that forms the basis and
culminates in Esposito's concept of the impolitical. As Esposito notes, the term emerged
gradually (starting with Cacciari's essay and continuing into his own work) by seeking
inspiration across the range of works of diverse thinkers. Among the latter are Romano
Guardini, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Hermann Broch, Elias Canetti, Simone Weil, and
Georges Bataille. Esposito's vision of the impolitical, however, is not elaborated much in
the book, which is mostly dedicated to a close reading and discernment of something like
the 'impolitical' in the works of the above-mentioned authors (who themselves do not
employ the term as such). We get a much better understanding of what he means by the
impolitical in his original introduction of 1988 to Categories of the Impolitical and, most
importantly, in the Preface written for the second edition of the book in 1999. As a result,
in my analysis I will primarily focus on these texts. Furthermore, it it worth clarifying
right away that in my engagement with Esposito I will consistently translate the Italian
term impolitico as impolitical rather than unpolitical. As we will see below, Esposito's
impolitical, similar to Cacciari's, reproduces the topology of the outside-within. And, as
Bruno Bosteels (2010, 222) points out, the prefix 'in-' better guides our understanding of
l'impolitico toward such a topology.
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My interest here will primarily be in Esposito's early work, oscillating around the
Categories, where biopolitical concerns are barely present. In his later works, there
occurs, in Esposito's own words, a certain development or rather displacement of the
semantic centre of gravity: from the impolitical toward communitas,59 and toward the
biopolitical. The notion of community and its essence become of the most importance for
Esposito, but also the project of something like the affirmative biopolitics that
prominently figures in his later or 'post-impolitical' works. 60 Instead of trying to draw a
genealogy of Esposito's works and finding ways of connecting them (i.e., looking for the
traces of the biopolitical in the impolitical of Categories or vice versa), I will focus on the
impolitical in its initial distinction from questions of biopolitical life. This strategy has a
potential of better elucidating the place of Esposito's notion of the impolitical and its
possible relation with different, non-biopolitical, life.
Esposito notes at the beginning that Categories of the Impolitical is situated at the
intersection of two important works of the 20 th century – Thomas Mann's Reflections of a
Nonpolitical Man and Carl Schmitt's The Concept of the Political. The title of Esposito's
book speaks to this double reference. However, Esposito is quick to distance himself
from both authors suggesting that the impolitical of which he wants to speak can be
identified with neither Mann's apoliticism nor with Schmitt's total politics and politicotheological argumentation. Moreover, regarding Schmitt, Esposito notes that his own
discourse starts exactly where Schmitt's stops: at its exteriority (Esposito 2005, 5).61 After
that Esposito goes on to let his readers know that his engagement with Schmitt is going to
be limited to one of his earlier, less known and often neglected works – Römischer
Katholizismus und politische Form (1923) (Roman Catholicism and Political Form).
However, I suggest that Esposito's fleeting disclaimer regarding Schmitt's The Concept of
59 Esposito notes in particular that his later book Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community
([1998] 2010) constitutes such a development of Categories as well as “displacement of its semantic
center of gravity” (Esposito 2009, 112).
60 See, for instance, his 'trilogy' Communitas ([1998] 2010), Immunitas ([2002] 2011), Bios ([2004]
2008). It is interesting that Esposito's later works were among the first to be translated into English,
which seems to give even more reason for me to consider his earlier works separately from currently
popular biopolitical concerns.
61 Here and below, the translations from this work of Esposito's are my own.
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the Political is more important for our understanding of his 'impolitical' project than it
might seem at first.
Let us recall the discussion of Schmitt's concept of the political and, specifically, its
constitutive 'blindness'. As Michael Marder notes, the political, as a self-grounding
phenomenon, “begins with the cognitive-perceptual elimination of the neutral third. [...]
[I]t arises from a pronounced blindness [...] to everything that surrounds or falls outside
of it” (2005, 18–19; my emphasis). The only 'visible' spot within this neutral field is the
exception, the inclusive exclusion, the figure of neither friend nor enemy that is
'recognized' by the political as unpolitical. While the political as the total is characterized
by blindness (or partial blindness) toward its own exteriority, Esposito's impolitical
engages this exteriority. To be more precise, the impolitical is described by the author in
terms of the “vision” and “gaze” directed at the political: “the impolitical is the political
viewed from its external limit” (Esposito 2005, 18). That is, the outside of the political
field is no longer eliminated but illuminated as the impolitical gaze.
It is interesting to note that while Esposito denies his works the status of political
philosophy, he refers to them as political thought. 'Thought' as contemplation, vision or
spectatorship has the original Greek meaning of theoria (θεωρία), which is, for instance
by Aristotle, contrasted to praxis – a realm of action driven by desire (manifest in politics
and ethics). As a result, one may interpret Esposito's recourse to the figure or metaphor of
'vision' as a gesture toward the classical distinction between 'theoria' and 'praxis', where
the term 'impolitical' stands for the reflective (theoretical) distancing from the political
praxis. (The same seems to be the case for Cacciari, who suggested that it is necessary to
step back in order to be able to see political reality as it is, as will to power.) However,
regardless of the similarity, there is a significant difference between Aristotelian theoria
and Esposito's impolitical vision: the former is concerned with the unchangeable and
eternal, the truth or the real (philosophy, mathematics and theology). The latter is
concerned with exactly the opposite: the impolitical gaze illuminates (political) reality as
it is, in its 'essential' changeability, difference and conflictuality. Thus, Esposito concludes
that “all the great political realism – that is to say non-theological thinking on politics –
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was impolitical,” even if its impolitical orientation remained only unconscious (Esposito
2005, 18). As a result, Esposito's 'impolitical thought' seems to imply a different kind of
theory: a 'vision' that is not guided by the search for the unitary principle or essence of the
political or itself, but rather by the perception of difference and illumination and
affirmation of its “irreparable inessentiality” and absent origin (see, Esposito 2009, 110).
Esposito's impolitical thought, then, falls within the field of post-foundational theory and
critique, and is opposed to traditional political philosophy (see, Esposito 1993a; Esposito
2009).
What is the 'essence' of the impolitical for Esposito? As I noted above, it is the outsidewithin of the political. Even though, in this way, the impolitical occupies the paradoxical
place of the exception, its structural position, however necessary, is not geared toward
normalization of the political as, for example, in Schmitt. If we recall, the exception for
Schmitt reveals “the decision in absolute purity,” meaning that through a decision on
what constitutes an exception the sovereign establishes “a homogeneous medium,” a
“normal situation” or “frame of life” to which the norm (i.e., general codification, for
instance, in the form of law) can be applied, since “there exists no norm that is applicable
to chaos” (Schmitt 2005, 13). Structural integration of the exception makes possible the
establishment and maintenance of a normal situation. Contrary to Schmitt, Esposito's
impolitical gestures toward the 'essential' impossibility of the normal situation, that is,
impossibility of the total representation of its elements and elimination of the void. The
impolitical, as the exception to the political, constantly challenges, destabilizes or
deconstructs this political. Moreover, it manifests the 'originary' rupture of any political
order: at the heart of any normalcy lies abnormality, of regulation, irregularity. In other
words, the “impolitical perspective” points at the absence of foundation of the political
and, as in Cacciari, it affirms politics without foundation. This is the 'proper' function of
the impolitical exception to the political – affirmation of its originary 'impropriety'.
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The other of representation, depoliticization and political theology
The affirmative project of the impolitical, Esposito clarifies, emerges out of an opposition
to the dominant modes of operation of the modern political: representation,
depoliticization and political-theology. The impolitical is “...other than representation. Or
rather the other, that which remains stubbornly outside. But this unrepresentability is not
that of modern depoliticization. Its refusal is not refusal of the political. In this sense it is
radically removed from Mannian semantics. It is not the value that is opposed to the
political. It is exactly the opposite. It is the refusal of the political as invested with value,
of any 'theological' valorization of the political” (Esposito 1999, 14).62 The impolitical is
the other of representation, which for centuries has constituted the essence of
(democratic) politics in the West, for example, in the form of the statist representation of
the common good and interests. The impolitical points toward the persistent remainder or
the outside of the domain of the representable, accountable and immediately visible in the
political space, as well as itself remains stubbornly unrepresentable as a category.
Esposito recurs to Hannah Arendt to further elaborate on these traits of the impolitical.
Her conception of politics in terms of plurality contains the necessity of
unrepresentability, since it is not possible to represent plurality without reducing it to a
unity. So, any attempt to represent it, whether through politics of representation or a
decision, involves a reduction resulting in the effective suppression of this plurality and
consequent inversion of a political form into the technical (e.g., political economy and
management) or totalitarian. For politics to remain authentic (and not to reverse into
technology or totalitarianism), it has to acknowledge the essential impossibility of
representing the multiple: there are always elements that escape the indexing procedure
of representation. So, the impolitical, in this regard, is that which is politically
unrepresentable (here politics refers to the traditional model of representation as
delegation). For instance, as in Hobbes, whose ultimate solution to the existence of the
inactive (thus apolitical) multitude ultimately lies in its submission to or representation by
the sovereign.
62 Here and below, the translations from this work of Esposito's are my own.
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Since the impolitical is other than representation and emerges in opposition to it, Esposito
notes that it is very hard to speak of it, that is, to represent it linguistically. Nevertheless,
this does not mean that we cannot speak of it at all. We can do so in terms of that which
does not represent. As a result, Esposito prefers to refer to the impolitical not so much as
a 'category' but rather as “a perspective, a mode of gaze, a way of looking at politics.”
Because a category “already gives an idea of some completed, defined thing – of a
concept, let us say. While it [the impolitical] is, in this case, more precisely a tonality, a
mode of looking” (Esposito 1993b).63 The impolitical is not a defined thing, but a
colouring, a specific tonality of the gaze from the outside of the political space that resists
representation and definition. Thus, the language of the impolitical needs to remain itself
impolitical, in a sense of affirming its essential inability to define anything in the last
instance or to delegate meaning.64 Esposito's discourse on the impolitical, then, is a
project of encircling conceptually what escapes any direct definition or proof.
Esposito further warns us that the impolitical is not the same as depoliticization, i.e., the
refusal of the political in favour of another, apolitical reality that establishes itself as an
alternative value, that is, as a better, preferable mode of existence or as mere apathy or
withdrawal. The impolitical is far removed from the Mannian unpolitische – valorized
apoliticism. Like Cacciari, Esposito suggests that the impolitical is a different kind of
refusal: it is the refusal and critique of the political as value or, in Esposito's words, of its
“theological” valorization. Political theology is opposed to the impolitical on several
levels. First of all, it refers to political thought and, more specifically, to Catholic political
philosophy that confuses power and Good, and thus creates the ground for valorization of
the political (the political being reduced to the operations and relations of power) – an
'object' of the impolitical refusal. Political theology, Esposito argues, coincides with the
modern secularization movement: it translates the concepts with theological origin into
politico-juridical language, which effectively results in the theological justification of the
63 Here and below, the translations from this work of Esposito's are my own.
64 This idea of impotence of language to define the impolitical is similar to the Lacanian view of
language, specifically, of the relationship between the signifier and the signified. The latter, for Lacan,
is altogether absent, resulting in the never-ending proliferation of signifiers around the void of
meaning – the real that cannot be accessed in language except as a failure of speech. Similarly,
language cannot capture the meaning or represent the essence of the impolitical.
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existing order. For example, Esposito shows how in Romano Guardini's political
Catholicism theological conception of Good undergoes political translation in terms of
power: “the Good is representable by power” and “power can produce the Good.”
Guardini also presents an “affirmative conception of power” (“power as potenza is a
determination of being”) and the “must” of power: “man must exercise power to obey
God, because it is God who imposes on man the exercise of power, and who thus
sanctifies it. That is why power is good: it is its political translation” (Esposito 2005, 9).
Furthermore, such a translation of the operations of power in terms of the Good produces
an eschatology, in which another reality is affirmed and awaited. For the impolitical,
however, there is no other reality, except for the reality of politics as it is, meaning that it
does not present an apology of the political based on its justification by theological or any
other transcendent principles. The impolitical affirms the essential finitude of the
political, that is, its foundation in nothing else except itself, in the actual absence of any
foundation, in the constitutive, unrepresentable void.
The impolitical further opposes the politico-theological reduction of plurality to unity,
more specifically, it restores the thought of conflict to its 'proper place' at the heart of the
political (which was denied to it by various modern political philosophies of
depoliticization). Traditionally, the plurality that is characterized by tensions is resolved
into a unity of sovereign representation, for example, as in the contractual model of
society. This idea of the repression of conflict in political philosophy was already
introduced in my earlier discussion of post-foundational political thought. Esposito's
position here is not much different from the other thinkers who aim at restoring or
establishing something like 'the state of nature' as the core of the political. He suggests
that the central theme that lies behind “all the great conceptions of politics” (i.e., the
'impolitical tradition' starting from Nietzsche and continuing in Weil, Arendt, Canetti,
Bataille, etc, and which also can be found in earlier instances such as in Plato, St. Paul,
St. Augustine, and Machiavelli) is that of “irreducible conflict and irreconcilable
contradiction” (Esposito 1993a).65 This current of thought is in direct opposition to the
65 Here and below, the translations from this work of Esposito's are my own.
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modern political based on the contractual model, of which Hobbes' Leviathan is a pivotal
example. The latter, Esposito argues, cannot resolve contradictions except at the price of
progressive neutralization: exclusion of conflict from the 'civil' order, of complete
depoliticization of society in favour of the sovereign (2005, 6). So, Esposito concludes,
political theology that requires the submission of political reality to a unitary principle
(e.g., the Good) actually depoliticizes it by affirming the necessity and possibility of the
resolution of conflicts and contradictions. It is effectively “[p]olitical theology, but
politics of depoliticization” (12), the act of repression of the reality and memory of
conflict. As a result, political realism for Esposito is nothing else than the non-theological
thought of politics, thought that does not confuse politics and ethics, and that does not
contain apologetic justifications of a certain Good on the basis of which reality must be
transformed into something other than what it is (conflict and contradiction).
The shadow of politics: the coincidence of the political and the impolitical
Impolitical refusal is not that of radical separation from the political but rather of critical
attachment to it, deconstructive of both political theological and depoliticizing tendencies
that define the modern political. The impolitical does not draw a line between itself and
the political, and thus does not establish separate spheres of operation. This would be the
case if it were to coincide with apolitical or anti-political attitude, but it is exactly the
opposite: it is in “direct opposition to all forms of depoliticization, and thus in a
relationship totally other than simple opposition to the political” (1999, 20). Drawing on
Canetti, Esposito argues that the impolitical is rather the shadow of politics and not its
outside, and as shadow it is intimately attached to but also distinct and separated from its
figure – the political. Esposito writes: “It is not sufficient to say that the impolitical does
not refuse the dimension of the political. It must be said that it is, from a certain point of
view – as in Canetti, situated precisely behind it – coincides with it. In other words, the
impolitical is the political viewed from its external limit [confine esterno]. It is its [the
political] determination, in the literal sense of tracing the terms (coinciding with the
whole reality of human relations)” (20). The impolitical is the political. Obviously, it is a
different kind of the political (not that of representation, depoliticization or

146
theologization) with which the impolitical coincides. 66 It is my suggestion, in this regard,
that 'the impolitical' is Esposito's term for something like 'political politics' (contrary to
apolitical or depoliticized politics) which is similarly advocated by many postfoundational authors.
The impolitical is the 'authentic' political, and it is not the same as apolitical or antipolitical attitude. Esposito emphasizes this distinction again and again. He notes that a
number of scholarly reservations toward his book concern exactly this point: they
assimilate the impolitical to the anti-political, suggesting that “the impolitical is a
filiation, albeit a fairly sophisticated one, of the 'antipolitical' which is dominant today”
(2009, 101). Esposito argues that the fundamental difference between the impolitical and
any sort of a- or anti-political attitude is that while the latter implies the modality of
opposition to or indifference and disinterest in the political, the former implies “neither a
weakening nor a discontinuation of attention to the political” but, on the contrary, entails
“its intensification and radicalization” (102). This project of intensification is what I call
the construction of 'political politics', of the political 'proper', even though the latter
ultimately consists in the absence of properness, illuminated by the impolitical
deconstructive gaze. “[T]he political has neither propriety [proprietà] nor essence [...]
what is proper to it lies in the absence of propriety, as its essence lies in an irreparable
inessentiality” (110). This is the problem of the origin in political philosophy that,
Esposito maintains, modernity conceptualizes (but does not invent) beginning from
Machiavelli. This problem is that of “the constitutive 'demonic' of the political; its
irreducibility to a single 'symbol'” (110). In other words, what is at issue here is the
66 Esposito suggests that the anti-political coincides with the political as well, but in a different way. By
rejecting the political the anti-political attitude assumes the very strategy of the political: opposition,
struggle, conflict, war, etc. So, by trying to eliminate the political, the anti-political ends up becoming
nothing more than what it aims to reject. In this respect, Thomas Mann says something very similar to
Carl Schmitt: “antipolitics is also politics, for politics is a terrible force: if one only knows about it,
one has already succumbed to it. One has lost one’s innocence” (Mann in Esposito 2009, 102; my
emphasis). It is interesting that the outside of politics, whichever way it is conceived, is often
identified with certain purity or innocence, as in Mann. Another example of such an identification is
Herbert Read's view of “the politics of the unpolitical”: “the politics of those who desire to be pure in
heart” (1964, 327; my emphasis). Giorgio Agamben's bare or naked life is also suggestive of certain
purity, in this case a removal from the political or, rather, of the self-purification of the political. The
idea of 'the state of nature' points us in a similar direction of originary innocence, purity,
uncontaminated nature as opposed to the artifice of culture and political society.

147
irreducible conflictuality, unrepresentability and finitude of the political that add up to the
problem of its non-originary origin. One can notice the similarities between Esposito's
argument and Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's discussion of the an-archic archè of the
polis.67 Politics, as being-in-common, affirms the void as its 'centring' principle or rather
it affirms the irreducible plurality of archè as the plurality of origins of the world.
Esposito points in the same direction when he suggests that the polis as “a unitary
cosmos” never existed, “[o]n the contrary, from the very beginning the nomoi of the polis
were reciprocally in conflict” (110), signalling the plurality of the political origins, their
an-archy and irreducibility to a single “symbol.”
Another important trait that constitutes the political 'proper' is the acknowledgement of its
constitutive “demonic” and finitude. The “demonic” aspect refers, vaguely, to the
irreducibility of the conflictual aspect of the polis that is often overlooked, denied or
repressed by modern political philosophy, perpetuating “a politics of neutralization.”
Esposito argues, similarly to many other post-foundational thinkers, that “[t]he
impolitical, far from conflicting with political conflict and negating the political as
conflict, considers it as the only reality and the entirety of reality, adding, however, that it
is only reality. Not in the sense that outside of this there exists another space, time, or
possibility [...] Rather, in the sense that this non-opposition is precisely a 'non': neither an
apologetic assumption of the political, nor an impossible withdrawal from it. This 'non' is
the limit that determines the political, circumscribing it within its specific terms – which
are finite” (2009, 103). The impolitical affirms conflict (polemos, agon) as the only
reality of the political, meaning that there is no alternative reality to the political. There is
no outside of the political as such, but only as an ideological illusion (such as apolitical
attitude whose conflict with the political is, by definition, dialectically attached to what it
tries to deny) or as the impolitical (which is not the other of the political but rather
coincides with it). So, Esposito's work falls within the tradition of political realism that
affirms the political for what it is, but does not present an eschatological alternative to it.
67 Esposito notes on several occasions the similarities between his notion of the impolitical and LacoueLabarthe and Nancy's “retreat of the political,” though developed independently (cf. Esposito 1996a,
59). In his later works, he also points out a number of similarities between his and Nancy's thought,
specifically regarding the view of community as sharing (cf. Esposito 2009, 25).

148
Opposed to politics of depoliticization and a variety of a- and anti-political attitudes, the
impolitical affirms the political as inescapable. It “defines the whole of reality in political
terms. ... [F]or the impolitical there is no entity, no force, no power that could contest the
political from within its own language” (103). Thus, the impolitical does not contest the
political but radicalizes it, which means that it identifies the reality of politics for what it
is without attributing to it any values (cf. Esposito 1993b). The impolitical determines
and delimits the being of politics, coinciding with the reality of human relations in its
entirety: conflict and difference, absence of foundation and, most importantly, finitude.
Similarly to Cacciari, Esposito writes that the political is not always aware of its void or
“constitutive finitude,” and the impolitical “does nothing but 'remind' the political of its
finitude, returning it to the very heart of the political: not only at its margins, but at its
center – which is itself impolitical...” (2009, 104). The impolitical is at the heart and
centre of the political as its absent foundation: it coincides with the political precisely
because it does not negate it but constitutes its unrepresentable origin.
Consequently, the impolitical is strictly the “non” of the political: neither an apology, nor
an impossible withdrawal from the political. The latter point requires further elaboration
since it might imply that the political is still a totality, just of a different, open kind, as I
proposed in the previous chapter. It seems that what makes it impossible to withdraw
from the political, for Esposito, is the very conception of 'withdrawal' presupposing a
given, identified unity from which one has to take distance, resulting in correlationist
dynamic. Esposito wants to avoid such implications by identifying the apolitical attitude
with such a withdrawal, while the impolitical affirms its impossibility. I argue that as a
result of such reasoning Esposito ultimately leaves us with only two possible choices: to
be apolitical, remaining dialectically or negatively attached to politics, or to be
impolitical, based on the impossibility of the radical outside of the political (i.e., located
beyond the relative outside of the impolitical gaze). Both choices suggest the same
impossibility of the radical outside of the political. But what is the value of identifying
the impolitical as a limit and not envisioning a way of crossing it? Is this akin to the
problem that Simone Weil identified: for how long will we not be able to cross the
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threshold and become truly “asocial”? I have a sense that if we manage to think a kind of
'detachment' from the political not in terms of another reality strictly produced by the
withdrawal from the political but, rather, as 'indifferent' to the political (and to the very
idea of withdrawal) in the first place, we might be able to conceive of a possibility of
crossing this threshold into an un-political outside. I will return to this important question
below.
Let us now further examine what Esposito means when he suggests that the impolitical is
the heart of the political. The impolitical, supposedly, reminds the political of its finitude,
locating it, simultaneously, at the margins and at the core of the political, since the only
limits the political has are its internal limits. Consequently, the outside circumscribed by
these margins is necessarily within. The impolitical is both the limit and the heart of the
political: by reminding the political of its finitude, the impolitical essentially points out
the reality of its limits, its non-totality and separation from any other order that could
guarantee 'infinity' to the political. In this respect, Esposito engages with Simone Weil's
argument that “[t]here is no other force on this earth except force” (Weil in Esposito
1996a, 68). Weil is situated in the realist tradition since she suggests that there is no other
force in this world that is opposed to force. There is no recourse to another reality in
relation (of opposition) to this world. “As for the force which is not of this earth, contact
with it cannot be bought at any lesser price than the passing through a kind of death”
(Weil in Esposito 1996a, 68), which for Weil is “Justice.” Following Weil's logic,
Esposito writes that “there is no other political but the political. But also that precisely for
this reason the political is concluded – or, more accurately, determined – by this identity
with itself. It is nothing other than itself. Its potential [potenza] is only what it is. It
cannot transcend itself toward any end or completion beyond its own bare being-such.
The impolitical is the end of every 'end of the political' (2009, 104). However, Weil
further admits that force is not absolutely sovereign: as real, it is its own limit, meaning
that it cannot cross beyond reality, it cannot transcend into something else beyond this
world.
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There is no other force that is opposed to force; it is force itself that reaches its limit. So,
force is not absolutely sovereign because it is subjected to a stronger necessity – Justice.
“What is sovereign in this world is determinateness, limit” (Weil 2002, 279). In other
words, force is subjected to its own finitude, limit which, according to Weil, is a
necessary attribute of any force. “Every visible and palpable force is subject to an
invisible limit which it will never cross. In the sea, a wave mounts higher and higher; but
at a certain point, where there is nevertheless only space [vide], it is arrested and forced to
redescend” (Weil in Esposito 1996a, 69). For Esposito, the impolitical occupies the place
of justice in Weil: it is stronger than the force of the political not in the sense of an
opposition, but in a sense of “waiting for that which is necessary. It is the force stronger
than force because it is force without the power of thought” (Esposito 1996a, 69). The
impolitical is not another force or reality opposed to the political, but rather an eyewitness attesting to the limits, finitude and reality of the political. It is an invisible
internal threshold which the political cannot cross, unless it passes through death and thus
no longer belongs to this world. The question that arises in this respect is about a
possibility of crossing the threshold of worldliness that is not conditioned by the passage
through death. In other words, what we might need to consider further is the reality of the
unpolitical which is not that of the world and which is not constituted as a result of
worldly death, but is rather manifest prior to the world. I will return to this question in my
discussion of the radical philosophy of life of Michel Henry in the next chapter.
So, in Esposito we can find two major interrelated aspects of the impolitical: it is the limit
of the political and its core. It is the limit insofar as the political cannot cross it, and it is
the core since this limitation is internalized by the political 'proper' as its quasi-origin or
quasi-foundation. In the first instance the impolitical is presented by Esposito as “the
limit, the border, the margin which the political cannot determine precisely because it is
in turn determined by it – just as the voice is by silence” (2009, 111). This is the point I
discussed above in relation to Weil: the impolitical determines the political in its finitude,
attesting to the internal limits of political reality. It is not the political that tries to
establish or imagine its own borders and exteriority, as was, for instance, the case with
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the Schmittian political that tends to outline its outside in terms of the exception. It is the
impolitical gaze that determines the political and its limits in the literal sense of determination, of drawing up the terms for the totality of human relations. It is not the
political that brings its own finitude and being to consciousness but the impolitical. I
might go as far as to suggest that the impolitical is not only the silent unconscious of the
political but rather its reflexive consciousness: it is the mirror at the limit of the political
that reflects nothing other but the political itself. In Esposito's words, “the impolitical
defines the whole of reality in political terms” (103), that is, the impolitical opens up the
angle of refraction through which the reality acquires its full visibility in political terms.
Internal difference, threshold, and sharing of the political space
The impolitical is also the difference inherent in the political: it differentiates and
subtracts the political from itself, from its “fullness,” without constituting a dialectical
opposition. As I already indicated, the impolitical coincides with the political; thus, it
does not appear 'as such' but only in its vanishing as a trace or threshold. The threshold is
an ontological anomaly, a space outside of space, existing only in its disappearance. I
believe that Esposito refers to the impolitical as such an ontological anomaly when he
suggests that the work of deconstruction performed by the impolitical turns back onto
itself, resulting in the loss of any identity of the impolitical, “[a]s if it could not manifest
itself except by cancelling itself in the pure 'taking place' [aver luogo] of the political”
(2009, 106). For Esposito, then, there is no impolitical space that does not always already
coincide with the political. The impolitical exists as the mere “intensification of the
differentiating limit” (107) of the political, which implies that it might be nothing more
than the internal differentiation and limitation of the political (e.g., the political
difference).
The impolitical as threshold has another important distinctive feature: as a limit or border
it not only separates but also unites. Esposito does not fail to emphasize this quality by
suggesting that the impolitical has an affirmative side: it is “a division but at the same
time a union of that which it divides” (Esposito 2009, 107). If there were only separation,
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then we would inevitably end up with two separate and opposing spheres, however, this is
not the case for the impolitical; it necessarily connects that which it separates. Esposito
notes that “'sharing' [condivisione], or, in Bataille’s French, partage” is the term that
better than any other conveys this “liminal co-presencing of separation and connection”
that the impolitical refers to. And so, “the impolitical is not divided from the political but
shares its space. It is the sharing of the political, or better still, the political as sharing”
(108). The idea of sharing becomes very important for Esposito's later thought of
communitas, where munus is understood as “nothing in common,” as the “spacing” or the
void established by the “operative impossibility of community” (cf. Nancy's “inoperative
community”), which is nevertheless the heart of community. 68 In this aspect, Esposito's
thought is similar to Nancy's vision of community as 'sharing', who as well borrows this
term from Bataille. Furthermore, the affirmative side of the impolitical is reminiscent of
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's “retreat of the political” which implies both withdrawal,
deconstruction of the political and its positive re-tracing.
Another important aspect of the impolitical as limit is that it is not only the limit of
politics but also the limit of itself, of its own being a limit. The impolitical vision of the
political from its borders is not interested in the constitution of these borders. Neither is it
interested in itself, meaning that what is at stake for the impolitical perspective is not its
own representation. As a result, as I noted above, it is hard to speak of the impolitical
since it is opposed to the representational mode of thought (and of the political), since it
resists its own representation as a unitary force or as identifiable thing and space that
counterpoints the political. The impolitical, rather, coincides with or shares the political
space: it is the political as sharing, which refers back to the aspect of the impolitical as
the heart of the political, and not just its limit. In this regard one might suggest, in the
vein of Lacanian political thought, that the impolitical for Esposito is 'the real' of the
political – its unrepresentable, inexpressible void. Esposito suggests that “the 'outside' –
68 In Communitas, Esposito suggests that it is necessary to think community as always “implying the
impolitical,” meaning that one has to accept the unrepresentability of the political or rather the
impossibility of its historical representation: “The community is and needs to remain constitutively
unpolitical in the sense that we can correspond to our being in common only to the degree in which we
keep it away from every demand for historical-empirical actualization ...” (2010a, 97).
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or more accurately, the void of substance to which the impolitical refers – is situated
resolutely within the political. Or perhaps one could say that it is the very same 'political'
without its mythico-operative 'fullness'” (2009, 111). The subtraction of the political from
this “fullness” nicely recaps Esposito's initial point about the opposition between the
impolitical and the regime of political theology and representation that tend to reduce the
political and its origins to a unitary “symbol.” The impolitical as the void of the political,
on the contrary, can manifest itself only as a failure, absence or rupture of the political but
never as such; it remains unrepresentable in its own identity. In this respect, Esposito
writes that the impolitical is not “an external reality, which does not exist as such,” but is
the “negative” of the political, the “wound that cuts or interrupts it” (1996a, 62).69 It is the
“immemorial background” or “forgotten origin” of the political, “the inactive heart which
political action unconsciously carries within itself as its objective limit or its internal
contradiction” (64). Even though Esposito draws the two aspects of the impolitical
closely together, the emphasis here still falls on the internalization of political exteriority:
the impolitical is the inactive heart and internal contradiction rather than a gesture toward
the (radical) outside. Esposito notes that while his earlier formulations of the impolitical
focused on the exteriority and limit, his more recent elaboration “has proceeded in a
direction which ever more explicitly interiorizes its exteriority, its being outside, its limit
– in the sense in which Bataille called his passion for the 'outside' precisely inner
experience, thereby alluding to a perfect overlapping of immanence and transcendence.
Transcendence – as is already largely set out in the final chapter of Categories of the
Impolitical – is not the opposite of immanence, but its interruption, or its exposure to its
own 'outside'. It is the transcendence of immanence, not from immanence” (2009, 111).
So, the impolitical is the exposition of the political to its own outside, which is
superimposed onto the inside as its interruption, as its immanent transcendence (cf.
Bosteels 2010, 222). It is a kind of impossible inner experience of being outside that
cannot be located due to its anomalous threshold ontology. This understanding of the
impolitical is characteristic of Esposito's later works that pick up on the points already
69 Here and below, the translations from this work of Esposito's are my own.
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found in the last chapter of Categories dedicated to Bataille. It is interesting that Bataille,
according to Esposito, is representative of the “ecstatic register” of impolitical thought,
while Weil is representative of its “ascetic register” (Esposito 2009, 107; Esposito 1996b,
22–23). It seems plausible to draw a parallel here: the ascetic register of the impolitical
emphasizes the more radical limit or exteriority of the political, while the ecstatic register
circumscribes the impolitical in terms of the relative outside, i.e., the constitutive outside
of the political.70
It is not surprising, then, that Esposito's later works, with their terminological shift from
'the impolitical' toward 'community', are situated within this ecstatic dimension. The
impolitical as ecstasy (from Greek ek-stasis – displacement) refers, in the first place, to
dis-placement of politics as traditionally conceived by political philosophers (as
representation, depoliticization, political theology). The impolitical is the displacement of
the political that opens the latter to its essential inessentiality. That is, while displacing the
political through its deconstruction, devalorization and by reminding it of its finitude, the
impolitical simultaneously illuminates that which remains of the political after this
displacement – unrepresentable elements, void, emptiness or silence. But, most
importantly, impolitical ecstasy is indicative of the political as sharing (cf. Bataille’s
notion of partage as an inspiration for Esposito's and Nancy's thought of community).71
The impolitical shares the space of the political, meaning that it both de-limits the
political as well as coincides with it. Esposito's impolitical shares in the ecstasy of the
political or, in other words, it shares in the political as ecstasy. The impolitical is ecstatic,
70 It seems that a possibility of the more or less radical 'beyond' of the political is ultimately articulated
through the ascetic register of the impolitical, which Esposito does not seem to be developing is his
later works. He rather follows upon and unpacks the ecstatic register (initially articulated in his chapter
on Bataille) as he develops his later philosophy of community. The ascetic aspect of the impolitical
that was 'practised' by Simone Weil Esposito associates with “passive power” (Esposito 2005, 150): a
way of relating to the force of this world, the “non-agent action” that is a kind of “shrinkage,
contraction, reduction of the person, in favor of the impersonal” (Esposito 1996b, 22; my translation).
Person here being the usual agent of political action, thus the impersonal is the non-agent of 'passive
politics', which basically consists in the “passive attitude of waiting or attention,” in the power of
“passion, patience, forberance [passione, pazienza, patimento]” (22). This attitude is effectively
'abandonment' (an action not motivated by outcomes, reminiscent of Galassenheit) that is opposed to
renunciation (abstinence from action motivated by desire) that, according to Esposito's logic, would
effectively amount to the anti-political attitude rather than passive politics.
71 On the relationship between the impolitical, community and ecstasy see, for example, Esposito (2010a,
86–111).
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it reaches toward the outside, transcends the political while still remaining immanent,
inside, and actually partaking in the being of the political. In this respect, I suggest that
the quintessence of Esposito's notion of the impolitical is expressed in his early
pronouncement that “the impolitical is the political” (cf. Dubreuil 2006, 89). Even though
the full statement reads as follows – “the impolitical is the political viewed from its
external limit” – what in the end makes the most sense is precisely its first part. The
impolitical is the political and nothing more, at least that is what Esposito wants to
emphasize in his later career, as if apologizing for a potential 'misunderstanding' of his
earlier works that could suggest otherwise: that there is indeed something 'beyond the
political' in the radical sense.72
So, the impolitical shares in the space of the political. But what does this sharing mean
once we take into account the understanding of the impolitical as vision, gaze, theory and
thought? It is my contention that in this regard Esposito's impolitical is similar to Nancy's
affirmation of the indissociability of thought and politics. As we recall from the previous
discussion, Nancy reformulates Descartes' ego sum as ego cum, where cum suggests that
thinking is always in-common, resulting in the view of politics and thought as sharing or
as conditioned by such a space of sharing. Esposito's impolitical as vision of the political
from its borders seems to refer to such sharing as well, that is, the impolitical consists in
de-limiting the political, in subtracting it from itself, in pointing out its “non,” its
constitutive void or outside. The impolitical is the political as sharing, inasmuch as it is
the shared vision or the vision of sharing (in its double meaning), of the in-common and
its limit, finitude. The impolitical vision or thought is the constant reminder and guard of
the sharing, the simultaneous differentiation and connection that constitutes the political
space. The task of the impolitical is to sustain the political as sharing, without
representing or giving itself or the political a form or a figure. The impolitical thus, as I
showed above, is the limit of the political as well as the limit of itself being a limit. The

72 Bruno Bosteels similarly (2010) attests to this difference between Esposito's earlier and later works,
suggesting that the move toward the impolitical as the outside-within or as the constitutive outside of
politics was seemingly preceded by an attempt to explore the possibility of going 'beyond politics', for
example, in an anthology titled Oltre la politica [Beyond the Political] edited by Esposito (212).

156
impolitical is the political, it shares its space, and it is the space of sharing. The
impolitical is an articulation or a vision of the space of the in-common.
Impolitical politics
We cannot do otherwise here but notice a number of motives in Esposito's impolitical
thought that are similar to many other post-foundational thinkers, especially regarding the
nature of the relationship between 'the impolitical' and 'the political'. This relation is
reminiscent of the correlationist dynamic involved in the movement of 'the political
difference'. First of all, Esposito's thought revolves around the unbreakable relation
between two principles or notions of politics: “the political” and “the impolitical.” To put
it differently, Esposito's project aims at distinguishing between 'apolitical politics' (of
representation, depoliticization and political theology) and '(im)political politics'
revolving around an impolitical heart, or between the foundational politics (politics of the
political philosophers) and politics without foundation (politics of the impolitical
tradition). Politics of the impolitical tradition distances itself from the political of
philosophers which, according to Esposito, is founded on the repression of the
unrepresentability and conflictuality. In this distancing, the impolitical remains,
nevertheless, indebted to this very tradition of political philosophy because it initially
articulates itself in opposition to this tradition. This applies particularly to Esposito's
notion of the impolitical, which is historically situated against the background of modern
politics of depoliticization. However, a further clarification is needed here. If we agree
with Esposito that the impolitical tradition, or at least its major elements (such as the
affirmation of conflictuality or contradiction at the core of politics), extends beyond
modernity (to Plato, St. Paul, St. Augustine, etc.), then its historical background appears
not as important. In this regard, Esposito argues that the impolitical does not arise simply
as a reaction to modern politics, remaining necessarily attached to this modernity (as its
internal contradiction) and its political language (2009, 108–110). The impolitical
tradition, according to Esposito, articulates the limit of the political as the “ahistorical
element of history” (109); as a result, such political is never reducible to its historicalempirical actualization. Esposito is not alone here: other post-foundational thinkers see,
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for example, the relation between the fluid and the rigid principles of politics in
ahistorical terms. For instance, Rancière's politics appears as an outline of the vanishing
difference between two ahistorical logics, police and equality, or as an inscription of an
ahistorical void or supplement. The 'advent of the void' for Rancière (as event of politics)
as well as for Esposito (as the impolitical) is not a specifically modern occurrence but a
structural principle that does not owe its existence to history. Nevertheless, I suggest that
even though the impolitical as a principle of politics is not historically conditioned or
reducible to modernity, its terminological articulation is historically situated. This is the
way in which Esposito's impolitical remains indebted to modernity.
Esposito's project remains, at the same time, different from other post-foundational
thinkers because of his explicit and positive use of the notion of the impolitical to signify
the internal limit of the political, that is, the differentiation of the political from itself,
from its assumed principles and history. What others would still refer to as the political
principle, Esposito calls the impolitical, thus, seemingly gesturing toward a possibility of
going beyond the political. However, in this nomination Esposito does not escape the
horizon of modernity or, rather, the horizon outlined by thought that aims to overcome the
modern political, but remains attached to it insofar as he fails to conceive of the radical
outside of politics. It appears that modern political thought is somehow limited to the
constant re-working rather than transcending of the political (thus, the proliferation of
prefixes of politics: in-, un-, infra-, ultra-, meta-, etc). 'Prefix politics', including
Esposito's impolitical, emerge within the correlationist horizon of thought: the thought of
the political finitude that is coextensive with a rejection of the radical outside of politics,
in its ideal and material sense. Let us recall that what is specific to modernity is
disappearance of terra incognita, the space outside the polis, outside 'the state' (the
expression, form and quintessence of the modern political). Such a total occupation of
space by politics was not conceivable for early 'impolitical thought', so it is possible to
argue that its 'vision' of the political outside could not be limited to the topology of the
outside-within. The outside was strictly outside, for example, as oikos, slavery or simply
the space beyond the walls of the city-state. With the rejection or closure of the outside
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or, to use Meillassoux' words, of the Great Outdoors, the only apparent outside that
remains available to modern thought is the relative outside. As a result, post-foundational
thought, to which Esposito's project belongs, remains attached, in its inability to think the
radical outside of politics, to the modern political and its representational form (e.g., the
state). Insofar as the impolitical, in a truly post-foundational manner, is thought of not as
exteriority but mere rupture or wound of the political, it can become manifest only as a
failure of the latter, again pointing in the direction of the relative outside that empowers
the inside, even without valorizing it. The impolitical remains a political project for
Esposito, as it was for Cacciari, akin to many other contemporary attempts at re-thinking
or re-working politics rather then enquiring into its 'beyond'.
Despite my conclusion that Esposito's impolitical and its logic effectively resemble the
outside of 'the political difference' (the relative outside), there are several intriguing
elements of Esposito's impolitical thought that might be useful for further investigation
into the possibility of the radical outside of politics. First of all, the terminological
distinction of Esposito's project is important. Esposito, contrary to other postfoundational thinkers, names the excess of the modern political (its inessential essence or
non-originary origin) the impolitical. It seems to me that regardless of its eventual
submission to the logic of the 'outside-within' or to the position of the 'relative outside',
the name itself, without failure, keeps extending beyond Esposito's intentions: on its
surface, untouched by an etymological analysis, and in its immediate appearance, the
prefix 'in-' of the impolitical gestures toward the outside of politics or toward a possibility
of “leaving politics” (cf. Dubreuil 2006). It is important that Esposito speaks of the
impolitical and not merely of some new kind of the political, politics, meta-politics, ultrapolitics, etc. As a result, it is still worthwhile using Esposito's notion, thus to some extent
engaging in the 'prefix politics' characteristic of the late-modern rearticulation of political
philosophy.
However, in order to limit the scope of my project to the considerations of the radical
outside of politics, I prefer to use the term unpolitical instead of impolitical in order to
avoid a potential misreading of my intentions and to distance myself from Esposito's
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work. The prefix 'un-' does not carry the double meaning of 'in-', consequently, I employ
it to signify the radical outside of the political. It is important to note right away that my
'unpolitical' project does not call for an ultimate rejection or negation of Esposito's though
of the impolitical (in the same way as the affirmation of the unpolitical as such does not
dispose of the importance of politics). What I am rather suggesting is that the thought of
the impolitical is 'incomplete' or problematic insofar as it does not 'account' for the
possibility of the radical outside, of the unpolitical. To put it differently, for the
impolitical vision to be 'complete', it has to account for the fallibility of its vision, that is,
to accept its own limit. One of the sources of such a 'fallibility' of Esposito's project, its
blind spot, could be located in the abandonment of his initial consideration of the
impolitical in terms of exteriority. Furthermore, Esposito's engagement with the thought
of Simone Weil remains unsatisfactory, since it is she who proclaims that the limit is
everything and who speaks of 'force' beyond this world, of 'force' disentangled from
thought. It is Weil who is curious about our ability to cross the doorway of society and
become truly asocial, without endlessly remaining on the threshold. She cries out: “This
world is uninhabitable. That is why we have to flee to the next. But the door is shut. What
a lot of knocking is required before it opens! Really to be able to enter in, and not be left
on the doorstep, one has to cease to be a social being” (Weil 1956, 2:466). But does this
cry actually affirm the possibility of stepping outside, of the unpolitical, or does it merely
point out the impossibility of doing so, as Esposito seems to suggest? This is the question
that remains to be answered.
In the final analysis, it appears that Esposito indeed suggests that there is no way of
crossing into something like the real outside of the political, since this kind of outside
simply does not exist without an immediate relation to politics. The impolitical is, thus,
the outside-within of the political, it is a vision, a gaze, a domain of contemplation and
thought that enables the constitution of politics without foundation. The impolitical is a
theoretical engagement with the political, it is a 'corrective' political project that aims at
bringing politics to its origin, which ultimately consists in the absence or plurality of
origins, in the originary an-archy of the political. That which is unmediated by thought, a
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possibility of the unpolitical experience, seems to remain beyond the scope of Esposito's
impolitical project developed in his early works.
The impolitical in Esposito appears not only as the silent unconscious of the political that
secretly testifies to the absence of the ground of the political, but functions almost like its
reflexive consciousness, as a mirror at the limit of the political that reflects nothing other
than the political itself. The impolitical does not oppose a totalizing politicization of
human relationality, on the contrary, it aids in the renewal of this process: the impolitical
opens up the angle of refraction through which the reality acquires its full visibility in
political terms. Consequently, the impolitical disappears with the appearance of the
political, it manifests itself only in cancelling itself in the taking place of the political.
The impolitical is never radically beyond or prior to politics, it is not unpolitical, insofar
as it shares (i.e., coincides with and differentiates) the space of the political, cuts it open
without ever leaving it. In the end, the impolitical is merely constitutive of politics
without foundation, of the political deprived of its fullness.

2.3. Impolitical and Unpolitical: “Bare Life” and “Form-of-Life”
Giorgio Agamben presents a contrast to Esposito's approach to impolitico in
contemporary theory, insofar as his vision of the notion remains primarily negative: the
impolitical, as bare life (nuda vita), is the originary problematic aspect of Western
(bio)politics that needs to be addressed in order to contain its destructive power.
However, despite the obvious negative rendering of the impolitical, I will argue that we
can get a glimpse of something like the positive impolitical in Agamben's notion of
“form-of life” (or “happy life”) that is supposed to form the basis of “coming politics.” In
other words, “form-of-life” (forma-di-vita), which Agamben so readily politicizes, can be
interpreted as the unpolitical as such (especially given Agamben's attention to the “as
such”): an integral notion of life that gains more and more importance in contemporary
thought in contrast to a variety of its 'differential' conceptions. In view of this task, I will,
first, present an analysis of the use of the impolitical in Agamben's works and suggest
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how it is related to the notion of “bare life;” then, I will sketch out his view of “form-oflife” (even though he does not present a consistent theory of this notion) and show how it
can be interpreted as containing the unpolitical elements that we are after. Due to the
enormous amount of literature and studies dedicated to Agamben's oeuvre, I will only
focus here on distilling his notion of the impolitical in its relation with 'life', leaving the
general, more comprehensive investigation of the various themes in his philosophy
beyond the scope of my present endeavour. I will also briefly discuss Foucault's synthetic
notion of life and of life as the domain of error, as well as Esposito's and Deleuze's notion
of “impersonal life” as a point of comparison to Agamben's notion of “form-of-life.”
Most importantly, these discussions constitute not just mere cases of comparison but echo
what Agamben calls “the coming philosophy” and pave a way toward something like the
coming unpolitical thought of life.
Life and politics
Consideration of life in its relation with politics is not unique to Agamben, of course. The
most obvious examples of other thinkers, discussed here, that posit life at the centre of
their thought are Hobbes, Schmitt and Foucault. Hobbes famously defines the state of
nature in terms of war of all against all, where the major criteria of this very war lies not
in actual fighting but in the permanent threat of (potential) death. Thus, mere survival,
preservation of life or struggle with death seem to be the major concern of humans in
such a state. In a similar way, Schmitt brings life to our attention in his discussion of the
concept of the political as well as in his writings on sovereignty. First of all, the political
is defined by Schmitt through the struggle between friend and enemy which, as I showed,
oscillates, in a Hobbesian manner, around the threat of real killing or death.
Consequently, for Schmitt and Hobbes life comes to attention mainly through its opposite
– death, and their 'definition' of life could probably be exhausted in terms of struggle with
death. Furthermore, many post-foundational thinkers also consider life primarily in its
relation with death, however, in not exactly the same terms as Hobbes and Schmitt. The
real threat of death and killing, as the ultimate limit as well as drive of life, is replaced by
the considerations of finitude in more general terms, i.e., non-specific to any particular
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situation of human interaction. The struggle with death is translated into facing and
coming to terms with finitude, with the absence of the ultimate foundation of human life
and thus of any politics and community. The resulting affirmation of void or finitude at
the 'core' of the new conceptions of community is evident.
An important 'source' for Agamben's project is Foucault's investigation of modern
biopolitics. However, even though Agamben pays homage to Foucault in his Homo Sacer
(1998), it would be hard to conceive of Agamben's work as a direct engagement with
Foucault's. Mika Ojakangas (2005b) describes this situation as an “impossible dialogue
on bio-power,” implying that Agamben's view of biopolitics, except for the term itself,
has little in common with Foucault's. If for the latter biopolitics is a modern 'invention',
the result of transformation of the previous mode of power relations, i.e., sovereignty
with its right over life and death, for Agamben bio-power has been with us since the very
inception of Western politics: “before impetuously coming to light in our century, the
river of biopolitics that gave homo sacer his life runs its course in a hidden but
continuous fashion” (1998, 121). Foucault's work is thus dedicated, according to
Agamben, to the study of “growing inclusion of man's natural life in the mechanisms and
calculations of power” (119; my emphasis), implying that Foucault's biopolitical inquiries
were limited to the study of modernity, which does not 'introduce' biopolitics (as Foucault
would suggest) but rather brings it to light by explicitly recognizing life as the object of
politics.
Furthermore, Agamben's view of biopolitics (contrary to Foucault) hinges on the figure of
“bare life,” that is, he proposes that Western (bio)politics is founded on the originary
exception of naked life from the polis. What is of the most importance is the very
definition of this excepted life: bare life is life exposed to an unconditional power or
threat of death (Agamben 1998, 88, 90). In Agamben's view, the biopolitical regime is
purely negative, it contains death as its animating principle: biopolitics in its essence is no
more than thanatopolitics. As Ojakangas argues, Foucault's conception of biopolitics,
however, is of a more positive character since its main principle is no longer the threat of
death, as it used to be in the case of sovereign power (and of which Agamben apparently
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gives an accurate account), but “the care of 'all living'” (2005b, 6). 'Make live and let die'
is the operating principle of bio-power. In this regard, Ojakangas reminds us that “[i]n
order to function properly, bio‐power cannot reduce life to the level of bare life, because
bare life is life that can only be taken away or allowed to persist ... Bio ‐power needs a
notion of life that corresponds to its aims. ... Its aim is not to produce bare life but, as
Foucault emphasizes, to 'multiply life', to produce 'extra‐life'” (14). As a result, she
suggests that Foucaultian biopolitics already presupposes as its ground a “synthetic”
notion of life, for which Agamben is only searching with his notion of “form-of-life,”
which would apparently announce the end of biopolitics. Consequently, it seems that
Agamben's project might have been born out of the misreading of Foucault's account of
bio-power in The History of Sexuality.
The impolitical as bare life
Whatever the 'origins' of Agamben's ideas, what interests me here is his explicit
connection between life and the notion of the unpolitical, which is not found in the
authors discussed previously (except, perhaps, in Esposito's later works).73 Impolitico,
variously translated into English as “unpolitical,” “nonpolitical” or “impolitical,” is not a
major notion in Agamben's works as such, however, it is intimately connected with a
pivotal concept of his political philosophy – bare life. As a matter of fact, for Agamben
the unpolitical is bare life. In this respect he follows Schmitt's structural logic asserting
that “the political is the total, and as a result we know that any decision about whether
something is unpolitical [unpolitische] is always a political decision...” (Schmitt 2005, 2).
Agamben slightly adjusts the content of this statement, thus radically reorienting its
perspective, by adding that “something unpolitical” refers solely to bare life. Starting
with a similar quote from Schmitt's another work, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, he writes “'It is
general knowledge among the contemporary German political generation that precisely
the decision concerning whether a fact or a kind of thing is apolitical [apolitico] is a
specifically political decision' (ibid., p. 17). Politics is now literally the decision
73 Of course, let us not forget the impact of Hannah Arendt's ideas, especially her discussion of naked
humanity in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), on Agamben's development of the notion of bare
life.
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concerning the unpolitical [dell'impolitico] (that is, concerning bare life [nuda vita])”
(1998, 173; my emphasis). Agamben translates that which Schmitt proposed a while ago
in terms of life, and not just any life, but naked, impolitical life that, in fact, is always
already politicized through its exposition to death in the originary state of exception,
springing from the sovereign decision. “Not simple natural life, but life exposed to death
(bare life or sacred life) is the originary political element” (88).
On several other occasions Agamben refers to something like bare life in terms of the
unpolitical or impolitical (1998, 131; 2004, 76, 77). Let us consider another example
here. He writes: “[t]he political ... is drawn out of the living being through the exclusion –
as unpolitical – of a part of its vital activity” (2007, 6). The unpolitical, bare life, is
clearly presented here as only a part of the vital activity of the living being. What is this
part, and what is the rest of it? Agamben famously starts his investigation into the history
of Western biopolitics by suggesting that the ancient Greeks did not have a unitary
concept to signify life, as we do nowadays, but differentiated between two kinds of life:
zoē and bios, “the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or
gods)” and “the form or way of living proper to an individual or group” (1998, 1),
respectively. In other words, the Greek notion of life was based on the distinction and
apparently clear separation between the mere fact of living, often also referred to as
nutritive or vegetative life isolated from logos (cf. Agamben 1999, 231), and qualitative
life proper to (some) human beings – bios politikos, life organized or manifest in the
polis for the sake of 'good life'. Corresponding to the linguistic distinction, the Greeks
maintained a separation of spaces dedicated to these different kinds of living: oikos or the
domain of the household was the space of zoē's confinement, devoted solely to
maintenance and reproduction of natural life, while the polis was the space where logos
was exercised for the attainment of 'good life'.
Following his reading of Aristotle, Agamben suggests that this distinction between zoē
and bios, even though no longer preserved in contemporary European languages, does not
disappear but, on the contrary, forms the foundation of Western politics; it is its
ontological presupposition. “In contrasting the 'beautiful day' (euemeria) of simple life
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[zoē] with the 'great difficulty' of political bios ... Aristotle may well have given the most
beautiful formulation to the aporia that lies at the foundation of Western politics” (1998,
11). This irresolvable internal contradiction that contaminates a transhistorical ontology
of politics is bare life, which is “included in politics in the form of exception, that is, as
something that is included solely through an exclusion” (11). As exception, impolitical
life is not simply opposed to politics, like zoē might be opposed to bios, and it does not
preexist politics, as the state of nature might precede the state, but rather it is co-originary
with politics. The latter is constituted, according to Agamben, through an originary
decision, split, distinction and separation between inside and outside, between the
political and unpolitical: politics emerges in the delimitation of its own outside, in
drawing its border. As a result, due to the dialectic nature of a limit, which not only
separates but also unites, the outside of the political space always faces the inside. More
than that, it is 'domesticated', incorporated into the inside through the status of the
outside. “Exteriority [i.e., impolitical life],” Agamben writes, “is truly the innermost
centre of the political system, and the political system lives off it in the same way that the
rule, according to Schmitt, lives off the exception” (36). Consequently, this exteriority is
never truly outside, it is only relative outside epitomized in the excepted figure of homo
sacer. In his own terms Agamben seems to address here the problem of modern
correlation between political inside and outside, pointing out the impossibility of
conceiving something like the radical outside of the political space from within the
categories of this very space. In order to go beyond this correlationism one would have to
rework the very distinction between the inside and the outside: to 'collapse' one into the
other, but not in the same way as modern biopolitics turns the exception into the rule
everywhere. This redefinition would have to occur, according to Agamben, in rethinking
the notion of life in terms of its immanence to itself – as “form-of-life.”
This new notion of life is 'integral' (cf. Prozorov 2009, 343), meaning that it precludes the
possibility of distinguishing life from itself, or rather of separating living from its form (or
zoē from bios), as in the case of bare life. This does not suggest, however, a return to
some prior state of innocence of zoē or the state of nature, that is, to the state not
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contaminated by sovereign politics. It is important to understand, Agamben reminds us,
that the 'purity' of zoē or 'truly' unpolitical life is not available to us; all that we know of it
is bare life, which is not natural life, but a product of politics. As William Rasch puts it,
“[t]he political ... does not replace nature; it creates it” (2007, 101). This 'nature' or
'outside' of the political is “not simply natural reproductive life, the zoē of the Greeks, nor
bios, a qualified form of life. It is, rather, the bare life of homo sacer [...], a zone of
indistinction and continuous transition between man and beast, nature and culture”
(Agamben 1998, 109).74 The topology of exteriority of Western politics is thus nothing
else but the zone of indistinction, the outside-within, the exception. It has the topology of
a Mobius strip or a Leyden jar, where what is presupposed as external reappears as the
inside (37).
As for Esposito, Agamben's impolitical is the “threshold,” space outside of all space, “the
always present and always operative presupposition of sovereignty [i.e., of the political]”
(1998, 106). The political does not replace the unpolitical, it is not opposed to it but
creates it. Impolitical life, for Agamben, is not independent of politics, on the contrary, it
is a political product: the threshold which the system invents and continues to reinvent,
and through which it declares itself always different from (or nonidentical to) itself.
Agamben refers to Blanchot in this respect suggesting that “[c]onfronted with an excess,
the system interiorizes what exceeds it through an interdiction and in this way 'designates
itself as exterior to itself'” (18; my emphasis). (This is true not only for Agamben's
analysis of sovereign relation with life, but also for correlationist thought in general that
emphasizes the difference or exteriority of politics insofar as it can be interiorized or reincorporated into it as, for instance, 'the political', 'exception' or 'outside-within'.) We can
conclude that the impolitical does not have positive connotation for Agamben (as it has
for Esposito and Cacciari), but designates life resulting from a prohibition or
abandonment through sovereign decision and withdrawal.

74 Catherine Mills suggests that there are altogether “four categories of 'life' operating in Homo Sacer:
zoē or biological life, bios or political life, 'bare life' (sometimes rendered as 'naked life', from the
Italian term 'nuda vita'), and a new 'form-of-life', ...” (2005, 219).
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Bare life is “a destroyed or degraded bios from which all positive determinations have
been subtracted” (Prozorov 2009, 341). The sovereign gets a hold of life not by
conquering it but by withdrawing from it, meaning that the law applies to this life in its
abandonment. The impolitical is not simply left outside of political space but is rather
“taken outside” or banned by the sovereign from the 'inside' and thus from being subject
to law of any order, sacred or profane. As Agamben puts it: “The rule applies to the
exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it. The state of exception is thus not
the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension. In
this sense, the exception is truly, according to its etymological root, taken outside (excapere), and not simply excluded” (1998, 18). In other words, the exception, on which
Western politics is found, is not “real” but “fictional”: the structure of the juridicopolitical order is that of an inclusion of what is simultaneously pushed outside, an
inclusion through abandonment. The figure of homo sacer, according to Agamben, is
representative of this structure: homo sacer not simply exists in the anomie of the state of
nature, where the way of killing is the way of survival and so anyone can kill him without
committing a homicide. The state of nature is a political creation, it does not (pre)exist in
non-relation with politics, and so the condition of homo sacer is not indicative of prepolitical chaos but can appear only as a result of exclusion from the political order, of
stripping bios down to naked life. However, this abandonment of life to exteriority does
not sever its link with politics: bare life is never fully outside or really excepted, but is
placed within the political order as a structurally necessary element of presupposed
exteriority. Agamben's analysis, in this regard, is very similar to Schmitt's, from whom he
obviously derives many of his arguments: first, the exception (the impolitical) is a
structurally necessary element of political order, and not contingent or disruptive, as it
was, for example, in Esposito's view; second, the unpolitical is reduced solely to the
status of the exception, acclaimed positively by Schmitt and negatively by Agamben.
In Agamben's work, the notion of 'impolitical' remains attached solely to 'bare life' (an
excluded part of vital activity) and is not 'redeemed' in the messianic coming of the new
politics envisioned by him. His main task consists in a redefinition of the notion of
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'politics', while 'the unpolitical' serves only as the negative background against which this
urgent necessity of redefinition is posited. As a result, while for Agamben the state of
exception is the ahistorical negative foundation of political order in the West, the
reduction of 'the unpolitical' to 'bare life' is the negative foundation of Agamben's
messianic political project. The 'redemption' of bare life in Agamben's work happens
through its politicization and is thus reminiscent of, for example, Rancière's solution to
the problem of 'the part of no part'. Let us now look at how this happens in more detail.
Coming politics and form-of-life
Agamben suggests that it is a specifically modern biopolitical regime that posits the acute
necessity of rethinking politics in a way that would prevent the multiplication and
reproduction of bare life as the sole ground of sovereignty. 75 He writes: “[o]ne of the
essential characteristics of modern biopolitics (which will continue to increase in our
century) is its constant need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and
separates what is inside from what is outside. Once it crosses over the walls of the oikos
and penetrates more and more deeply into the city, the foundation of sovereignty –
nonpolitical life [l'impolitica vita naturale] – is immediately transformed into a line that
must be constantly redrawn” (1998, 131). The task of modern biopolitics lies in
maintaining and redrawing its own foundation: unpolitical zoē which, contrary to its
originary confinement in the household, has penetrated (as Foucault also suggested) the
centre of the political, and, as bare life, has become the sole foundation and object of
politics. As a result, following Walter Benjamin, Agamben argues that while earlier in
history the exception (as well as bare life of homo sacer) emerged at different specific
times during the states of emergency and was confined to them, 76 nowadays the exception
has become the rule and bare life now coincides with the biological life of political
subjects, citizens. “If today there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred man, it is
perhaps because we are all virtually homines sacri” (115).
75 In this respect, the pressure of the necessity to rethink modern politics is clearly expressed in the
phenomenon of the camp that encompasses and manifests the horrors of the “biopolitical paradigm” or
“'nomos' of the modern.”
76 In addition to Agamben's study of the state of exception in Homo Sacer (1998), see his State of
Exception (2005).

169
Furthermore, since the exception (bare life) is impolitical, Agamben seems to advance a
thesis similar to Schmitt's and many post-foundational thinkers' suggesting that the
political is threatened or taken over by the unpolitical, or rather that politics has become
apolitical, depoliticized. He argues that for the humanity of the 20th century, which in
various totalitarianisms has reached its historical telos, which “has become animal again,
there is nothing left but the depoliticization of human societies by means of the
unconditioned unfolding of the oikonomia, or the taking on of biological life itself as the
supreme political (or rather impolitical) task. ... [P]osthistorical humanity seems to take
on its own physiology as its last, impolitical mandate” (2004, 76, 77; my emphasis). In
modern biopolitics the political has been completely reduced to the impolitical, life has
been reduced to bare life that is defined through the struggle with death (as in 'the state of
nature' or as in the biopolitical care for life that consists in prevention of death by any
means), rather than by happiness as the 'proper' orientation of life in the polis.
It is this turn from death to happiness that defines Agamben's search for new politics and
community. In order to advance the coming of the latter he proposes to begin not with the
rejection of the present condition but to work from within it, to take it to its limit.
Consequently, through his reading of Walter Benjamin he attempts to turn the 'fictitious'
exception that defines modern sovereignty (politics) into the 'real' exception, which
Benjamin associated with “divine violence” (Agamben 1998, 63–65). Or, to use Louis
Althusser's words, “the inner darkness of exclusion” has to be transformed into “the outer
darkness of exclusion.”77 In the same way, the abandonment of bare life has to be not
negated but rather “appropriated” (cf. Prozorov 2009). These transformations essentially
address the problem of correlation between the political inside and the outside, where the
77 “In the development of a theory, the invisible of a visible field is not generally anything whatever
outside and foreign to the visible defined by that field. The invisible is defined by the visible as its
invisible, its forbidden vision: the invisible is not therefore simply what is outside the visible (to return
to the spatial metaphor), the outer darkness of exclusion – but the inner darkness of exclusion, inside
the visible itself because defined by its structure. In other words, the seductive metaphors of the
terrain, the horizon and hence the limits of a visible field defined by a given problematic threaten to
induce a false idea of the nature of this field, if we think this field literally according to the spatial
metaphor as a space limited by another space outside it. This other space is also in the first space
which contains it as its own denegation; this other space is the first space in person, which is only
defined by the denegation of what it excludes from its own limits. In other words, all its limits are
internal, it carried its outside inside it” (Althusser 1970, 26–27).
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solution is defined by the assertion of the as such of the outside, thus taking it beyond the
mere status of exception. Agamben's project, thus, deals with the question that I initially
posed: a possibility of the unpolitical as such, beyond exception. However, as I already
mentioned, even though Agamben attempts to takes the notion of politics beyond
correlation, he stops one step short in rethinking the unpolitical in the same vein. In this
respect, I suggest that what Agamben calls political life or “form-of-life” is bare life or
the unpolitical as such, even if he does not interpret it in these terms.
Against the background of his initial critique of sovereignty, Agamben's project consists
in the search for the “coming” or “post-sovereign politics,” “the guiding concept and the
unitary center” of which is no longer the exceptio of bare life but “form-of-life”
(Agamben 1996, 155). Through “emancipation” from the division of life into worthy and
unworthy of living, i.e., political and bare life, and the “exodus” from any sovereignty,
the possibility of “a non-Statist politics” is presented: “[a] political life, that is, a life
directed toward the idea of happiness and cohesive with a form-of-life ... a life for which
living itself [is] at stake in its own living ... a life of power (potenza)” (153). Politics is no
longer a means to an end of survival (as it is often presented in the various social contract
theories), but rather emerges as a submission to potential (power) and happiness, the
essential human features. Agamben writes that every form of human living “always
retains the character of a possibility; that is, it always puts at stake living itself. That is
why human beings – as beings of power who can do or not do [...] are the only beings for
whom happiness is always at stake in their living, the only beings whose lives are
irremediably and painfully assigned to happiness” (151; my emphasis). The natural
sweetness of zoē or the simple “beautiful day” of life, to which Aristotle opposed life in
the polis, becomes the guiding principle of the coming politics for Agamben, since human
happiness does not require a submission to a historical telos or higher goal, a good life,
that can be achieved only through thorough purification of bios from zoē. The so-called
goodness of life lies in the living itself; bare life 'as such' (not as an exception but as
form-of-life) is the political life of happiness. As a result, form-of-life is a new politics
and new politics is form-of-life. What is redeemed in bare life or the unpolitical is its
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politicalness: insofar as in form-of-life it is impossible to isolate something like naked
life, that is, to depoliticize it, this constitutes it as “political life” (151).
Human beings are beings of power (potenza) that are assigned to happiness, and thus a
completely new politics, according to Agamben, corresponds to such an assignment: it is
“a politics contained in the sheer experience of existence (bios as zoē) that does not strive
to attain any identity or realize a vocation” (Prozorov 2009, 346). It is a politics of means
without end (cf. Agamben 2000). This allows Agamben to explain anew why there is
politics in the first place. Within the Western political “paradigm,” 78 Agamben argues,
“[t]here is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and
opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation
to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion” (1998, 8; my emphasis). Western politics is
founded on the possibility of separating life from itself, on the distinction between
various kinds of life, where the attainment of 'good life' acquires the status of the political
end. In opposition to this paradigm, Agamben proposes that “[p]olitics is that which
corresponds to the essential inoperability [inoperosità] of humankind ... There is politics
because human beings are argōs-beings79 that cannot be defined be any proper operation
– that is, beings of pure potentiality that no identity or vocation can possibly exhaust”
78 I borrow the notion of “paradigm” from Roland Barthes' lectures on The Neutral, who defines it as
“the opposition of two virtual terms from which, in speaking, I actualize one to produce meaning”
(2005, 7). As in Saussure's linguistics, meaning arises from the opposition of terms and not their
intrinsic values. Paradigm in Agamben's case refers to the originary relation between bios and zoē that
forms the basis of Western politics and, more generally, of meaning insofar as logos is indissosiable
from the political bios. Barthes speaks of the “the desire for the Neutral,” the desire to go beyond the
opposition of the paradigm. In a way, it is a desire for rest, but not in the sense of “grayness,”
“neutrality” or indifference”; it is rather a “burning activity” that outplays the paradigm (7).
Furthermore, the overcoming of the “struggle of angry forces” in opposition “does not occur through
suspension, abstention, abolition of the paradigm, but through invention of a third term: complex term
and not zero, neutral term” (55; my emphasis). “The Neutral” for Barthes is such a “third term,”
“tertium,” a structural position that is beyond and outplays the paradigm. For Agamben, the task of
thought lies in the creation of tertium, more specifically, in creation of a new notion of life, form-oflife, that outplays the traditional paradigm of Western politics – opposition and interdependence of
bare life and political existence.
79 Agamben borrows the notion of “argos” from the reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where
the latter wonders if there is such a thing as an ergon, a work proper to man, or whether “man as such
might perhaps be essentially argos, that is, without work, workless ...” (Agamben 2000, 141).
Agamben suggests that man indeed is workless, a being of pure potentiality that is not exhausted by
any identity or work and is not limited by proper function and sphere of action (as, for example, “a
carpenter and a shoemaker have their own proper function and spheres of action”). It is this essential
worklessness of humankind that allows its irremediable and painful assignment to happiness (142).
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(2000, 141; my emphasis). In other words, human beings are essentially assigned to
happiness, which cannot be achieved through any work, insofar as work presupposes an
end product, a certain telos (and often a stable, unitary definition of happiness). “[T]he
issue of the coming politics is the way in which this argia, this essential potentiality and
inoperability, might be undertaken without becoming a historical task, or, in other words,
the way in which politics might be nothing other than the exposition of humankind's
absence of work as well as the exposition of humankind's creative semi-indifference to
any task, and might only in this sense remain integrally assigned to happiness” (141142).80 Agamben's view of politics here, as an exposition of the essential worklessness (or
essential inessentiality) of humankind, is reminiscent of other post-foundational thinkers',
especially Nancy and Esposito, who follow a similar path in their rethinking of a
possibility of community that would not be reduced to a unitary identity but rather would
hinge on its impossibility and thus absence. Another interesting comparison to Agamben's
view of the coming politics is Karl Marx's 'imagination' of the imminently approaching
communist society that will not only abolish exploitation and wage labour (including its
necessary identitarian attachment to a 'profession' or proper function) but also liberate
human desire and creativity that would always remain, as it is for Agamben, semiindifferent to any task. Only when “nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity,” it
becomes possible for me to do as I wish: “to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to
hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner,
just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic”
(Marx and Engels 2004, 53; my emphasis). In the same way as for Agamben, in Marxian
communist society I am essentially 'workless'.
Moreover, “the coming being,” a “whatever (qualunque) being,” is a singularity that is
“reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or
that set, to this or that class (the reds, the French, the Muslims) – and it is reclaimed not
80 Another aspect of life defined by happiness, for Agamben (2004, 89–92), is its exteriority with regards
to the man and animal distinction and, thus, to being. In the words of Catherine Mills, “[t]his [happy]
life is not simply redeemed or reconciled in the sense of simply re-integrating natural and non-natural
life through, for instance, reducing one to the other. Instead, it is 'outside of being' – that is, external to
the Heideggerian opposition of animal and man on the basis of the openness to being, and instead
characterised by beatitude or happiness” (Mills in Murray and Whyte 2011, 125–126).
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for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its beingsuch, for belonging itself” (Agamben 1993, 1). As in Marx, then, a whatever being can
hunt but is not a hunter, can critique but is not a critic, etc., that is, this singularity is
“expropriated of all identity, so as to appropriate belonging itself” (11). This belonging of
the singularity, when exposed as such, is “whatever you want” (2), referring to “an
original relation to desire” of whatever being (1), which is similar to the Marxian project
of liberation of desire in communist society. The greatest difference between the two
thinkers, in this respect, is that whatever being, according to Agamben, is not able to form
a societas, while Marx speaks of the communist society to come. In a way reminiscent of
Nancy's and Esposito's thought of community, Agamben suggests that whatever
singularities form a community without affirming an identity, and that they “co-belong
without any representable condition of belonging” (86). This 'community' is “the
principal enemy of the State” (87), since the latter can recognize any claim for identity
but cannot come to terms with an absence of such a claim. Consequently, Agamben
argues that 'whatever', insofar as it refers to the expropriation of all identity and thus
never belongs to a set of qualities or to a societas, is “a pure exteriority, a pure
exposure ... the event of an outside” (67). This outside is not another space beyond a
determined space, but is the passage or threshold – the ek-static “experience of beingwithin an outside” (68). What is distinct about Agamben's view of exteriority as threshold
here is that it seems to exist as such. In other words, there is no inside or outside that the
limit mediates, and the passage itself, as 'whatever' life, is all there is. This being-within
an outside is not an outside-within, an expropriated exteriority of correlationism, but is
more akin to the outside which, as Meillassoux puts it, “thought could explore with the
legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory – of being entirely elsewhere” (2008, 7). I
will return to the discussion of the relationship between the 'outside', 'life' and 'thought'
below.
Life of “whatever being” is “whatever life” or “form-of-life”: life not assigned to work or
common identity but happiness. Following Agamben, let me emphasize once again that
one cannot work toward the attainment of such happy life (through politics) but can only
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experience or live it as such in the very act of living (as politics). Thus, the grounding
concept of the coming politics is the “form-of-life” or “happy life” of whatever being, life
that is not separate or distinct from its form (as was the case with bare life). It is important
to keep in mind that Agamben's use of hyphen in the term “form-of-life” is deliberate
(and inspired by Heidegger), as opposed to just speaking of some form of concrete life,
which he does on occasion. The use of the hyphen points out a specific kind of
relationship between life and its form: “the hyphen is ... the most dialectical of
punctuation marks, since it unites only to the degree that it distinguishes and
distinguishes only to the degree that it unites” (Agamben 1999, 220). As a result, we can
interpret form-of-life as an expression of a dialectical unity of what has been long
separated in the Western tradition – of bare life and its political form. Form-of-life is,
thus, a name of a “being that is only its own bare existence” and of “life that, being its
own form, remains inseparable from it” (Agamben 1998, 188). This integral life is still
bare life but no longer in the sense of excepted, abandoned or degraded form of life, but
rather in the sense of life that affirms itself as such, that is, it affirms in every being its
manner or form of being, its inoperativity and potentiality (cf. Prozorov 2009, 347). I
argue that this form-of-life is not only strictly political life (due to its indivisibility, as
Agamben claims), but also unpolitical. The unpolitical is no longer impolitical, an
outside-within or immanent transcendence: the distinction between inside and outside is
renounced, abandoned altogether. Politics and its outside or exteriority become
“absolutely immanent” to each other. As a result, in Agamben's work political life (formof-life) can be also interpreted as unpolitical (life) as such (however, they are not
identical, as we will see).
In The Coming Community (1993) Agamben elaborates on the notion “as such” (tale
quale),81 which is related to the notion of “whatever” (qualunque) that I touched upon
above.82 From different perspectives, both of these terms refer to “an absolute suchquality that does not refer back to any presupposition” but only indicates “being-such,
81 See the corresponding French term tel quel.
82 Note that Agamben uses “the being-such” and “the thing itself” interchangeably (see, for example,
Agamben 1993, 100).
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[...] manner of being” (96). The 'suchness' does not refer to any presupposition or quality
but is exposed in itself in the same way as I, as a singularity, am never “this or that, but
always such, thus” (96). Consequently, Agamben suggests, “[t]he category of suchness
is ... the fundamental category that remains unthought in every quality” (98). Given these
considerations, what would it mean to speak of the unpolitical as such or rather what
would it mean to speak of bare life as such as the unpolitical of Agamben's coming
politics? First of all, it is no longer the negative foundation of sovereign politics but
exposed as such, not referring to any other quality, entity or sphere. In other words, the
unpolitical is neither an interruption of the political (its wound, crack, lack or void, etc),
nor it is a dynamic principle of politics. It is a 'third term' of any political opposition that
itself is not attached to any of these oppositions. I suggested above that bare life 'as such'
(i.e., form-of-life) is unpolitical; however, insofar as there is actually nothing 'naked' or
'stripped' in this life (since it cannot be distinct from its form, which 'dresses' it), I further
propose that bare life 'as such' or the unpolitical is nothing less than life as such: an
immediate sweetness, as Aristotle and Agamben might say, and the unthought of all
possible politics. Here we can note the difference between Agamben's view of form-oflife as political life, the core of coming politics, and my interpretation of this life as the
unpolitical – the unthought of politics that persists and is exposed only 'as such'. It is the
“great outdoors” of politics that can be thought only as unthought, and which this thought
explores with a feeling of being entirely elsewhere. Perhaps, as in the case with bare life
of sovereignty (as well as pure Being of metaphysics), 'life as such' (the unpolitical) is
“an unthinkable limit” that reason cannot think except “in stupor and in astonishment”
(Agamben 1998, 182). While Agamben is interested in redeeming politics through a new,
integral notion of life – form-of-life or political life – my concern here is rather with the
unpolitical, which for Agamben still remains lost in the net of sovereign politics, since he
suggests that in what is to come there will be only the 'happy life' lived as politics.
Accepting Agamben's argument concerning the integrity and indivisibility of form-of-life,
I would like to take this notion further and think of its inverse 'quality', which, actually,
lies beyond any quality, i.e., of the unpolitical as the unthought of any politics, no matter
how the latter is rethought and redefined. This 'unpolitical-as-such' combined with
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Agamben's specific concern for the 'form-of-life' or 'happy life' renders a question of
another possibility – of 'the unpolitical form-of-life' (an oxymoron, if one applies
Agamben's argument, insofar as the 'form-of-life' or 'happy life' is, by definition, political
life). Thinking the unthought of political life 'as such' is what is at stake here.
Politics, thought, life
First, it is necessary to clarify the place of 'thought' in Agamben's project and, most
importantly, the intimate relation between this 'thought' and 'form-of-life'. Similar to the
experience of life 'as such', in its 'purity', thought belongs to this kind of experience: “[t]o
think does not mean merely to be affected by this or that thing, by this or that content of
enacted thought, but rather at once to be affected by one's own receptiveness and
experience in each and every thing that is thought a pure power of thinking” (Agamben
1996, 153). This pure power of thinking refers to the potential (power as potenza) that
form-of-life stands for: thought cannot be reduced to an object (a thing) as life cannot be
exhausted in some identity or 'work'. To put it differently, the notion of form-of-life
asserts the inseparability of (bare) life from its form in the same way as thought, in its
potentiality, is indistinguishable from itself and is thus “able to think itself” (153), i.e., to
coincide with itself as life coincides with its form. The object of thought is “the potential
character of life and human intelligence” (153). As a result, Agamben calls thought “an
experience, an experimentum” and “the nexus that constitutes the forms of life in an
inseparable context as form-of-life” (153). Thought constitutes form-of-life; it is not
separate from and more valuable than mere living, as, for instance, in ancient Greece bios
theōrētikos, the domain of thought and philosophy, was considered more advanced over
concerns of both oikos (the sphere of zoē) and bios politikos (cf. Arendt 1992, 21). For
Agamben, not only do the latter two coincide with each other, but thought itself is
inseparable from them. Thus human life, as form-of-life, is 'totally' indivisible. This leads
to a conclusion that thought not only constitutes form-of-life, it is not an instrument, a
means toward an end, 'happy life', as has been the case with traditional political
philosophy that took charge of politics by trying to design the best model for being
together. To the extent that Agamben's coming politics is politics without an end but of
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pure means, thought is form-of-life and form-of-life is thought. “Thought is form-of-life,
life that cannot be segregated from its form; and anywhere the intimacy of this
inseparable life appears, in the materiality of corporeal processes and habitual ways of
life no less than in theory, there and only there is there thought. And it is this thought, this
form-of-life ... that must become the guiding concept and the unitary center of the coming
politics” (155; my emphasis).
By placing thought at the centre of politics, Agamben emphasizes here the difference
between classical thought, which had made of “contemplation, bios theoretikos,” “a
separate and solitary activity ('exile of the alone to the alone'),” and modern political
philosophy that begins with “the thought of the one and only possible intellect common
to all human beings, and, crucially, with Dante's affirmation – in De Monarchia – of the
inherence of a multitude to the very power of thought” (1996, 155). Agamben adheres to
this modern affirmation of man's potential for being intellectual, referring to it as “the
diffuse intellectuality” (or the Marxian notion of a “general intellect”), that constitutes
“the experience of thought ... [as] always the experience of a common power” (154, 155).
In this respect, we can compare Agamben to Rancière, who grounds the principle of
equality in the equality of human intelligence and understanding, as well as to Nancy's
assertion of thought as always multiple, as thinking-with. Similar to Nancy, but also to
Foucault, Agamben argues that when I think, i.e., exercise the power (potenza) of
thought, I always belong to the multiple, I am 'with', I am involved in the multiplicity of
power relations. “After all,” he writes, “if there existed one and only one being, it would
be absolutely impotent. ... Where I have power, we are always already many (just like
when, if there is a language, that is, a power of speech, there cannot be then one and only
one being who speaks it)” (154; my emphasis). As a result, Agamben suggests that
community and power are identical, meaning that a communitarian principle inheres to
any power due to “the necessarily potential character of any community” (154). Insofar
as human beings are never fully enacted (i.e., they are essentially workless), this enables
their communication with others that consists in communication not of something in
common (an identity) but “of communicability itself” (154). Due to the always already

178
multiple character of thought and power, as well as the origin of communication in
potentiality and not in identity, that is, due to the potential character of the community as
such, similarly to Nancy Agamben views this “coming community,” according to
Prozorov, as “a genuinely universal and non-exclusive” (2009, 347). However, insofar as
Agamben assigns the power of thought and its potentiality to “human life” (1996, 151),
the question of universality of such a 'human community' and life remains open.
But let us now return to the question of the unpolitical. If thought and form-of-life are at
the 'foundation' of completely new politics, then how is it possible for us to think the
unpolitical? Would not that amount precisely to a renewed attempt at separating life from
itself? I believe this is not the case. Insofar as form-of-life is power (potenza) and,
according to Agamben, “[o]nly a power that is capable of both power and impotence
[adynamia or 'the potentiality to not-be' (dynamis me einai)], ... is the supreme power”
(Agamben 1993, 35, 36), then the unpolitical is rather an exploration of this 'potential to
not be' of form-of-life, that is, an exploration of the unthought of the political
life/thought. While 'form-of-life' is 'thought', the 'unpolitical-as-such' is its 'unthought'
that can be thought only 'as such', as unthought. The multitude, the supreme “power of
thought as such,” of “pure potentiality,” is manifest in the unpolitical. The unpolitical
must remain the 'foreign territory' for political thought in order to avoid a drift back to
correlationism and a return to the state-centred (or, in Agamben's terms, sovereign)
politics and thought. I believe that the unpolitical, that is, life as such, is among the few
notions that we can still explore with a feeling of being altogether elsewhere, regardless
of the accumulation of scientific knowledge about something that is called 'life', insofar
as we can imagine or even experience 'some life' that exists 'before' and 'after' thought,
that is not correlated to it. In this respect, I can certainly agree with Agamben, who
pronounces that the concept of “life” is the point of departure and the subject of “the
coming philosophy” (cf. 1999, 220, 238). More specifically, it is the various elaborations
of the concept of something like integral life that Agamben refers to, having in mind
several contemporary projects, for instance, Foucault's and Deleuze's last endeavours, as
well as his own work. I would also add Roberto Esposito's notion of “the impersonal” and
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Michel Henry's notion of “life” as important examples of such an elaboration. While the
former can be closely compared to Agamben's 'form-of-life', the latter presents an
opportunity to explore further the notion of the unpolitical-as-such by taking it beyond
thought. I will return to this question in detail in the next chapter.
Echos of the coming philosophy of life
Life in Foucault
Agamben suggests that in the last text published before his death (“Life: Experience and
Science”) Foucault sought after the “different way of approaching the notion of life,” that
is, for the notion that would take him beyond his initial understanding of the idea of life.
According to Agamben, starting with The Birth of the Clinic Foucault was under the
inspiration of “Xavier Bichat's new vitalism and definition of life as 'the set of functions
that resist death',” however, he ended by “considering life instead as the proper domain of
error” (Agamben 1999, 220). That is, by taking life beyond its reduction to “bare life”
(i.e., the dynamism of constant struggle with death, of exposition to death). This is the
essence of Agamben's own endeavour. However, something like 'form-of-life', which
Agamben sees as the centre of coming politics, is for Foucault, according to Ojakangas
(2005b), already the basic or grounding notion of modern biopolitics – a “synthetic”
notion of life. It is no longer the Aristotelian notion that differentiates life into levels, nor
is it “the classical taxonomic notion, differentiating species according to their visible
properties,” but rather “a synthetic notion, unifying both the levels and the species in the
'invisible focal unity' of life” (12). In The Order of Things Foucault writes that the
transition from the Classical age to modernity saw the transformation in the notion of life
from “taxonomic” to “synthetic”: life no longer appears as the deployment of the visible,
“as the effect of a patterning process” (Classical taxonomy) but, starting with Cuvier, as
“depth” hidden from view and concealed in the body, as “the enigma of a force
inaccessible in its essence, apprehendable only in the efforts it makes here and there to
manifest and maintain itself. ... [L]ife, on the confines of being, is what is exterior to it
and also, at the same time, what maintains itself within” (Foucault 1994, 273). Against
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the suggestion that such a distinction between surface and depth in the synthetic notion of
life can be interpreted as differentiation of life (as in the case of zoē and bios), Ojakangas
argues that for Foucault it is not the case, insofar as modern notion of “life,” the
“untamed” or “wild” ontology, can be conceptually distinguished but cannot be isolated
from its “visible surface.” Life, this “distant,” “fundamental force” resides within the
surface (Ojakangas 2005b, 13). Nevertheless, Ojakangas' argument for the 'integral'
nature of the synthetic notion of life can be challenged on the ground that the very
distinction between the 'surface' and 'depth' is enough in order to separate life from itself,
which is what, as Foucault seems to suggest, becomes possible for the first time with
Cuvier. It becomes possible to “separate the being from itself,” that is, to view “life” as
both exterior and interior to being, as the outside-within (Foucault 1994, 272–273). This,
obviously, is reminiscent of Agamben's critique of the separation of (bare) life from its
form (as well as separation of pure Being from beings), however, not only in modernity,
but at the very foundation of Western politics.
Ojakangas' argument points into an important direction that is useful for the present
endeavour: it is useful for situating 'historically' the possibility of thinking the unpoliticalas-such. I will keep in mind Foucault's analysis of the emergence of the modern notion of
life as the “enigma,” “the great, mysterious, invisible focal unity” (Foucault 1994, 269)
that enables the living beings to be alive but at the same time kills them. In this respect
Foucault writes: “The experience of life [of that “inexhaustible force”] is thus posited [in
modernity] as the most general law of beings, the revelation of that primitive force on the
basis of which they are; it functions as an untamed ontology, one trying to express the
indissociable being and non-being of all beings. But this ontology discloses not so much
what gives beings their foundation as what bears them for an instant toward a precarious
form and yet is already secretly sapping them from within in order to destroy them. In
relation to life, beings are no more than transitory figures...” (278; my emphasis). Life
here refers not so much to some static foundation of the living but to the process of
becoming of living beings (cf. Ojakangas 2005, 13), to the process of life's own
revelation. Furthermore, contrary to the ancient Greek notion of life, as Michel Henry
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(2003) will argue, that represents life as “less than man,” life is viewed in modernity,
perhaps, as “more than man,” meaning that the latter, as Foucault puts it, is no more than
a transitory figure in relation to life. (I will return to this discussion, as well as to further
implications of Foucault's discussion of life in The Order of Things, in more detail in the
next chapter.)
Impersonal life
Roberto Esposito's notion of “the impersonal” presents another example of something
like form-of-life in Agamben, at least it compares to the latter in its attempt to think
'integral' life that cannot be separated from itself. The major difference between the two
authors lies in the perspective that Esposito takes in order to approach this problem: it is
the notion of the 'person'. Timothy Campbell argues that Esposito's later focus on the
problem of the person is grounded in his earlier consideration of 'the impolitical' (2010,
136), which I discussed above. That is, the impersonal has an impolitical nature. As I
showed, an impolitical perspective, similar to Agamben's form-of-life, is 'grounded' in
thought or rather it is a different theoria or vision that illuminates what could not have
been seen from the traditional perspective of political philosophy. For Esposito, the
'impolitical perspective' constitutes 'the impersonal' (resulting in the “thought of the
impersonal”), in a way similar to Agamben's 'thought' which constitutes the forms of life
as form-of-life. Furthermore, the impolitical is a critique of valorization and of the forms
that the political tends to assume. As Campbell suggests, based on his reading of
Esposito's Terza persona: Politica della vita e filosofia dell’impersonale (2007) (Third
Person: Politics of Life and Philosophy of the Impersonal (2012)), today “no form is
more central to the political than that of the person” (Campbell 2010, 138). Consequently,
the impolitical, viewed against Esposito's later attention to the impersonal, presents a
perspective that opens up a space “in which the limits of the personal as a privileged form
of the political are uncovered” (138).
While Agamben's form-of-life emerges as a result of the critique of sovereign
abandonment of life and, thus, against the division of life into bare and political life in the
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sovereign regime of Western biopolitics, thought of the impersonal arises as a reaction to
“the dispositif of the person” that, according to Esposito, is responsible for “separating
life from itself” (2010b, 128). This dispositif (rather than sovereign decision) is “the
mechanism of separation and exclusion”: that is, awarding personhood is the “symbolic
door,” “the threshold, the decisive means by which a biological material lacking in
meaning becomes something intangible” (121). Similar to Agamben's view of the origin
of Western politics, i.e., its constitution against the negative background of bare life, the
concept of person emerges in “negative fashion from the presumed difference” (125) with
respect to the nonpersons or, more generally, to the domain of the thing. “No one is born
a person. Some may become a person, but precisely by pushing those who surround him
into the dimension of the thing” (126). Thus, any act of attribution of the personal is at
the same time an act of depersonalization, i.e., reification of “the impersonal biological
layer” of the living (127). The result of this process is obvious: one part of humanity is
pronounced truly human, possessing “juridical capacity,” and the other bestial, owning
only “the quality of naturalness” (126, 128), which is very close to Agamben's argument
about the separation of bare life from political existence through the former's degradation
and exposition to death. While Agamben does not seem to identify a single notion that
regulates the distinction between mere living and its qualitative form (except for the
human rights, perhaps), Esposito argues that it is the concept of the 'person' that
“distinguishes each one from his or her own mode of being,” and that enables “the
noncoincidence ... of being with respect to its mode of being” (126). Like for Agamben,
for Esposito the problematic aspect of the Western political (dominated by the personal)
lies in its foundational distinction of life (being) from itself, i.e., from its form or mode of
being. The consequent task arises against such a reality: the urgent need for a “thought of
the impersonal” that would present “a radical critique of that process of depersonalization
or of reification that inheres in the ... dispositif of the person” (129). The roots of such a
critique, Esposito notes, are already implicitly present in, for example, various
contemporary philosophical and artistic practices of deconstruction of personal identity.
In his turn, Esposito endeavours to develop a notion of the impersonal, pursuing three
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horizons of its meaning: justice (based on his reading of Weil), writing (following
Blanchot's thought) and life (inspired by Deleuze).
Following Weil's engagement with the impersonal (Weil 1962), Esposito suggests that,
like the impolitical, the impersonal is not a simple negation of the personal but is “that
which, from within the person, blocks the mechanism of distinction and separation” with
respect to nonpersons (2010b, 130–131). Applied to life, the impersonal prevents the
separation of life from itself, of being from its mode of being. Like Agamben, Esposito
finds the primary inspiration for his investigation of the impersonal life in Gilles
Deleuze's last text, Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life (2001) (however, they both
mention Foucault as another important contributing figure). More specifically, both
thinkers engage with Deleuze's notion of “a life” that refers to the conjunction of the
impersonal life and immanence. This life, Esposito clarifies, is common to all those who
live but is never general: it is always of someone in particular (a life). Furthermore, this
“undefined life” is “absolute immediacy,” meaning that it is non-separable, it is one with
itself: “life constitutes the indivisible point in which the being of a human perfectly
coincides with its mode, in which the form, precisely of life, is the form of its own
content. This is what Deleuze means when he associates it with what he defines as 'level
of immanence'” (Esposito 2010b, 132; my emphasis). Life, for Esposito and Agamben, is
impersonal power or potentiality, that which never exhausts itself; in other words, it is
“always-moving fold” (133), “immanent movement, a striving that obstinately remains in
itself” (Agamben 1999, 236; my emphasis). Like form-of-life, impersonal life is
immanent to itself: it is integral life where being cannot be separated from its mode or
form. Life is absolute immanence (“pure power” (Deleuze 2001, 30))83 which, Agamben
suggests, “describes the infinite movement of the self-constitution and self-manifestation
of Being” (1999, 235; my emphasis). Life is, then, more than being (“man”), since it is
83 Deleuze suggests that an example of such an impersonal life of a singularity, “pure power” or “bliss,”
is small children (2001, 30), which is similar to Agamben's suggestion that “whatever singularity”
comes “from limbo,” the place where “unbaptized children who die with no other fault than original
sin” are dwelling. These beings “that have left the world of guilt and justice behind them ... persist
without pain in divine abandon,” “they are infused with a joy with no outlet” (Agamben 1993, 5–6).
We will see further on, in the discussion of Michel Henry, the recurrence of this identification of
immanent life with the infantile experiences.
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infinite, common to all as well as “everywhere” (Deleuze 2001, 29), “in all the moments
that traverse this or that living subject and that measure lived objects” (Deleuze in
Agamben 1999, 233), but at the same time it coincides with a living being, since it is
always someone's life. Thus, the mystery of life is never really hidden (as in Foucault's
analysis of modern notion of life as “inner darkness”) but manifests itself as such in the
living beings. Impersonal life thus consists in its own mode of being.
In this respect, Esposito borrows Deleuze's notion of “becoming-animal” in order to
further speak of the impersonal, immanent life as “a mode of being human (uomo) that no
longer moves toward the thing, but ultimately that coincides only with itself” (2010b,
133; my emphasis). What is really at stake for Esposito in the notion of the impersonal
life is, then, a possibility to think different political forms (modes of being) that are not
limited to the person; and the notion of the impersonal presents the ground for such
thinking. According to Campbell (2010), Esposito's ultimate goal in Third Person is to
present a notion of “relationality among all living phenomena” or, put differently, of
“shared bios,” “ecumenical” or “nonsocial relationality,” which is not limited to the
relations between persons but is grounded in the impersonal life. As a result, the
impersonal, once the threshold of the personal is traversed, names an “openness to
relationality with forms not limited to the person” (141). This form of openness of the
impersonal is becoming-animal: a form of life that “puts in relation completely
heterogeneous terms like human, animal, and microorganism. ... [T]he becoming animal
of human alludes to a mode of being human that does not coincide either with person or
with thing” (Esposito in Campbell 2010, 145–146). While the notion of impersonal life
refers to life common to all living and thus to an ecumenical relationality to the world, the
human mode of being that springs from this impersonal life Esposito calls “the living
person.” The latter is “not separate from or implanted into life, but coextensive with it as
an inseparable synolon of form and force, external and internal, bios and zoē. The third
person, this figure that has yet to be fathomed, points to this unicum, to this being that is
both singular and plural – to the non-person inscribed in the person, to the person open to
what has never been before” (Esposito 2012, 151). The living person, as Campbell
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summarizes once again, is “one who lives to the degree he or she is open to a larger
horizon of relations not encompassed by the social form of the person” (2010, 147).
As was the case with Agamben's 'form-of-life', Esposito's thought of 'impersonal life' and
'living person' is a political or, rather, impolitical project and, as I argued before, the
impolitical stands for the search for different politics, and consequently, for an alternative
political mode of being that is not limited to the person. Thus, Esposito's thought is that
of affirmative biopolitics (cf. Campbell 2010, 147), a new politics of life. It is an
investigation of a possibility of alternative conception of political life and its political
form beyond the personal. This, in its turn, raises for me the question of the unpoliticalas-such: a possibility of thinking that which seems to remain unthought in Esposito's and
Agamben's political projects – of something like the unpolitical form-of-life.
***
My analysis of the the impolitical in Cacciari, Esposito and Agamben suggests a reversal
in the valuation of the political: the impolitical no longer appears as a side-effect of the
political but is rather seen, in a way, as the condition of possibility of the political or as a
necessary element in the constitution of new (authentic) politics. In this regard, in
Cacciari's and Esposito's account, the impolitical functions as a critique of the modern
political, and thus paves the way for politics-to-come. In Agamben's view, the impolitical,
as bare life, functions as the originary exception that constitutes Western (bio)politics and
not just a contingent phenomenon of, for instance, liberal depoliticization. The challenge
to the primacy of the political in modernity is further evident in Cacciari's and Esposito's
positive accounts of the impolitical, insofar as it no longer appears as something to be
feared but, rather, acknowledged and encouraged. The impolitical refusal that they
advocate is, then, of a different kind: it is not an apolitical rejection of politics but, on the
contrary, its radicalization, an extension to its limit. The impolitical is not different from
the political, but coincides with it or constitutes its heart. Consequently, the category of
the impolitical fails to address the radical outside of politics and remains restricted to the
topology of the outside-within. Despite its failures, this concept empowers a further
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inquiry into a possibility of the unpolitical as such by presenting a ground from which the
unpolitical can acquire its radically positive meaning. In this respect, my analysis of
Agamben's project turns out especially helpful in suggesting an avenue for unpolitical
thought based in the notion of life. Despite the fact that his account of the impolitical as
bare life is purely negative, we can trace some intimations of the unpolitical in his notion
of form-of-life that, ultimately, remain undeveloped in Agamben's 'messianic' project of
redemption of politics. What must to be done, then, is to think something like the
unpolitical form-of-life that would integrate Agamben's rethinking of bare life (as formof-life) with a positive exteriority of politics.
It this regard, it is important that the notion of the impolitical, as a vision and as bare life,
brings to the fore and articulates the relation between politics, thought and life. The
impolitical is a gaze directed at the political; furthermore, it is life lived in its bareness
outside of the space of politics. However, this living, reconsidered in its unity with itself
(as happy life), ultimately coincides with thought, where the latter refers to the
immediacy of an affection or receptiveness and not of a relation between a subject and an
object. It is the nature of this thought that we need to consider further. What exactly is
this thought that corresponds to form-of-life, and is it, like Agamben suggests, necessarily
political in its essence? These questions will come to the fore of my following discussion
of the unpolitical form-of-life as life and as the unthought of politics. That is, I will
consider a possibility of conceiving differently the relationship between politics, life and
thought.
Furthermore, Esposito's, Agamben's, Deleuze's and Foucault's thought exemplifies a
double shift in the notion of life: first, it is the shift from divisible life to that of absolute
immanence with itself (inseparability of life from its form or mode); second, the shift in
the orientation of the notion of life away from 'death' and, most commonly, toward
something like 'pure power', 'potentiality' and 'happiness', expressed in the various
notions, such as, form-of-life, impersonal life, a life, domain of error, worklessness, etc. I
suggest, in more general terms, that we witness a shift from a dynamic to, what I would
like to call, phoretic (from Greek phoreo, mere going) model of life. While the former is
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defined by the struggle of opposing forces (life and death, friend and enemy, etc.), the
latter is marked by the movement of self-revelation. This notion of life as phoretic, as I
will further suggest, is the unpolitical-as-such: the outside which political thought can
explore with the feeling of being altogether elsewhere. A detailed elaboration of this
notion of the 'unpolitical-as-such' in terms of 'life' is what will be at stake in the next
chapter. In other words, taking Esposito's and Agamben's projects into consideration, I
will argue that the unpolitical-as-such is life and, the other way around, that life-as-such
is unpolitical.
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Chapter III. Living Beyond Politics:
the Unpolitical Form-of-life
[W]ithin each form of life, even the most unhappy,
there is accomplished the essence of absolute Life.
Michel Henry

It has been the primary intention of the previous chapters to suggest that contemporary
political theory does not present a satisfactory positive account of the radical outside of
politics. While post-foundational political thought strives to bring into the discussion of
political ontology the excess of traditional politics (understood in terms of the state), it
ultimately fails to address this excess unpolitically. As I showed in the analysis of works
by Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière and Jean-Luc Nancy, such political
thought is defined by correlationist and totalizing tendencies, both of which contribute to
the absence of an effective and positive account of the outside of politics. Furthermore,
even when such an account is attempted, for example, in works of Massimo Cacciari and
Roberto Esposito, it remains lacking in radicalism, insofar as the impolitical, as a notion,
remains attached to politics as a function of its internal transformation and critique. Thus,
it remains also 'defined' as an operation of thought. Giorgio Agamben, despite his
negative view of the impolitical merely as bare life, brings into the present discussion a
very important element: the outside of politics is no longer seen as merely an operation or
projection of political thought, but is located at the level of the lived experience of homo
sacer. His thought leads toward a re-conceptualization of bare life in terms of integral,
happy life or form-of-life. However, this bare life, for Agamben, is redeemed only
through its ultimate politicization: inasmuch as it is not separate from its form, form-oflife is essentially political life. My task, then, begins where Agamben's thought remains
insufficient: I will try to conceive of a way of 'redeeming' bare life unpolitically through
the notion of the unpolitical form-of-life.
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In order to do so, I will attempt to push the questions of political theory to the original
points of contention. In this regard, I will deal with the following questions: what is life?;
is political life different from mere life?; what is happiness?; what is thought and what is
its relationship with politics and life? Only by dealing with these questions it is possible
to address the problems of correlation and the totalizing ambition of the political, as well
as to present a way of conceiving its radical outside – the unpolitical as such. First, I will
argue that in order to take life outside the correlationist circle, it is necessary to 'locate' it
beyond both thought and being. In this aspect, I will turn to the radical philosophy of life
of Michel Henry, who shows us a way of doing just that: he contends that life does not
manifest itself in the world (i.e., as being) or in a relation to it (i.e., as thought), but
remains radically immanent. Life reveals itself as the certainty of its self-affection
precisely in the absence or reduction of the world and its light. As a result, I will suggest
that such life is non-correlationist and, thus, it remains indifferent to the play of the
political difference. Insofar as life is acosmic, it remains radically unpolitical: life cannot
be brought to the political world, either as thought or experience, without losing its
essence. As a result, I will further assert that the modern 'forgetting' of the unpolitical
relies on the forgetting of life, its substitution for the objectivity of material processes
studied by sciences, which ultimately amounts to the murder of life. In this way, modern
(bio)politics is nothing but thanato-politics. A possibility of resistance to the modern
political lies, then, in an advancement of an unpolitical project of 'remembering' life, but
also, perhaps, in a political project of reinventing politics based on the primacy of life, in
the affirmation of life's a priori in relation to politics. Life, I will argue, is that which
persists in its positivity and non-relation 'prior' and 'after' politics and its world. Life is,
thus, essentially unpolitical.
By taking life beyond politics, I hope to achieve a redefinition and affirmation of life as
an immediate given and shared experience of self-affection that is not conditioned by
anything else and cannot be separated from itself. Life cannot be a human 'right' since the
human does not define or determine life, but, rather, on the contrary, life defines the
human as the living. However, the living is in no way limited to the human form. As a
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result, such a universalist understanding of life presents an opportunity of affirming
unpolitical community that is radically open to all 'forms', to all the living, to all that
'suffers' and 'bears' life. Since life is not a right that is manifest in and guaranteed by the
political world, we can see further 'practical' applications of my notion of the unpolitical
form-of-life. It affirms positively what has been seen primarily negatively: living located
outside of the system of political states. Agamben names it bare life, but others have
conceived it similarly, for instance, in terms of the “correlative other” of the state political
order. These lives are often indexed as the lives of the refugees and the stateless, the
populations that have lost their attachment to the social and political texture that used to
define their being in the world. These figures are often portrayed only negatively, similar
to the way the apolitical excess of politics in post-foundational thought is portrayed as a
threat of depoliticization or as exception. I will suggest that the figure of the refugee
appears in its specificity not as an aberration of 'normal' political being within the state
(e.g., of citizenship), nor in correlation with politics, but as a figure of 'becomingunpolitical'. In the reduction of the refugee's political world, life manifests itself, but not
as bare life, a diminished and degraded life deprived of its political form and, thus, of its
quality and happiness, but as an immediate and irreducible given of life's self-affection
and self-revelation that remains 'indifferent' to the disappearance of the political world.
The recognition of this positivity affirms life in its inseparability from itself, and calls for
'respect' of life that is neither mediated by nor dependent on its political status. As a
result, this affirmation is 'ecological', because it is radically open to all the living.
Furthermore, once we take into account life's essential movement, we can suggest that the
movement that appears in the world as displacement has its origin in life's pure
movement of self-revelation and self-transformation: prior to displacement in space,
movement is manifest in self-affection. More than that, we can suggest that “culture,” as
opposed to “barbarism,” is essentially mobile, insofar as it is understood as life's
movement of self-transformation. As a result, what is most generally at stake in this
chapter is, first, a conception of the unpolitical form-of-life, based on a redefinition of life
in terms of an immediacy of acosmic self-affection of the living; and second, an attempt
at integrating this notion with the practical concerns of critical refugee studies. In the end,
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I do not aspire to give any definite answers to the multiple questions provoked by the
modern figure of the refugee, but to suggest a sort of 'practical' opening to the question of
what might constitute 'life beyond politics'. What comes below, then, is an invitation
(rather than a conclusive statement) to participate in the important but often overlooked
discussion about the unpolitical. However, this does not mean that my discussion will
lack in a 'programmatic' element: at the very least it is conceived as an affirmation of the
unpolitical form-of-life, and of the figure of the refugee as a worldly 'projection' of life's
pure movement of 'becoming-unpolitical'.

3.1. The Unpolitical Form-of-life:
the Unthought, Life and the Living
In what follows below, I suggest that the unpolitical is 'the unconscious as such' of the
political, that is, life. In this regard, the unpolitical 'appears' twofold: as the unthought and
as life. It can be objected, however, that what the political difference has already
addressed is the unthought of politics: that which extends beyond the visible, conscious
reality of the state and institutionalized order. It can be further argued that this unthought,
for instance, in the form of the concept of the political, accounts for some sort of 'life', as
a mobile, dynamic principle that animates immobile political structures or, in Schmittian
terms, as the exception that breaks through the crust of repetition. I argue that what we
need to do here is not only introduce the notion of the unpolitical into discussion, but also
rethink the relationship between the unthought and thought, between the unconscious and
life. My initial task, then, will be to determine what kind of unthought and life define the
unpolitical and how they are different from those employed by the political correlation. In
order to do so, I will turn to Foucault's exploration of the relationship between the
unthought and life as it emerges in the modern episteme, which, as I will show, basically
outlines the correlationist dynamic in thought since Kant. Most importantly, Foucault
exposes how the unthought and life emerge as doubles of the cogito. Thus, his analysis
outlines a tendency that needs to be avoided in the presentation of the unpolitical as the
unconscious (or the unthought) of the political: we need to avoid a definition of the
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unpolitical-as-life as a mere negative of consciousness and consider it in an autonomous
way. Furthermore, what Foucault's analysis draws out is a crucial difference between two
prominent ways of thinking life regrading its 'availability' to experience. In other words, I
will argue that despite himself and his interpretation of life in modernity as an enigmatic,
blind force devoid of substance, unavailable to experience and, thus, a mere correlate (or
even an illusion) of the cogito, Foucault, in his recourse to Nietzsche, intimates a
different understanding of life, revealed in the experience of will.
This view of life, life as real experience, points us into a direction of a non-correlationist
notion of life developed by Michel Henry. In this respect, I will maintain that life,
conceived as self-revelation in the immediacy of self-affection, is unpolitical as such
insofar as it appears through the radical reduction of the world. That is, life appears, in
relation to thought, only as its radical unthought or as the unconscious as such, never
blind or empty but full of self-feeling, self-suffering and self-enjoyment. Considering the
implications of Henry's radical philosophy of life for my critique of the political
correlation, I will further suggest that politics is always secondary to life, consequently,
unpolitical-as-life is the a priori of politics. The shift of emphasis from the political to the
unpolitical necessarily implies a rethinking of humanity and human community. Human
being is no longer defined through its relation to logos but is recognized as essentially
living, who experiences life immediately, in its very living. Consequently, I will speak of
the unpolitical form-of-life as an expression of this unity of life and its form, the living,
that takes place prior to the constitution of any world, politics and political community.
Furthermore, I will show that since every living shares in gift of life, we can conceive of
the unpolitical community of life, where everyone is equal in her access to life and, thus,
to community. From this perspective, life is not a right guaranteed by a political
community, but is itself an a priori community, an immediate bond of pathos of every
living with every living. In the end, I will propose that the modern forgetting of the
essence of life and its unique mode of acosmic manifestation is parallel to the forgetting
of the unpolitical in political thought. In sum, what will be at stake in this section is an
articulation of life's positive non-relationality (solitude or being-without) and
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unpoliticalness in its relation to the world. However, I will also consider a possibility for
a renewal of political thought based on the recognition of the primacy of the unpolitical in
relation to politics, and revolving around an exploration of the positive relationship
between life and its worldly projection, for instance, in terms of the art of living.
The unthought, life and the 'cogito' in Foucault
Foucault's archaeological analysis of the modern episteme in The Order of Things
provides us with an interesting outline of the structural role of the unthought, but also life,
as coincidental or co-originary with 'the cogito'. In other words, the unthought, he argues,
functions as the irreducible double of the cogito or rational thought. I suggest that
Foucault's analysis of the modern episteme is an excellent presentation of the problem of
correlationism (which he prefers to name “phenomenology” 84) that comes to define
modern thought since Kant. More than that, Foucault, in his outline of the limits of
modernity, despite himself, is giving us a clue on how to proceed with thinking a
different, non-correlationist unthought and life.
Similarly to Meillassoux's diagnosis of modern thought as correlationist beginning with
Kant, Foucault suggests that the Kantian critique “marks the threshold of our modernity;
it questions representation [...] Thus it sanctions for the first time that event in European
culture which coincides with the end of the eighteenth century: the withdrawal of
knowledge and thought outside the space of representation” (1994, 242), that is, outside
the space of visibility. This outside, however, is not discovered as a result of the progress
of human knowledge; it appears in correlation with the knowing subject, “man” – the
being that “has thoughts.”85 “[T]he forms of the unthought in general, have not been the
84 Stéphane Legrand convincingly argues in this regard that phenomenology is present in Foucault's work
not simply as a criticized theory or a set of arguments but, in much wider terms, as a “problem” or
rather “as a symptom of our historical a priori (not to be described in its totality, but unavoidable in its
presence)” (2008, 286). As a result, it might be suggested that “phenomenology-as-a-problem” for
Foucault is a stand-in for the modern episteme – “something unthought in the way we think, ... this
unknown or unconscious dimension of our knowledge” (285). “Phenomenology” is, then, Foucault's
name for the same “symptom” of modernity that Meillassoux calls “correlationism.”
85 Foucault famously argues that man is only a recent invention: “abandoning the space of representation,
man enters in his turn, and for the first time, the field of Western knowledge. ... [M]an is only a recent
invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will
disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form” (1994, xxiii).
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reward granted to a positive knowledge of man. Man and the unthought are, at the
archaeological level, contemporaries” (326). That which is beyond representation is the
unthought that is intimately attached to “man” or the 'cogito'. Representation as well as
what represents is co-originary with its Other – the absence of representation, the absence
of thought.
Thought that emerges at the threshold of modernity (in its investigation of “man”)
'discovers' or rather acknowledges “what could never be reached by his [man's] reflection
or even by his consciousness” (Foucault 1994, 326), but in this very discovery it
prescribes a task for itself: the unthought has to be thought, “the veil of the Unconscious”
has to be lifted, man's alienation from himself has to be ended. This project of modern
thought, which Foucault vaguely names phenomenology, resolves itself “into an ontology
of the unthought that automatically short-circuits the primacy of the 'I think'” (326), and
which, nevertheless, remains no more than the cogito's “insistent,” “inexhaustible
double,” the Other and the shadow that “has never been the object of reflection in an
autonomous way” (326; my emphasis). It is my suggestion that it is this reference to the
autonomy of reflection about the unthought that will eventually be at stake for Foucault,
and is also crucial for us to consider in the pursuit of the unthought as such of the
political. In modernity, the unthought, the outside of man's cogito (of a domain of
consciousness and representation), is attached to the 'inside' in “an unavoidable duality”:
this obscure space is both exterior and indispensable to thought. As a result, “the whole of
modern thought [a new form of reflection – phenomenology-as-a-symptom] is imbued
with the necessity of thinking the unthought – of reflecting the contents of the In-itself in
the form of the For-itself, of ending man's alienation by reconciling him with his own
essence, of making explicit the horizon that provides experience with its background of
immediate and disarmed proof, of lifting the veil of the Unconscious, of becoming
absorbed in its silence, or of straining to catch its endless murmur” (326). Modern
thought faces the unthought as its indispensable Other, thus returning this unthought to
itself, to the domain of visibility and consciousness as its negative origin. The unthought
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doubles thought: they are correlated. What we need to do, then, is to take this unthought
beyond the correlation, to consider it autonomously.
Psychoanalysis, Foucault contends, is an example of 'correlationist' reflection or function
common to all the “human sciences” insofar as it sets itself “the task of making the
discourse of the unconscious speak through consciousness” (1994, 374). Just as I
discussed in the case of political correlation, the invisible, mobile and fluid principle of
'the political', often analyzed in terms of the unconscious of the visible, ordered and rigid
domain of 'politics', comes to presence only as a gap, wound, rupture or failure of this
very 'consciousness', i.e., of politics-as-state. However, psychoanalysis, similarly to postfoundational political thought, does not approach the unconscious with its back to it as,
Foucault suggests, all the human sciences do, “waiting for it to unveil itself as fast as
consciousness is analysed... [P]sychoanalysis, on the other hand, points directly toward it,
with a deliberate purpose – not toward that which must be rendered gradually more
explicit by the progressive illumination of the implicit, but towards what is there and yet
is hidden, towards what exists with the mute solidity of a thing, of a text closed in upon
itself, or of a blank space in a visible text” (374). Like psychoanalysis, the thought of
political difference is focused on pointing out these blank spaces (e.g., the lack of
foundation) in the visible text of traditional politics. Such function earns it the name
'post-foundational', while psychoanalysis is rendered by Foucault a “science of the
unconscious” or rather a “counter-science.”86 It can be suggested that post-foundational
political thought is a science of the political unconscious, characterized by a correlation –
an intimate and unbreakable relation and co-dependence (doubling) of the visible and the
invisible. And thus, just as modern thought, according to Foucault, fails to reflect on the
Other of representation (e.g., the unconscious) in an autonomous way (not just in terms of
a blank space of the visible), political correlationism fails to thinks of its outside, its
unconscious – of the unpolitical as such.
86 Ethnology (mainly represented by the works of Levi-Strauss) is another counter-science for Foucault.
He explains that “[i]n relation to the 'human sciences', psychoanalysis and ethnology are rather
'counter-sciences'; which does not mean that they are less 'rational' or 'objective' than the others, but
that they flow in the opposite direction, that they lead them back to their epistemological basis, and
that they ceaselessly 'unmake' that very man who is creating and re-creating his positivity in the human
sciences” (1994, 379).
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Foucault further argues that we owe the phenomenological project of modernity the
discovery of the domains of “life, work, and language” that, in their own ways, stand for
this 'unconscious' region of thought with which “man” has to be reconciled. My main
interest here lies with the notion of life. Foucault's analysis seems to suggest that the
notion of life that emerges in the modern episteme is correlationist: life occupies the same
structural position as 'the unthought', and thus the experience of something like 'life-assuch' is rendered impossible. As I noted previously, Foucault traces the transformation or
rather displacement of the Classical, “taxonomic” notion of life, which appeared as “the
effect of a patterning process” in “the deployment of the visible,” meaning that life was
“a mere classifying boundary,” a continuous totality established between the visible
entities, natural beings (all subject to extension, weight, and movement): life was
confined to the domain of representation. The modern, “synthetic” notion of life,
according to Foucault, is purely functional: it emerges out of the separation of the visible,
superficial features and organs from the invisible depth of the body and its functions. The
development of comparative anatomy marks this decisive break: once it becomes possible
to literally penetrate the invisible, inner darkness of the body, it becomes necessary to
establish a foundation upon which the visible can be related to the invisible, upon which
“superficial organs” can be related to those “whose existence and hidden forms perform
the essential functions” (1994, 228). In other words, at stake was the reconstitution of
“the unities that underlie the great dispersion of visible differences.” The established
correspondence between the exterior and interior forms, which both constitute the
animal's essence, is life. However, life, this enigmatic center of identities, itself receives
no essential definition, it is rendered “non-perceptible” and “purely functional”: life can
be experienced, perceived or known only through the observation of the multiple “plans”
for the maintenance of life. “[L]ife withdraws into the enigma of a force inaccessible in
its essence, apprehendable only in the efforts it makes here and there to manifest and
maintain itself” (272; my emphasis). Life here, I suggest, is a function of its own
maintenance; and as such life escapes it own essence, it is paradoxically excluded from
its own field, which is in the end occupied by the visible bodies – organisms – that
presuppose a common identity in something called 'life', in the force that moves them but
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itself remains nothing, a void. It can be argued that life has no being except as a
conceptual artifact, fiction or a mere nomination of an abstract idea of the Other of the
domain of the representable, i.e., observable organs and material processes. As Thomas
Hall puts it, “[n]amed abstractions possess a notorious tendency to take on an illusory
concreteness. Inadvertently, we begin to operate conceptually as if something (life) were
there, some unitary entity, agent, or act, that biologists should try to explain – whereas,
what is there in fact may be nothing more than an interactive ensemble of observed or
inferable material changes” (1969, 2:376). So, let me sum up, life in modern episteme is
“the great, mysterious, invisible focal unity,” the a priori, the foundation of all experience
and knowledge that is, nevertheless, non-material, beyond all experience and knowledge,
and thus it can be eventually reduced to a fiction, a convenient abstraction. The only way
life appears is in its efforts to manifest itself, that is, in the appearance of the living
organisms; consequently, the notion of life makes sense only in correlation with the
visible domain. Like the unconscious that only speaks through consciousness or the
unthought that shadows the cogito, life manifests itself through visible arrangements for
its own preservation. This life, then, I argue, is a great contradiction, an aporia: it is what
gives, i.e., founds the experience of the living, but itself is never given. It remains “the
enigma of force inaccessible in its essence,” beyond the reach of the experience of the
living.
Life, this enigmatic, inaccessible store outside of representation that nevertheless founds
it is thus, like the unthought, outside but also within “man”: life, on the confines of being,
is what is exterior to it and also, at the same time, what maintains itself within” (Foucault
1994, 273); it is “that not-known from which man is perpetually summoned towards selfknowledge” (323). Foucault suggests that the emergence of the synthetic notion of life, of
vitalist themes in the early nineteenth century, from the archaeological point of view,
signal the establishment of “the conditions of possibility of a biology” (269) and
consequently, one should add, of biopolitics. The incitement to self-knowledge thus takes
a specific (political) form in modernity – biopower. The human sciences that emerge at
this time are supposed to aid “man” in his journey toward the 'discovery' of life and, thus,
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his own self (disciplinary power), eventually resulting in the formation of various
biopolitical governmentalities, guided by the task of the care for life. However, the
content of care, the multiple techniques used to 'enhance' something like life, and the
tools used to measure its progress, cannot obscure the fact that what is stake is never lifeas-such but its primarily biological representation through the visible, material processes
that converge on the void point of life – the presupposed inexhaustible, invisible and
inaccessible founding force, the root of all existence. In other words, as I will show
below, biopolitics arises as a result to the forgetting of life, and derives its power from the
obscuration of the question of life's 'real essence' through the scientific study of life's
processes.
It is interesting to note that regardless of his analysis of the notion of life in the modern
episteme primarily in terms of enigma, force inaccessible in its essence and beyond all
experience, Foucault writes the following in his discussion of death: “The experience of
life is thus posited as the most general law of beings, the revelation of that primitive force
on the basis of which they are; it functions as an untamed ontology, one trying to express
the indissociable being and non-being of all beings. ... In relation to life, beings are no
more than transitory figures, and the being that they maintain, during the brief period of
their existence, is no more than their presumption, their will to survive” (1994, 278; my
emphasis). What is apparent and distinct here is that Foucault speaks of the experience of
life as the most general law of beings; however, he does not elaborate much on the nature
of this experience, except, perhaps, for suggesting that it becomes apparent or takes the
form of the will to survive.87 Foucault, despite himself, seems to imply that the experience
of life, the (material) revelation of this primitive force, is will. This implication might be
leading us toward Foucault's own project, his 'desire' to look beyond the modern
phenomenological project without abandoning the question of life and the unthought. 88
87 We can note here the recurring theme of 'struggle with death' which defines the dynamic notion of life
that, as I earlier suggested, dominates modern political thought. However, for my purposes here the
recurrence of the Nietzschean notion of the will is more important. Moreover, in his last essay
Foucault himself rethinks life beyond struggle with death, nevertheless, something like “will” remains
in his discussion of life toward the very end, for instance, in the notion of “courage.”
88 Foucault seems to abandon this task in his works following The Order of Things, however, I would
argue, he explicitly returns to this problem of the real experience of life, not delimited by the empty
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Alternatively, we can interpret his intriguing statement as a clue for the investigation of
the unpolitical as the unthought and life: it would require rethinking both of these notions
beyond correlation with the domain of representation and thought, as well as further
thinking through the possibility of the experience of life that is more than an abstract
notion. So, in order to proceed with the discussion of the unpolitical-as-such and the
unpolitical form-of-life we need an exposition of the non-correlationist notion of life and
the unthought; we need to consider them in an 'autonomous' way. Furthermore, we will
have to consider how these notions relate to the experience of life as unthought, which
would essentially establish a task for a renewal of political thought or, rather, the
development of the thought of the unpolitical. I should note right away here an apparent
difficulty of thinking the unpolitical: how is it possible to think the unpolitical (the
unthought as such) without immediately politicizing it (turning it into thought), and if it is
impossible, what, nevertheless, are the implications of this impossibility for political
thought. Another aspect of this difficulty is historically determined; as Deleuze
(following Foucault) reminds us, insofar as the notion of life is the object of power
(which is the case in modern biopolitical regime), any thought that considers life shares
its object with power and must, consequently, confront this power, and thus become
political. More than that, life itself becomes political: “[l]ife becomes resistance to power
when power takes life as its object. Here again, the two operations belong to the same
horizon ... When power becomes bio-power resistance becomes the power of life, a vital
power that cannot be confined within species, environment or the paths of a particular
diagram” (Deleuze 1988, 92). This 'life' that Deleuze mentions in his reading of Foucault
is obviously not that enigmatic and inaccessible force of the modern episteme; it rather
speaks to my previous suggestion that Foucault views 'real' life as 'will', of which
'resistance' could be but just another name. So, two major questions that we are facing
are: first, what is the experience of the unpolitical-as-such in terms of life-as-such;
second, what is the nature of the apparently necessary and unavoidable relation of the
unpolitical experience or form-of-life and the thought of this experience, which seems to
modern (biopolitical) notion of life, in his late 'ethical' works, especially in his public lectures at the
Collège de France of 1982-1983 and 1983-1984.
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remain essentially political (at least in the present historical junction). In other words,
what is the experience of the unpolitical and what is its relation to politics and thought?
(Bio)politics and the acosmic a priori of life
Eugene Thacker identifies “the three major modes in the philosophical engagement with
'life' today – the affective-phenomenological, the biopolitical, and the politicotheological” (2010, xiii–xiv).89 The first is represented by the so-called “new vitalisms” of
affectivity, process, and self-organization, stretching from the philosophies of Maurice
Merleau-Ponty and Michel Henry to the philosophies inspired by Deleuze and Bergson.
For the second strand, life is explicitly “politically at stake” (in the conjunction of biology
and politics), such as in the works of Agamben, Esposito and Foucault. The politicotheological mode of engagement with life builds on the prior work on religion by
Heidegger and Derrida, noting the relationship between the qualified political life (bios)
and the spiritual life (Mark C.Taylor, Luc Ferry, Jean-Luc Marion, Slavoj Žižek).
Thacker's classification is helpful in that it highlights the main contemporary themes
concerning life, however, it is hard to distinguish these modes from each other once the
question of politics is raised. As I noted above, once life is at stake for any thought, it is
impossible to avoid at least some political engagement. In this sense politics still remains
a totality (at least for the contemporary thinking of life); or, as Jean-Luc Nancy argues,
everything crosses its paths in politics. In this respect, Thacker notes too that these
“contemporary strands find their point of tension in political reflection on 'life', where
what is at stake is not just the thing or the self, but the qualified life, the life worth living,
the life that is part of the body politic” (xiv). In the end, any reflection on life today tends
to converge on the question of life's relation to politics. In what follows below, I will, to
some extent, engage with the examination of such a convergence.
While biopolitical and politico-theological reflections on life engage politics directly, I
would like to turn here to Michel Henry's phenomenological reflection on life that, at first
89 Thacker also addresses the question of what he calls “a vitalist correlation” and the possibility of a
non-correlationist notion of life. For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Thacker (2010, 254257).
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glance, might seem almost irrelevant to the problems raised in the previous chapters.
However, I will suggest that Henry's thought addresses the problem of correlation and
presents one of the ways, available to us today, for thinking the unpolitical-as-such in
terms of life. First, I will show how the problem of correlation is constituted in Henry in
terms of the paradox of modern thought that, in its attempt to free itself from the
dominance of consciousness and thought, ends up in a negative relationship with it.
Similar to Foucault, Henry illuminates how the correlationist unconscious emerges as a
mere double of the cogito. Consequently, Henry's thought allows us to extend the
question of the unpolitical to the space of the unconscious as such, which is no longer
constituted as a correlate of thought. Most importantly, the content of this unconscious is
positive, it is the real experience of life, and not a mere void point of convergence of
modern scientific thought. Life, Henry argues, has two major 'characteristics': immanence
to itself (an integral notion of life) and affectivity (it immediately 'knows' or experiences
itself in its self-feeling). Contrary to Foucault's observation, life is not beyond experience,
however, it is beyond any form of vision, specifically thought, insofar as the latter is
conceived as a form of relation to the world. Life is acosmic. Objects of consciousness
appear within the ecstatic horizon of the world to which life does not belong because it is
not and cannot become an object: in its immanence life cannot be ob-jected, separated or
distanced from itself. Life, in its essence, is radically separate from being-in-the-world. 90
More than that, life is prior to the world, to thought, and to any other kind of relation
appearing in the world. Nevertheless, it does not constitute another world, it does not
appear as the Other or the outside of the world, but only as such: life manifests itself in its
own revelation, and not in the knowledge, thought or vision of the world. Insofar as
politics, however defined, is constituted by the relation to the world and in the world, I
will argue that life, in its acosmism, is unpolitical as such. It is the unthought that can
never be brought to light as thought. So, Henry brings to the fore an important and often
overlooked question of the relationship between politics, as a form of being-in-the-world,
and its outside, which I call the unpolitical, that is not just another 'form' of worldly being
90 Much of Henry's argument is built on a critique of modern phenomenology; of Heidegger, in
particular.
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but accounts for the experience of life that is not mediated by the world. As a result, the
question of the unpolitical will be addressed along the line of life's relationship to the
world and, thus, of life's relationship to any form of politics.
An important clarification or even a correction of terms in necessary at this point.
Throughout this work I have put the question of the unpolitical as such in terms of the
radical outside of the political correlation. However, the notions of the out-side as well as
the un-political seem to imply a structural position similar to 'the outside' that is
correlated to 'the inside', amounting to the play of the political difference. Unpolitical lifeas-such, I propose, is not strictly out-side, since it is radically immanent, it does not share
'a side' with anything except itself. The outside that I have been speaking of refers not to
life itself, but rather to the notion of the unpolitical that is not correlationist, that does not
belong to the political correlation. Meanwhile, the experience of the unpolitical as life is
not outside but prior to politics – the unpolitical is the a priori of politics. Such a reversal
further challenges the primacy of the political: it is no longer the condition of possibility
of all experience; politics itself (including the thought of the political difference) finds its
possibility in the unpolitical, i.e., in life.91 So, politics is always secondary to what is
unconscious as such – life. It is important to remember that this a priori is not historical,
it is not a return to some 'state of nature' or an affirmation of some other kind of sociality
that is chronologically prior to politics; 92 we should rather say that life-as-such is
ahistorical becoming-asocial that affirms the non-relational as such. I will return to the
question of the non-relationality of life in more detail below.
91 We can recall, in this regard, Foucault's suggestion that life always escapes and that freedom is
somehow 'prior' to power relations, as well as Deleuze's affirmation of the primacy of the “lines of
flight” in relation to systems of power, which are always secondary. “[A] society, a social field ... first
and foremost, it leaks on all sides. The first thing it does is escape in all directions. These lines of
flight are what come first (even if first is not chronological)” (Deleuze 2006, 127).
92 However, there are some accounts of something like the unpolitical as historically prior to politics.
Patricia Springborg (1990), for example, presents an interesting argument regarding the historically
secondary nature of politics. She argues that politics, i.e., the polis of ancient Greece, comes to replace
a prior, primarily female, non-political sociality: politics is 'invented' in order to accommodate and
occupy the male soldiers returning from wars. “[T]he ekklesia, as a space for political assembly and
participation, was created for those soldier citizens whose real services to the city had no adequate
recognition in the structures of everyday life. But it soon came to displace those everyday, or 'private'
institutions in importance. And yet the polis was really no more that a club for the socially excluded: it
took in male householders who spent too long on campaigns away from home” (Springborg 1990, 3).
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'Real' life does not arise in opposition to politics or as resistance to politics (or, for this
matter, any other principle, e.g., death). Immanent in its essence, life-as-such is phoretic:
it is an abundant, eternal movement of self-revelation, of its own living. Dynamics,
borrowing its definition from physics, describes the relation of forces of attraction and
repulsion; it is “the science which treats of the action of force, whether it maintains
relative rest, or produces acceleration of relative motion. The two corresponding divisions
of Dynamics are thus ... Statics and Kinetics” (Kelvin and Tait 1912, 1:vi). The political
correlation resembles this science of dynamics, where the major focus lies on the
investigation of relation between the immobile or static and mobile or ekstatic principles.
The dynamic framework of the political difference comprehends movement primarily in
its correlation with a relatively static order, thus motion remains attached and attracted to
what it interrupts or disturbs, never extending into radically non-relational, immanent
movement. Life, within this framework, assimilated into the active principle of the
political, is often defined as some sort of resistance to or struggle with its Other –
immobility and death. Phoretics refers to the science of “pure motion,” insofar as the
Greek word phoro is “expressive of the idea of mere going, without any reference to the
cause of motion” (Besant 1892, 462). So, phoretics (or phoronomy) refers to the study
of pure movement, while dynamics focuses on the relational aspect of the motion of
forces.93 Consequently, the phoretic notion of life addresses the political correlation by
asserting the primacy of the immanent movement of life over (dynamic) political
relationality, in other words, it views mere life-movement as pre-ontological (prior to
being, to being-in-the-world) action or force that conditions and enables relations to be
established in the world and as the world. Insofar as the dynamic framework of political
difference relies on the radical relational ontology, the phoretic framework of life points
in the direction of 'non-relation' and 'being-without.'

93 We can also find an elaboration of the notions of dynamics and phoronomy in Immanuel Kant's
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.
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Life-as-such: correlation and the unconscious as such
Let us recall that the problem of the correlation of thought and being, of subject and
object in modern thought, applied to politics, is twofold: first, politics and what exceeds it
are mere doublets, inseparable masks and negatives of each other, resulting in the
unavoidable reestablishment of the centrality of politics-as-state; second, 'the great
outdoors' of politics is non-existent, replaced by the relative outside. As I suggested
above, Michel Henry's philosophy of life addresses the problem of correlation in modern
thought (however, without naming it such) in a way that allows me to project its
'solutions' onto the political concerns here at hand. Henry posits a question similar to that
posed by Foucault and Meillassoux: is there some experience or being that is not a mere
double of thought, that is not determined and revealed only in relation to the domain of
visibility and knowledge. Using the language of psychoanalysis, Henry asks if there is
something like the unconscious as such. He argues, in a way almost identical to
Foucault's, that the concept of the unconscious makes its appearance in modern thought
“[s]imultaneously with and as the exact consequence of the concept of consciousness”
(1993, 2). In other words, what in modernity comes to challenge the realm of
representation, visibility and thought appears only as its shadow, the Other, the obverse
that can never manifest itself independently or as such but only in subtraction from 'the
conscious'. “There is no irreconcilable opposition between conscious and unconscious.
The only true opposition is between them and life” (61). Henry's task, then, consists, in
my view, first, in bringing to light “the unthought ground” from which this modern,
correlationist doctrine proceeds and, second, in affirming life as the unthought and the
unconscious as such – a non-correlationist experience.94
94 It can be argued (cf. Williams 2008, 273) that Henry does not solve the problem of correlation but
rather represents a case of “fideism,” of “strong correlationism” that in its search for the 'beyond' of
consciousness and intentionality must turn to kinds of mystical and pious donation, something forever
beyond human thought. As Meillassoux puts it, “This is a piety that has been evacuated of content, and
that is now celebrated for its own sake by a thinking that has given up trying to substantiate it. For the
apex of fideism occurs at the point where it becomes the thought of piety's superiority to thinking,
without any specific content being privileged, since it is a matter of establishing through thinking that
it is the prerogative of piety, and of piety alone, to posit its own contents. Accordingly, the
contemporary devolution towards the wholly-other (the otherwise empty object of the profession of
faith) is the strict and inevitable obverse of interpreting the obsolescence of the principle of sufficient
reason as reason's discovery of its own essential inability to uncover an absolute – thus, fideism is

205
Henry speaks of correlation in terms of the paradox of modern thought: “the more
representation is criticized and contested in its pretension to equal reality and its ability to
make reality, and the more our epoch defines itself against representation, increasingly
understanding itself as the 'era of suspicion', the more the empire of that same
representation expands to include everything and the more it appears as the principle of
all knowledge, hence of all possible salvation. This is because more than ever, at the very
moment it seems to be called into question, it continues to constitute the unique essence
of manifestation and being. Thus an astonishing reversal of values occurs, which
concludes with Freudianism:95 calling representation into question ends in establishing its
absolute dictatorship” (1993, 159).96 This reversal is conditioned by the forgetting of life
in modernity; however, this forgetting is not absolute since from time to time life is
“rediscovered.” Unfortunately, Henry argues, even when we manage to get a glimpse of
life, it is often lost again.
Descartes' introduction of the concept of consciousness into modern philosophy, Henry
argues, in its essence was the first “effort toward a radical phenomenology” (Henry also
calls it “beginning Cartesianism”) that was eventually superimposed by Descartes'
“scientific aim” and consequently lost. Contrary to the conventional interpretation of
consciousness in Descartes as the certainty of the cogito, of the “I think,” Henry argues
merely the other name for strong correlationism” (2008, 48). We can see at least two major objections
to such an argument: first, this “piety” (i.e., life) as Henry wants to think it, however inaccessible to
thought, is, nevertheless, not evacuated of content or an attempt at substantiation, it is not a mere
obverse or incapacity of reason; life is a real, positive experience of self-affection. A second objection
is presented by James Williams (2008), who points out the incompatibility between fideism's
devolution to “wholly-other” and Henry's position that is “explicitly and firmly opposed to any notion
of the ‘Wholly-Other’. Quite to the contrary, his argument for the association of transcendental life
with Christianity is based on immanence rather than absolute transcendence. ... For Henry, faith is not
at all a question of a mysterious transcendent donation, but rather stems from the argument that life is
given to itself as auto-affectivity determining a selfhood which is given to itself” (274).
95 Henry suggests, due to the scope of his particular work, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, that this
paradox concludes with Freud. However, this does not mean that the problem disappears after Freud;
this paradox, this unthought ground of thought, Henry notes, “will, if we don't take care, determine
everything that may come after” (1993, 2).
96 This statement becomes increasingly political once we substitute 'representation' for 'politics'. We end
up with an outline of one of the major problems of the political correlation: in its denial or rather
deconstruction of the traditional notion of politics, post-foundational thought fails to really go beyond
'the state', conceiving something like 'the political' as the negative, the shadow or the unconscious of
the latter.
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that Descartes gave this concept its “ontologically radical significance” in which it
“designates appearance considered in itself – not just some thing but the principle of
every thing, the original manifestation in which everything that can exist comes to be a
phenomenon and so into being for us” (Henry 1993, 2). So, we can discern two notions of
consciousness or appearance that are repeated throughout Henry's work in terms of the
“duplicity of appearance”: first, it is the more familiar notion of the cogito as thought and
representation, i.e., what appears in the visibility of the world's horizon; second, is the
'deep' notion of consciousness (pre-intentional consciousness97) – the cogito as life.
The radical beginning in Descartes: life's revelation in self-affection
In his search for radical beginning, Descartes begins by doubting everything, including
the visible world (to which he himself belongs) as well as eternal truths. As a result of the
reduction of everything to potential nothing, of the rejection of all things and their
appearance, Descartes is able to consider what remains in itself: pure appearance,
abstracted from everything that appears in it (Henry 1993, 12). He calls this appearance,
this radical foundation of being “thought”: I think therefore I am, he declares. In response
to Heidegger's objection in Being and Time, who suggests that the Cartesian beginning is
not radical, since it must presuppose an “ontological pre-comprehension” of the “I am,”
of being, Henry emphasizes the importance of “therefore” in Descartes' affirmation (I
think therefore I am): thought, i.e., appearance, is “the indispensable precondition
necessary to the proposition of being. [...] This precondition's determination is cogito's
content. 'We are, only in thinking'” (13). So, the certainty attained by Descartes through
his doubt has nothing to do with sum; the Cartesian precondition of being is appearance
which reveals itself to itself in the radical epochê of the world. “[T]he cogito is fulfilled
only with the epochê of the world, with the exclusion not only of everything that is but of
the phenomenality of the world as such, that is, the ecstatic dimensionality from which
thought borrows its possibility, and with which it has coincided ever since the Greeks”
97 In this regard, Henry tirelessly questions whether “the manner in which intentionality is given to itself
[is] itself intentional” (Barbaras 2012, 40). His ultimate discovery is that “intentionality cannot give
itself to itself intentionally,” thus returning “the ecstatic appearance to its ultimate condition of
possibility” (53).
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(2). This “thought,” which borrows its possibility from the world, is essentially
“understanding” (the ultimate basis of the modern theories of knowledge and science),
while “the cogito” here refers to the radical certainty of pure appearance, “more ancient
revelation,” “ek-stasis's [world's] wholly other” arrived at only by the epochê of the
world. As a result, for Descartes “'I think' means anything but thought. 'I think' means
life, what the author of the second Meditation calls 'soul'” (3).
Let us look closer at what is this “life” which Descartes calls “thought” and “soul,” and
which is attained through the epochê of the world. Henry suggests that as a result of the
exclusion of the ecstatic dimensionality what remains is exteriority's radical interiority.
However, “this interiority cannot be maintained in the problematic as a simple concept or
structure, as the formal anti-essence of ek-stasis” but must be based on “an actual
apparition ... something like a total self-exhibition in the mode of its actual presentation
and in the pure phenomenological materiality of that presentation ... [Then we can] affirm
that such a manifestation is absolute and indubitable, escaping every reduction” (1993,
27). What we see here is an attempt at affirmation of the non-correlational manifestation
(prior to being and thus independent of the world and its thought) in its actual apparition
as opposed to primarily negative appearance as a conceptual anti-essence of the visible
(or conscious). Henry suggests that we find in Descartes an elaboration of that mode of
manifestation, of thought, which ultimately escapes every reduction: we find “the cogito's
ultimate formulation is the proposition videre videor: I seem to see” (17).98 This assertion
happens within the context of the radical epochê: after Descartes has doubted everything,
everything he sees, the whole world that is perhaps just an illusion or a dream, he
nevertheless sees all of this, even if Descartes himself, his body, his eyes (all subjects to
the epochê) do not exist: “'At certe videre videor, audire, calescere' (Yet I certainly seem
to see, to hear, and to be warmed)” (17). What is the meaning of this seeing and seeming?
As we know Descartes rejects seeing, the domain of visibility, even as mere appearance,
since it might be otherwise than appears and perhaps not at all. For what is seeing, asks
98 Considering that the tense of the verb videor is passive, a more accurate English translation of videre
videor would be “I see myself seeing” or “I have seen myself seeing.” This articulation of the passivity
of videor better reflects Henry's emphasis on the radical passivity of life in a sense of receptivity. I am
grateful to Dr. Antonio Calcagno for this note on the translation of the Latin videre videor to English.
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Henry. Due to Descartes' reduction, the human eye is barred and recognized as incapable
of vision, as a result “vision is given its true nature, the pure fact of seeing” (18). Henry
notes that what is accomplished for the first time here is “a clear differentiation between
what appears and appearance itself” (18). Seeing something is essentially an ob-jection,
“seeing is looking toward and attaining what holds itself before the gaze so that the object is seen only through the ob-jection of what is thus thrown and posed before” (18).
The pure seeing, however, presupposes a horizon of visibility, a transcendent light: before
the ob-jection of what is seen is “originally that of being-posed-before as such, that of the
pure horizon. It is the opening of openness as the ontological difference on which is
founded all ontic presence. Ek-stasis is the condition of possibility of videre and of all
seeing in general” (18-19). But the Cartesian epochê renounces both the domain of
visibility and the pure seeing, this original ek-stasis. What is left then?
Henry argues that the certainty that remains after reduction has a different mode of
manifestation: it is not that of seeing (videre) in its empirical or transcendental mode, but
videor, “the primal semblance.” The vision, however false it may be, nevertheless exists:
“At certe videre videor (at the very least, it seems to me that I see)”; but what is existing,
what appears, what manifests itself? Not videre (seeing) but videor (seeming):99 “Videor
designates the primal semblance, the original capacity to appear and give through which
vision originally presents and manifests itself, regardless of what veracity is accorded it
as vision, regardless of what it sees or believes itself to see, even regardless of seeing
itself” (1993, 19). This sensing does not have an ob-ject, it is self-sensing, self-affection,
opposed to seeing that constitutes itself as seeing through the attainment of its object. As
a result, Henry argues, this original essence of revelation, as sensing, is not reducible to
99 An example of Descartes' that Henry uses to raise this question and also suggest an answer to it is that
of a dream in The Passions of the Soul. Whether asleep or awake, the reality of what is seen or sensed
in the body is rejected. However, “self-sensing, original affectivity in general, and all of its modalities
are suddenly marked by the seal of the absolute. They are revealed in the substantiality of their
phenomenality, in and by their affectivity, as they are in themselves, and no illusion has any power
over them. 'Thus often when we sleep, and sometimes even when we are awake, we imagine certain
things so vividly that we think we see them before us, or feel them in our body, although they are not
there at all. But even if we are asleep and dreaming, we cannot feel sad, or moved by any other
passion, unless the soul truly has this passion within it'” (Henry 1993, 27–28). The passions of the soul
are this original semblance, seeming, videor that remain despite the epochê of the world.
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the ek-stasis of ontological difference. “I sense that I think, therefore I am,” this is the
conclusion that Henry reaches upon the close examination of the Cartesian method of the
radical reduction. “Seeing is thinking that I see [...], but thinking that I see is sensing that
I see. Videor, in videre videor, designates this sensing inherent to seeing and makes it an
actual seeing, a seeing that senses itself seeing” (21). Thought's primal sensing is
radically opposed to the sensing that rules seeing, in other words, “thought's essential
self-sensing” excludes “ek-static sensing.” Consequently, “[b]ecause self-sensing thought
excludes ek-static exteriority, it is essentially a radical interiority” (22). And this mode of
interiority, as expulsion of all transcendence, “constitutes the first essence of
consciousness, original-revelation ... 'that type of inner knowledge (cognitione illa
interna) that always precedes acquired knowledge' and that is really the basis of all. No
matter how it is expressed, the fundamental texts [of Descartes] refer to this radical,
almost unthinkable interiority whenever they attempt to unveil the final possibility of
appearance's essence as self-appearing, an essence grasped in the cogito as 'thought', or
more ultimately, 'consciousness'” (23). What is affirmed here is not the reflexive
consciousness of seeing, but the immediate impression of seeing. The double notion of
consciousness in Descartes becomes apparent: first, consciousness as reflexive thought
(i.e., understanding), a mode of seeing, of a relationship to the world (representation of
objects), of knowledge; second, (pre-intentional) consciousness as self-sensing thought,
an immediate inner 'knowledge' and impression, an original revelation, “the mute
immanence of its first being-to-self, in the affectivity of pure self-sensing” (33) (attained
through the retreat from the world), which “deserved another name, a name that indeed
Descartes gave it, the name of 'soul' or, if you like, 'life'” (40). In this “sensing,” in the
self-affecting “thought” beyond thought, the Cartesian epochê finds the radical beginning
it was seeking, which Henry calls “life.” 100 His ultimate conclusion is that “thought,
100 A question that can be raised regarding Henry's nomination of that which deploys its essence
independently of representation, i.e., thought, as necessarily 'life'. Why determine this unthought in
“vitalistic fashion” and not call it something else (cf. Calcagno 2008, 128)? Perhaps, we get a glimpse
of Henry's intention in his reading of Descartes when he eventually leaps from “soul” to “life.” Soul,
viewed as the principle of life in scholastic philosophy preceding Descartes, allows Henry to suggest
that the principle of inner knowledge 'discovered' by Descartes (immediate consciousness, “knowledge
of soul”) deserves the name of “life.” Henry's leap from identifying that real experience which lies
beyond thought and representation to its designation as “life” might give us an understanding of a
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including rational thought, is only ever given to itself in the pathetic auto-revelation of
life” (2007, 253).
The opposition between videor and videre, Henry argues, signals the division of thought
according to the two fundamental modes of phenomenality: one is focused on the visible,
the understanding's seeing, the phenomenality of the world, whereas the other affirms 'the
invisible', different 'vision' – “the astonishing concept of a vision, an eye, whose essence
is not light” (1993, 272). The concept of consciousness doubles itself as it enters the
philosophical stage: it designates both the visible and the invisible; moreover, that
revelation of life, arrived at by the reduction of the world by Descartes, instead of leading
to important research was simply lost. We witness in this moment the “historical
deviation,” as Henry calls it, which abandons the path toward the original revelation, the
beginning, and under the name of the “philosophy of consciousness” engages itself “in
the opposite direction, moving toward the world and its knowing, to a transcendental
theory of knowledge and science, which in turn made possible the mastery of things and
the universe of technology” (3). Descartes deviates from his original insight upon the
superimposition of his scientific aim onto it.
Radical immanence of life and transcendence of the world
This historical deviation results in the “forgetting of life.” Henry argues that it was Kant's
critique of the Cartesian soul that 'sealed' this forgetting and foreclose “to contemporary
thinkers access to what constitutes both our innermost being and its original essence,”
i.e., life (1993, 3). Like Meillassoux and Foucault (and certainly many others), Henry
identifies Kant's philosophy as the moment in the history of philosophy where correlation
is instituted or rather becomes apparent: Kant raises “the philosophy of consciousness (as
an ontology of representation; that is, of experience understood as the general rapport
between subject and object) to an elaborate theory of the objective universe” (3; see also
normative aspect of his overall philosophic project. As Joseph Rivera suggests, “Henry’s interest in
‘Life’ ... reflects an attempt to restore the interior ‘soul’ or spiritual dimension within a philosophical
tradition which gradually became parasitic on and complicit with the objectification of humanity
effected by modern science and technology” (2011, 208). This intention will become more clear as I
consider Henry's critique of the modern “forgetting” of life.
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103-129). I suggest that in his attention to the insights of beginning Cartesianism, but also
to, however limited, the “rediscovery” of life by Schopenhauer (life as will), Nietzsche
(life as will to power and the eternal return) and Freud (life as the unconscious), Henry
addresses the loss of “the great outdoors” of representational thought: he affirms life as
such, as original self-affection. “Self-affection, independent of the difference between
'subject and object', between 'knower and known', independent of Difference as such,
constitutes life's essence...” (164). Life is the 'being' “that never becomes ob-ject of or for
a subject and, by this absolute refusal of obstance, defines reality” (4). So, facing the loss
of life, the abandonment of the unthought as such in the correlationist philosophy of
modernity in favour of the establishment of the objective universe (of science), Henry
offers his philosophical intervention as an attempt at 'remembering' the essence of life as
such. His project has important implications for contemporary political thought
(specifically affected by correlationism) since it points politics (the “worldly” affair, the
polis as cosmos) in the direction of its radical unthought or unconscious, the unpolitical as
such – an acosmic experience of life immanent to itself, which lies at the bottom of an
integral notion of life.
Before proceeding with a closer examination of the process of 'forgetting' and the
possibility of 'remembering' life, let me articulate in more detail the major points and
oppositions that are implicit in my reading of Henry. First and foremost, there is a
defining opposition between immanence of life and transcendence of the world: life as
the invisible and the unthought, as radical immanence is opposed to ek-stasis, being-inthe-world, the domain of the visible, of representation and thought. However, Henry does
not fail to emphasize that while, in the most general terms, the radical difference between
life and the world cannot be overcome (the world knows nothing about life and life
remains indifferent to the world and its thought), their relationship is not constituted
exclusively by this opposition. Henry aims to affirm the independence of life's mode of
manifestation from that of the world, but not the other way around: a philosophy of life
“takes into consideration the very soil in which thought grows” (1993, 4). In his apparent
(even Gnostic) dualism, in his 'rejection' of the world in favour of life, which have
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become the important objects of criticism for many Henry scholars (cf. for example,
Rivera 2011; Steinbock 1999; Williams 2008), Henry, I suggest, does not really intend to
dismiss the world but rather to subject it to its a priori, life. He establishes a “hierarchy”
of modes of manifestation and experience:101 life is always prior to being-in-the-world.
Life reveals itself in its immanence before any relation to the world is possible. Invisible
life is prior to the visible world, but not correlated with it; in other words, life manifests
itself independently of representation, consciousness and thought, and not as their mere
opposite or shadow. Life remains in itself, in its radical immanence insofar as it “deploys
its essence independent of representation (independent of the ecstatic dimension that
gives representation its light)” (1993, 169). Despite the fact that it is invisible and
acosmic, life resembles “concretely experienced substance – the lived-experience of one’s
own ipseity, this 'me' that I am. This experience manifests itself deep within the structure
of interior feelings and thus cannot appear within the exteriority of the physical body or
the horizon of the world” (Rivera 2011, 207). This affirmation of the concreteness and
real substantiality of life's experience lies at the basis of Henry's project of a “radical” or
“material phenomenology.” Its implications for the thought of the unpolitical are
apparent: life as real experience, beyond world and beyond thought, affirms the radical
outside of politics (in terms of real experience that is not correlated to the cogito).
However, this affirmation is not established as a negation or dismissal of world-politics,
but rather merely subjects it to the a priori of life. What happens, then, is the unpolitical
displacement of the political as a non-value (similarly conceived by Cacciari and
Esposito), in a sense of the condition of possibility of all relationality.
Contrary to the idea of being-in-the-world (constituted by the (cor)relation between the
subject and the object, thought and being) as the only possible domain of experience of
life, as, for instance, Heidegger suggests (see, Henry 1993, 45–46), Henry establishes his
view of life as such, of experience that is not only independent of correlation but which
101 “More important, if this project intends not only to institute a radical differentiation between two
modes of presentation, which present everything that can be presented or come to us, but additionally
to claim to establish a hierarchy between them so that only what is presented by one of the modes, as
its pure ontological content, is presented indubitably (in other words, if only one mode of revelation is
absolute)...” (Henry 1993, 26; my emphasis).
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makes this correlation possible. Life is prior to the relation between thought and being:
one has to be in life, living, before one can think and be in the world. However, this does
not establish a necessary relationship between life and thought, that is, one who is living
is not necessarily thinking (i.e., representing). In this respect, Henry employs the figures
of infant and animal (borrowed from Nietzsche and Freud102) as examples of the
immediacy of life's experience, of its inner knowledge of itself that does not equal or
require reflexive thought (211, 229, 294).103 More than that, life, in the first place, cannot
represent itself to itself as such since it excludes any form of ek-stasis, of distancing
which would enable it to make itself into its own object. In the pure self-revelation of life
thought is excluded or rather is not possible; as immanence, life “expels ek-stasis and
thus all possible forms of thought. Nietzsche represents immanent life as animal, [...]
expressing an absence of the thought that traditionally defines man's humanity, specifying
him as the rational animal. Thus it is eidetically necessary that the animal, insofar as it
represents the essence of life, and life excludes thought, is determined in its being by
forgetting...” (211). “Forgetting” belongs to life and defines its radical immanence in the
rejection of the ecstatic dimension in which thought moves; thus, this forgetting is not an
operation of thought (something that was once present to thought as an object and is no
longer such) but an originary precondition of life's immanence, of the inner assembly
through which life coheres with itself. “In the absolute already of Life's autarchic
enjoyment lies the Immemorial, the Arch-Ancience that eludes any thought – the always
already forgotten, that which lies in Arch-Forgetting” (Henry 2003, 151).104 Before there
102 “Just like Nietzsche's animal, Freud's infant does not refer to a stage in a process; it is the hidden name
of an essence, namely, the essence of life. This is why its characteristics are found in every stage of
life, regardless of its age” (Henry 2008, 128).
103 It is interesting to note in this regard the distinction that Henry draws between the language of life and
the language of the world: he illustrates this distinction by pointing out the difference between a cry of
pain and the statement ‘J’ai mal.’ The former's potency consists in the way in which “life ... generates
its own reality in experiencing itself in the Self in which it auto-reveals itself” (in Jarvis 2009, 372);
the language of life is that of affect while the language of the world appeals to reason. This argument
is reminiscent of the Aristotelian distinction between phone (the animal cry of pleasure or pain) and
logos (the language proper, defining a human being); however, for Henry, the relationship between
these two kinds of 'language' is reversed. Life's expression does not require the mediation of a
symbolic system, reason or thought; life presents itself immediately to itself in suffering and not in
knowledge. As Schopenhauer puts it, “[t]here is no longer any need to obey the Socratic precept
'Know thyself'; it is enough merely to cry” (in Henry 1993, 177–178).
104 An interesting comparison presents itself here between Meillassoux's insight into the problem of
correlation through his notion of “arche-fossil” and Henry's notion of life as “Arch-Ancience.” In both
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is any thinking ego or any me, there is life. Life is anterior to every living and to thought;
“only what is alive can be affected by anything else and the world” (Henry 1993, 79).
Life's embrace precedes everything, it precedes the world and its multiple forces, life is
“the force prior to all force, the power of all power” (212) that nevertheless cannot think,
remember or represent itself in the world. Consequently, the “hyperpower” of life is
simultaneously the radical impotence inasmuch as in its radical immanence life cannot
think and objectify itself, transcend itself, be other than itself and, most importantly, be
rid of itself. To “'suffer oneself' is the structure of life” (Henry 2003, 199), not as a
negative form of experience that has to be relieved or eliminated, but as a mode of access
to life itself, life's proper mode of revelation. Absolute life, Henry suggests, experiences
itself as autarchic self-enjoyment, while the radical passivity characterizes the way in
which each living relates to life and thus to itself. The pure fact of experiencing oneself or
“sensing” oneself, which I discussed above, means being radically passive with respect to
one's own life: one is living, is in life, not as a result of a choice or an act of will, but
rather as a 'gift'. “Will's essence contains its anti-essence, its inability to will or not will
itself. This inability is the greatest force. [...] This force is life. It is the force of being, the
edifying gathering that presents everything to itself. Such a force, which is neither action
nor will, which is not action but its opposite, is the passion of being, the primal suffering
in virtue of which the essence of being is also that of life. After immanence and as its
ultimate precondition, every philosophy of life inevitably encounters this second essential
determination: affectivity” (1993, 177). Primal suffering, the submission to life at each
moment is “unfreedom;” the very “structure of being [of life] is unfreedom and
cases authors refer to the reality prior to the inauguration of human world and thought. However, while
arche-fossil refers to something like a pre-historical artifact that 'testifies' about the events that have
occurred in the past which were not manifest to anyone (thus arguing that being is not co-extensive
with manifestation), Arch-Ancience refers to an 'ahistorical' principle, insofar as the essence of life is
ahistorical, suggesting that that manifestation (original self-manifestation, not as an object to someone)
is prior to being. Life is the always already forgotten not as something that chronologically preceded
human history and the world, but what continues (moves) beyond thought in every historical present
and conditions this thought. The arche-fossil is a visible fact of that which once did not appear to
anyone (thus was relatively 'invisible') but still is presumed to have existed (since it exists, is visible to
us now); Arche-Ancience, life, is radically invisible in its essence, it never appears as an object
(visible) to anyone, neither before nor after the inauguration of the human world and specifically
human life. Life is a priori, that is, anterior to (not out-side of) every living.
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insurmountable passivity in regard to self” (215). Life's hyperpower is impotence since it
is ultimately unable to be rid of itself.105 Thus, self-destruction of the inner essence of life
is impossible.106
So, the mode of revelation proper to life consists in the pure fact of experiencing oneself
structured as suffering oneself. Let us look at the nature of this 'suffering'. As I already
mentioned, suffering here is not viewed negatively but rather as 'bearing' oneself, as
pathos, as a 'name' of affectivity, the immanent, non-intentional and universal structure of
affectivity that encompasses everything that is. This experience of suffering oneself, i.e.,
of life, in its turn, has an “antinomic structure”: Henry argues that two contrasting
affective tonalities, suffering and joy, are bound together (rather than opposed to each
other) by reference “to a primitive unity: the absolutely primitive original unity of
Suffering and Rejoicing” (2003, 200). Suffering is a path and condition of enjoying; it
attains itself through life's process of self-revelation. The two affective tonalities are thus
possible only in life's self-suffering, so that “suffering takes place and does not stop
taking place within happiness, as what gives it to itself, as its internal and insurmountable
condition” (201). Consequently, the pure states of suffering and happiness or joy cannot
be encountered; they are inseparable from each other, they constitute the structure of life.
“Happy are those who suffer” (Henry 2007, 259). The one who suffers, whose form of
life appears to be the most unhappy, is nevertheless not separated from the happy,
abundant life of which essence one partakes, as the living: “within each form of life, even
the most unhappy, there is accomplished the essence of absolute Life” (Henry 2003, 205).
105 The impotence of life as 'hyperpower' in Henry is different from Agamben's suggestion that the
ultimate power lies in the potential not to be. For Henry, life's inability is radical, it cannot not be, it is
always continuing, outpouring, and embracing everything in its inability to not be, to not be its own
manifestation. However, if we consider Agamben's statement literally, life is the potential not to be per
se, insofar as life, the universal structure of affectivity, is prior to being.
106 As a result, death serves as a reminder that life is not a product of the ego's will (one does not have an
ability or choice to not live or not die) but is bigger than the living; through death a living being faces
the hyperpower of life and comes to terms with its own radical passivity in relation to life. This
consideration of death opposes the view of death (for example, expressed by Freud, but also by many
others before and after him) as the internal movement and even the ultimate goal of life. As Henry
argues, “Freudianism accounts for life only to liquidate it”: life is interpreted as the movement of
internal self-destruction, the effort and aspiration toward death (the principle of reduction of entropy;
cf. Beyond the Pleasure Principle). He quotes Freud: “Everything living dies for internal reasons –
becomes inorganic once again. ... 'The aim of all life is death'” (1993, 313).
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This absolute life, in its self-suffering, delights in itself: happiness lies in the very simple
fact of experiencing itself, “in the radical immanence of this experiencing, where there is
neither 'outside' nor 'world'” (103). Life is thus “self-sufficient” insofar as its foundation
is self-affection in which life exhausts itself and to which it refers back (see, Henry 1993,
265). Life in its essence is always sufficient, is always happy life. Suffering and joy, these
different affective tonalities (but not modes), constitute “the unique essence of being, as
life, as the original self-experience in self-growth of self-delight” (232). This life, selfsuffering which delights in itself, has a second name that, Henry suggests, Nietzsche
gives it: “[d]elight, joy, happiness, intoxication, 'overflow of a primordial delight'” (232).
In suffering, the self plunges into the power which established it, becomes submerged in
“the intoxication of life” (Henry 2007, 259). Perhaps, this life's immediate and irreducible
delight in itself is what Aristotle was referring to when he spoke of the natural or
immediate sweetness of zoē. The same is true for Agamben's thought of “happy life” to
which humans “are irremediably and painfully assigned.” Form-of-life is life's painful but
irremediable assignment to happiness. Agamben wants to call it not just “happy” but also
“sufficient” (in the sense of good enough) life, which, one can argue with Henry's help, is
not just that but also an intoxicating and always abundant life (zoē perissōn) that has been
incorporated into the Christian notion of life.107
If the experience of life is always both, happiness and suffering, we can see “bare life” in
a different, more positive light: bare life can never be purely unhappy insofar as it is life;
as a result, what does its bareness really stand for? Before Agamben can affirm form-oflife as happy life in opposition and as an answer to the problem of bare life, he might
need to address the question of the possibility of happiness in bare life, whether life can
ever be stripped naked and reduced to pure suffering. Not that any form of life should be
abandoned to any form of worldly suffering in order to be happy, but it is still important, I
believe, not to reduce something like 'bare life' to pure unhappiness and suffering, fully
deprived of joy. In this regard, we should question the very notion of bare life: is it a mere
thought experiment (just like the Hobbesian “state of nature”) that never appears in
107 As we read in John 10:10b: “I am come that they might have life, and that they might have [it] more
abundantly.” (ἐγὼ ἦλθον ἵνα ζωὴν ἔχωσιν καὶ περισσὸν ἔχωσιν)
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experience, or is life, in its essence, nothing but bare life as such, which is exhausted in
its self-suffering and self-enjoyment and never is more than that. I suggest that Henry's
thought of life guides us toward the second option: bare life is life-as-such, not different
in its essence from any other form of life. There is no other life than life. A similar
argument can be applied to Rancière's elaboration of “the part of no part”: regardless of
the negative situation of being outside the dominant order, of not being accounted for,
there is a positive side to this 'life beyond politics'. The life of “the part of no part” cannot
be reduced to mere suffering insofar as it partakes in life; this is an important addition to
Rancière's political project of equality. No living being is outside of life and thus no
living is deprived of life's delight; moreover, inasmuch as life is radically immanent, it
does not have a degree or measure of more or less: everyone has an equal 'share' of life, is
equally alive.108
The unpolitical form-of-life: the indivisibility of life and the living
At this point it would be hard not to recognize that Henry's notion of life is 'integral',
especially considering his emphasis on life's immanence. As in Agamben and Esposito,
the emphasis falls on the inseparability of life from itself. Opposed to the appearing of the
world, which unveils only in the 'outside of self', in ekstasis, and everything that appears
in it is thus exterior, other, different, “the first decisive trait of the revelation of life is that,
because it carries no divide or gap within it and never differs from itself, it only ever
reveals itself. Life reveals itself. Life is an auto-revelation” (Henry 2007, 247). Life never
differs from itself; life is independent of “Difference as such.” Consequently, it does not
make much sense to speak of something like bare life and qualitative life, since in both
cases we would be dealing with the same life that, regardless of its modalities (even in the
108 “Now, supposing there are degrees of power, 'quantities of force', and their intermingling and conflict
are born from inner modifications of these forces. Nevertheless, the power by which they are and in
which despite their vicissitudes they remain knows neither degree nor quantity, neither growth nor
diminution, neither modification nor alteration. It is the omnipresent and omnipotent hyperpower in
every power, turning it over to itself, making it ready to be what it is. All its power is in each thing, the
weakest as well as the strongest. Thus we understand that no force, no matter how insignificant and
derisory, fails to bear the incommensurability of that hyperpower, which in fact is not a measure for
any force, since it cannot be measured by any, being in each before its action, taking and giving its
measure, the incoercibility of its self-grasping bond” (Henry 1993, 209–210).
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most humble of its impressions, i.e., visible representations) remains life. Furthermore,
life is not only one with itself (self-revelation) but also one with that which reveals itself
in it (248). And what reveals itself in life is the living. I maintain that the only real 'form'
that life takes is 'the living', and insofar as there is no living outside of life as much as
there is no life without the living, we basically encounter here an example of 'form-oflife': life that is not separate from its form, and form that is not separate from life. Life is
anterior to the living, but there is no life without the living: “[t]here is no life without a
living being” as there is no living without life, since “life ... resides inside, in every living
being, as that which causes it to live and never leaves it for as long as it lives” (249, 250).
It is important to keep in mind that “the living” or “a living being” here is used “in the
sense of life which experiences itself, and not just a complex set of material processes
which know nothing of themselves” (250). 109 This is one of the crucial oppositions
established by Henry: life and the living (life that experiences itself) are invisible and
have nothing to do with the visible, objective processes described as 'life' by sciences, for
instance, biology. The scientific substitution of material processes for life constitutes
nothing but forgetting or even murder of life, and not knowledge and study of life. Living
is possible only outside the world, but neither living nor world are possible apart from
life. The relationship between life and the living, then, is not that of scientific knowledge
or thought, it is not a relationship between a giving subject and a constituted object but an
immanent, immediate relation of oneness. However, this unity does not mean total
identity; the living is one with life, but life is always more than the living. Henry
describes this relationship between life and the living in terms of “generation” and
“birth”: the living is constantly generated in life.110 If there is any knowledge involved, it
is that of an immediate self-'knowledge' of life that knows everything without speaking a
word; “[l]ife is what knows itself without knowing it” (Henry 2003, 232). Life is
'knowledge' only in the same sense as it is 'thought': immediate self-sensing or
109 “The living” and “a living being” are common translations of the French term vivant. The translation
of vivant as “a living being” might seem to be less accurate considering Henry's emphasis on the
distinction between life (vie) and being (être); as a result, it is worth keeping in mind that in this
translation the emphasis falls on “living” rather than on “being.”
110 The relation between life and the living is called, from life's viewpoint, generation, and from the
living's viewpoint, birth (cf. Henry 2003, 51). Joseph Rivera (2011) presents an excellent study of
Henry's notion of generation and its theological implications.
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consciousness of itself that does not require and pass through representation or the
process of objectification. Taking this into consideration, I can, to some degree,
retrospectively agree with Agamben who argues that thought constitutes form-of-life or
that thought is form-of-life, insofar as this 'thought' is but another name for life's selfrevelation. As I already noted, for Agamben, “[t]o think does not mean merely to be
affected by this or that thing, by this or that content of enacted thought, but rather at once
to be affected by one's own receptiveness and experience in each and every thing that is
thought a pure power of thinking” (1996, 153; my emphasis).
I speak here of life's relation with the living in terms of form-of-life in order to emphasize
their immediate relationship and indivisibility; life is not separate from its only possible
'form' – the living – and the living finds its condition only in life, and never in anything
else, such as politics. So, as opposed to Agamben's suggestion that form-of-life is by
definition political, I suggest that the relation (unity) between life and the living is
unpolitical, since life manifests itself in something like the inner certainty of the living
and not in the world, and, as a result, never in politics. Thus, I will speak of the
unpolitical form-of-life: the relationality that is acosmic and embracing everything there
is, prior to as well as the condition of being-in-the-world and its political relationality.
There is more than the world. Life. The living being is living not by having a world but
by being generated in life.
The universal relation of life and the living regardless of the world (the unpolitical formof-life) which Henry presents, I argue, is a positive account of the non-relational; positive
in a sense that it 'allows' this non-relation to subsist as such. From the perspective of the
world, the relationality of life is a non-relation; from the perspective of being-with life is
solitude, something like 'being-without'. The experience of the living self emerges only in
life: “[t]he living being is thrown into life, inasmuch as life, by throwing itself into life,
throws the living being into life” (Henry 2008, 132). The relation of the living self to
itself is, then, posited by “an other,” i.e., life; however, we can argue so insofar as “we
understand that this relation to oneself designates the absence of any relation, if the other
[life] is in the first place nothing posited or thought of as other, and if the other is nothing
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that goes beyond what emerges within this relation to oneself” (132; my emphasis). The
other is nothing but the self; the living is nothing other but life. “The ground on which I
stand is never larger than the two feet that cover it. That is the mystery of life: the living
being is coextensive with all of the life within it; everything within it is its own life. The
living being is not founded on itself; instead, it has a basis in life. This basis, however, is
not different from itself; it is the auto-affection in which it auto-affects itself and thus with
which it is identical” (132; my emphasis). Life does not become other than itself; even in
the living being it retains the unity of its own essence, it “remains alone with itself”
(Henry 1973, 284). This 'relationship' of life to itself is a 'non-relation', inasmuch as there
is no other toward which life extends itself. To be more precise, the other of this
relationship is life itself: what relates and what is being related to are the same. Life's
relation to itself and the living is that of an immediate bond, of unity. Henry calls this
unity of life's essence “solitude”: “the relation of the essence with itself ... is a relation
such that in it the essence rejoices concerning itself, has the experience of itself, reveals
itself to itself in that which it is, such as it is. That which has the experience of self, that
which enjoys itself and is nothing other than this pure enjoyment of itself, than this pure
experience of self if life. Solitude is the essence of life” (285; emphasis in original). The
relationship inherent in the unpolitical form-of-life is solitude, there is no 'other' or 'with'
involved in this relation; considering that the world is constituted through relation to
objects, to an other, that it involves an extension of the self toward this other, the acosmic
relation of life to itself in solitude is a 'non-relation' from the perspective of the world. It
is important to note, however, that this immediate relation that characterizes life or formof-life, once it is mediated through the world, requires an elaboration in different terms,
which, I believe, constitutes a political problem or rather a problem for political thought. I
will return to this question below. For now, let us examine how life's non-relation
presents the ground for a different, unpolitical notion of the human and community.
The interpretation of the human as inherently political being is a familiar motive of
political thought, from Aristotelian zoon politikon111 to the Heideggerian affirmation of
111 Let us recall that according to Aristotle belonging to the polis defines the very humanity of man: “the
state is a creation of nature” and, as a result, “he who is unable to live in society or who has no need
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Dasein as essentially Mitsein. If we follow Michel Henry in his affirmation of life's
essential solitude and its inseparable 'relation' with the living, we end up with a new,
unpolitical conception of “man:”112 the cogito, which used to define 'man' through the
activity of thought, is, as I showed above, exhausted in videor and, as a result, it
“demands the exhaustive phenomenological definition of 'man' as living” (Henry 1993,
321). This conception, first of all, implies that the human is understood on the basis of
life and as constituted by it and not as more than a living or even as a necessary condition
of life's manifestation. The former misconception of man, Henry argues, originates in
Greece: in the classic conception “a man is more than a living, a man is a living endowed
with Logos, that is to say, with reason and language ... It follows, reciprocally, that life is
less than man, or in any event less than what makes his humanity” (2003, 50). We can see
how this conception of man's relation to life lies at the basis of the distinction between
zoē and bios: the mere 'living' part of man is not enough to constitute his humanity,
humanity is defined by man's relation to logos and, thus, the polis and the world. Life,
Henry argues against this Western tradition rooted in classical thought, is always more
than man, more than reason and language: life is more than the living, thus life is equally
more than man understood as a living being. “To the extent that Life is more than man
understood as living, it is from Life, not from man, that we must begin” (51). So, the
hierarchy that is preserved here is no longer between the forms of life that are
qualitatively different due to the presence of an added attribute (such as language) but
only between life and the living. We must begin from life and not from man in order to
avoid a substitution of man for life or rather reduction of life to man which, according to
Henry, was Heidegger's mistake: the insertion of man for him became necessary as the
guardian of the truth of being. “The reception of the ecstatic horizon as the precondition
of its phenomenological formation, receptivity as the transcendental precondition of the
truth of being that lights itself in the lighting of exteriority, this is the primary process to
which man lends his name, a process wherein the lighting of being is given its
preliminary possibility. This is why Heideggerian being has need of man...” (1993, 96;
because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state” ( Politics, i.
2. 1253a25-30).
112 Henry seems to use the term “man” interchangeably with “human.”
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my emphasis). The living being is substituted for life, meaning that we have access to
life only in the human form: “Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being, but essentially it is
only accessible in Dasein” (Heidegger in Henry 2003, 45). This refers back to
correlationism: once life's revelation (or, as in this case, being) is reduced to human
receptivity, it loses its independence and becomes a correlate of human (representative)
consciousness, not more than an object for a human subject. What Henry suggests, in
turn, is not a new version of humanism and correlationism but rather an assertion of the
primacy of life where 'man' arrives only as an addition to the already accomplished
essence of life. As a result, man cannot add anything more to that life, to its quality; thus
man himself cannot be more than living. And since living is not possible in the world,
man as living does not refer to “the ecstatically appearing individual” (who is ever
alienated from and just a stranger to himself) but rather to “the individual who as
suffering-Self coincides with the foundation of things [i.e., with life's affectivity]” (1993,
265; my emphasis) and appears in the disappearance of the sphere of thought.113
The unpolitical community of life: pathos-with
The next question we need to ask is how does such a conception of the human as living,
as grounded in life's essential affective solitude, translate into a conception of community
(including human community) or, rather, how does the essential non-relation manifest
itself in relation with others, in intersubjectivity. I suggest that the answer lies in the
notion of “community of life,” the unpolitical community that is prior to any political
community, to any being-with. As I noted above, there are two kinds of relationality: vital
relations and relations mediated through the world. Intersubjective relations as well can
be seen through the prism of these two dimensions. First, we can view relations with the
113 The conception of the individual as suffering-Self is important for Henry because it involves the notion
of Ipseity. The suffering-Self is conditioned by life's original Ipseity: “ ...a living comes to life only as
a living 'me' and thus only on the condition that this life has already constructed the originary Ipseity
that makes it possible for that living person to be a Self and a 'me'” (2003, 111). In this respect, it
would be interesting to compare Henry's and Esposito's notions of the living person. Let us recall that
the latter for Esposito is “not separate from or implaneted into life, but coextensive with it as an
inseparable synolon of form and force, external and internal, bios and zoē. The third person, this figure
that has yet to be fathomed, points to this unicum, to this being that is both singular and plural – to the
non-person inscribed in the person, to the person open to what has never been before” (2012, 151).
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other in the world as an essential part of being-in-the-world. These are intentional
relations mediated by perception and thought; as a result, Henry suggests, it is not the
real other involved in this relationship but “the other in thought,” “the other-thought,” “a
quasi-other” (2008, 102). Second, since, as Henry argues, the reality that constitutes the
content of the world is life, concrete relations with others (real others) point us toward the
invisible essence of life. Vital intersubjective relationships are “nonintentional,” they are
not based on representation but rather “put Life into play” (2003, 61). And not only the
terms of this relationship imply life, i.e., as the living implies life, but “it is the relation
itself that is constituted as a relation with Life, that draws its essence from within it” (61).
So, intersubjective relations are formed in life: before being 'placed' in being, in the
world, the living is 'placed' in life; this is where relationship with the other begins. Since
radical powerlessness applies to every living self, this self cannot be the point of
departure for relation with others. Finding its origin in life, the self can establish its
relations with others only in life. However, the self can mistakenly take itself for the
origin of this relation and even of its own life, resulting in the “transcendental illusion of
the ego.” Henry suggests that the “normal play of intersubjective relations” unfolds
within such a “system of transcendental egoism ... [where] each person is concerned with
the other only with a view of himself” (255). Against this “normal” situation
characteristic of modern society, Henry argues that the relation with others can take place
only in life.
Such a relation is based on the recognition of the in-common of the living: “[w]hat they
have in common, in effect, is to be livings, carrying this life in them,” “sharing” in the
essence of life (2003, 254, 257), in the gift of life. Life is self-givenness insofar as it is
what gives and what is given; consequently, since it is life that gives, the living beings
“can only have a share of this gift in life. This is what constitutes the essence of every
possible community. [...] [W]hat is shared in common is not some thing; instead, it is this
original givenness as self-givenness. It is the internal experience that brings to life
everything that is and makes what is alive in this very experience become alive in and
through it alone” (2008, 120; my emphasis). The essence of the in-common, of
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community is life: “every community is a community of living beings” (119; my
emphasis). And every living equally shares in this gift of life, is equally a part of the
community of life that is original givenness. “Community is an a priori” (131). Living
beings are thrown into life, into the shared experience of living. Among the living there is
no 'part of no part': every living has an 'equal share' of life inasmuch as it fully coincides
with it, cannot be separated from life.
Furthermore, considering the transcendental affectivity of life and that every possible
relation with the other is located in life, it can be inferred that “real being with the other
occurs in us as an affect” (2008, 115) and not as representation. Each of the members of
the community is related to the others in life before being related in a world, and since
life escapes thought and can only be experienced as pure affectivity, this “primal
experience [of community] is barely conceivable” (133). In the community of life
the living being is neither for itself nor for the other; it is only a pure
experience, without a subject, without a horizon, without a meaning, and
without an object. It experiences both itself – the basis (fond) of life – and the
other, inasmuch as the other likewise has this basis. It thus does experience
the other in itself but on this basis, in terms of the other's own experience of
this basis. Both the self and the other have a basis in this experience. But
neither the self nor the other represents it to themselves. The community is a
subterranean affective layer. Each one drinks the same water from this source
and this wellspring, which it itself is. But, each one does so without
knowledge and without distinguishing between the self, the other, and the
basis. (133; my emphasis).
The experience of the in-common occurs as the pure, invisible experience of life's
relentless arrival into itself and so the arrival of each one into itself. The essence of
community as well as life is not something that is (2008, 133). “Life 'is' not. Rather, it
occurs and does not cease occurring. This incessant coming of life is its eternal coming
forth in itself, a process without end, a constant movement” (Henry 2003, 55; my
emphasis). The constant movement of life coincides with the movement of the incommon, where no living is separated from life's movement of self-revelation. Since life
is a process without end, the community of life does not have an end, both in the sense of
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termination and goal. The end of the community of life is life itself. Furthermore, this
community is unpolitical; this subterranean affective layer never appears as such in the
visible world of the 'political game', neither as the state nor as something like the
movement of 'the political'. The unpolitical community of life is in no way 'pre-political',
meaning that it tends toward eventual politicization; life and its community are
indifferent to any political expression (i.e., worldly mediation in thought) of its essential
relationality, even though it always conditions this expression and forms its real content.
“To those thoughts of life, however, and although they all come from it, life remains
indifferent” (Henry 1993, 10). The pure (unpolitical) experience of life, of community,
and any (political) thought of this life and community remain related, insofar as life
conditions politics and thought, and unrelated, insofar as life remains essentially
indifferent to its worldly representations (e.g., phone of life remains indifferent to its
representation in logos).
The essence of community is life, the essence of community is affectivity. Every
community is a community of the living beings. Life does not require the human but only
the living, and the living is not reducible to 'man'. As a result, Henry argues, “the
community is not limited to humans alone. It includes everything that is defined in itself
by the primal suffering of life and thus by the possibility of suffering. We can suffer with
everything that suffers. This pathos-with is the broadest form of every conceivable
community” (2008, 133–134; my emphasis). There is one single community of life that
cannot be known or thought but is intelligible (i.e., available to experience) to others and
to oneself “on the basis of the primal intelligibility of pathos” (134). This sort of
intelligibility implies equality of the living (not limited to the human) in their access to
the single community of life through the primal suffering of life.
How does this “pathetic community” relate to the world? Henry argues that when,
“instead of being carried out 'unconsciously' as a pure affect in the immediacy of life, the
relation between the living occurs through the mediation of the world ... a new dimension
of experience emerges that must be described in its own terms” (2008, 133). These terms,
as I suggested above, are political terms. But what kind of politics and on what premises?

226
I believe, we get a sense of a potential answer to this question in Henry's occasional
distinction between two kinds of worlds (none of which, importantly, refers to something
like the other world in a sense of an after world): “the abstract world” and “the real
world,” “an absolute world” (see, Henry 1973, 291; 2008, 134). While the former is the
unreal world that excludes life, the world of ekstasis where things are never what they
are, “the world that does not exist and has put subjectivity out of play” (2008, 134); the
real world is the cosmos “for which every element – form, color, and so forth – exists
ultimately as auto-affective” (134). It exists in and through the pathetic community, it
unfolds on the basis of the immanent movement of life. As a result, when we encounter
the worldly mediation of the 'unconscious', pure experience of life and community, there
are two ways we can go about it: we can either affirm the essential opposition between
life and the world (and eventually fall into a dogmatic dualism), or we can move toward a
more positive account of a world, the key feature of which relationality is understood not
on the basis of ekstatic representation but on the basis of life. To paraphrase Henry, it is
from life, not from world, that we must begin. To begin from life does not mean to
exclude the world, it rather calls for a change of perspective. As Simon Jarvis puts it,
“[w]e do not need to put out our eyes in order to listen to the voice of life; we do not need
to imagine a dead world in order to protect a living subject” (2009, 374). The world that
claims its primacy over life does not know life, the world that springs from life and
recognizes its own 'reality' or 'content' in life is a world “without lie” (see, Henry 1973,
291). We can speak of a different kind of vision here, vision that is auto-affective, that
always immediately 'knows' itself as a non-vision, which is, however, not just a mere
negative, mere blindness, but is available to experience. The real world is thus built on
the assumption that “[i]n seeing, there is always a nonseeing and thus something unseen
that altogether determines it” (2008, 134). This nonseeing is life. Consequently, in order
to think the political experience (relationships mediated through the world), and in order
to avoid the problems of the political correlationism, we must begin with the unpolitical,
with life. The forgetting of life (through the assumption of the primacy of the world)
results in “barbarism” that, according to Henry, comes to replace “culture” in modernity
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(cf. Henry 2012). In a similar way, I will argue, the forgetting of the unpolitical form-oflife results in total politicization. Let us draw out this parallel in more detail.
The forgetting of life, the forgetting of the unpolitical
First, we need to note that there is a connection between the 'historical' forgetting of life
and life as Arch-Forgetting. As I discussed above, life as such, in the first place, is not
susceptible to being known, to being discovered by reason, thought and its vision; life is
forgetting. However, once in modernity the scientific methods of knowledge are
prioritized, once science becomes the ground of access to truth, this ultimately leads to
the specifically modern forgetting of life and exclusion of 'real' life from culture, resulting
in “barbarism.” There are several recurrent themes running throughout Henry's works that
account for the modern forms of forgetting or “ways of slandering life,” which resemble,
in a way, the forms of forgetting of the unpolitical (or forms of politicization of life)
exhibited by the political correlation. The modern forgetting of life can be separated into
three major approaches that do not, however, represent some pure types but are closely
interrelated: scientific (prioritization of the objective phenomena and processes, e.g., in
biology), philosophical (substitution of life for the living being with priority being given
to the being-in-the-world), and what I would like to call psychoanalytic (where life is
rediscovered and lost again; primarily consists in reduction of life to blind unconscious
force undermining consciousness). All of these approaches have political implications; as
a result, we can distinguish between the following corresponding ways of forgetting of
the unpolitical form-of-life: politicization of life through, first, the 'invention' of
biopolitics, second, the prioritization of being-in-the-world and thus of being-with, and,
third, the construction of the concept of the political primarily as the negative
unconscious of representative politics (i.e., of politics-as-state).
The inauguration of modern science for Henry is marked by “the Galilean decision” that
excludes life through the “mathematization of the universe.” Science excludes the
sensible qualities (which emerge primarily as pure subjective impressions) that refer to
life from its field of study and focuses solely on the objects and their visible qualities. As
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a result, “[t]he Galilean reduction ... leaves outside its field of interest the decisive
phenomenological question of knowing whether there exists a mode of revelation other
than that in which the phenomena of the world give themselves to us” (2003, 46). In
short, modern science lays ground for the forgetting of life by giving primacy to the study
of the phenomena of the world. Such an exclusion of life concerns biology above all:
once phenomenological life is placed outside of the field of study, it cannot be
rediscovered through research, even though it calls itself biology, the science of life.
What biology concerns itself with is not life but the objective processes of an organism;
and once life is reduced to the content of biology, we no longer know anything about it.
“[T]he infrangible pathētik embrace” of life is reduced to “material particles ... something
that experiences nothing and is in principle incapable of doing so” (39). Consequently,
modern science, such as biology, “never encounters life, knows nothing of it, has not the
slightest idea of it. ... [I]n biology there is no life; there are only algorithms. ... [T]oday,
despite the marvellous progress of science, or rather because of it, we know less and less
about life. Or, more exactly, we no longer know anything about it, not even that it exists”
(38; original emphasis). We live in the age of not mere forgetting of life but of its
“murder”: depriving life of its essential self-revelation, science is forced to say what it
really cannot say, it is forced to speak of life when it knows nothing of it. It thus murders
life by reducing “everything that lives, and experiences itself as living, to a set of blind
processes [functions like nutrition, mobility, and so on, considered specific to life] and
death” (39). The reduction of life to objective phenomena implies that it is not really life
but the living being (or rather an organism separated from its relation with transcendental
life and thus not exactly 'living') that science studies. In short, confusion of life with a
living being means that “what is true of living organisms as objective empirical beings
appearing in the world ... is attributed without question to life itself” (45).
Foucault marks the inauguration of modern biopolitics by the emergence of biology and,
further on, of human sciences. Considering that biology knows nothing of life,
biopolitics, which places man's existence as a living being in question, remains only this:
politics that never puts into question or governs life but only the objective processes
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associated with biological existence of an organism as well as the species. Biopolitics is
not politics of life but only of “natural” or “biological” life. Since life is never shown in
the world, absent from it, it is also absent from the field of biology and thus biopolitics,
which are both worldly ones and which are constituted by the forgetting or murder of life.
In this sense, biopolitics is always thanatopolitics. In the forgetting of life, biopolitics
extends its totalizing embrace, suggesting that politics has a capacity to extend
everywhere, over every 'bit' of life, and thus to divide and separate the latter from itself. A
strategy of resistance to biopolitics, then, must emerge from 'remembering' life (Henry's
work, for example, is an attempt at such a 'remembering') and not from the assertion of
some common objective element across living beings, which would merely recreate the
very inaugural event of biopolitics – the forgetting of “transcendental” life. Consequently,
I see that an effective strategy of resistance to biopolitics might be grounded in the
affirmation of the primacy of the unpolitical form-of-life over any form of politics,
including biopolitics. Henry's philosophy of life presents an example of such a possibility
for resistance (in a form of academic thought and practice).
Philosophical approach that “slanders” life, Henry argues, “oscillates between the
confusion of the living with a being made manifest through being-in-the-world and the
definition of the phenomenality proper to the living by attributing to it a ... form of this
same being-in-the-world” (2003, 50). That is, such an approach substitutes a being
manifest in the world for the living or suggests that the only form of manifestation of life
and the living is possible as being-in-the-world. We have access to life only in and
through the world. Like science, this approach leaves outside the question of an acosmic
mode of revelation or even negates it; in this way, “the philosophical problematic of life
resembles the scientific approach more than it might wish” (47). Henry suggests that the
history of Western thought reaches its “endpoint” in the philosophy of Heidegger, which
springs from the radical negation of life's essence, of the self-revelation foreign to the
'outside' of the world, and so “signifies nothing less than the impossibility of any form of
life, and thus amounts to the murder of life – not accidentally but rather in principle”
(46). Applied to politics, such thinking contributes to the constitution of modern politics
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as thanatopolitics, politics built on the “murder” of life. Insofar as access to life is seen to
be possible only through the world but also in the form of Dasein (that is essentially
Mitsein), we witness a constitution of the ground of a (non-living) community that is
centred around the principle of being-with in the world. Being is again substituted for
life, however, in this case the emphasis lies not on the organismic character of this being
but on its appearance in the world's light: life is essentially only accessible in Dasein. The
relation between a being and life is thus established only in the world and through the
world, and those who do not have a world are not truly living. That is, from this
perspective, the living “enters into the condition of living” not thanks to life but “only
because he is open to the world”; and so their relationship is always mediated by the
world. As a result, a being does not have an immediate access to life but requires the light
of the world. “It is only to the extent that a person is open to the world that he is related,
and can be related, to living beings – to life” (45). Consequently, a gap is introduced
between the living and life that makes it possible to speculate about the level, degree or
quality of life within a certain 'living' being. Access to the world's horizon of light
becomes the key to the attainment of something like 'qualitative' or 'good' life, or rather
proper human life in a community (political life), which is the only life that ultimately
counts. Reduction of life's manifestation to being-in-the-world results in its total and
unavoidable politicization where being-with 'commands' over the notion of community.
Opening up to the truth of life, to “a mode of revelation other than that in which the
illumination of the world occurs” presents an opportunity, creates a ground for a positive
account of a- or non-political forms of life that necessarily find their condition in the
unpolitical form-of-life, in the essential solitude of life, in its being-without. Moreover,
even that which does not have a world can be fully living, can be a part of an a priori
community of life. From the perspective of transcendental life, Aristotle's classical
distinction (that Heidegger does not overcome) between humans, beasts and gods no
longer holds; neither does the distinction between zoē, bios and bare life.
The third way in which the forgetting of life occurs in modern thought is the same
approach that initially happens to “rediscover” life (for example, in the works of
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Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Freud) but that loses it again by, like Descartes, veering
away from its most significant findings. This strain of thought is similar to the other two
insofar as it rests on the denial of the specificity of life's mode of revelation. It “makes
life the metaphysical principle of the universe, but by stripping it of the capacity to reveal
itself, to experience and live, by stripping it of its essence. Life is only a blind entity, like
the processes to which Galilean science reduces it” (2003, 50). This “entity” is what
eventually receives the name of “the unconscious,” defined primarily by its opposition to
consciousness. I will call this approach 'psychoanalytic' since the concept of the
unconscious figures prominently as the inaugural concept of psychoanalysis, even though
it has a long history before the Freudian institution of psychoanalysis as science.114 The
major intuition of this approach consists in recognition of the limits of consciousness and
representation, and the acknowledgement of some 'unconscious' force that is responsible
for the activity of the human psyche. Henry suggests that the 'unconscious' that is
discovered by philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and later by Freudian
psychoanalysis is the name of life. What they uncover is in fact a vital force, a force
beyond consciousness, i.e., beyond representation in the world. “As a radical refusal of
ecstatic phenomenality and its claim to define psyche's essence, the unconscious assures
man of a hold on his most intimate being: the unconscious is the name of life” (1993, 286;
original emphasis). However, such an affirmation does not go as far as to grant life its
own mode of appearance: inasmuch as life is alien to representation (and representation is
still believed to be the only possible mode of manifestation) “it finds itself deprived of the
power of accomplishing in and through itself the work of revelation – it becomes blind
and unconscious” (2003, 49; my emphasis). As a result, life claims to define the psyche's
essence only as blind, as something that secretly moves underneath the surface but never
shows itself and thus cannot be known; more than that, in the absence of vision it does
not even know or experience itself. It is un-conscious, the reverse of that which
represents, and as such it is “unknown, unknowable, and unknowing, and its mode of
being is blindness” (1993, 147). Consequently, as, for instance, Schopenhauer and Freud
114 Henry dedicated a series of lectures to the investigation of this history that was published as The
Genealogy of Psychoanalysis (1993).
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conclude, since the unconscious cannot be experienced as such, in order to unravel its
mystery, in order for it to be something rather than nothing, it has to be brought to the
light of consciousness, it has to be represented (never on its own terms but on the terms
of consciousness). Life is blind because it is defined in the first place from the point of
view of vision, of representational consciousness. The un-conscious in the end means unmanifest in terms of representation, it is un-representable, it is blindness that, in its
essence, is nothing more than mere absence of seeing. The unconscious is thus by
definition (negatively) bound to consciousness, it is correlated with consciousness, it is its
“exact consequence.” The conception of life in such a way, Henry suggests, bears
important consequences: “A blind and unconscious life, a life that desires without
knowing what it desires and without even knowing that it desires, is an absurd life. An
absurd, blind, unconscious power, life can then be charged with every crime. In its
murderous frenzy, entering millions of times into a struggle against itself, it becomes the
source of all that ravages the universe [...]” (2003, 49). In other words, from the murder
of life follows the conclusion that life itself is murderous: it is a secret force that kills
from within, that turns against itself; life is essentially death.
Contrary to the view of life as negative unconscious, Henry argues that similarly to the
double meaning of the concept of consciousness, the “ontological concept of the
unconscious” has two different meanings: “representational unconscious” that we just
discussed, and “the unconscious that secretly refers to life's essence,” i.e., “pure
unconsciousness as such” (1993, 287, 297). The former is nothing but the barred
consciousness (“the pure and simple negation of phenomenality”), where “the bar placed
on phenomenality concerns only representational phenomenality”; however, such a
rejection secretly “liberates appearance's original dimension in which being reveals itself
to itself outside and independent of ek-stasis, in the radical immanence of its selfaffection as life” (287). This concept of the unconscious thus refers to pure
unconsciousness as such, to the experience of life as such that in itself is never
unconscious insofar as affect is never unconscious. The concept of the unconscious that
secretly refers to life's essence, which itself is never unconscious (in a sense of the
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unrevealed), rather than suggesting the existence of a different kind of the unconscious, I
argue, guides us toward the concept of consciousness defined as life. This kind of
consciousness, of 'conscious' experience of life, excludes representational phenomenality
which has determined the concept of consciousness for so long, and from this perspective
can be called pure unconsciousness as such (it is pure because it is not mediated by
representation). Otherwise, as we saw in Descartes, the name of this pure unconscious is
“consciousness,” “soul” or “life.” Life, the unconsciousness as such, lies beyond the
reach of the representational consciousness but is never blind and unconscious since it
immediately 'knows' and experiences itself. It is an eternal movement of self-revelation
that desires itself and rejoices in itself.
Reduction of life to blind and unconscious force essentially results in murder of life
through its ultimate subjection to the power of representation. This unconscious is just the
limit of consciousness, it is not more than “the horizon of nonpresence” that surrounds
every worldly presence resulting in “the incessant transformation of one into the other, by
virtue of which every appearance in the world is also a disappearance” (1993, 286). The
unconscious, thus, freely transforms into consciousness and vice versa; the play of
correlation is apparent here. Once life is subjected to representation for its manifestation,
it becomes politicized: that which is essentially unpolitical and is an a priori to the
emergence of any world is deprived of its power to reveal itself except as the obverse or
the limit of politics that represents. The unpolitical, life-as-such, is manifest as a wound
of politics-as-state, a void, an interruption of the ordered reality. As I showed, many
concepts that intend to signify the excess of politics (such as the political, politics, event,
etc.) and that could potentially direct us toward the unpolitical, are constructed primarily
in terms of the negative unconscious of representative politics (i.e., of politics-as-state).
Liberation of life's own specific mode of manifestation (the unconscious as such that is
not correlated to consciousness) presents a possibility for limiting the totalizing ambition
of the political difference as well as for an effective rethinking of politics beyond the
state. Furthermore, the thought of the unpolitical allows for a positive conception of
politics that springs from life rather than from a constant redefinition of what politics
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could or should be in opposition to the state. Ultimately, the reality of the unpolitical
raises a question for political thought that tends to be self-referential: there is thought
because there is politics or there is politics because there is thought; alternatively, politics
is thought or thought is politics. In any case, thought (including political thought) and
politics that acknowledge their unpolitical 'origin', i.e., life, have a chance (despite life's
indifference toward them) of challenging the political correlation and, consequently,
allow for a non-statal conception of politics – something akin to 'living politics' or 'a
politics of the living.'115
So, the continuing forgetting of life characteristic of modernity, as I noted above, tends to
reduce life's movement to objective processes and being-in-the-world. Thus the real
'meaning' of life, i.e., as a movement of self-transformation, as an action and different
'vision', is often dismissed. As a result, we witness something like a reduction of human
behaviour to politics, meaning that insofar as the primacy of the world is upheld and
insofar as “in the world, acting only appears in the form of an external behaviour” (Henry
2003, 241), life's reality, the reality of the living action, of the unpolitical form-of-life,
escapes thought's vision. In the end, what remains is “only action's empty shell” devoid of
its vital content. In this way, the movement of living, an “eternal flux,” “life's internal
pathetik self-transformation” is reduced to nothing more than a mechanical definition of
life as movement, an objective displacement in space. 116 Henry points out that due to the
duplicity of appearance, “every determination of the radically immanent force that
constitutes our own being also presents itself to us, simultaneous with its
accomplishment, which is our inner being, as the appearance of an objective
displacement in space” (1993, 139). Life and the world, in this case, 'cooperate' by each
appearing in its own mode. Once, however, life is dismissed, we are left only with
objective displacement (or a body as a mere object) that, in the absence of its vital
115 The latter is Henry's expression. See, for example, his interview Une politique du vivant (2004).
116 Henry calls life's movement of self-transformation “culture” and its impoverishment and a degradation
“barbarism.” “'Every culture is a culture of life, in the double sense that life constitutes the subject and
the object of this culture at the same time. It is an action that life exercises on itself and through which
it transforms itself as it is itself that transforms and that is transformed'; it is 'the movement through
which life does not cease to modify itself in order to reach the highest forms of realisation and
accomplishment, in order to fulfil itself'” (O’Sullivan 2006, 142).
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foundation, can be manipulated in many ways. For example, movement of a body may be
defined in terms of a political right or a quality that can be encouraged, nurtured,
sanctioned and suppressed (taken away); living may be viewed as a set of objective
processes that can be cared for or terminated based on an objective scientific
determination of the quality of these processes, of the quality of such living; political
action may be viewed as an action of ego that appears to be self-founding and free,
resulting in suppression and determination of an 'invisible' action (which is essentially an
'ethical' action) as unreal, apathetic and indifferent to the concerns of the world and its
suffering. In the context of the forgetting of life and of total politicization, an attempt at
'remembering' life, a turn toward ethics, might be interpreted automatically as turning
away from the world, as an anti-political project of theology. I argue, with Henry, that
affirmation of life's invisible essence, however imperfect and impossible this task is, is
not a rejection of the world but “is the means of access to what is real in that world – to
the unique reality” (2003, 242). In the words of Karl Hefty, “[t]he phenomenality of life
provides no way of escape from the world; nor does this phenomenality perform the task
of 'a formal and empty negation of the world'. [...] On the contrary, Henry sees unfolded,
at the foundation of the world, 'the horizon of a pure world', not another world, but 'this
world without laceration' (ce monde sans déchirement), in which, in his words, 'is
inaugurated our vital communication with the Being of nature'” (Hefty 2007, 238–239).
The “world without laceration,” “the world without the lie,” “an absolute world [un
monde absolu]” is a basis for a conception of politics of the living: the relations mediated
through such a world do not lose the connection with their vital essence.117

117 I have already mentioned above that there seem to be two notions of world in Henry. While one refers
to the visible world (resulting in the assertion of life as acosmic), the other – cosmos – is a world of
life, internal and invisible. “This original, subjective, dynamic, impressionable and pathetic nature,
this veritable nature whose essence is Life, is the cosmos” (Henry in Yamagata 1999, 247; original
emphasis). Henry employs this concept of “the cosmos” in his work on the abstract art of Kandinsky,
Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky (2009). The real world, the cosmos is not visible but revealed only
in affect. Henry quotes Kandinsky in this regard: “'The world ... sounds. It is a cosmos of spiritually
affective beings. Thus, dead matter is living spirit'. This is why painting, for example, is not the figure
of external things but the expression of their internal reality, their tonality, or what Kandinsky calls 'the
inner sound', an experience of forces and affects” (2008, 134). Thus, art becomes, for Henry, a unique
and, perhaps, privileged 'form' of practice that brings life's self-experience to “light” because it always
springs from life's feeling and not from an object of representation (see, Henry 1993, 269).
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A renewal of political thought: life and the art of living
I suggest that an exploration of a positive relationship between the world and life
constitutes one of the major problems for (renewed) political thought, the thought that, in
a way, engages life with and after Michel Henry.118 An important part of such an
exploration would occur along the line of the relationship between essentially invisible
life and its visible 'forms', not in terms of another separation between life and its form,
which is impossible in case of the unpolitical form-of-life, but in terms, for example, of
the aesthetic expression of the intensity of life's feeling. As I showed above, the invisible
essence of life conditions and explains the appearance in the world but by no means
denies this appearance. We find in Henry several suggestions considering the connection
between life's essence and its positive manifestation in and through the world (see,
especially, Henry 1983; 2009). Even though Henry argues that, for instance, action's
visible form is but an empty form or shell of the real action of life, once life is
'remembered', the connection between life and the world, which is always already there
unconsciously, is reestablished 'consciously': the affectivity of life is no longer rendered a
blind force. Henry writes: “the more intensely life experiences itself in the pathos of its
suffering and joy, the more lively, the more luminous, the more intelligible, are the
images in which it projects itself. This world-truth, affectivity's production and radical
determination of representation, is brought to light by every form of art...” (1993, 269;
my emphasis). So, invisible and acosmic life is capable to projecting itself in the world
without losing itself. This raises an interesting question for further research: if art is
essentially living art, what does it imply for the art of living, that is, for the visible form
of living rendered art. Living, from this perspective, is an aesthetic project, a form of art
that finds its ultimate condition in life. The question of the relationship between invisible
life and its visible forms, between life's truth and the “lie” of the world can be phrased in
terms of the return to a problem of “true life,” which for a long time had been a major
philosophical question but is no longer relevant insofar as science has become the sole
118 In this regard, Henry writes: “only a mode of thought deliberately opposed to representation, to its
foundation as well as its forms, the actuality of a praxis, can deliver power from ek-static lighting and
save its original possibility” (1993, 322).
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legitimate source of access to truth, including the truth of life. Michel Foucault dedicated
his last series of lectures at the Collège de France (2011) to the investigation of this
question of true life or ethical parrhēsia (free spokenness, frankness), i.e., the way of
living as an object of care (epimeleia), of “the aesthetics of existence.” Foucault focuses
on the study of the Cynics' way of living as an example of “true life” understood as “an
other life” (une vie autre), life that is radically and paradoxically other, striving for “an
other world” (un monde autre) (244). This way of living (which, in Cynics case, exhibits
truth of life partially as bareness of life) manifests itself as a constant critique of this
world, a world given at any particular time in history. Despite significant differences, we
can notice here some similarities between Foucault's and Henry's projects, both of which,
I believe, are dedicated to a search for something like 'true life' that is defined by its
relation to “an other” or “an absolute” world. Considering Foucault's later investigation
of the problem of “true life” in terms of the aesthetics of existence and Henry's assertion
of art as a 'privileged' way of life's self-projection into the world, it would be interesting
to further investigate the political potential of life's positive relationship with a world in a
sense of 'true life' – a visible form of living in which unpolitical form-of-life projects
itself. The question of 'true life', at the intersection of Henry's and Foucault's works,
remaining beyond the scope of the current project, opens an avenue for further research
that would address a possibility of something like 'politics of the living', in terms of both
collective and subjective ethical experience of living in the “world without the lie,”
without the forgetting of life, which is essentially “an other world.”
For now, in order to prepare a starting ground for a further, more practical, engagement
with the notion of the unpolitical, let us re-articulate several important points that came
up in the discussion above. The most important affirmation that I will carry forward in
thinking of the unpolitical, in the wake of Henry's philosophy, is that life manifests itself
in the radical reduction (or disappearance) of the world. In other words, in the radical
reduction of the political world, the unpolitical manifests itself as real, positive, nonrelational experience of life. Thus, the notion of the unpolitical form-of-life articulates the
positivity that persists when the world disappears, that is, the positivity of living outside
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the world of politics and its community. It relocates the experience of sharing into an a
priori of the unpolitical community of life, where every living has equal share, equal
access to life, which is given to it as its own essence. In life, there is no 'part of no part'.
Such a conception of community has important 'ecological' implications: insofar as life is
not limited to humanity in its manifestation, the community, the sharing of life is not
limited to human community but embraces everything that “suffers.” In this way, it also
addresses the problem of correlationism: the emergence of 'man' and his thought is not a
necessary condition for life's manifestation. Life is 'prior' to man, to being and the world,
and so it constitutes their 'great outdoors' that persists in its positivity even 'after' the
emergence of the world. Life is more than the living, thus, life is equally more than man
understood as living, as a result, we must follow Henry in asserting an a priori of life: it
is from life, not from the human, that we must begin. This question of where to begin
becomes very important once we consider such 'practical' issues as living outside of the
political system of the states. In the absence of a political community, it becomes of the
utmost importance to assert that life is not a right, not a quality that manifests itself in the
world, but is an invisible experience of self-affection that is full of itself and rejoices in
itself even in the most “unhappy” forms of life. To do so means to redeem 'bare life' in a
positive, unpolitical way, that allows it to persist as such, without an immediate
incitement to politicization, to salvation through politics (that could have produced its
apparent misery in the first place).
In the view of these preliminary conclusions, I would like to further consider how my
conception of unpolitical life or form-of-life can help us redefine and rethink the
contemporary problematic question of 'life beyond politics', in particular, of the forms of
living outside the state (or that simply do not fit 'properly' within the system of politicsas-state), identified, for example, as the conditions of refugeeness and statelessness. I do
not endeavour to redefine these questions in order to find possible 'solutions' for the
'problems' of the stateless and the refugees, but to present an opening to a different
perspective on these 'figures' of modern displacement. Or, rather, to learn from the 'truth'
that they manifest to us. Refugees, as Agamben rightly suggest, are not just a 'problem'
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that emerges after the World War I; the 'refugee' constitutes “the paradigm of a new
historical consciousness.” The turn to the question of refugees also follows from my
critical engagement with the correlationist post-foundational thought over the previous
chapters. I have outlined and critiqued the recurring tendency of submitting the excess of
politics to re-politicization, and this tendency is clearly exemplified in contemporary
critical refugee studies: the refugee, an 'excess' of politics-as-state, is rendered in terms of
'the political', thus, constantly bringing this figure back into the order of politics that
produced it. In other words, insofar as the refugee stands for the paradigm of a new
historical consciousness, I will argue that this paradigm has been determined within the
modern correlationist framework. As a result, an introduction of the unpolitical
perspective makes possible an important reversal in the way in which we view the figure
of the refugee: it presents a possibility of dismissing the primacy and totality of the
political correlation and its perspective, and offers a positive ground from which we can
interpret this figure today.
In more general terms, the question of refugees is taken up below as an attempt at a more
'practical' application of the notion of the unpolitical form-of-life. I will suggest that the
figure of the refugee, in its loss of political world, affirms life, the 'remainder' of this loss,
as sufficient and full of itself regardless of the lack of social and political texture. From
this perspective, something like bare life is allowed to persist positively outside of
politics. However, this is not limited to just the extreme cases of expulsion from the statesystem; life persists positively in the living outside the world under the 'normal'
circumstances. As a result, I will look at the refugee as an extreme case that serves as an
instrument, a kind of magnifying glass that can bring into better focus the unpolitical
essence of life, which remains blurry and obscured in the 'normal' course of affairs.

3.2. Living Beyond Politics: the Stateless and the Refugee
What would it mean to live beyond politics? What would it mean to be a refugee beyond
the refugee? In order to address these general questions, I will argue that the refugee
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appears in its uniqueness in the reduction of the political world that defines and
constitutes this figure. Not only the paradigm of a new historical consciousness, the
refugee is a historically situated epitome of life's acosmic becoming, i.e., of the
ahistorical (however, in this case, forced) experience of 'becoming-unpolitical'. Despite
its historicity and its forced negativity, it gives us a positive insight into what constitutes
the unpolitical form-of-life. In the first place, for me this figure raises a question of what
remains when the political world disappears or is taken away. In this way, it begs for a
positive account of the remainder of the world, for an unpolitical account of living
beyond politics. What has been achieved so far in refugee scholarship is primarily based
on the political assessment of the problem or situation of the refugee. That is, the political
perspective has been given priority, resulting in such conclusions as that the refugee is
indicative of the relative or constitutive outside of politics. It is viewed as the “correlative
other” of the state political system. There is a sense that these approaches only partially
account for what is going on, relying primarily on a totalizing and correlationist view of
the political. Consequently, I will argue, first, that what is lacking in contemporary
refugee scholarship is a positive account of the unpolitical, of living beyond politics,
which may suggest a way out of the totalizing prescription of the refugee's 'salvation'
through politics that, in its forgetting of life, takes charge of humanity's being-in-theworld. Second, following a critical overview of contemporary refugee studies, I will open
up a discussion of what it would mean to apply an unpolitical perspective to the figure of
the refugee. (However, the implications of this opening, I believe, are not limited to this
particular figure.) To be more specific, I will suggest that among the major shifts that this
perspective allows for are, first, an affirmation of life not as a human right but as an
immediate experience available to all the living regardless of their relation to the world,
and, second, an affirmation of pure, phoronomic movement not as 'resistance' to stasis or,
again, as a right, but as a projection of life's abundant and incessant movement of selfrevelation, becoming and transformation.
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“Sedentary” versus “nomadic” metaphysics: the tenets of correlation
Today, when one raises the question of the forms of life beyond politics (predominantly
conceived in terms of the territorial nation-state), the mass displacements of people,
identified, for instance, as refugees and the stateless, are among the first to come to mind.
And there is a good reason for this: starting with the World War I, unprecedented mass
displacements as well as the movements of the refugees and the stateless emerge as a
prominent 'problem' in both the national and international arena. Never before in its
history has the state-centred model of the world met a greater challenge. To stand up to it,
an international refugee regime has been gradually established, the major task of which
were the definition of these new phenomena, their categorization and management based,
however, on the premises of the very same system that produced them in the first place.
The various kinds of displacement and, most significantly, the movement of refugees
have been problematized in terms of the lack, aberration, pathology and anomaly within
the presumably normal political order of the (nation-)state and citizenship (cf. Soguk
1999, 8, 11). As Liisa Malkki puts it, in the scholarly and policy discourse on refugees
“[t]he term 'refugees' denotes an objectified, undifferentiated mass that is meaningful
primarily as an aberration of categories and an object of 'therapeutic interventions” (1992,
34).
Insofar as the state, with its attributes of bound territory, sovereignty and population,
anchors the notion of modern politics, the condition of refugeeness is interpreted as a
void of politics and as an absence of political subjectivity defined in terms of the state
citizenship. Within conventional political and academic discourse, the figure of the
refugee stands for a problematic excess of being political in terms of belonging to a welldefined political community of the state. The refugee is ontologically determined in
relation to the norm of politics-as-state and is, consequently, represented as a problem
that needs to be solved, either through repatriation to its original or integration into a new
political community. The condition of the refugee is nothing but the lack of statebelonging. The definition of the refugee in The United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees is quite representative in this regard. Article 1 of the Convention,
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as amended by the 1967 Protocol, reads as follows: the refugee is a person “who owing to
a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it” (my emphasis). The refugee is defined in terms of abnormality that has to be fixed, put back into place. Since refugees comprise a specific,
minor group in relation to 'normal' communities of non-refugees, their forced depoliticization has to be fixed by similarly forced re-politicization. It appears that politicsas-state cannot tolerate the existence of that which exceeds it and thus it aims to (often
violently) re-inscribe this excess. In a nutshell, conventional representation is reduced to
a view of the refugee as a limited, problematic abject of the normal, all-encompassing
(i.e., total) system of the nation-states. This view of the refugee as a pathology of the state
order is exemplary of what Liisa Malkki calls “sedentarist metaphysics” (1992, 31) that is
arborescent in its structure and which powerfully determines modern thought.
Contrary to the conventional attitude, there has emerged a trend of thought (to which I
will further refer as 'critical refugee studies') that reverses the view of displacement: no
longer a sign of pathology, the movement of refugees is rendered to be an essential
expression of the political as well as of the human condition. As, for example, Agamben
contends, 'refugee' is not just a specific problem of post-World War I international
politics, but “the paradigm of a new historical consciousness” (Agamben 1995, 114). In
Arendt's words, refugees and the stateless are “the most symptomatic group in
contemporary politics” (1951, 276).119 That is, the figure of the refugee propels us to
question and rethink the basic concepts of modern politics, and specifically to
problematize the classical identification of political space with the state. In this vein, the
condition of 'refugeeness' is pronounced to be the general condition of homelessness,
estrangement and displacement today. I argue that such a shift in thought occurs primarily
119 See also Xenos (1993), who similarly suggests that the refugees constitute “the modern political
condition.”
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within the larger framework of political difference, that is, it is indicative of rethinking or,
rather, the displacement of politics-as-state by the political. As Michael Dillon puts it,
“the refugee raises the question of association beyond, outside, in the margins, or in
excess of, established political sociation, because the refugee is by definition asocial,
apolitical. Being political, or as one might say being of politics, is profoundly at issue
here, in and through the presence of the refugee” (1999, 117; my emphasis). The refugee,
then, is one of the prominent figures or manifestations of 'the political' as the principle of
displacement of 'politics'. As such, it is correlated to politics-as-state. Furthermore, due to
the totalizing ambition of the political, the existing scholarly approaches to the question
of the refugee lack a positive unpolitical account of this figure.
Critical refugee studies, as an instance of thought of the political difference, challenge the
traditional definition of politics by affirming the primacy of mobility and difference: that
is, by acknowledging the ongoing disruption of politics by the irreducible difference,
otherness, plurality and mobility that inhabits political spaces and 'defines' (as much as a
definition is possible in this case) what it means to be human. What is suggested in the
end is that such recognition of difference as such calls for rethinking of politics in terms
of hospitality to this difference (cf. Dillon 1999; Kristeva 1991; Nyers 2006; Warner
1992). The affirmation of the constitutive role of otherness and strangeness within is
presumed to result in acceptance of a stranger from without. We can distinguish three
major aspects that mark the paradigm shift in relation to the figure of the refugee. First, a
“sedentary metaphysics” is displaced by something like a “nomadic metaphysics” (cf.
Cresswell 2006, 26), where movement, flow and displacement play the defining role. 120
Second, identity is rethought in terms of difference, otherness, resulting in the affirmation
of the human condition as defined by an innate split or strangeness – we are all refugees,
strangers to ourselves.121 Third, the refugee is viewed as an exception or “correlative
other” of political space of the state and sovereignty122 and, employing Agamben's
120 See, for instance, Bauman (2000), Braidotti (1994), Cresswell (2006), De Certeau (2011), Deleuze and
Guatarri (1987), Glissant (1997), Malkki (1992; 1995), Nyers (2006), Said (1994), Shields (1997),
Virilio (2007).
121 See, for instance, Agamben (1995), Arendt (1996), Connolly (1988), Dillon (1999), Kristeva (1991),
Nyers (2006), Warner (1992).
122 See, for instance, Dillon (1999), Isin (2002), Lui (2004), Malkki (2002), Nyers (2006), Soguk (1999).
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analysis, as a homo sacer.123 In all three aspects the clear-cut distinction between refugees
and non-refugees (i.e., citizens) is challenged, blurred and even proclaimed non-existent:
we are all strangers, refugees and homines sacri. As in the case of post-foundational
political thought, what once was viewed as non-political (e.g., the state of nature,
difference, conflict, etc) is 'placed' at the heart of politics 'proper'. The condition of
refugeeness that, in its conventional representations, is suggestive of the condition of
“savages” or a state of nature124 (cf. Arendt 1951, 300) and is rendered as life “desperately
simple, and empty” (UNHCR in Soguk 1999, 8), is re-interpreted, within a 'nomadic
framework', as the core of politics, as a manifestation of being political in modernity. No
longer viewed as a pathology, in many recent studies displacement, movement or
nomadism have been reinterpreted in positive terms and even 'nominated' as a kind of
virtue and a subversive and creative practice. 125 However, what we see in the case of the
political, as well as the refugee as its manifestation, is the provocation of politics-as-state
from the 'outside' by the excess of an already established political way of being. The
excess of politics functions as a conceptual tool for the renewal of politics: the figure of
the refugee supposedly leads politics to its 'authenticity'. In a nutshell, the renewal of
politics and its categories happens through politicization (i.e., re-inscription) of its
outside. As a result, the excess of politics is but a relative outside, the apolitical figure of
the refugee is but an instrument of thought for the sake of rethinking politics.
123 See, for instance, Agamben (1998), Arendt (1951), Biswas and Nair (2010), Bousfield (2005), Decha
(2010), Diken (2004), Malkki (2002), Nair (2010), Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2004).
124 The refugees are not unique in such representations. The unpolitical groups that emerged before the
advent of the refugees in the 20th century were often allotted a status of savages in the state of nature.
For example, when pirating proliferated in the 18 th century, it was described in terms reminiscent of
Hobbes' state of nature. As William Blackstone puts it in his Commentaries on the Laws of England
(London: 1769): “the crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high seas, is an offence
against the universal law of society; a pirate being, according to sir Edward Coke, hostis humani
generis [the common enemy against all mankind]. As therefore he has renounced all the benefits of
society and government, and has reduced himself afresh to the same state of nature, by declaring war
against all mankind, all mankind must declare war against him: so that every community hath a right,
by the rule of self-defence, to inflict that punishment upon him, which every individual would in a
state of nature have been otherwise entitled to do, for any invasion of his person or personal property”
(in Turley 1999, 28).
125 For example, as Steven Best and Douglas Kellner put it, “[n]omad life is an experiment in creativity
and becoming, and is anti-traditional and anti-conformist in character. The postmodern nomad
attempts to free itself of all roots, bonds and identities, and thereby resist the state and all normalizing
powers” (Best and Kellner in Cresswell 2006, 50).
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Refugeeness is affirmed only as “a scandal for politics” (Dillon 1999, 95; my emphasis).
In view of this, it is my suggestion that recent scholarly efforts to think the movement,
life and politics of forces migrants, including the refugees, is correlationist in the similar
way as I see this dynamic at work amongst post-foundationalist thinkers, resulting in the
closing off of a view of the unpolitical.
In what comes below I do not intend to deny the value of critical refugee studies, since
they make an important contribution in rethinking refugees beyond lack, anomaly or the
state of exception. What is at stake here is a critical examination of the figure of the
refugee in contemporary scholarship from the perspective of the unpolitical. That is,
insofar as the unpolitical as such is not acknowledged, political thought will tend toward
totalization due to its correlational character. Affirmations of something like pure
movement and nomadism remain (despite their important insights) totalizing, insofar as
'everything is in motion' and 'we are all refugees'. However, such radical assertions
appear to function primarily as provocations of the state order and not as such, as a result,
they do not really go beyond the state but merely displace its primacy. As Soguk writes,
“[i]t seems that to theorize away the sovereign state does not automatically make it go
away” (1999, 47).126 Despite the challenges, the task of statecraft is carried on. I will
show that the theoretical challenges to the state, such as in critical refugee studies (which
tend to re-inscribe the figure of the refugee as the figure of the political and do not assert
an outside of politics as such), themselves participate in the modern project of statecraft;
they do not escape the tenets of correlation. 127 As a result, these failures of contemporary
126 As Kam Shapiro similarly suggests, polemical affirmation of “contingency, excess, or disruption ... at
the heart of a politics of reason or identity does not suffice to dissolve the power of the latter” (2003,
9).
127 In addition, there exists a number of other critiques of 'nomadism' today. The most common of them
incorporate an anti-capitalist perspective and address the fact that mobility should not be considered as
abstract and unspecified, as “a kind of blank space that stands as an alternative to place, boundedness,
foundations, and stability” (Cresswell 2006, 2). Nomads, literal or allegorical, are not absolutely 'free',
they are “overdetermined” by the conditions of their existence: “[r]ather than the employment of
freedom, is nomadism not a form of obedience to contingencies that are restrictive?” (Glissant 1997,
12). It is a mistake to literally project ontology onto displacement in space: even if becoming (rather
than being) is the 'source' of identity, this does not automatically mean that we all are unrestrained in
our mobility. As Janet Wolff writes, “the problems with terms like 'nomad', 'maps' and 'travel' is that
they are not usually located, and hence (and purposely) they suggest ungrounded and unbounded
movement – since the whole point is to resist selves/viewers/subjects. But the consequent suggestion
of free and equal mobility is itself a deception, since we don’t all have the same access to the road” (in
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scholarship beg for a different, unpolitical perspective to adequately respond to the basic
observations that motivated them in the first place.
What does it really mean to say that the refugee is a manifestation of the (transgressive
and rebellious) primacy of the political over the state, while the figure of the refugee
itself is but a product of the state system? Does such an inversion of hierarchy do away
with the ultimate attachment to or correlation of the refugee and the political with the
state? I suggest that it does not. I agree with Edouard Glissant when he writes that many
authors
extol nomadism, which supposedly liberates Being, in contrast, perhaps, to a
settled way of life, with its law based upon the intolerant root. Already Kant,
at the beginning of Critique of Pure Reason, had seen similarities between
sceptics and nomads, remarking also that, from time to time, 'they break the
social bond'. He seems thus to establish correlations between, on the one
hand, a settled way of life, truth, and society and, on the other, nomadism,
scepticism, and anarchy. This parallel with Kant suggests that the rhizome
concept [and similarly many other concepts, including 'the refugee'] appears
interesting for its anticonformism, but one cannot infer from this that it is
subversive or that rhizomatic thought has the capacity to overturn the order of
the world – because, by so doing, one reverts to ideological claims
presumably challenged by this thought” (1997, 11–12).
Cresswell 2006, 54; my emphasis). The capacity for mobility is affected by history, economy, gender,
class, geography, and so on. Moreover, it is not always freedom of movement per se that is at stake,
but the right to settlement or residence, the right to stop on the road, the absence of which might make
this freedom itself meaningless (cf. Arendt 1951, 296). A great deal of criticism is directed at
nomadism from an anti-capitalist perspective which takes into consideration the economic and
historical determination of flows. What is often noted is that unrestricted mobility is specific to the
globalization landscape which is “subservient to the absolute mobility of capital (think transit villages,
global hotel chains, networked financial institutions, widespread commuter infrastructure, city-like
airports and the aerotropolis, outsourced factories, etc.), [while] the nomadic landscape of the
developing world is becoming all the more stationary and enclosed” (Finoki 2008, 73; my emphasis).
So, flow today defines movement of commodities, raw materials, technologies, ideas, and capital in a
globalizing world, and in much lesser degree it describes human movement, be it identified as labour,
the refugees or the stateless (see, Malkki 2002, 353–354). As Bryan Finoki argues, the mobility of
populations is rounded up and detained within a “nomadic fortress” – “a mammoth informal
hydrology of migration control ... [that conducts] the flows and currents of global nomads into a
turbulent system of dehumanizing channels and estuaries that extend all over the world” (2008, 74).
Slavoj Žižek, in Bodies Without Organs, presents a similar critique in his engagement with Deleuze
and Guattari's nomadology. The bottom line is that, according to Robert Sinnerbrink, Deleuzian
nomadology for Žižek is “an ideological reflection of today’s ‘digital’ capitalism”: “[f]ar from
presenting a marginalised or resistant mode of subjectivity, Deleuzian dissolved nomadic subjectivity
presents a neat ideological fit with the deterritorialised fluxes of global capitalism” (2006, 78).
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I argue that the refugee, as a figure of the outside of politics, is re-inscribed into the
political order negatively, as an ever-present and even constitutive interruption or
rupture128 of the political ordering, i.e., the state. Refugeeness, as a general condition,
remains necessarily tied to the initial limitation of politics in terms of the state. The
refugee emerges within the international system dominated by states as an abject of this
system: those who do not or cannot remain within their own states are left somewhere inbetween. So, refugeeness is initially called into being by the state. Within contemporary
studies, however, this very condition is turned into a general condition of humanity, and
displacement becomes a defining characteristic of the political space. But insofar as
displacement implies emplacement (cf. Malkki 2002, 353), how is this different from the
Aristotelian definition of man as a polis-being (zoon politikon)? What we get is rather a
re-definition of the human in terms of a being that in its essence resists stasis or, to be
more precise, of a being that resists the state (but in no way resists its own political
nature). In the end, it is still politics-as-state that anchors the critical notion, as well as the
presumably transgressive nature, of the political and the refugee. The refugee is presented
as the paradigm of a new historical consciousness, in which we are all refugees, however,
this perspective illuminates but at the same time obscures the fact that the refugee is an
issue at all because of the world-system of states. Refugeeness is seen as subversive of
state order and as such the refugee appears primarily as a reactive figure. If the state did
not anchor the notion of modern politics, the refugee would not have become a marginal,
subversive figure and a figure of difference. As a result, the refugee as a transgressive
figure is determined by its opposition to that which produced it; if it is an event of
difference at all, it is only a difference from, the relative outside that without failure faces
the inside and never appears as such. A similar critique applies to the interpretation of the
refugee as homo sacer, which reduces the unpolitical and non-statist figure to the
originary exception that constitutes politics; as a result, the outside of politics is merely a
(cor)relative outside. The refugee, from this perspective, remains a negative figure of

128 In Michael Dillon's words, it is “a rupture” indicative of “the dramatic, and dramatically disruptive,
ontopolitical valence of the refugee” (1999, 118; my emphasis).
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politics, not more than its “correlative other,” even if this other happens to possess
agency.
Another aspect of refugeeness as an affirmation of the difference or 'relative outside' of
politics is based, as I noted above, on the recognition of the constitutive role of difference
for human ontology. This argument relies on the recognition of what Dillon (1999, 115)
calls the “onto-alienness of human being”: the constitutive role of estrangement,
irreducible otherness or difference, essential homelessness and the limits of selfknowledge. William Connolly's (1988) reading of Nietzsche on the limits of selfknowledge and homesickness in modernity serves as a point of departure for Daniel
Warner's radical affirmation that the very distinction between “the universal condition” or
the basic norm (the community of non-refugees) and “the plight of refugees” diminishes
as we see “the important ways in which we are all refugees” (1992, 367; my emphasis).
Connolly examines the modern condition of “homesickness” through Nietzsche's works
and suggests that since 'the death of God' (or since the Enlightenment, when man
institutes himself as both the guarantor and a 'recipient' of knowledge and rights,
including so-called inalienable rights (cf. Arendt 1951)) man has lost a possibility of
finding 'home' or 'roots' in this world. Worldly estrangement or “uprootedness,” to use
Simone Weil's term, characterize the modern human condition. Homesickness, which is
essentially an urge to find a home and be at home with oneself, cannot be fulfilled despite
the desperate desire to do so; however, it can transform into an 'illness' that expresses
itself in a wish to expunge all otherness and difference from what is viewed as home and
self. So, according to Connolly's exegesis of Nietzsche, the modern search for home and
community “may be a nostalgic search that has no solution,” the “drive for
integration/self-knowledge can never be fulfilled, either by remaining in or returning to a
specific place, or in some individual search for self-knowledge” (Warner 1992, 370). In
the works of Nietzsche we see the recognition of the 'shadow' side of the human identity:
it is split from within, separated and different from itself, always in excess of what is
available to consciousness, knowledge and understanding. “So we are necessarily
strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand

249
ourselves, for us the law, 'Each is furthest from himself' applies to all eternity – we are
not 'men of knowledge' with respect to ourselves'” (Nietzsche in Warner 1992, 370). In
more general terms, the inauguration of modernity is marked by the acknowledgement of
an unconscious principle that interrupts and often disrupts ordered, conscious reality. As a
result, since (self-)knowledge is viewed as necessarily limited, the unknown, the
unthought part of identity and self are presumed to remain alien, strange and even
uncanny (cf. Kristeva 1991). Consequently, since the stranger inhabits the self, since we
are all strangers to ourselves, the identity of the refugee, insofar as he is human, can no
longer be presumed to be different from the identity of those who did not experience
some sort of exile or displacement. Their legal definition and status can remain distinct
but their condition as humans is the same: to be human means to be impregnated with
disjuncture, strangeness and difference.
What this account brings to the fore is the fact that insofar as constitutive difference is
viewed as the limit of consciousness, knowledge and understanding, it is presumed to be
essentially unknowable, that is, not available to experience. As a result, human being is
defined in terms of this unbreachable inner gap and strangeness to itself. First of all, even
if we accept this argument, it remains unclear how recognition of the unconscious and
uncanny strangeness within may result in the outward hospitality. As Rudi Visker
suggests, uncanniness, as presented, for instance, in Kristeva's work, receives “a
homeopathic function: difference in us becomes a precondition for us living with
difference outside of us” (2005, 428). However, such an argument is very puzzling since
it remains unclear how “Freud's uncanniness” has undergone such a drastic
transformation and has “become surprisingly 'canny', 'comfortable', almost homey.” Such
transformation, Visker argues, cannot be the work of the individual's own doing but
requires an intervention of politics, an imposition of a matrix for regulating human
behaviour; as a result, the 'problem' of foreigner calls not for an ontological analysis but
for a change in “the way in which we have arranged our societies” (2005, 439).
Furthermore, I propose, based on the engagement with Michel Henry's work, that the
affirmation of innate strangeness and homelessness is but an affirmation of a gap or
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separation between life and the living. In other words, saying that 'we are all refugees' or
'strangers to ourselves' effectively amounts to the forgetting of the unpolitical as such,
i.e., of life. If the living find their foundation in life and are never separated from it, “how
can one claim,” Henry asks, “that 'each is furthest from himself?” (1993, 249). Pondering
upon this Nietzschean proclamation, he reaches a different conclusion than, for example,
William Connolly. What we see here is indeed Nietzsche's radical mistrust in the
possibility of self-knowledge, that is, a denial of possibility of access to life through
knowledge. However, this does not mean that the unthought – what remains beyond the
access of knowledge – is ultimately 'unknown'. Rather, as I discussed earlier, it is 'known'
differently: 'knowledge' of the excess of consciousness is immediate, it is a feeling of life.
So, the fact that we might not understand ourselves fully, or know ourselves, must not
necessarily lead to a conclusion that we are all refugees, alienated from ourselves and
strangers to ourselves or split from within, it merely points to the limits of thought,
knowledge and understanding. And that which is beyond thought is not necessarily alien
to what we are, to the living experience of life. The alien that inhabits the human, then, is
not altogether strange since it is available to experience through a mode of manifestation
other than that of the world. Each one may become a stranger to himself, “to take himself
for other than what he is” (1993, 249), as a result of the forgetting of life and consequent
attribution of primacy to the worldly manifestation, to being-in-the-world, that reduces
one's life to an object with properties and even some rights. Once human being is defined
through the strangeness and separation from himself, he ceases to be a living or, rather, he
no longer finds his 'origin' in life since this life, as strangeness that cannot be understood,
remains beyond his reach, beyond the experience of the living. As a result, a living must
look elsewhere (in various add-on qualities) for its essence and its worth or even
validation for being alive. The living, that believes itself to be separated from life, tries to
find its refuge in worldly belonging, for instance, to 'humanity' that is viewed as political
by nature and that is endowed with rights, which are guaranteed by the very same
humanity and its politics. Consequently, an expulsion from the polis “becomes identical
with expulsion from humanity altogether” (Arendt 1951, 296). This becomes possible
only when being alive no longer qualifies as enough for being considered human or rather

251
for being an equal member of community. Thus, Arendt proclaims, we are not born equal
but attain equality through politics (1951, 300). In this situation, that which remains
beyond politics has no other hope of becoming an equal member of a community than
through politicization.
“Life” of the refugee: an unpolitical perspective
I maintain that which is lacking here is a positive account of the unpolitical, of living
beyond politics, which may suggest a way out of the totalizing prescription of 'salvation'
through politics that, in its forgetting of life, takes charge of humanity's being-in-theworld. Let us read a passage from Arendt concerning the stateless:
The more highly developed a civilization, the more accomplished the world it
has produced, the more at home men feel within the human artifice – the
more they will resent everything they have not produced, everything that is
merely and mysteriously given them. The human being who has lost his place
in a community, his political status [...] is left with those qualities which
usually can become articulate only in the sphere of private life and must
remain unqualified, mere existence in all matters of public concern. This mere
existence, that is, all that which is mysteriously given us by birth and which
includes the shape of our bodies and the talents of our minds, can be
adequately dealt with only by the unpredictable hazards of friendship and
sympathy, or by the great and and incalculable grace of love, which says with
Augustine, “Volo ut sis (I want you to be),” without being able to give any
particular reason for such supreme and unsurpassable affirmation. (1951,
300–301; my emphasis)
What we see here is an outline of a distinction between political being and its
“remainder,” between “the human artifice” and that which is “merely and mysteriously
given.” This distinction, Arendt argues, becomes apparent in the refugee who, because he
has nothing else to fall back upon except for his “natural givenness,” exhibits naked
humanity. I suggest that what Arendt actually points at here is closer to 'bare' life or,
rather, the life as such. The refugees, the stateless, those people who lost their political
status, “to whom the rules of the world around them had ceased to apply,” who suffered
“the loss of the entire social texture” that provides material for establishing “a distinct
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place in the world” exhibit not bare humanity but life as such, what Arendt calls “the
mysteriously given,” “mere existence” or “the dark background of mere givenness.” Once
the world no longer 'claims' these peoples' existence, once they seem to belong to no
community whatsoever, the only 'thing' that remains is their life (even if for a very short
time). No wonder that this 'remainder' of the world can be adequately dealt with only
affectively, as Arendt notes, by friendship, sympathy and love, and in no way politically
(in Arendt's terms, it remains unqualified in all matters of public concern). In sum, the
figure of the refugee suggests to us how in the reduction of the world life manifests itself
in its acosmic affectivity. The emphasis thus falls not on the nomadic aspect of being-inthe-world, of which the refugee as a moving and displaced body is a paradigm, not on the
affirmation of the political as the condition of possibility of relationality in general, but
on the positive affirmation of life outside the world that the figure of the refugee opens up
in its loss of worldliness. In other words, the figure of the refugee appears in its
uniqueness in the reduction of the political world, which initially defines and constitutes
this figure. Not only the paradigm of a new historical consciousness, the refugee is a
historically situated epitome of life's acosmic becoming, i.e., of the ahistorical experience
of 'becoming-unpolitical'. Despite its historicity and its forced negativity, the figure of the
refugee gives us this positive insight into what constitutes the unpolitical form-of-life, of
living beyond politics.
It is not only the question of mobility (however important it is) that we need to address
and rethink as we approach the complexity of the condition of refugeeness; what we can
discern in the flight and plight of the refugees is an illumination of a different kind of
relationality that remains when political relations, connections and attachments dissipate.
Arendt argues that for the stateless the loss of political status, of a polity, becomes
“identical with expulsion from humanity” and from any possible community (1951, 296).
However, insofar as humanity is a political product, defined by the added qualities of
what it means to be human and not just merely living or existing, expulsion from
humanity is, in a way, an 'experiment' in the radical reduction of the world through which
life's own mode of manifestation is 'discovered'. Once the primacy of worldly,
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specifically political, relationality and belonging is challenged, as in the case of the
stateless and the refugees, another kind of relation comes forth – life's relation to the
living and relation between the living. Being expelled from humanity and any political
community does not result in the expulsion from life that holds every living in its
embrace. Living does not begin and does not cease with politics. The 'remainder' of
political being is a “subterranean affective layer” of the community of life, of pathoswith, which is not able, as Arendt rightly points out, to give any particular reason for its
“supreme and unsurpassable affirmation” of itself. This inability is not due to the
essential impotence of life; rather, it is an inability defined as such from the perspective
of reason and argumentation, from the perspective of that which gives understanding in
thought. The experience of life is not mediated by worldly knowledge but is immediate
self-affection of the living; as a result, life affirms itself and its affective relationality
without being able to give a reason for this self-affirmation in terms of the world and
politics.
Arendt seems to conclude that, stripped from all her qualities (e.g., citizenship,
profession, opinion, identity, etc) and “deprived of expression within and action upon a
common world,” “a human being in general,” who is now marked only by her “unique
individuality” or the mysteriously given, “loses all significance” (1951, 302). This loss is
obviously relative to the primacy of political organization of living: since validation of
the quality of existence is determined in terms of the belonging to a common world,
however defined, whatever defies the logic of validation (i.e., the presentation of specific
reasons) is rendered, in the best case, irrelevant. Thus life, which does not present any
reasons for its self-affirmation, becomes irrelevant: the figure of the refugee makes
apparent the modern forgetting of life.129 That is why, I believe, Arendt calls affective
relations (friendship, sympathy and love), which can adequately address the refugee as a
living being, “unpredictable hazards”: they defy the logic of validation, do not obey
reasons and arguments, and endanger the stability and primacy of political existence.
129 We can argue that when Arendt writes that “we actually live in a world in which human beings as such
have ceased to exist for quite a while” (1996, 118), she actually comments on the modern forgetting of
life, since, as I argued above, human beings as such are nothing other than the living.
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From the perspective of the world, affirmation of life as such is a hazard because it
requires a shift of perspective from the primacy of the political, the world and the human,
to the unpolitical unity of life and the living that, ultimately, seems to challenge the value
of political action and community.
This results in the “suspicion” of the unpolitical, “a deep resentment against the
disturbing miracle” of life (cf. Arendt 1951).130 As Michel Henry suggests, since the
Greeks the human has been defined as more than just the living: the living aspect of the
human is relocated onto something identified as 'mere existence' that is not rendered
enough for being qualified as fully human. What is 'mysteriously given' and of which
politics cannot get a hold is partially 'tamed' by being included through exclusion, by
being assigned a place in the polis, even if a negative one. In Arendt's words, “[t]he dark
background of mere givenness, the background formed by our unchangeable and unique
nature, breaks into the political scene as the alien” (1951, 300; my emphasis). However,
life is “the alien” of politics only from the perspective of politics; insofar as life is
affirmed as an a priori of the world and as capable of self-manifestation, it is no longer
the alien and no longer the dark background that can be subsequently charged with
various atrocities.131 Suspicion of the unpolitical and its effective elimination through the
installation of the primacy of the political is at the core of modernity. The totalizing
tendency of the political rests on the forgetting of its radical 'outside' – life-as-such – that
ultimately amounts to the “murder” of life. The empirical and theoretical treatment of the
figure of the refugee illuminates the tendency toward constant re-politicization of the
excess of politics, but at the same time presents an opportunity for an affirmation of lifeas-such. The refugee is not primarily a figure of the political displacement of politics, of
the mobile principle inherent to politics, or of difference and onto-alienness constitutive
of the human condition. The refugee, I argue, is primarily an exhibition of the living
aspect of the human, of the primacy of life's self-affection and self-affirmation that does
130 “Since the Greeks, we have known that highly developed political life breads a deep-rooted suspicion
of this private sphere, a deep resentment against the disturbing miracle contained in the fact that each
of us is made as he is – single, unique, unchangeable” (Arendt 1951, 300).
131 As, for example, Arendt suggests that the “alien” is a frightening symbol which “indicates those
realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and in which, therefore, he has a distinct tendency
to destroy” (1951, 300; my emphasis).
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not disappear together with political relationality, community, or being-in-the-world. The
civilization that succeeds in the elimination of unpolitical life or in its subjection to
politics may end, as Arendt rightly suggests, “in complete petrifaction and be punished,
so to speak, for having forgotten that man is only the master, not the creator of the world”
(1951, 302). This “punishment” might appear in the form of the humanity's self-produced
slaughter of the living (including ecological destruction), the murder of that which cannot
present a reason for its being except for holding onto the mysteriously given, which
cannot explain and speak its truth except for simply living it “as such, in mystery” (Henry
1973, 18).
We need not fail to recognize that the figure of the refugee calls for the affirmation of life
as such and not for a (re-)politicization of the 'beyond' of politics-as-state that this figure
so clearly demonstrates. The unpolitical, life-as-such, loses significance insofar as we
recognize politics, a common world, as the only source of such significance. Once the
priority of politics is taken for granted, this leads to a conclusion (like Arendt's) that the
mystery of life is not 'functional' in itself, that 'mere existence' (being no more than a
living) is insufficient. But is not the assumption of such an insufficiency itself a product
of politics and its totalizing tendency? Just as the camp, or a pitiful, impoverished
condition of the contemporary refugee (labelled as the condition of bare life, of life as
such) is viewed as undesirable; but is it not in its essence just a political product, an
outcome of the modern project of statecraft? If it were possible to live unpolitically
without being confined to a camp or to poverty, if politics did not appear as the only
means of 'salvation' and happiness, how many, I wonder, would chose differently?
Consequently, I contend that even in the face of the empirical pressures and demands of
state politics as well as the stateless, we need not further proclaim the necessity of repoliticization of the 'mere existence', excepted 'bare' life, but, perhaps, we need to push
forward, to take the thought of unpolitical life to the limit, so as to proclaim and affirm
something like “the real state of exception.”
Affirmation through the figure of the refugee of the unpolitical, of life-as-such is an
affirmation of the universal (but not cosmopolitan) community of life, in which (and not
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in humanity and the political) the living 'grounds' itself. The refugee 'beyond' the refugee
points to a positive experience of living in the absence of the world, in the removal of the
world. An account of the unpolitical forms of life from this perspective rests not on a
reaction to or correlation with politics, state and sedentarism, but on an affirmation of the
forms of living that originate in the unpolitical as such, in life. An unpolitical project,
thus, establishes universality not on the basis of onto-political difference but on the basis
of life. While a correlationist project of political difference lies in, to use Dillon's words,
giving an “extremely positive validation” of worldliness as “a certain modality of
alienation” and estrangement “inscribed at the heart of one's existence” (1999, 115), an
unpolitical project consists in exploration of the a priori and the 'remainder' of the world
(of what 'remains' when the rules of the world no longer apply), and in their positive
'validation'. The refugee, in the first case, is a figure of universal strangeness, while from
the unpolitical perspective the refugee is a figure of living beyond politics that can be
'known' only affectively, in, for instance, relations of friendship and love that are not
subjected to politics but remain unpolitical. 132 In sum, the figure of the refugee, in the
reduction of its political world, affirms life not as a human right, nor as a quality that
manifests itself in the world, but as an immediate experience of self-affection (that is full
of itself and rejoices in itself) available to all the living regardless of their relation to the
world. This affirmation, in a way, allows something like “bare life” to persist as such
positively and unpolitically, without the necessity of politicization.

132 We can notice a growing attention in current scholarship to the question of affective relations, of
friendship and love in particular, for instance, as a site of resistance and a way of “leaving politics.”
On the one hand, for example, we can recall Michel Henry's (2003) affirmation of life in terms of love.
Furthermore, Laurent Dubreuil argues, in his critique of Agamben and Esposito, that friendship (suzen
and sumbioun), already in Aristotle, is distinct from politics, it remains in excess of political being,
which forms a ground for an affirmation of “life outside of politics – even today” (2006, 97). Todd
May (2012) takes up friendship as a strategy of “resisting the forces of neoliberalism.” On the other
hand, Jacques Derrida (1997) takes up the question of friendship but in its relation to politics, as a
ground for different politics. Similarly, friendship famously figures in Schmitt's work as one of the
defining categories of the concept of the political. However, it is interesting that even though Schmitt
categorically subjects friendship to the political, it seems to evade the latter. In his discussion of the
concept of the political Schmitt pays almost no attention to the role of friendship in politics. It appears
that in the end it is enmity that defines the political (cf. Van Der Zweerde 2007), while friendship
belongs to altogether different, unpolitical reality of life and the living.
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The immanent movement of life: mobile “culture”
Another important shift that the notion of the unpolitical might be able to bring to
contemporary refugee scholarship is a possibility of an affirmation of pure, phoronomic
movement not as a 'resistance' to stasis or as a right, but as a projection of life's abundant
and incessant movement of self-revelation, becoming and transformation. Here I will
present merely a sketch of how it might be possible to conceive of pure, phoronomic
movement grounded in the phenomenology of life, which could account for the
movement of “displaced lives” in a new way. A much deeper examination of the
implications of the notion of the unpolitical for the study of movement would require
further research and analysis.
In existing scholarship pure movement is primarily presented as a reaction to, as a way of
resisting stable order. As Tim Cresswell puts it, “[w]ithin nomadic metaphysics, mobility
is linked to a world of practice, of anti-essentialism, anti-foundationalism, and resistance
to established forms of ordering and discipline. Often mobility is said to be
nonrepresentational or even against representation. Linking all of these, perhaps, is the
idea that by focusing on mobility, flux, flow, and dynamism we can emphasize the
importance of becoming at the expense of the already achieved – the stable and static”
(2006, 47). However, the understanding of movement that I want to present here is not
altogether absent in critical refugee studies. In particular, there are some similarities
between my assertion of the primacy of pure movement and Peter Nyers' argument, based
on a reading of Deleuze and Guattari. He suggests that “to fully appreciate the politics of
refugees, we must consider movement to be an ontological activity. It is through
movement that bodies encounter and confront one another; thereby developing
relationships that constitute the myriad ways of being and living in the world” (x; my
emphasis). Movement is at the basis of identity and relationality: the bodily encounter
constitutes the 'raw' material for being in the world; as a result, it is an absence of
movement, stasis that might be said to be 'pathological'. The refugee body, then, is a
moving body that is involved in the building of its world as it moves along. It is a
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“volatile body,”133 body that actively reconfigures, re-inscribes, and resists as it moves
through, across, and between political spaces (x), reshaping them and their identity. The
state (a way of ordering movement) is but a secondary phenomenon in this regard.
However, even the state itself does not avoid the effects of mobility: “it is not only the
refugee's body that is moving but also the sovereign state – the body politic – that is in
constant motion” (x).134 The strict opposition between the static and moving bodies (such
as between citizens and refugees, states and nomads) no longer applies; everything is in
some sort of motion, even if it appears static. As Gilles Deleuze points out, “[t]here is
nothing more unsettling than the continual movement of something that seems fixed.”
What differs in my proposition from Nyers' is that I would like to assert movement not as
an ontological but rather a pre-ontological activity of life. The 'relationship' that is
established on the basis of this movement is not a mere bodily interaction, but it also
constitutes the essence of the community of life. As a result, the moving bodies of the
refugees are observed not only as constituting different ways of being and living in the
world through this movement. Their movement is prior to the worldly relationality: their
bodily relocation or displacement in space is but a projection of life's movement of selfrevelation and self-transformation. Such movement is necessarily phoronomic insofar as
life's movement in never dynamic, it does not oppose, rebel against or resist anything, it
does not relate to anything except itself, and so it endlessly unfolds in its immanent
movement of self-affection and becoming, without any transcendent motivation or goal.
Consequently, movement cannot be reduced to a human right, which can be granted,
protected or withheld. Reduced to a definition in terms of right, such movement,
ultimately, relies on the forgetting of life and the unpolitical. As Henry points out, due to
the duplicity of appearance, “every determination of the radically immanent force that
constitutes our own being also presents itself to us, simultaneous with its
accomplishment, which is our inner being, as the appearance of an objective
displacement in space” (1993, 139). Once life-as-such is out of the picture, what remains
133 Nyers borrows the notion of “volatile bodies” from Elizabeth Grosz (1994).
134 Benjamin Arditi (2003) similarly affirms the presence of mobility, i.e., “a continual process of political
territorialization and re-territorialization,” in politics-as-state as opposed to the view that only the
political is expressive of such dynamism.
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is mere objective displacement, even if it is extended to everyone or everything. From
this perspective, we cannot affirm movement as an ontological activity, in terms of the
worldly relationships established through the interaction of the moving bodies, without at
the same time missing life. This would be an affirmation only of 'intentional' movement
that is directed and guided by the goal of establishing a political relation. Contrary to this
view, I suggest that life's movement is phoronomic, that is, non-relational and nonteleological movement of its self-revelation. Before movement appears in the world as
displacement, it is manifest as an affect of a living self: the real movement of the living
never ceases and can be 'known' only affectively. Furthermore, the pure movement of life
is essentially the movement of its self-transformation, which lies at the core of Henry's
concept of “culture.” Living culture, then, is essentially mobile; and is opposed to
“barbarism” that emerges due to the forgetting of life. In this regard, the international
refugee regime will remain essentially “barbaric” as long as it does not account for and
respect the 'origin' of the various kinds of 'displacement' – the unpolitical, pure movement
of life. This concept of 'mobile culture' remains to be further unpacked, which would be a
task for another study, perhaps, a task for a renewed political thought that takes
unpolitical life as its starting point.
What remains to be done, and it cannot be done easily, is a complete reversal of
perspective through which we view the figure of the refugee and the movement that it
'represents'. This is a task for a long-standing engagement and cannot be accomplished
within the limitations of one project. It also requires a degree of perseverance and
courage, since it endeavours to stand up to the dominance of the political in a different,
unpolitical way. In this way, in speaking 'truth', however, one risks much, as Foucault
suggested that truth always requires courage, since it puts one's 'life' at risk (2011, 11-12).
There are real, historical, instances of something like unpolitical uprising. For example,
we can see the traces of unpolitical engagement and reversal of perspective apart from
politics in the movement of the non-violent disobedience inspired by Mahatma Gandhi,
or in a variety of artistic engagements that aim at “seeing the invisible” 135 and so irritate
135 See, Henry's Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky (2009).
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the political nerve of many. These movements, however, often fail to 'survive' in the face
of political interventions; their attention to the invisible living force often has tragic
consequences. But why? Perhaps, Hannah Arendt was right to suggest that the
civilization that represses the unpolitical (or that which is merely given, as she prefers to
call it), ends up “in complete petrifaction” and in the slaughter of the living. Is this where
we find ourselves and our Western culture today? Or is it, as Henry wants to suggest, no
longer “culture” but “barbarism”? Or, perhaps, is it indicative of the presence of the selfdestructive elements of life (that Henry's thought might fail to accommodate) which do
not define it but, nevertheless, remain inherent to it? I prefer to end with a number of
questions rather than definite answer in order to emphasize the nature of the unpolitical,
as I see it: an opening toward a possibility of thinking and living differently beyond all
forms of politics.
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Conclusion
The aim of this dissertation has been to examine contemporary political thought
regrading its engagement with the possibility of a radical outside of politics and, based on
this critical investigation, to present a conception of the unpolitical that would account for
this outside in positive terms. Chapter 1 provided an overview of contemporary political
theory that, in its attempt to transcend the limitations of politics-as-state, oscillates around
the split notion of politics and the political. Through a critical analysis of works of
Schmitt, Foucault, Rancière, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, I have shown that they not
only exhibit and preserve the totalizing ambition of the political and thus are unable to
account for the unpolitical, but also are unable to complete the political task they set out
to undertake: to take the thought of politics beyond the state. However recognized, the
excess, the outside of politics-as-state remains correlated to what it aims to displace. I
have shown, in this regard, how the political in Schmitt remains attached to politics; how
resistance, i.e., real politics, in Foucault remains determined by its opposition to the
stabilized structures of power, i.e., petrified politics; how politics in Rancière ultimately
originates as an interruption of the order of police; and how the primordial political of
being-with in Nancy is opposed to but never really abandons the space of the polis. In
sum, in its attempt to rethink politics, contemporary, post-foundational political thought is
characterized by correlation, resulting in the preservation of the totalizing ambition of the
political and in turning its back on the unpolitical. However, I have also come to conclude
that despite this, political thought does not rid itself of the unpolitical altogether: it is
preserved negatively, as a side-note to the concerns of rethinking or revitalizing politics
and political community. To be more precise, it is primarily either viewed in terms of the
exception to the political field or in terms of an imminent threat of modern (liberal)
depoliticization or neutralization that has to be ultimately avoided. It is Foucault who
gives us an indication that life always escapes the grip of power, opening up our thinking
to the question of what that life might be and how it manifests itself in relation to the
political field.
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Taking these conclusions into consideration, Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the two
prominent ways in which the unpolitical is directly addressed within contemporary
theory: Cacciari's and Esposito's notion of the impolitical, and Agamben's concept of bare
life. What distinguishes Cacciari's and Esposito's accounts of the impolitical is, primarily,
their apparent positivity: the impolitical displaces the political through a critique of its
totalizing tendency and valorization in modernity. It reminds the political of its finitude
and limitations in the attempt to “found” politics without foundation. Consequently, the
impolitical does not reject or withdraw from the political but deconstructs and, thus,
radicalizes it. It is, then, not to be viewed negatively, as something to be feared or
avoided, but rather fostered, as a gaze (a vision of theoria), that points the political
toward its “essence” that consists in its irremediable inessentiality. Nevertheless, it was
my contention that neither Cacciari nor Esposito succeed in taking the impolitical to its
limit, that is, radically outside the political. It remains attached to the latter as its shadow
as well as its heart, a void that prevents the completion of the political but is never itself
radically different from it. The impolitical remains primarily a function of the critique and
transformation of the political.
While Cacciari and Esposito delimit the impolitical as a gaze and, thus ultimately, as
merely an operation of thought, Giorgio Agamben introduces an interesting and important
twist into this notion. He defines the impolitical in terms of “bare life”: originary
excepted life that unchangeably, throughout the history of Western (bio)politics, finds
itself placed outside and, simultaneously, inside political space. What is important in
Agamben's account is that he introduces into the notion of the impolitical the real
experience of living outside of politics, even though this outside still remains only
relative. Contrary to Cacciari and Esposito, Agamben views the impolitical only
negatively, nevertheless, his project is especially helpful in suggesting an avenue for
unpolitical thought based on the notion of “form-of-life.” In it we can trace some of
Agamben's intimations of the unpolitical: “form-of-life” or “happy life,” addressing the
negativity of “bare life,” is life that is not separate from its form. Thus, it is necessarily
always a political life. As a result, in his messianic project of the “redemption” of
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Western politics, Agamben addresses the problem of the impolitical, i.e., bare life, solely
by “redeeming” its politicalness. What remains to be further explored, then, is the
possibility of something like an unpolitical form-of-life, where “bare life” is allowed to
persist positively outside the space of “coming politics.”
Chapter 3 of this dissertation has assumed the task of thinking life unpolitically in order
to arrive at a conception of the radical outside of politics. The earlier analysis of the
notion of the impolitical, as a vision and as bare life, brings to the fore and articulates the
relationship between politics, thought and life. In this respect, the notion of the
unpolitical form-of-life addresses the relationship between life and politics, as well as life
and thought. Drawing on the radical philosophy of life of contemporary French thinker
Michel Henry, I conceived the unpolitical as the unthought or the unconscious as such of
the political. What is more, the unpolitical is life-as-such: positive, real, non-relational
experience of self-affection that manifests itself in the radical reduction of the world. I
have argued that this view of the unpolitical, i.e., as acosmic life, addresses the problem
of the political correlation and its totalizing ambition insofar as it affirms life as an a
priori of the world and, thus, of politics. Furthermore, this “life” is essentially “form-oflife”: life is radically immanent to itself and so it does not carry a separation between
itself and what it generates, its “form” – the living. However, inasmuch as the unity of
life and the living appears in the absence of the world, this form-of-life remains radically
unpolitical. As such, it offers a further possibility for redefining notions of the “human
being” and “community” unpolitically in terms of, respectively, “the living” and a priori
“community of life,” of an immediate bond of pathos of every living with every living.
The forgetting of life-as-such leads to the forgetting of the unpolitical, as a result,
“remembering” life leads to the positive acknowledgement of the unpolitical as an a
priori of politics and presents a way of addressing the totalizing ambition of politics in
modernity. In addition, the notion of the unpolitical form-of-life has important
“ecological” implications: insofar as life is not limited to humanity in its manifestation,
the community, the sharing of life is not limited to human community but embraces
everything that “suffers.” Life is more than the living, thus, life is equally more than

264
human understood as living, as a result, I followed Henry in asserting the a priori of life:
it is from life, not from the human, that we must begin.
The question of where to begin becomes very important once we consider the 'practical'
issues of living outside of the political system of states today. In the absence of a political
community, it becomes of the utmost importance to assert that life is not a right, nor a
quality that manifests itself in the world, but is an invisible experience of self-affection
that is full of itself and rejoices in itself even in the most unhappy 'forms' of life. To do so
means to redeem “bare life” in a positive, unpolitical way, that allows it to persist as such,
without an immediate incitement to politicization, to salvation through politics (that
produced its apparent misery in the first place). In order to explore the possibilities
presented by the notion of the unpolitical form-of-life, I turned to an examination of the
modern condition of refugeeness. I suggested that the figure of the refugee appears in its
uniqueness in the reduction of the political world, which initially defines and constitutes
this figure. Not only the paradigm of a new historical consciousness, the refugee is a
historically situated epitome of life's acosmic becoming, i.e., of the ahistorical (however,
in this case, forced) experience of 'becoming-unpolitical'. Despite its historicity and its
forced negativity, the figure of the refugee gives us a positive insight into what constitutes
the unpolitical form-of-life, of living beyond politics. Furthermore, in return, the notion
of the unpolitical, I argued, offers an important reversal in the way in which this figure is
understood in contemporary scholarship. Most importantly, it allows for, first, an
affirmation of life not as a human right but as an immediate experience available to all the
living regardless of their relation to the world, and, second, an affirmation of pure
movement not as a 'resistance' to stasis or, again, as a right, but as a projection of life's
abundant and incessant movement of self-revelation, becoming and transformation.
I believe that the major significance of my research lies, first, in pointing out and
analyzing the totalizing and correlationist aspects of contemporary thought that attempts
to rethink politics in terms of the political; and second, in bringing together various
accounts of something like the unpolitical in contemporary thought, ranging from postfoundational accounts of the political difference to the engagements in Italian thought
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with the notions of the impolitical and bare life. As I have showed, these engagements
with the unpolitical remain insufficient insofar as they do not extend the reality of the
unpolitical beyond the consideration of politics and the political. Furthermore, by raising
the question of the unpolitical in terms of the radical outside of politics, my project,
similarly to Cacciari and Esposito, represents a call for at least a partial reversal of the
perspective: away from the primacy of the political and toward its outside. My work
ultimately encourages a return to the original points of contention within political thought
by raising the questions of what it means to live, to live politically and beyond politics.
My proposed way of addressing these questions is located at a unique intersection of
post-foundational theory, which seems to have abandoned the questions of an a priori and
origins, and the phenomenology of life, which brings these questions back into debate; of
correlationist political thought that tends to address the question of the real only in
relation to thinking subject and a novel phenomenological approach that is able to locate
the reality of life beyond the reach of thought and its vision. I believe that the result of
this intersection or synthesis of different, often opposing schools of thought, is productive
in addressing the question of the unpolitical: it presents a way of extending our view of
life, reality and the world beyond a one-dimensional plane. It allows us to speak of both
the inner, unpolitical, and the outer, political, dimensions of living without the necessity
of excluding one or the other, of reducing one in favour of the other. In a way, I return to
an earlier theoretical distinction between politics and the non-political, however, in this
case both politics and the unpolitical lose their restrictive delimitation in terms of spheres
and, instead, remain fluid in their determinations and operation without losing their
mutual independence. Thus, I might say that the relationship between these 'politics' and
their 'outside' is no longer that of either clear separation or differentiation (difference
itself seems to have reached a point of exhaustion) but, rather, of 'indifference'. It is this
relationship of 'indifference' between politics and life, between life and the world, that
requires further consideration. It may constitute a ground of future unpolitical thinking as
well as a road to a renewal of political thought.
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However productive, my study has its limitations. First of all, because of its deliberate
focus on Henry's radical phenomenology of life, it excludes from the field of its vision
other possibilities for approaching the unpolitical. For example, further and deeper
examination of the practices of care of the self, of materialist thought inspired by
speculative realism, and of the possibilities presented by the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze
and Félix Guattari, among many others. My approach might be also criticized for its
overly idealistic or utopian attitude, that is, one might argue that by merely affirming life
theoretically as an a priori of politics, I do not effectively challenge the dominance of the
political and, moreover, of the persistence and importance of practical politics, i.e.,
national and international policies that continue to govern the lives of human populations
and their environments. For instance, it might be suggested that my rendering of refugees
through an unpolitical perspective does not really change and improve the lives of the
real people, it does not address their suffering in any substantial way. Or, alternatively,
that my affirmation of life, no longer conceived as a human right but as a universal
immediate experience available to all the living, cannot alter the fact that the task of the
protection of lives, however conceived, rests with those human groups that carry arms
and possess technological capabilities. In other words, even if humanity is not the giver
or creator of life and the living, it remains somehow entrusted with the decision to either
protect or abandon the living to their 'fate'. Furthermore, on a more theoretical level but in
the same vein, do I not walk a very fine line by affirming life as universal experience
without paying attention to its multiple, always singular manifestations, marked by
concrete and unique experiences? Moreover, do I not walk a very fine line by affirming
life as essentially suffering? Is it not dangerous to proclaim with Henry that happiness
essentially lies in suffering when very similar proclamations were made by those who
aimed at nothing other than the slaughter of millions of living beings?
These are important questions and they certainly have to be kept in mind. They are
questions that open up a field of further scholarship regarding unpolitical life. However, I
believe that to continue to think the unpolitical and to think unpolitically requires
courage. To walk at the limit of politics and to challenge its primacy unpolitically, in a
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way unknown by politics, such as, in a way of friendship and love, is to become
vulnerable, to expose oneself to severe critique from those who believe that politics is the
means to 'salvation' and 'happiness' in this world. As Foucault reminds us, by speaking
truth or living a true life one always seems to risk one's life. Does this ultimately imply
that the limit of politics and the limit of life tend to coincide? I continue to hope not. It is
a task for a further study, then, to elaborate the possibility of living and thinking beyond
politics in a way that might be positively present in the world for longer than a fleeting
moment of 'goodbye'.
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